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ABSTRACT 
The topic of God’s beauty, while receiving attention in theological aesthetics, is not 
often a focused pursuit in Christian spirituality. The study attempts to answer the question 
of what the nature would be of an Evangelical Protestant Christian spirituality predicated 
upon seeking and apprehending God’s beauty. 
 The study establishes the relevance of beauty to Christian spirituality. It then 
develops a definition of God’s beauty from Jonathan Edwards. God’s beauty is found to be 
his love for his own being. 
 Examining Scripture and Christian history, the study establishes that God’s beauty 
was regarded as an objective reality until the Enlightenment. The focus of the research 
then turns to the subjective apprehension of beauty, and examines the methodology of 
pursuing beauty in art, and finds parallels in spirituality. The study considers the 
epistemological dichotomy of subject and object with reference to beauty, and considers 
Christian proposals for a form of correspondence theory for transcendentals.  
 The findings are united in a model of spirituality. Apprehension of God’s beauty 
occurs through the subject possessing a correspondent form of God’s love. Findings from 
the aesthetic and epistemological study are united with theology to suggest that this love 
can be cultivated through four areas: Christian imagination, an implanted new nature, the 
exposure to communion with God, and the nurture of spiritual disciplines. Each of these 
areas is explained and justified as means to cultivate correspondent love. The postures and 
approaches found in the study of art and epistemology are used for explaining the nature of 
correspondent love. Evangelical Protestant Christian spirituality predicated upon seeking 
and finding God’s beauty is one which cultivates love for God that corresponds with God’s 
own love.   
Key terms: beauty, Christian spirituality, theological aesthetics, subjective-objective dichotomy, ordinate 
affection, correspondence theory.  
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Chapter 1. General Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction  
1.1.1.  The Return of Beauty 
 Beauty is experiencing a renaissance in academia in general, and in Christian 
academia in particular. Beauty has spent a long season in the wilderness, perhaps partly 
brought about by philosophers such as Kant and Nietzsche (Asproulis, 2012:154), partly 
due to the effete aestheticism begun in the eighteenth century, or perhaps due to the overall 
abandonment of God in the Western tradition and the disparagement of the arts derived 
from that tradition (Moore, 2004:157). 
 In the past few decades, beauty has made a surprising comeback. Mostly banished 
from discourse in the twentieth century, it is now returning in Christian and non-Christian 
circles (de Gruchy, 2001:1). The terminology of beauty is now, curiously, heard often in 
scientific literature, speaking of the beauty of a mathematical solution, the beauty and 
elegance of “nature’s ways”, or the beauty of the cosmos and its laws (Stackhouse, 2002). 
Hudson (2003:117) notes that beauty is now employed in philosophy, art production, 
ethics, and science, with an avalanche of books taking beauty as their theme. Indeed, as 
Nehamas (2000:393) speculates, these may not all be a single phenomenon, but different 
or even opposing objectives may be uniting under the banner of beauty. 
Partly through the attention drawn to it by the Catholic theologian Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, beauty began to re-emerge in the twentieth-century Christian consciousness 
(Howard, 2011:4). Thiessen (2005:§104) writes that it is only in the last twenty years that 
the field of theological aesthetics has merited its own reader, referring to her own work, 
Theological Aesthetics: A Reader. 
 Beauty has now become the specific study of Christian academics labouring in the 
diverse fields of liturgics, trinitarianism, ethics, Christianity and the arts, and theological 
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aesthetics (Edgar, 2001:109). 
 This interest in beauty extends to broader, non-Christian postmodern society, 
though perhaps more sensually than consciously. Thiessen (2005:§107) points out the 
aestheticisation of everyday life in postmodern society: through the powerful effect of 
images in mass media, the ubiquity of popular music, the worship of the body and of 
youth, the pursuit of instant gratification, and the longing for “religious or quasi-religious 
experiences”. These are all forms of sensuous experience and phenomena, which is to say, 
they are aesthetic experiences and aesthetic phenomena.   
 Paradoxically, the increase in attention to the idea of beauty coincides with the 
sentiment that beauty is fast disappearing (if not absent) from contemporary art. Scruton 
(2009:176) speaks of the modern flight from beauty in art, with an attendant “cult of 
ugliness”, determined to desecrate and profane. Others regard the concept of beauty as 
“vague, illusive, and ultimately useless” (Lorand, 1994:399). Some Christians continue to 
balk at the idea of beauty. The continuing rejection of beauty in some circles requires some 
explanation. 
1.1.2. The Resistance to Beauty 
  The first reason for resistance to the notion of beauty is a concern with justice. 
Some regard beauty as hostile to justice. In a world where beautiful images detached from 
moral value abound, a real risk exists of loving the idea of beauty as a kind of fetish, 
detached from the perplexity and pain of life (Burton-Christie, 2002:7). When beauty is 
defined too narrowly, or perhaps too vaguely, it becomes identified with pleasure, with no 
place for pain, discord, tragedy, and suffering (O’Hear, 2001:177). The reaction to this 
prettifying of genuine suffering has been the overreaction of rejecting the very idea of 
beauty.  
 Similarly, the schools of post-structuralism, deconstruction, semiotics, and cultural 
studies declared statements about beauty as insensitive to cultural concerns (Edgar, 
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2001:107). Scarry (1999) has written to answer the objection that beauty makes one 
inattentive to other objects by fixating one on only one object, which is not good for the 
object. These objections amount to the assertion that beauty is an unhelpful concept, 
oblivious to suffering, or ethical obligations (Begbie, 2007:§567). 
 A second objection to beauty is as a reaction to what Roger Scruton calls the 
“kitschification” of religion or art. This refers to the preference for sentimentalism over 
genuine feeling, for the sensuous trappings rather than genuine art, for narcissistic 
fantasies over the mirror of reality. Here a false beauty obscures the true, and those 
objecting to kitsch and sentimentalism dispense with beauty altogether. Scruton 
(2009:192), defending the idea of beauty, suggests that reactions to the “Disneyfication” of 
art and religion have produced an opposite postmodern desecration, a deliberate pursuit of 
what is disturbing, grotesque, or obscene. In the attempt to counter what are imagined to 
be the sweet lies of beauty, these artists and critics prefer to highlight the ugly.  
 The third form of resistance to beauty is unique to Christians, particularly of the 
Evangelical kind. These have typically claimed that pragmatic concerns such as 
evangelism must trump any concern with beauty (Edgar, 2001:108). Groothuis (2000:261) 
claims that some Evangelicals have been complicit in the decline of beauty since the 
Enlightenment, viewing art according to simple moral concerns or pragmatic value. Their 
view of beauty has been judged through sentimental lenses (“God looks at the heart, not at 
the art”) or as unrelated to objective aesthetic standards, repeating the old Roman maxim, 
“[T]here is no accounting for taste”.  
 Some resistance to beauty’s renaissance have to do not with the idea of beauty, but 
with a vague “aestheticisation” of other disciplines, including hermeneutics. Vanhoozer 
(1987:55) raises the alarm against aesthetic hermeneutics which treat the author of a text as 
dead and irrelevant to the interpretive process, and the remaining text as an autonomous 
object upon which interpreters may project their meanings.  
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 Such resistance to beauty stands in curious antithesis to its revival in other spheres. 
Beauty’s presence, however, forces Christians to grapple with its relationship to their faith.  
1.1.3. The Relevance of Beauty to Christian Spirituality 
 In light of these objections to beauty, should Christians share in the broader 
enthusiasm for the revived interest in beauty, or should they align with the postmodern 
resistance to its very idea? Four reasons exist for Christians to pursue the idea of beauty 
within Christian spirituality. These reasons reflect four ways that beauty relates to 
Christianity, and give both an external and an internal witness to Christianity.  
Externally, beauty provides an apologetic for the Christian faith. When Christian 
spirituality is saturated with beauty, it will witness to the reality it purports to experience. 
Internally, beauty is fundamental to the lived experience of people knowing God. Beauty 
is relevant simultaneously to the contemporary non-Christian world needing a Christian 
witness, and to the Christian world of spirituality, needing an authentic and robust lived-
experience of God. Christians desiring both a subjectively satisfying and objectively 
grounded spirituality should weigh these four statements of Christianity’s relationship to 
beauty carefully. These relate to respectively to the four philosophical categories of 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. 
1)  Beauty and a Christian Metaphysic 
 First, beauty supports a Christian metaphysic. Beauty is a transcendental, calling 
for its seekers to find the invisible amidst the visible. Artists have long been linked to seers 
and prophets, for their works provide moments of transport: of entering another cosmos 
before returning to one’s own. Pope John Paul II wrote of art’s affinity to the world of 
faith, so that even where secularism has alienated most of its citizens from religion, beauty 
in art remains a kind of “bridge to religious experience”. It need not explore only what is 
pretty; art can consider the tragedy of evil, appealing to mystery and the universal desire 
for redemption (John Paul II, 1999:9). This answers the objection that beauty trades in 
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comforting falsehoods. Christian beauty is concerned with reality. It happens to believe 
that ultimate reality is grounded in God, the source of beauty. 
 What Rudolf Otto called “the numinous” is the experience of beauty that pushes its 
observers beyond sheer materialism or naturalism, and towards supernaturalism, 
transcendentalism, even Christian forms of Platonism. C.S. Lewis’s oft-quoted words on 
desire sum up the metaphysic that beauty suggests: “If I find in myself a desire which no 
experience in this world can satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for 
another world” (Lewis, 2002:136–137). Even non-Christians recognise the experience of 
beauty transcends mere materialism. O’Hear (2001:191) disavows that beauty teaches any 
explicit religion, but nevertheless claims that beauty suggests that 
there is a power in the universe which works towards the good and helps achieve it, 
and that in our conscious experience we can somehow link in to that power. My 
point is that positive aesthetic experience—the experience above all of beauty—
will for many people be a pointer to the existence of such a reality. 
The expectation for how convincingly beauty can persuade one of the existence of the 
transcendent realm must be chastened. God’s existence cannot be proved through beauty. 
God cannot be contained to our immanent experiences of beauty (Edgar, 2001:114). But 
put simply, beauty witnesses to the supernaturalism and transcendentalism that 
Christianity’s worldview depends upon, and which Christian spirituality assumes as its 
first principle. Beauty identifies spiritual ideas such as unity and harmony in the created 
order. The reduction of beauty to mere appearance removes grace from nature, leaving a 
soulless materialism, with only Nietzsche’s will to power remaining. Any recovery of 
beauty in an era of death and ugliness must surely be spearheaded by those people who 
claim to know the God who is the origin of beauty (Moore, 2004:169). In short, beauty 
points to existence and reality beyond physical materialism. 
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2) Beauty and Christian Epistemology 
Besides supporting a Christian metaphysic, beauty encourages a Christian 
epistemology. As the Enlightenment pursued its dream of epistemological certainty 
through the subject’s “neutrality”, thinkers began disparaging the certainty of those 
elements of knowledge and human experience that could not be verified through empirical 
means. This was soon to affect the very idea of beauty.  
The aestheticism of the eighteenth century was a corollary of the rationalism of 
natural religion. It was Kant’s stunning achievement to situate aesthetics in the 
critical architectonic as a form of judgment two small steps away from pure reason 
(Danto, 2002:16).  
This has come to be called the fact/value distinction, which refers to the Enlightenment’s 
sundering of what it saw as clear, demonstrable “facts”, and mere human attitudes towards 
those facts. 
 Modernity’s quest for objective, value-free knowledge discovered by a 
disinterested, neutral observer has largely been shipwrecked. Postmodernity’s intellectuals 
delighted in pointing out the situatedness of all knowers, of the interpretive bias of all 
knowledge, of the impossibility of escaping our personal commitments.  
 Some of Christianity’s early reactions to modernity’s desire for objective, rational, 
value-free facts included an apologetic for the faith that all but capitulated to this demand, 
attempting to defend Christianity on scientific and empirical grounds alone. In so doing, 
Christians were submitting the faith to a faulty epistemology. Since no lie can be brought 
into the service of the truth, attempting to validate Christianity by a false standard was 
doomed to failure.  
 As the movement broadly known as postmodernity (and now as postsecularism) 
began in the 1960s, the seeds were sown for a broad cultural indifference to supposedly 
empirically verified truth-claims. According to Turley (2016:n.p.), a post-secular society is  
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one that no longer subscribes to the two fundamental commitments of secularism: 
scientific rationalism and personal autonomy or lifestyle values. At a very basic 
level, post-secular society is about the return of religion and religious values in the 
public square. 
Since scepticism over absolute truth-claims was now gaining momentum, Christians 
would begin finding within a generation that the demands for a rational, scientific 
Christianity were dying. A new, sensuous spirituality had gripped the modern 
consciousness, and a thirst for beauty had returned. Potential church goers were more 
interested in beautiful architecture, ancient traditions and artistic liturgy than they were in 
historical evidences for the faith. Many people, as Wooddell (2011:§201) remarks, are 
simply no longer interested in arguments for Christianity. Those defending the faith by a 
sole appeal to empirical apologetics found themselves dismissed as irrelevant by a post-
secular generation that was hungry for aesthetic spirituality, in any form. A religious 
apologetic of pure rationalism has had its day. 
 The Christian response to postmodernity’s epistemology has been varied, as the 
church grappled to understand the shift in outlook. Some retreated back into modernity, 
claiming a scientific and rational basis for the truth of the Bible. Others embraced the 
deconstructionism of postmodernism. A religion, however, that denies the reality of any of 
its metaphysical claims is crippled from the start. An uncritical accommodation of 
existentialism or deconstructionism implies the unreality of Christianity, except in the 
internal world of the believer. This is unacceptable for any Christian spirituality which 
claims a metaphysical basis outside the self.  
 The response suggested by the concept of beauty is to accept the critique of 
modernism supplied by postmodernity, but to simultaneously reject postmodernism’s 
nihilism. That is, while one should reject modernism’s epistemology, one should 
simultaneously reject postmodernism’s epistemology (existentialism and 
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deconstructionism) and its solution, which is, at root, Nietzsche’s will to power. Instead, 
having embraced a metaphysical realism, such a belief can comfortably assert that 
subjective knowledge is not the antithesis of objective knowledge. Along with 
premoderns, this study posits that such subjective knowledge must be chastened, trained 
and submitted to experience contact with forms of reality outside the self. 
  Beauty is the touchstone for an epistemology that concedes both the subjective 
aspect of human knowledge and an objective basis for that knowledge in reality outside of 
the subject. Christians have only recently begun scraping off the rust of modernity’s 
epistemology and aesthetic, recognising that the relegation of beauty to nothing more than 
the preferences and pleasures within a subject is an Enlightenment revision (Treier, 
Husbands & Lundin, 2007:§25). As truth-claims are met with scepticism, beauty comes to 
the rescue with its undeniable existence outside of individual subjects, while making 
demands on subjects that they shape their judgements to perceive and experience it rightly. 
Beauty provides the link to objective reality through subjective attitudes. Beauty is the 
merger between objective reality and subjective perception. Beauty calls for 
correspondence between affection and reality.  
 For this reason, the epistemology of Jonathan Edwards is particularly important for 
any Christian in dialogue with postmodernity. As Louie (2013:§6902) points out, since 
postmodernity recognises the subject’s non-rational pre-apprehension of reality, Edwards’ 
description of the world as a sensible metaphor of encounters between God and the human 
subject will certainly be recognisable, and even palatable to such a mind.     
 Beauty foregrounds imagination in perception, thereby foregrounding faith as 
perception. While not dispensing with reason, the aesthetic dimension of man is needed for 
his broadest, most encompassing grasp of reality. Indeed, the very concept of the aesthetic 
aids Christian epistemology when it comes to transcendent doctrines, divine mysteries, and 
theological paradoxes. Once reason and logic have rendered their crucial services to the 
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project of knowing God, the aesthetic aspect of man can adore, ponder, or be in awe 
beyond what reason can fathom (Stiles, 1997:208). 
 For Christian spirituality, the relationship between objective and subjective beauty 
is particularly important. If God possesses beauty independent of observers, then one of 
the great quests of spirituality, as the lived experience of God by his people, is 
understanding how the objective and subjective aspects of God’s beauty relate. 
Specifically, understanding how perceiving subjects can encounter and experience God’s 
beauty is at the heart of Christian spirituality: the experience of God’s people encountering 
and responding to God. That faith and experiential perception are combined in the pursuit 
of an objective knowledge of God is the clear intersection of beauty and Christian 
spirituality. Beauty is at the heart of how one knows the world. 
3)  Beauty and Christian Ethics 
Not only does beauty support a Christian metaphysic and a Christian epistemology, but 
beauty nourishes Christian ethics. The objection that beauty distracts people from justice, 
or that it anaesthetises them to suffering is false, if beauty is rightly defined. One of the 
effects of true beauty is to deeply humanise our souls (Hodges, 1995:66). This is because 
the judgement needed in beauty is needed for ethical judgement. As Scarry (1999:97) 
argues, beauty is actually distributive, so that an involuntary love of the beauty of one 
thing makes one deliberately attentive to other things. By teaching people the difference 
between selfish consumption and disinterested pleasure seeking, beauty identifies idolatry 
and self-love in contrast to generous, noble love.  
 De Gruchy (2001:3) warns that a “concern for truth without goodness and beauty 
lacks the power to attract and convince those whose critical sensitivities are repelled by 
such dogmatism”. On the other hand, he argues that a concern for goodness without truth 
or beauty becomes nothing more than dead moralism. Both truth and goodness, lacking 
beauty, do not have the power to convince and save.  
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 Christian spirituality deals with the ethical component of the Christian faith, for it 
is here that so much of one's experience of God will be fleshed out: in works, as James 
2:17–18 puts it. If beauty is a means of deepening this component, it becomes another 
important intersection with Christian spirituality. Beauty teaches people to love the good. 
4)  Beauty and Christian Aesthetics and Worship 
Beyond metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, beauty is integral to Christian worship. 
The neglect of beauty within Christian liturgy and practice in the last century have had 
visible effects on Christian worship. Concessions to the Enlightenment pursuit of value-
free objectivity have produced a less fruitful era for Christian expression in terms of 
music, poetry, literature, architecture, and the plastic arts. This lopsided emphasis may 
have contributed to a century that has seen little in music to rival Bach or Mendelssohn, 
little in poetry to rival George Herbert, Isaac Watts or even Christina Rossetti, little in 
literature to rival Daniel Defoe, Jane Austen, little in painting to rival Rembrandt.  
 Edgar (2001:111) remarks that the seeker-friendly church-growth movement is 
now reconsidering its adaptation to contemporary culture in its worship, finding that its 
target-market missed “the mysterious, the prophetic, and the beautiful, especially the rich 
musical heritage of the church of the ages.” Similarly, he points to the exodus from 
Protestant Evangelicalism to Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy is partly due to 
aesthetics: the perceived barrenness of beauty in the average Evangelical or low-church. 
 If beauty is indeed a transcendental, and if the human being is made in God’s 
image, a dearth of beauty must produce both a thirst and an eventual demand. If God is the 
quintessence or source of beauty, beautiful worship is required and fitting.  
 For the lived experience of Christian spirituality, it is important to add that the 
perceptive powers needed to recognise beauty are needed in worship. The arts are 
fundamental to both private and public worship, and without the ability to perceive the 
beautiful in art, there will be little sensed beauty in worship. To put it another way, lacking 
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the ability to see beauty in general may hamper the Christian’s ability to encounter and 
experience God. 
 An embrace of beauty supports Christianity, and particularly Christian spirituality 
in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and worship. Christian spirituality is 
concerned with reality, with knowing God, with living rightly, and with communing with 
God. These four reasons cement the conviction that a pursuit of beauty in Christian 
spirituality is not only timeous, but necessary. 
1.2. Methodology for Defining Beauty   
 To pursue a spirituality rooted in God’s beauty, one must begin by defining, as best 
as possible, the quality of beauty. Beauty, like truth, has suffered at the hands of those who 
wished to make it conform to Enlightenment epistemologies. For those of these schools, 
beauty needed to be empirically verifiable to be real. From this impulse, the very term 
aesthetics was coined in the eighteenth century by Baumgarten (García-Rivera, 2005:357). 
The second chapter will explore the various competing definitions of beauty and determine 
the one most plausible for the purposes of this study. This chapter outlines the 
methodology for determining such a definition.  
 First, a definition of beauty must be biblical. For Christians, Scripture must have 
the first and final say regarding definitions of matters ultimate and transcendental. Special 
revelation grants the interpretation of general revelation, not the other way around. One 
does not reason from creation to an understanding of God. Rather, God’s special revelation 
provides the interpretive framework to view the world. Beauty found in nature, the arts, or 
in perceptions of God himself in human experience, must be judged to be beautiful from 
the aesthetic grid that Scripture provides. This is not to say that Scripture will need to give 
an explicit definition of beauty. Rather, any definition obtained should be derived from 
and consonant with the teachings of Scripture. For this reason, chapter six will test the 
definition with a biblical and historical study. 
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 Second, such a definition should appear within the Christian tradition. Definitions 
wholly new are seldom true, and definitions wholly true are seldom new. Christians 
sensitive to the truth that Scripture itself invokes tradition (2 Tim. 2:2)1—the handing 
down of truth from one Christian generation to another—will expect to find a good part of 
their understanding of beauty within the writings and art of Christians of the past. While 
one wishes to bring the progress of contemporary knowledge to bear upon the problem, 
one does not want to be a radical innovator. Readers ought to stand upon the shoulders of 
those who previously laboured for understanding in this area. Chapter six will also 
consider the history of the idea of beauty in Christian thought. 
 Third, the definition must be sensitive to the discussions of philosophy. Beyond the 
discussion within the Christian tradition, the question of beauty has been a topic of 
discussion for philosophers dating back to classical Greece. The presence of the common 
grace of God in human culture means that truth can be found in both believer and 
unbeliever. Aesthetics as a philosophical specialisation is no more than a few centuries 
old, but the discussion of the idea of beauty is far older and deserves attention. Chapter 
eight will study the epistemological considerations of our definition.   
 Fourth, the definition should be workable in the lives of Christians. A definition so 
abstract that few minds can grasp it, let alone implement it, is useless to Christians, and 
especially useless to the daily Christianity of Christian spirituality. A useful definition of 
beauty can be understood and adapted into worship, discipleship and fellowship within the 
local church and the lives of ordinary Christians. Chapter seven will consider the 
experience of beauty in art, while chapter nine will synthesise the cumulative findings into 
a proposed model of spirituality.  
                                               
1 Unless otherwise noted, all Scripture quotations are from the New King James Version of the Bible, 1982,  
Thomas Nelson. 
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1.3. Conclusion 
 Beauty has experienced a renaissance, while simultaneously experiencing 
resistance. This chapter has explained the resistance to beauty in postmodernism, while 
answering these objections. Four relationships between beauty and Christianity have been 
explored, which suggest that it is fundamental to a robust Christianity. Metaphysically 
speaking, beauty supports the Christian idea of ultimate, transcendent reality. 
Epistemologically speaking, beauty explains in concrete form the Christian idea that 
ultimate realities are outside the observer, and yet are rightly understood when that 
observer comes into right relationship with them. This corresponds to what Christian 
spirituality claims to be: a lived experience of a transcendent reality. Beauty is a hands-on 
lesson in faith. Ethically speaking, beauty further develops the moral side of our souls. 
Aesthetically and liturgically speaking, beauty is indispensable both as the goal of 
worship, and for the tools of worship: art. The ability to perceive beauty in the tools that 
express worship becomes equivalent to the ability to perceive beauty in the object of 
worship: God. Beauty is thus integral to a Christian metaphysic, a Christian epistemology, 
a Christian ethic, and Christian aesthetics. These four aspects of beauty are simultaneously 
vital to Christian spirituality. Christians would do well to seize the moment for returning 
the vocabulary of beauty to their faith in general, and to spirituality in particular. The next 
chapter will define both spirituality and beauty, and describe their intersections.  
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2. Defining Beauty 
2.1. Introduction 
A definition of beauty or the beautiful has eluded the grasp of those who wish a 
definition with mathematical precision. This more than two-millennia-old discussion 
remains open, and no definition has satisfied its perennial participants or become the final 
word. Enough consensus exists to say that beauty describes either a quality in ultimate 
reality or a phenomenon in secondary (created) reality, but this is as much as saying that 
beauty points to something or represents an experience—hardly a precise definition.  
This dissertation is not concerned with answering this question to the satisfaction 
of metaphysicians and aestheticians. This study is in pursuit of a method of apprehending 
God’s beauty, not a final definition. As Thomas à Kempis put it, “I had rather feel 
compunction than know the definition thereof” (Imitation of Christ, I, i, 3). Far better to 
discover the means of knowing and loving God’s beauty, than to be able to define such an 
experience with exactness without partaking in it.  
Nevertheless, a working definition of beauty, and more particularly, of God’s 
beauty, is essential to the progress of this study. This chapter will outline and group the 
most prominent definitions or descriptions of beauty, drawing from Christian and non-
Christian sources. Chapter six will provide a historical survey of the development of these 
ideas, particularly in Christian history, while this chapter will compare and contrast the 
competing and complementing definitions of beauty. Since the goal of this thesis is to 
understand how the beauty of God can be subjectively apprehended in Christian 
spirituality, a particularly theological understanding of beauty will be necessary for 
determining this study’s working definition of beauty.  
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2.2. Definitions of Beauty 
2.2.1. Introduction 
Definitions of beauty and the beautiful can be broadly classified into four types: 
classical, transcendental, subjective, and theological definitions. Some definitions attempt 
combinations of these, though for the purposes of this study, particular definitions will be 
judged to be primarily allegiant to one category or the other.  
2.2.2. Classical Definitions 
Classical definitions use some form of what Farley calls “the Great Theory of 
Beauty” (2001:17), which originated in Pythagoras and was developed by Plato, and later 
Platonists. Christians influenced by Plato developed similar versions of the same idea.  
 The Great Theory defines beauty as essentially proportion. At the heart of this 
theory is the idea that the distinctive pleasure of beauty is the harmony of parts to a whole 
(Farley, 2001:17). Beauty is symmetry between composite parts or elegant relationships 
between parts that combine to make a unified, whole form. This symmetry is what 
provokes pleasure in the beholder. Plotinus saw beauty as “that which irradiates 
symmetry” (Coleman, 1991:213). When the human mind or spirit senses the order and 
harmony of things, it experiences the pleasure of beauty (Viladesau, 1999:134). 
 Christians found in this formula a way of linking beauty to God himself. 
Augustine, channelling Plato, regarded equality as the main principle of beauty, where 
harmony and unity are reducible to equality (Bychkov, 2008:199). Thomas Aquinas, 
following Aristotle’s expansion of Plato’s definition into integrity, harmony, and clarity 
(Martin, 1990:16), coined what became a standard definition of beauty during the High 
Middle Ages, stating that beauty includes three conditions: perfection or integrity, 
proportion or harmony, and brightness or clarity (Louie, 2013:§735). Richard Harries, 
bishop of Oxford, saw all beauty as characterised by wholeness, harmony and radiance, 
though differing in its forms (1993:24–25). 
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 Materialist and Darwinian accounts of beauty in symmetry also exist. Goldman 
(1990:33) suggests that humans find beauty as they spot order within complexity, since the 
intellect ever seeks patterns of order. Some see beauty as the human recognition of 
mathematical and geometrical patterns in nature and transposed into art (Newton, 
1950:25). 
 Of course, objections are levelled at both the Christian and non-Christian forms of 
this definition. Guy Sircello (1990:21) criticises all theories of beauty that are some form 
of the classical theory as “unitarian” and sees them as destined only to increase the demise 
of beauty. Calvin Seerveld (2001:160) strongly challenges Christian forms of the classical 
theory, or the classical idea of metaphysical beauty, saying that Scripture does not bear out 
this notion, feeling that the core of what is often considered aesthetic is in Scripture 
“lucidity”: “a playfulness, which assumes vital, sensitive formative ability, is at the core of 
imaginativity”.  
 While classical definitions have never persuaded all, the perennial return to the 
notions of harmony and symmetry in the discussion of beauty is significant enough to 
warrant giving this theory some consideration.  
2.2.3. Transcendental Definitions 
 The term “truth, goodness, and beauty”, coined by Plato, is well known as the triad 
of transcendentals. Transcendental definitions of beauty define beauty in relation to the 
unseen and ultimate qualities of truth and goodness, or as some combination of these. In 
these definitions, beauty is understood as identical to the good (Viladesau, 1999:134), as a 
form of moral goodness (Skillen, 2002:15), as the “radiance of the true and the good” 
(Caldecott, 2009:31), or even as the “capacity to proclaim truth and to realize goodness” 
(Munson and Drake, 2014:§301).  
Mortimer Adler claims that beauty is a synthesis of truth and goodness: “like the 
good in that it pleases us, like the true in that it is not acquisitive desire” (2000:156). 
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Savile (1989:127) states that Hegel saw art’s role to “reveal truth in pleasing, sensible 
form”.  
 Again, those in Christendom have found this definition useful. Pope John Paul II 
defined beauty in this way:  
[I]n a certain sense, beauty is the visible form of the good, just as the good is the 
metaphysical condition of beauty. This was well understood by the Greeks who, by 
fusing the two concepts, coined a term which embraces both: kalokagathía, or 
beauty-goodness (John Paul II, 1999).  
Wainwright (2000:24) conceives of beauty along the lines of divine design: truth reveals 
the Creator’s design, goodness is when creatures act in light of the Creator’s purpose, and 
beauty is the result—when all is shaped according to the divine design.  
Bishop Harries distinguished between beauty and glory by saying that “when 
goodness, truth and beauty are combined we have glory. When boundless goodness, total 
truth and sublime beauty are combined in supreme degree, we have divine glory” 
(1993:54). 
 The transcendental theory has had its critics, too. Cory (1925:395) disputes the 
equivalence of beauty and truth, saying each requires the other, but they are not forms of 
one another. Von Hildebrand goes beyond truth and goodness, saying that beauty is the 
radiance of every value: qualitative values, moral values, intellectual values, and 
aesthetical values (2004:41).  
 The transcendental theory has the power of explaining why beauty seems to have 
much to do with fittingness, and excellence. The overlap between goodness, which is to 
say, what ought to be, and beauty, shows that beauty must have a strong relationship to 
truth and goodness. The repeated declaration that God saw that the creation was “good” 
(Gen. 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31) is not primarily a statement about the created order’s 
ethical state, as much as its aesthetics: its excellence, fittingness, and beauty.  
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2.2.4. Subjective Definitions 
 Some definitions define beauty almost entirely as its effects or experience within 
the perceiving subject. These expound beauty in terms of the peculiar aesthetic pleasure, or 
its ethical effect upon the subject. Such explanations adopt some form of emotional or 
psychological theory that locates beauty in the response of the perceiver (Lindsey, 
1974:121). 
 Some, such as McMahon (1999:23), see the experience of beauty as the human 
pleasure of awareness of the process of problem-solving in perception. Perhaps partly 
borrowing from the classical theory, this definition sees the human mind as experiencing 
beauty when it recognises relationships of harmony and unity, be these components of a 
physical object, or concepts within an idea. Kant’s idealism saw beauty as the mind’s 
recognising purposiveness, without having an acquisitive interest in the object. 
 Lorand (1994:402) believes that beauty is a complex concept, best understood by 
its numerous opposites: ugliness, meaninglessness, boring, kitsch, insignificant, or 
irrelevant. Though these represent real values, they cannot be united, and therefore beauty 
is a “high degree of inner order”. For others, such as Elaine Scarry (1999:9), beauty cannot 
be defined as an unattached ideal, but one can point to beautiful objects, and describe their 
effects: causing one to be deliberative, saving life, and increasing justice. Again, Scarry 
does not deny the idea of or the presence of beauty, but focuses instead on its effects upon 
subjects.  
 To be clear, proponents of this definition do not necessarily deny that objects of 
beauty have outward qualities that might be construed as beautiful. Rather, their claim is 
that beauty itself must be defined as the subject’s response to these qualities, not as 
something that exists entirely independently of observation or inherently in the 
unperceived object.  
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 Some definitions do not regard beauty as an entirely subjective phenomenon. 
Philosopher Roger Scruton defines beauty as that which pleases, while stating that beauty 
is nevertheless the subject-matter of a judgement of taste. This judgement of taste is “about 
the beautiful object, not about the subject’s state of mind” (2009:5). 
 Perhaps one might summarise the valid insight of this definition thus: what is 
experienced as beauty may exist separately from a perceiving subject, but it does not truly 
exist without a perceiving subject. That is, while beauty is not merely the inner experience 
of perceiving subjects, something’s beauty is impossible to speak of without perceiving 
subjects.  
2.2.5. Theological Definitions 
 Theological definitions take God himself as the foundation of beauty, or as the 
ultimate instantiation of it. In these definitions, beauty is either an attribute of God, or a 
way of speaking of God’s being or relations. Importantly, theological definitions insist 
upon defining beauty with God’s revelation in Scripture, not primarily with philosophy or 
aesthetics. De Gruchy (2001:6) warns against attempting to define God’s beauty based 
upon our own definitions of beauty, rather than using the form of beauty revealed in 
creation and redemption. Revelation, then must be the key for understanding beauty as it 
relates to God. Asproulis (2012:155) agrees with Hans Urs von Balthasar that beauty’s use 
in theology should be for reflection on revealed Scripture, and not contemplation of any 
metaphysical or abstract idea. One must not begin with philosophy or even nature, and 
then reason one’s way to God. One must begin with God and his revealed truth. 
 Understanding beauty as being, and God’s being as the ground of all being, makes 
beauty equivalent to God. Spiegel (1998:42) summarises the idea: “As all being is either 
God or is derived from God, so all that is beautiful either is him or comes from him”. The 
idea of beauty as being prevailed in medieval Christendom. 
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 According to Lindsey (1974:127), Karl Barth saw the beauty of God as the more 
precise designation of the glory of God, “the sum total of the divine perfection in 
irresistible self-manifestation”. Building on Barth, Lindsey (1974:128) defines God’s 
beauty in three ways: the essential reality of his divine being, the eternal reality of his 
triune being, and the unique reality of his incarnate being. Beauty is here a name for the 
perfection of God’s being (Viladesau, 1999:134).  
Wooddell (2011:§1327) ventures that something “is beautiful insofar as it reflects 
the character, nature, or will of God”. Munson and Drake (2014:§245) similarly regard 
beauty as the forms through which people recognise the nature and ways of God. 
 Similar to these definitions are those that regard the triune love of God as 
primordial beauty. Jeremy Begbie (2007:182) insists that God’s beauty be defined as 
dynamic love, not a static structure. Here, proportion, radiance, perfection, and pleasure 
can be united in light of the reciprocal love of the Godhead. In The Beauty of the Infinite, 
David Hart argues that “true beauty is not the idea of the beautiful, a static archetype in the 
mind of God, but is an infinite music, drama, art, completed in but never bounded by the 
termless dynamism of the Trinity’s life” (2003:177). 
 Along these lines, though perhaps differing from Hart in his view of divine 
simplicity, Robert Jenson has insightfully recognised the dilemma of subject and object, of 
beholder and beheld in the topic of beauty, and finds its ultimate reconciliation in God 
himself, that the triune God of Christianity is beautiful, and all that he perceives that 
reflects his own beauty. “In God there is a genuine I and a confrontation with another, and 
their harmony in loving beauty is reliable” (1995:152). 
 Some medieval theologians combined the classical idea of symmetry with the 
Trinity, seeing beauty in the three persons of the Trinity as equal, that is, mutually related 
through the common relation of equality (their beauty results from the proportion of 
equality, parallel to earthly beauty).  Other saw God’s beauty simply in his excellence, 
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while some saw it in the relations of procession between the Persons of the Godhead 
(Bychkov, 2008:212).  
 Conversely, some writers have rejected metaphysical notions of beauty. Edgar 
(2001:120) agrees with Calvin Seerveld and Jeremy Begbie that beauty should be thought 
of as that which alludes to God, and which faithfully represents his attributes and ways.  
 Since the time of Immanuel Kant, some writers have distinguished the idea of 
beauty from the idea of the sublime, a modern example being Gilbert-Rolfe (1999). They 
argue that being awed, humbled and overwhelmed with the dangerous beauty of a storm is 
qualitatively different from being cheered and delighted by the beauty of a tranquil 
landscape, calling for distinct words to describe the two: the storm being sublime, and the 
landscape being beautiful. Such a distinction was inevitable to the Enlightenment, 
attempting as it did to describe human reason and experience without reference to God. 
This nuance of the discussion of beauty need not detain the reader, for in the spirituality of 
Christianity, both will be combined in the experience of God. God’s beauty is both 
“unbounded” in his infinitude, and “bounded” in the creation and the Incarnation, meaning 
that Kant’s or Burke’s distinctions are not a problem for the study at hand (García-Rivera, 
2005:357). 
 Theological definitions then insist that beauty is defined derivatively from what 
God is: his being, attributes, or relations. Beauty cannot be a concept to which God 
conforms; the very concept must be derived from the perfection within God. 
2.3. Analysis of the Various Definitions 
 Since the goal of this study is to seek a model of Christian spirituality based upon 
apprehending God’s beauty, one cannot be satisfied with a definition of beauty abstracted 
from God. Beauty must be defined in relation to God. For such a definition, as has been 
noted, special revelation must show the beauty in general revelation, not the other way 
around. Beauty in creation, mankind and culture is always secondary and derivative. One 
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cannot judge beauty perfectly from general revelation. General revelation is where most 
incarnations of beauty will occur, so a person may be quite developed in seeing and 
judging beauty in this arena. Nevertheless, Scripture must rule finally on beauty. Special 
revelation speaks both directly and indirectly on beauty, as chapter six will outline. With 
this qualification in mind, each of the four definitions of beauty, or their schools of thought 
will now be examined. 
 Is beauty equivalent to truth and goodness? If beauty obtains a correspondence 
between internal appreciation and external realities, then beauty cannot be entirely 
separated from truth (Jeffrey & Maillet, 2011:§480). Nor can hating what is beautiful to 
God be considered moral or good, so loving beauty is itself virtuous, or good. Perhaps one 
might say with Scarry (1999:52) that beauty is allied with truth, but not identical to it. Its 
nature as some kind of ultimate value must place it into relationship with other ultimate 
values such as goodness or truth. If ultimate reality is indeed a universe of facts, then some 
relationship between beauty, truth, and goodness is plausible.  
Nevertheless, defining beauty solely in terms of the abstract transcendentals of 
truth and goodness (whether one grants them independent existence or not) potentially 
leaves beauty in the realm of a philosophical construct, rather than an attribute or property 
to be experienced. It might do to say that apprehending God’s beauty is apprehending the 
truth of God’s being and the goodness of God’s being, but this only pushes the question 
one level back. One is still forced to ask, what is the nature of that goodness? What is the 
experience of apprehending the true reality of God’s being?  Having said this, one must 
conclude that a transcendental definition is only partly adequate. 
 Is beauty the harmony or proportion so loved by Platonic aestheticians? Its constant 
refrain in discussions of beauty is certainly indicative of the attractiveness of the idea, and 
it would be bold to dismiss it out of hand. It certainly explains much, particularly in visual 
perception, in the beauty of intellectually elegant ideas (in mathematics, for example). For 
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all that, beauty-as-harmony fails to deal adequately with the phenomenon of unitary 
beauty, such as light, or colour. The pleasure obtained by beauty cannot be finally reduced 
to admiration of symmetry, for some beauty is the beauty of the simple, or the sublime, or 
even the tragic—in which the disharmonious nevertheless attains a beauty in our eyes.  
Certainly, the beauty of God’s harmony with his own being in the Trinity is 
unquestionable, and to this theme, the study will return. But it would seem that to make 
this harmony the very essence of beauty is to make harmony an ideal to which God 
himself conforms. God’s beauty must almost certainly contain the qualities of harmony or 
symmetry, but it will not do to say that it is equivalent to those qualities. Harmony then 
becomes the ultimate good, perhaps unwittingly displacing other attributes of God, 
claiming in an unwarranted fashion, to be the supreme good. 
 What about beauty defined as pleasure in a subject? Beauty may represent a 
phenomenon in a perceiving subject, but that phenomenon corresponds to something 
outside the subject. As Hart (2003) points out, the fact that beauty can surprise one shows 
that beauty is not merely a projection of one’s own desires, but an evocation of desire by 
the object. It may be true that no beauty exists without beholders; it is equally true that 
beholders do not create beauty out of themselves. One must examine the subjective 
experience of beauty, but Christians must insist that a real phenomenon exists outside the 
subject, in recognisable properties in the object. A definition of God’s beauty must include 
the concept of pleasure in another (pushing one inexorably to a Trinitarian view of God’s 
being), but more is needed to sustain a robust view of God’s beauty. It appears the 
remaining option for a working definition of God’s beauty is to harmonise these three 
definitions with the theological definitions of beauty.  
 Is beauty another name for God’s uncompounded, infinite being? Defining beauty 
as equivalent to God’s being creates its own problems. If beauty is God’s being simply 
considered, and God’s being is the ground of all being, how does one then explain ugliness 
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in the order of things? If beauty is to be predicated of God’s being, the idea must refer to 
solely God’s being in himself, transcendent above immanent reality. For unquestionably, in 
secondary reality—the created order—God’s beauty is not perfectly reflected; indeed, it is 
often parodied, warped, and distorted.  
 Moving one step away from God’s being simply considered, is God’s beauty one 
of his attributes, or the sum total of his will and ways? Is God’s beauty the name for when 
God’s glory is displayed and experienced? A tentative answer may agree that this is a 
generally safe assumption, since Scripture does link God’s beauty with his glory (1 Chr. 
16:29; Job 40:10; Ps. 29:2). Yet to say that God’s beauty is God’s glory is merely to 
substitute a biblical word for a philosophical one, and merely drives one to define both 
more explicitly.  
What of the idea that the Trinity’s life is the essence of God’s beauty? Is God’s 
beauty particularly related to the Trinity: the symmetry of relations, the harmony of three 
who are one, or the relationships of love with one another? If God’s beauty represents not 
merely his essence or being, but the refulgence and pleasurable splendour of this essence, 
then God’s delight in God would be one of the strongest contenders for a working 
definition of God’s beauty. 
 Jonathan Edwards represents one of the most compelling solutions. The 
seventeenth-century American theologian’s writings on beauty represent a fascinating 
(though perhaps unintentional) synthesis of our four definitions of beauty, combining 
harmony, the transcendentals, the subjective, and the varying theological definitions in 
one. 
Edwards’ definition of beauty was “being’s cordial consent to being in general” 
(WJEO, 8:620). This consent is benevolence, union, or love: the benevolence of God 
toward being in general and specifically toward other benevolent beings (Hodges, 
1995:67). Here Edwards defines beauty as God’s response to his own ontological being, 
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agreeing with medievalists that God himself is the ground of beauty, not a concept that 
could be abstracted from God (Strachan & Sweeney, 2010:§679). Yet God’s beauty is not 
merely his being in some static, abstract sense. The beauty is how God dynamically 
responds to God’s being. God’s dynamic benevolence, as inclined and expressed to 
himself and his works, is beauty. Trinitarian love is at the heart of what God’s beauty is. 
Edwards has perhaps the best theological definition of beauty, combining essence with 
dynamic response. 
 Yet Edwards nods to the classical theory in using the term “consent”. Consent is 
Edwards’ spiritual and moral equivalent of created or sensible harmony and symmetry. 
That is, symmetry in the created realm, such as gravity or music or colour, has a higher 
analogue in the consent of spiritual love and union. The ultimate harmony is loving union 
with God, and the ultimate form of such harmonious symmetry would be God’s love for 
God, meaning his intra-trinitarian love.  
 Edwards also assimilates the transcendental definition by combining truth, 
goodness and beauty in by defining beauty as “true virtue” (or true goodness, in modern 
parlance), which is the beauty of love for that which is most perfect—God himself (Louie, 
2013:§3393). Truth and goodness united become beauty.  
 Finally, Edwards makes room for the subjective definition, for he defines true 
virtue—subjective love of God’s beauty—as the beauty of God, the saints, and the angels. 
When a moral being finds pleasure in God’s beauty, that pleasure and desire constitutes his 
or her spiritual beauty. God is ultimately beautiful because of what he loves and because of 
what he is. Holy affections, loving and desiring what God loves, are the subjective 
analogue to the holy beauty of God.  
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2.4. A Working Definition of God’s Beauty  
 The previous chapter gave four criteria for a working definition of God’s beauty: a 
useful working definition must be theological, traditional, philosophical, and practical. It 
remains to formulate a working definition in light of these strictures.  
In formulating this definition, the exposure to the various voices on beauty leads to 
four observations about beauty that are crucial to the working definition of beauty. 
First, beauty is personal: it describes something persons recognise with pleasure or 
something in persons that is pleasurable. With Edwards, one can agree that beauty is not a 
static property, but a composite experience requiring both subject and object. God acting 
as both subject and object is possible only in the Christian expression of the Triune God. 
God’s delight in God is not a static property of God, but in the incomprehensibly myriad 
splendours of his being expressed and given to one another in the Godhead. The 
refulgence of his given character, and the reciprocal delight in this refulgence, constitute 
God’s beauty. Beauty then, cannot exist outside of persons, for observers and delight are 
essential to its existence. God’s beauty cannot be abstracted from his person, or his 
personal approbation of beauty. 
 Second, the properties of God’s being or nature regarded as beautiful represent an 
axiomatic first principle. That which is beautiful in God is beautiful because it is in God. It 
cannot be referred to a standard outside and above God to which he conforms. God is 
beautiful because God is the object of God’s love and because God is the subject of God’s 
love. He is beautiful for those qualities in himself that merit his love, and he is beautiful 
because he loves those qualities.  
 Third, beauty is dynamic: a reciprocal experience of beholding, partaking, and 
delighting. Beauty cannot exist apart from objects that signify and subjects that parse 
meaning. Static, unrecognised, unknown beauty does not exist in a universe created by an 
omnipresent, omniscient, and triune God. 
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 Fourth, one can say further that beautiful minds (those that recognise beauty) are 
simultaneously truthful and good. Simply put, who or what God is brings delighted 
pleasure to those pursuing goodness and truth. Beauty is then inescapably moral in nature.  
 God’s beauty, then, describes a personal, dynamic, and moral delight of God in his 
own excellence. God’s beauty is his radiant delight in his uncompounded being. 
 Created or secondary beauty is all that reflects the excellence of God’s being, 
which beautiful beings will love. 
Edwards defines beauty as “being’s cordial consent to being in general” (WJEO, 
8:620). God’s beauty is then “the Most Lovely loving the Most Lovely” (this researcher’s 
definition). This definition, combining all four theories, is difficult to improve upon. Such 
a definition is explicitly theological, traditional in that it grows out of historical Christian 
thought, philosophical in that it adopts and subsumes concepts such as symmetry, truth, 
and goodness, and practical in that God’s love for God is something Christians may 
possibly experience and share in (John 17:26). 
What could be expanded, or modified, in Edwards’ definition, is the meaning of 
consent, particularly since many anti-Christian epistemologies have risen since Edwards 
wrote. Considering this term as it relates to the experience of beauty is crucial for this 
study, and considering this term in light of Christian history, the discipline of art, and 
epistemology may yield rich results.  
2.5. Conclusion 
 Beauty has been variously defined. This chapter has explored four schools of 
thought regarding the meaning of beauty. Both Christians and non-Christians have seen 
merit in defining it as some form of symmetry or relationship of parts to a whole. Others 
saw an unmistakable relationship between beauty and truth or goodness. Still others have 
identified beauty as a phenomenon of pleasure or recognition within a subject. Christians 
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have added to these definitions by seeing beauty as an expression of God’s being, God’s 
attributes, or God’s dynamic relationship to himself.  
 Jonathan Edwards still represents perhaps the best synthesis of these definitions, 
defining it as being’s consent to being, meaning God’s love for his own being, simply 
considered, and all that reflects him. The meaning of “consent” in “being’s cordial consent 
to being in general” (WJEO, 8:620) has the potential for expansion and exploration. 
Drawing on Edwards, God’s beauty is defined in this study as the personal, dynamic, and 
moral give-and-take of pleasure and excellence that God has in relation to his being simply 
considered: the Most Lovely loving the Most Lovely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  29 
 
Chapter 3. Literature Review 
3.1. Introduction 
 This chapter will present a survey and review of relevant literature on the topic of 
the relationship between the objective and subjective elements of God’s beauty in 
Christian spirituality. The aim of this review is not to cover all aspects of the topic of 
beauty in Christianity, but particularly to consider the relationship between the objective 
and subjective aspects of God’s beauty as it relates to Christian spirituality. In doing so, it 
will seek to identify the lacunae in the existing scholarship. 
 The organisation of thought in this literature review will be conceptual, that is, 
structured around certain ideas relevant to the topic, rather than a historical survey. 
First, this review will consider the key trends and developing perspectives relevant 
to the topic.  
Second, it will review the literature that understands the importance of beauty to 
Christian spirituality.  
 Third, this review will survey the literature that has considered the topic of God’s 
beauty. This comes in three categories: exegetical or literary, theological, and historical. 
The review will consider if existing literature has made the case for God’s beauty on the 
exegesis of Hebrew and Greek words, pericopes or themes in Scripture. The next section 
will consider the work of theologians, both contemporary and historical, who have made 
the case for, or argued against God’s intrinsic, objective beauty. Third, the historical 
literature will be reviewed, considering books that track the church’s approach to God’s 
beauty through the ages. The historical literature will broaden to consider non-Christian 
philosophers who have contributed to the discussion during the ages.  
 Fourth, it will evaluate the literature surrounding the subjective/objective 
dichotomy in epistemology, with particular reference to aesthetics or transcendentals. It 
will consider the literature following the development of this idea, and its progress through 
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the Enlightenment era into modernity and postmodernity. It will review the literature that 
seeks to discuss the subjective/objective dichotomy, particularly forms of correspondence 
theory. It will survey the literature which considers modern Christian proposals for 
resolving this dilemma, particularly in regard to knowing truth about God and perceiving 
His beauty.  
 Fifth, the review will consider writings on the subjective perception of God’s 
beauty.    
 Finally, the review will identify the lacunae in the existing literature.  
3.2. Key Trends and Perspectives 
 Within the burgeoning literature on beauty, one finds four trends relevant to this 
study.  
First, as noted in chapter one, a broader interest in the idea of beauty has returned. 
One sees this in works such as Alexander’s Beauty and Other Forms of Value (1968), 
Sircello’s A New Theory of Beauty (1974), Mothersill’s Beauty Restored (1984), 
Gadamer’s The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays (1986) Turner’s Beauty: The 
Value of Values (1991), Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1997), Zemach’s Real Beauty (1997), 
Kirwan’s Beauty (1999), Scarry’s On Beauty and Being Just (1999), Brand’s Beauty 
Matters (2000), Gilbert-Rolfe’s Beauty and the Contemporary Sublime (2001), Sartwell’s 
Six Names of Beauty (2004), Armstrong’s The Secret Power of Beauty (2005), and 
Scruton’s Beauty (2009). These more philosophical discussions on beauty display a 
renewed interest in the idea, even from those not religiously committed. Indeed, a fairly 
large number of journal articles and books reference beauty’s relationship to science and 
mathematics.2 The broader cultural milieu in which Christianity exists has turned its eye 
back to beauty. 
                                               
2 For example, Colyvan, M, “Mathematics and Aesthetic Considerations in Science”, Mind 111.441 (January 2001), 69-
74; De Regt, H. W., “Beauty in Physical Science circa 2000”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 16.1 
(March 2002), 95-103; Van Bendegem, J. P., “Beauty in Mathematics: Birkhof Revisited”, Tijdschrift voof Filosofie  
60.1 (March 1998), 106-130; Chandrasekhar, S., 1987, Truth and Beauty: Aesthetics and Motivations in Science, 
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 Within Christianity, the last fifty years have seen the development of the discipline 
of theological aesthetics, probably partly through the influence of Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Christian Theology (Murphy, 2011), 
“[T]heological aesthetics addresses the place of beauty in Christian life”. This field of 
study explores Christianity’s relationship to the arts, and questions of imagination, cultural 
production, art and liturgy, creativity, and epistemology. While the scholarly output on this 
topic is too vast to exhaustively survey, the most prominent and prolific writers and 
philosophers of theological aesthetics include Jeremy Begbie, Frank Burch Brown, 
Edward Farley, Richard Harries, Paul Finney, Alejandro García-Rivera, John McIntire, 
John Navone, Aiden Nichols, Karl Rahner, Calvin Seerveld, Patrick Sherry, Paul Tillich, 
Gerardus van der Leeuw, Richard Viladesau, and Nicolas Wolterstorff. After a long 
neglect, particularly within Evangelicalism, books and journal articles are appearing 
seeking to define the role of the arts within Christian liturgy and in broader Christian life.  
The last few years have seen a growing interest in the writings of Jonathan 
Edwards on beauty. Few theologians placed beauty at the centre of their systematic 
theology like Edwards did. While Delattre’s (1968) work shaped much of what was to 
follow, much has been written in recent years on Edwards’ understanding both of the 
Trinity and of beauty (for example, Erdt, (1980); Lee (1976); Louie (2013); McDermott 
(2009); McClymond and McDermott (2012); Mitchell (2003); Spohn (1981); Strachan & 
Sweeney (2010); Venter (2010); Wooddell (2007). 
A growing body of literature exists that studies the work of a set of 20th century 
                                               
Chicago / London: University of Chicago Press; Engler, G., “Aesthetics in Science and Art”, British Journal of 
Aesthetics, 30.1 (January 1990), 24-34;  Fischer, E. P., 1999, Beauty and the Beast: The Aesthetic Moment in Science , 
trans. E. Oehlkers, New York / London: Plenum Trade; Flannery, M., “Using Science’s Aesthetic Dimension in 
Teaching Science”,  Journal of Aesthetic Education, 26.1 (Spring 1992), 1-15; Marie, G., “Wonder as Source of 
Philosophy and of Science: A Comparison”, Philosophy of Science, 6 (1995), 97-128; Heisenberg, W., “Science and the 
Beautiful”, Alexandria, 1997 (volume 4), pp. 25-40; Machan, T. R., “Kuhn, Paradigm Choice and the Arbitrariness of 
Aesthetic Criteria in Science”, Theory and Decision  8 (October 1977), 361-362; Osborne, H., “Mathematical Beauty and 
Physical Science”, British Journal of Aesthetics  24 (1984), 291-300; Parsons, G., “Nature Appreciation, Science, and 
Positive Aesthetics”, British Journal of Aesthetics  42.3 (July 2002), 279-295; Valenza, R. J., “Aesthetic Priority in 
Science and Religion”, Process Studies  31.1 (Spring/Summer 2002), 49-76; Wechsler, J., (ed.) On Aesthetics in Science, 
Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 1978. 
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British writers and scholars, who gave answers to rationalistic modernism in distinctive, 
but related ways. These writers include some of the so-called “Inklings”: C.S. Lewis, 
Charles Williams, J.R.R. Tolkien and Owen Barfield. These men, and their predecessors 
(men such as George MacDonald and G.K. Chesterton) answered the rational scepticism 
of their day by pointing to older Christian traditions of imagination, intuition, and beauty. 
The study of their writings has burgeoned, particularly in a post-secular era, seeking 
answers beyond the anti-supernaturalism of the early Christian modernism, the Scottish 
common sense realism of Fundamentalism, or the nihilism of postmodernism.  
 An eclectic group of writings has developed within the postmodern milieu, known 
collectively as Radical Orthodoxy. These Christians have recognised that the postmodern 
critique of modernity’s failure to achieve perfectly neutral and rational objectivity is a 
correct one. At the same time, Christians do not want to go where Heidegger, Sartre, 
Foucault and Meritain went—abandoning all hope for knowing external reality, and 
embracing despair or Nietzsche’s will to power. It holds that theology, particularly creedal 
theology, must be the lens through which all other branches of human knowledge are 
critiqued. James Smith (2009:39) defends a liturgical approach to epistemology, viewing 
life through the eyes of faith and love in worship. Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: 
Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (2004) explains much of the movement’s Augustinian 
presuppositions.  
  Finally, as has been noted by Venter (2010:185), there is a significant revival of 
interest in Trinitarian theology. Writers, following Edwards, often consider the Trinity as a 
possible source for grounding beauty as an absolute quality or for discussing its existence. 
(Bychkov, 2008; Venter, 2010). Some writers are looking to the Trinity as the source and 
ground of metaphysical beauty in the created order (Wilson, 2013:71).  
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3.3. Literature Survey 
3.3.1. The Importance of Beauty to Christian Spirituality  
 Christian spirituality as an academic discipline is a relative newcomer, compared to 
the established disciplines of church history, dogmatic and systematic theology. While 
beauty has played a significant role in historical writings on spirituality (such as those of 
Augustine, Bonaventure, Julian of Norwich, Bernard of Clairvaux, to mention a few), its 
study as a discrete topic within Christian spirituality is probably in its infancy. The 
Blackwell Companion to Christian Spirituality (Holder, 2005) devotes a chapter to 
aesthetics, largely concerned with defining beauty and the relationship of Christianity to 
the arts.  
Strobel (n.d.) studies the concept of the beatific vision, Riccardi (2013) sets forth a 
proposal for spiritual illumination, and Schwanda (2014:62) argues that Evangelicals have 
both resisted and begun to retrieve the spiritual discipline of contemplation of God’s 
beauty. These may be samples of a wider and perhaps growing phenomenon of seeing 
beauty as crucial to Christian sanctification and worship.  
Demarest (2012), contrasts and discusses the views on spirituality held respectively 
by Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Mainline Protestant and Evangelicals. Beauty is 
referenced, particularly by the Orthodox tradition. Evangelicals have been less convinced 
of the importance of beauty (as are the Orthodox and the Roman Catholics, for perhaps 
many reasons) not the least of which has been the attempt to argue for the objective truth 
of the Bible against its rationalist sceptics and postmodern indifferentists. Nevertheless, 
this modernist approach to beauty is changing in Evangelical literature. Evangelicals are 
advising one another to re-visit the topic of beauty (Hodges, 1995). The number of titles 
tackling beauty and spirituality, even in typically Evangelical journals, is growing (for 
example, see Hodges (1995); Schneiders (2002); Spohn (2003)). Nevertheless, there is a 
surprising dearth of work detailing the connection between God’s beauty and its 
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experience in Christian spirituality. 
3.3.2. Literature on God’s Beauty 
 The tradition of considering God’s beauty as a real absolute is both diverse and 
widespread. This review will consider the literature under three headings: exegetical 
literature, and systematic theology, and historical theology.  
3.3.2.1. Exegetical Literature 
 Some research has been done on the Hebrew and Greek vocabulary of beauty. 
Dyrness (1985:422) identifies word groups that speak of beauty and the enjoyment of 
beauty in the Hebrew Bible. Ferreter (2004) likewise analyses the aesthetic language and 
categories of the Hebrew Bible. Davidson’s (2000) work presents fairly extensive work on 
both the Hebrew and Greek vocabulary of beauty, as well as the presence of literary forms 
within Scripture. Loader (2011; 2012) discusses the concepts of beauty in the Hebrew 
Scriptures. Thomas Schreiner (2013) builds a biblical theology entirely on the concept of 
seeing and knowing the beauty of the Lord.  
3.3.2.2. Systematic Theology 
 According to Crain (2003:30), no mention of beauty is found in the Evangelical 
theologies of Louis Berkhof, or Millard Erickson, with only a passing mention in Wayne 
Grudem. Existentialist theologians, influenced by Kierkegaard, have been more interested 
in the topic, as seen in the writings of Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Reinhold and Richard 
Niebuhr. Hans Urs von Balthasar’s monumental seven-volume The Glory of the Lord: A 
Theological Aesthetics (Von Balthasar, 1961) reflects a twentieth-century position, seeking 
to mediate between modernity and the spiritual reality of God’s glory.  
  As mentioned, the discipline of theological aesthetics is now a thriving venture, 
and its output too voluminous to list. Thiessen (2005) has produced Theological 
Aesthetics: A Reader to sample significant contributions to the topics studied by 
theological aesthetics.  
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 Some twenty-first century works of theology or apologetics address the beauty of 
God. David Hart, in The Beauty of the Infinite (2003), presents the Christian vision of the 
Trinity, Creation, Salvation, and the Eschaton as the answer of peace and beauty to the 
postmodern ontologies of nihilism.  
Wooddell (2011:§834) argues that God’s beauty is objective enough to become the 
basis of a postmodern approach to apologetics. As Christians enter an era in which non-
Christians would describe themselves simultaneously as “spiritual” and sceptical over 
truth-claims, the matter of beauty becomes all the more important. New Age spirituality 
teaches non-believers to distrust historical claims, while longing for mystical experience 
(Herrick, 2003:34). Wooddell (2011:§1505) claims beauty is the most valuable apologetic 
for a postmodern generation. One sees this in works such as Imaginative Apologetics: 
Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic Tradition (Davison, 2011), Theological 
Perspectives on God and Beauty (Ward, Milbank & Wyschogrod, 2003), “A Theistic 
Account of Aesthetic Value” (Williams, 1998), and “Aesthetics: Beauty Avenged, 
Apologetics Enriched” (Edgar, 2001).  
 Beauty remains scarcely considered by systematic and dogmatic theologians in the 
Evangelical tradition. Apologetics seems more cognisant of beauty as a potential strategy 
for defending and presenting the faith.  
3.3.2.3. Historical Theology    
 The question of beauty’s relationship to ultimate questions has a long history. 
Farley (2001) is one of many competent surveys of its development, as is Louie (2013). 
Thiessen (2005) has sampled Christian writers on beauty from the early church to the 
present day. The historical Christian conversation about beauty cannot be separated from 
the broad conversation about aesthetics as described by various historians of thought, for 
example Barzun (2001); Cahn & Meskin (2008), Eco (2004); Scruton, (2009), and 
Tatarkiewicz (1970). 
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 Among them, there is broad consensus. With the growth of thirteenth-century 
nominalism, Cartesian dualism and Enlightenment scepticism, common views on beauty 
began to change (Weaver, 1948:3). Subjective taste began to dominate the eighteenth-
century conversation around beauty.  
Jonathan Edwards perhaps represents a bulwark against Enlightenment revisions, 
grounding beauty in the nature of God, and grounding perception of that beauty in a 
relationship of ‘consent’ (see the comprehensive study of this in Delattre, 1968). Edwards 
saw both natural and spiritual beauty as real, and the subjective perception of them a 
matter of correspondence and correct relatedness. The growing literature on Edwards’ 
treatment of beauty has been mentioned already. 
Eventually, Kantian notions of idealism supplanted the notion of beauty as a 
transcendental absolute. Existentialism gained popularity within twentieth-century 
theology, creating a place for beauty within human existence, while abandoning any 
metaphysical realism to ground such beauty. Theologians such as Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, 
Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr were prominent neo-orthodox theologians who combined 
existentialism with Christian doctrine (Pearcey, 2010:225). Roman Catholicism saw a turn 
back towards beauty in the works of J. Pohle (1852–1922), F. Diekamp (1864–1943), 
Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988) and J. Berthier (1923–1994) (Lindsey, 1974:126).    
Works such as Schaeffer’s (2005) argue that the Evangelical wing of the church 
has suffered from an absorption many of the Enlightenment’s revisions. As the church 
sought to fight attacks on many sides, beauty was often the casualty left behind in the fray. 
 The literature detailing historical theology on the topic of beauty is large, but each 
tells more or less the same story: a post-medieval erosion of confidence in the classical 
position on beauty, leading ultimately to scepticism as to its real existence outside the 
beholder, with Jonathan Edwards as a prominent exception. 
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3.3.3. Literature on the Objective/ Subjective Dichotomy 
 In considering the question of apprehending God’s beauty, it is important to 
understand the dilemma produced by the Cartesian duality of objective and subjective. 
Gilson (1938:99) argues that the move towards scepticism began when reason began to 
supplant revelation as the primary source of knowing. Weaver (1948:3) likewise points to 
William of Occam as the start of a process of scepticism about universals, which includes 
beauty. Dawson (1948:215) holds that the unravelling of the Christian consensus produced 
a non-culture, incapable of shaping its participants to sense beauty and make value 
judgements.    
 The Cartesian dichotomy of what can be objectively known through reason or, 
later, through empirical observation, and what is subjectively known, probably reached its 
Enlightenment conclusion in Hume, where empirical fact and value judgement were 
placed into completely separate domains of knowledge. Kant both concluded the rise of 
modernity, and began the ball rolling towards postmodernity, questioning the notion of the 
perfectly objective knower, and believing that the knower must bring his own sentiments 
to make sense of sense data (see the summary of 18th century philosophy in Beck, 1966). 
Beauty, then, was relegated to the realm of the personal preference, the privately held 
religious opinion, the situational ethic, determined by time, place and culture.   
 The account of the development of the dichotomy between subject and object is 
traced, from a Christian point of view, in writers such as Schaeffer (1972), Meek (2003), 
Pearcey (2010), and Farley (2001). The philosophical account of this same development 
can be seen in authors such as Weaver (1948), Allen & Springsted (1985), Gilson (1938), 
and Scruton (2002). Again, the story will be told slightly differently, but it will be 
essentially the same story.  
 If God’s beauty is indeed a transcendental, how should Christians respond to the 
dualism of subject and object?  
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3.3.3.1. Theories of Truth 
 Various models exist for understanding subjective perception of objective realities, 
particularly in the realm of aesthetics. Jeffrey and Maillet (2011:§443) suggest three: 
correspondence theory, coherence theory, and pragmatic theory, seeing correspondence 
and coherence as reflecting a more consistently Christian worldview.  
 Correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theory is covered in many works 
dealing with Christian epistemology, for example those of Feinberg (2001), Clark (2003), 
Craig & Moreland (2003) and Dupré (1998), who adds disclosure theory to those three. 
Postmodern philosophers prefer coherentist models of truth, since they deny mind-
independent states of reality. A modified correspondence theory is the most likely 
contender for a way of apprehending a transcendental such as beauty. A sample of the 
literature of each follows.  
3.3.3.2. Christian proposals for apprehending transcendentals 
1) The Augustinian proposal. Augustine’s emphasis on loving ordinately as the 
means to know God is echoed by Pascal. Studies of their approach to knowledge and 
beauty are found in works produced by Peters (2009), Harrison (1992), Taylor (1998) 
Meilaender (2006). Others appropriating Augustinian insights include Smith (2004; 2009; 
2013; 2014) and Milbank (2003) and Davison, et al (2011). 
2) The Edwardsian proposal. Jonathan Edwards’ epistemology had much to do 
with a heart that was tending towards voluntary union with God. Edwards scholarship is 
now an academic pursuit in its own right, but representative works dealing with Edwards’ 
epistemology include those of Delattre (1968), McClymond & McDermott (2012), Louie 
(2013), Wainwright (1995), Martin (1975), Lee (1976; 1988), Moody (2005). 
3) The British Romantic Realist Proposal. Writers such as G.K Chesterton 
emphasised imagination and intuition over accumulation of facts. Chesterton asserts this 
both in his non-fiction, such as Orthodoxy (Chesterton, 2009), and in his fiction, such as 
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The Club of Queer Trades (Chesterton, 2011). George MacDonald similarly emphasised 
the primacy of imagination. Their influence is seen most visibly in the most articulate 
proponent of “Romantic Rationalism” (Piper and Mathis, 2014), C.S. Lewis. Markos 
(2010:13) believes many of Lewis’ writings are fundamental for restoring faith in the 
transcendentals.  Lewis’ view of imagination and reason has become the subject of much 
scholarly attention. Representative samples include Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, 
Philosophy and the Catholic Tradition (Davison, 2011); Restoring Beauty: The Good, the 
True, and the Beautiful in the Writings of C. S. Lewis (Markos, 2010); Reason and 
Imagination in C. S. Lewis: A Study of Till We Have Faces (Schakel, 1984); The Romantic 
Rationalist: God, Life, and Imagination in the Work of C. S. Lewis (Piper & Mathis, 2014); 
“C. S. Lewis’s Theory Of Religious Knowledge” (Swedberg, 2010). 
Lesser known, but no less profound, was Owen Barfield. Barfield’s dense and 
difficult Saving the Appearances (1965) responds to the objective/subjective dichotomy 
with the view of participative perception. Barfield’s works have provoked studies of their 
own, for example, Smitherman (2001), and Di Fuccia (2016). 
4) The Polanyian Proposal. Michael Polanyi, as a trained scientist, argued for the 
place of intuition, imagination, interpretation, and personal desire in the empirical process. 
Michael Polanyi’s work, particularly Personal Knowledge (Polanyi, 1958) is gaining 
currency as one of the twentieth century’s most compelling answers to positivism and 
objectivist modernism. Polanyi’s thought has been studied by, among other Christians, 
Meek (2003; 2014), Gunton (1985), and Begbie (1991). Other notable voices objecting to 
the dichotomy between scientific knowledge and other kinds include Stephen Barr (2003), 
Thomas Kuhn (1962), and John Lukacs (2002), Philip Johnson (2000).  
3.3.4. Literature on the Subjective Perception of God’s Beauty  
 Synthesising these Christian responses to positivism and objectivism leads to the 
questions of the subjective perception of God’s beauty. Christian spirituality depends on 
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apprehending something of the beauty of God.    
 Two likely sources may assist in formulating a theory of subjective apprehension 
of beauty. The first is the four proposals listed above. The second is insights from those 
working in theological aesthetics.  
Representative works include Echoes of Eden: Reflections on Christianity, 
Literature, and the Arts (Barrs, 2013); “Christ and the Cultures: Christianity and the Arts” 
(Begbie, 1997); Art & Soul: Signposts for Christians in the Arts (Brand, 2001); Good 
Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste: Aesthetics in Religious Life (Brown, 2000); 
“Turning the Beast into a Beauty: Towards an Evangelical Theological Aesthetics” (Crain, 
2003); The Christian, the Arts and Truth (Gaebelein, 1985); Art and the Beauty of God 
(Harries, 1993); Art and Music: A Student’s Guide (Munson & Drake, 2014); “Christian 
Aesthetic Bread for the World” (Seerveld, 2001); “Aesthetics and Worship” (Spiegel, 
1998); The Beauty of God: Theology and the Arts (Treier, Husbands & Lundin, 2007); 
Theological Aesthetics: God in Imagination, Beauty, and Art (Viladesau, 1999); “Toward 
a Liturgical Aesthetic: An Interdisciplinary Review of Aesthetic Theory” (Witvliet, J.D. 
1996); Art in Action: Toward a Christian Aesthetic (Wolterstorff, 1980). 
Composers and critics provide aesthetic insights that can be appropriated. 
Examples would be composers and critics such as Carson Holloway (2001), Julian 
Johnson (2002), Abraham Kaplan (1966), Leonard Meyer (1956, 1967), and Roger 
Scruton (2009).  
The broader question of how culture and tradition shapes perception is related to 
this study. Niebuhr (1951:40) famously gave five Christian approaches to culture, though 
he equivocates on the definition of culture throughout his work (Bauder, 2011). Scruton 
(2007:14), following T. S. Eliot, describes culture as the “common pursuit of true 
judgement”. A culture provides “background knowledge” that provides broad literacy for 
functioning in that culture (Hirsch, 1988:10). To be in a culture is to receive its interpretive 
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grid, receive its judgements of beauty and ugliness, receive its aesthetic vocabulary as 
one’s own. Eliot (1949:27) similarly believes that a culture is the incarnation of a religion, 
while Machen (2004) sees in a culture the prior conditions of the mind that prepare the 
heart for faith. Writers such as Barzun (1989), Myers (1989) and Postman (1985) see a 
general degradation of Western culture’s perception of beauty. Scruton (2009:174) 
similarly argues that a cult of ugliness exists in the West, while the Evangelical 
Rookmaaker (1994) attempts to describe this progressive loss. If an inward, therapeutic 
culture has replaced one of contemplation (Rieff, 2006), one would expect to see a loss of 
aesthetic perception. If the perception of beauty is not an entirely solitary experience, but 
one received through community and tradition, one can further account for varying 
perceptions of beauty. Other notable works dealing with Christianity’s relationship to 
culture include those of Aniol (2015), Dawson (1948), Carson (2008), and van Til (1959). 
In terms of apprehending God’s beauty, the nature of love and emotion must be 
clarified. Thomas Dixon (2003) has demonstrated that what moderns call “emotions” were 
considered differently as affections and passions in the past. Recovering a biblical view of 
“emotion”, and understanding it as ordinate desire, or affection is integral to this study. 
Martin’s (2013) work on Edwards' view of the affections demonstrates that modern 
interpretations of him have often erred. McDermott (1995) also contrasts affections and 
emotions. Several works on a biblical view of emotions have appeared in recent years, 
including those of Bray (2012), Cameron (2012), Condie (2012), Jensen (2012), Smith 
(2012) and Williams (2003). More importantly, understanding how to order and shape our 
loves and desires is crucial (Naugle, 2008; Schindler, 2011). A right view of God’s love is 
also an important aspect of God’s beauty to be considered, as treated by scholars such as 
Leeman (2010) and Wells (2013).    
3.4. Summary and Lacunae 
 Literature abounds on the topic of God’s beauty. Exegetes have found aesthetic 
  42 
 
words and themes in Scripture. God’s beauty was certainly regarded as an objective reality 
by most Christians until the Enlightenment. Those modern scholars working in theological 
aesthetics have related God’s beauty to liturgy, creativity, and the making of cultural 
phenomena.  
 The question of apprehending transcendentals is also not a new one, nor one 
without numerous proposals, particularly for the transcendental of truth. The 
epistemological question of subjective and objective forms of knowledge is a topic of 
much study.  
 Nevertheless, little work has been done on relating the meaning and apprehension 
of God’s beauty to Christian spirituality. Theological aesthetics discusses beauty in respect 
of the use of arts in worship, how Christian artists may fulfil their callings, theories of 
artistic criticism, how theology and imagination relate, and descriptions of God’s beauty. 
Spirituality, on the other hand, describes the lived experience of God in the lives of 
Christians. Very little in the extant literature details a methodology for a Christian in 
pursuit of God’s beauty.  
 The lacunae in the literature appears to lie in detailing the meaning and experience 
of God’s beauty in the life of a Christian in pursuit of this beauty. The wealth of research 
in the areas of historical theology, theological aesthetics, and epistemology can be 
combined with an eye to Christian spirituality. Insights from aesthetics and epistemology 
on subjective apprehension can be adapted into Christian practices, dispositions, and 
experiences, in order to create a model of the Christian life based upon apprehending 
God’s beauty. 
3.5. Conclusion  
 This survey has considered representative literature related to the topic of God’s 
beauty. Significant work has been done to describe God’s beauty from a theological 
perspective, and to develop a theology of aesthetics. Several writers have accounted for a 
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biblical theology of beauty and identified the concept of beauty within Scripture. 
The Enlightenment split between empirical and transcendental knowledge has been 
analysed in various ways and Christians have set forth suitable proposals for joining what 
was split. Theological aesthetics discusses the relationship between theology and the arts, 
and the place of beauty and creativity in liturgy and broader Christianity. 
Few have developed the relationship of God’s beauty directly to the experience of 
Christians. This chapter concluded that the gap in the research lies in combining insights 
from history, theology, aesthetics, and epistemology, in order to build a model of Christian 
spirituality based upon apprehending the beauty of God. 
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Chapter 4. Problem Statement 
4.1. Introduction 
Having surveyed in the previous chapter a representative sample of the literature 
related to the apprehension of God’s beauty, this chapter will detail the research problem. 
It will outline the main problem, and state the key questions to be solved. It will then 
elucidate the problem, by delimiting the study, providing working definitions of key terms, 
and stating the presuppositions of the researcher. It will then set forth the value of the 
study, both theologically and practically.  
4.2. The Statement of the Problem  
4.2.1. The Main Problem  
While the concept of God’s beauty has enjoyed renewed attention in theological 
aesthetics, historical studies (particularly of Augustine and Jonathan Edwards), and in the 
occasional philosophical challenge to positivism or naturalism, little work has been done 
to explore the relationship of God’s beauty to the experience of Christians.  
  Christian spirituality has agreed that God is beautiful. But few, if any, have sought 
to describe an approach to Christian spirituality predicated upon seeking God’s beauty. It 
may seem tautologous to speak of seeking God’s beauty if God’s beauty and his person are 
identical, for then seeking God’s beauty is simply another way of speaking of seeking 
God. If God’s beauty, however, refers to a specific relation in God, or an identifiable mode 
of being within God, then seeking God’s beauty is not necessarily synonymous with the 
whole Christian life.  
 Beauty is assumed as a goal in Christian spirituality, but the experience is not often 
described, nor a corresponding method defined.  
What is needed is a study that embraces and describes God’s beauty as an objective 
transcendental, while describing a method that Christians can perceive and know this 
beauty in all of their spirituality, including, but not restricted to, liturgy and the arts. 
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Building on Christian responses to modernism, this model should recognise the place of 
imagination, intuition, and personal knowledge when considering desire.  
 A theory of Christian spirituality predicated upon apprehending God’s beauty is yet 
to be researched, taking into account work done on aesthetics, epistemology, and theology. 
 The main research problem can be summarised thus: what would the nature be of 
an Evangelical Protestant Christian spirituality predicated upon seeking and finding God’s 
beauty, in its priorities, postures, and practices? 
4.2.2. The Key Questions  
The study answers the question: what would the nature be of an Evangelical Protestant 
Christian spirituality predicated upon seeking and finding God’s beauty? To answer this 
question, several supporting questions must be asked and answered.  
1) Is there biblical precedent for believing in God’s beauty as a real, objective quality, 
and for pursuing it? 
2) How has God’s beauty been understood and pursued by Christians, from the early 
church to the present day?  
3) How has the idea of beauty developed in the intellectual climate within which 
Christians have lived, or in the philosophical tradition they have received? 
4) Since art is known for its pursuit of beauty, what is its relationship to the Christian 
religion and Christian spirituality? 
5) What are the generally shared experiences and methodologies of those pursuing 
beauty in the arts, and are there spiritual analogues to these? 
6) Since beauty is regarded by many as a mere internal state, with what certainty can 
the subjective experience of beauty be said to correspond with objective realities? 
7) How has the idea of objective and subjective knowledge developed in intellectual 
climate within which Christians have lived? 
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8) What Christian proposals exist for connecting transcendent with immanent, 
objective with subjective? 
9) In light of this history and theology, aesthetic theory and epistemology, what kind 
of spirituality can answer reflect the findings so far discovered? What are its 
characteristics, and what are its disciplines? 
4.3. The Elucidation of the Problem  
4.3.1. Delimitations of the Study 
A topic such as God’s beauty and its apprehension could easily be overwhelmed by 
attempting to answer questions too large for a limited study. Therefore, the study must be 
delimited by clarifying what questions will not be answered, or answered in any 
exhaustive sense.  
First, the study is not concerned to decisively and exhaustively tackle the definition 
of beauty or God’s beauty. A definition has already been supplied. The Christian and 
broader cultural understanding of beauty throughout Christian history will be surveyed, but 
this study will be content to spend the bulk of its attention on the question of apprehending 
beauty, not on defining it. 
Second, the study is not an exhaustive historical study of how beauty has been 
referenced in Christian spirituality. That beauty has been referenced by writers on 
spirituality is not disputed; that a model of spirituality predicated on apprehending God’s 
beauty exists is doubtful. In light of this, it will suffice to mention those writers who give 
beauty the greatest detail in their writings. 
Third, the study is not concerned to duplicate the work of theological aesthetics, 
exploring in detail the relationship of Christianity to the arts. It will suffice to establish the 
relationship, to explain the place of imagination in perception, and to harness insights from 
theological aesthetics. It will not set out to provide a theory of art criticism, except insofar 
as critical theory could provide analogous practices or procedures for Christian spirituality. 
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Fourth, the study is not attempting to exhaustively cover the development and 
intellectual history of Cartesian dualism of objective/subjective knowledge. Once the 
history is sketched, the focus will be Christian responses to this dualism. 
4.3.2. Working Definitions of Key Terms  
 The terms fundamental to this study are spirituality, beauty, subjective and 
objective. 
4.3.2.1. Spirituality 
Christian spirituality is the lived experience of Christian faith (Schneiders, 
2002:134). Spohn (2003:255) defines spirituality as “the affective, practical and 
transformative side of religion…Whether taken as a way of life or field of study, 
spirituality emphasizes experienced knowledge of the sacred”. This definition is repeated 
in various forms by others: “the lived experience of Christian faith and discipleship” 
(Holder, 2005:5); “the lived experience of Christian faith, the subjective appropriation of 
faith and living of discipleship in their individual and corporate actualization(s)” 
(Schneiders, 2005:16). Sheldrake (1988:2) says the term describes how “individually and 
collectively, we personally appropriate the traditional Christian beliefs about God, 
humanity and the world, and express them in terms of our basic attitudes, lifestyle and 
activity”. McGrath’s (1999:2) definition is “the quest for a fulfilled and authentic Christian 
existence, involving the bringing together of the fundamental ideas of Christianity and 
whole experience of living on the basis of and within the scope of the Christian faith”. 
 Of course, the study of Christian spirituality is equally the study of Christian 
spiritualities, for there are many. The Christian faith, from an Evangelical point of view, is 
defined by Waltke (1988:9) as love of God and love of man. According to Howard 
(2012:159), Evangelical spirituality concerns the manner by which believers live in 
communion with Christ in response to the Spirit in pursuit of holiness resulting in service 
to others.   
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 The incarnation of that love or knowledge, and the means to experience it, are 
usually described in the practices of prayer, Scripture reading, journaling, corporate 
worship and service in the local church. Nevertheless, at root, Evangelical spirituality is, as 
Lane (2001:1) believes John Calvin thought it to be: “a performance of desire shared by 
the whole of the universe, a deliberate practice of delight that echoes through every part of 
the created world”.  
 For the purposes of this study, then, the working definition of Christian spirituality 
is the experience of knowing and loving the triune God in its public, private, and perpetual 
manifestations.  
4.3.2.2. Beauty 
The introductory chapter gave four criteria for a working definition of God’s 
beauty: a useful working definition must be theological, traditional, philosophical, and 
practical. The second chapter added that beauty was personal, an axiomatic first principle, 
dynamic, and moral in nature. God’s beauty, then, describes the personal, dynamic, and 
moral love of God for his own being. God’s beauty is then “the Most Lovely loving the 
Most Lovely”. God’s beauty is his radiant delight in his uncompounded being. Created or 
secondary beauty is all that is not God that reflects the excellence of God’s being, which 
beautiful beings will love. 
4.3.2.3. Subjective and Objective 
The terms objective and subjective are commonly misused. Some take the word 
“objectivity” as a descriptor of a method of enquiry, describing a supposedly disinterested, 
neutral and unbiased form of analysis. This misuse suggests that subjective refers to what 
is unreal, or unreliable, while objective refers to what is fixed, true and verifiable in some 
way that exempts itself from human interpretation. Lukacs suggests replacing this use with 
the word “honesty”, which is something else, and more than a mere method of enquiry, 
and a modicum of humility resides within it (2002:90).  
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Barzun & Graff (1992:174–175) helpfully clarify: 
“Subjective” and “objective” properly apply not to persons and opinion but to 
sensations and judgments. Every person, that is, every living subject is necessarily 
subjective in all his sensations. But some of his subjective sensations are of objects, 
others of himself, or “subject.”...But objects themselves are known only by subjects 
—persons—so the distinction is not clear-cut, much less a test of reality.  
In other words, rightly used, subjective refers to the perceiving subject’s judgements and 
perceptions. Objective refers to what is perceived by the subject. The subject may  
misconstrue or misinterpret the object, or he or she may perceive it as truly as possible.  
Either way, the subject’s knowledge is always, necessarily, subjective. Calling such  
knowledge subjective does not mean it is less true or real, for a subject’s judgements may  
conform to what truly is. All knowledge is interpreted through the mind of the subject,  
which means it is impossible for a subject to obtain knowledge of an object that is not  
filtered through his or her own interpretive grid.  
4.3.3. Presuppositions of the Researcher  
While the academic discipline of Christian spirituality draws on hermeneutics, 
theology, history, and anthropology, it is ultimately the study of an experience. This makes 
its pursuit challenging. Studying that which cannot be quantified or subjected to strict 
empirical tests strains the researcher’s own sense of objectivity and subjectivity. This may 
be a weakness, but it can be a strength. A lack of personal investment in Christian 
spirituality would, in some senses, be incongruous. Bringing confirmatory insights and 
experiences from one’s own experience may enhance and develop the study of what others 
have thought and written. 
This researcher’s theological persuasion is Evangelical Protestant. This entails the 
at least the following presuppositions: 
a) recognising the sixty-six books of the Protestant Bible as Scripture.  
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b) holding to the divine inspiration and dual-authorship of Scripture, seeing it as 
the ultimate authority for life and practice. 
c) holding to the sum and substance of the Apostles’ Creed, Nicene Creed, 
Athanasian Creed, along with the doctrinal understanding of the Reformers and 
non-Conformists, found in confessions such as the 1689 London Baptist 
Confession of Faith, or the New Hampshire Baptist Confession of Faith. 
4.4. The Value of the Study  
4.4.1. Value to Christian Spirituality 
 To understand the value of this proposed study to Christian spirituality, the reader 
should consider six intersections between beauty and spirituality. 
 First, in some Christian spiritualities, beauty is a synonym for God’s glory, or for 
the encounter with God. This is as much as saying that for these spiritualities, the pursuit 
of beauty is the practice of spirituality. Howard (2011:2) writes that Christian spirituality 
and spiritual formation begins or ends with the perception of an aim, and this aim is 
aesthetic; it is perception of beauty. He argues, 
 Christian formation is not simply the application of principles to our lives, it is 
rather the ever-increasing embodiment of Beauty. Hence we must learn to see the 
aims of our growth in Christ not simply as responsibilities or commands but also as 
experiments in a beautiful life (2011:8).  
Studying the objective and subjective dimensions of God’s beauty is studying the lived 
experience of Christian faith.  
 Second, love is at the heart of both beauty and spirituality. Beauty calls for 
correspondence between affection and reality: the “good taste” that loves good form in art.  
In spirituality, God himself becomes the motive for the holy soul to pursue more of him. 
Beauty comes from and leads to love or benevolence. Elaine Scarry’s Beauty and Being 
Just (1999) argues that beauty is distributive, and that the involuntary love of the beauty of 
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one thing, makes one deliberately attentive of other things. The soul in pursuit of God 
must similarly become more in love with its neighbour. Beauty has a way of identifying 
idolatry and self-love, calling people to examine their motives in loving something 
beautiful. Christian spirituality equally forces one to ask if Christians are loving God as a 
means or as an end, whether one’s pleasure in God is disinterested or acquisitive.  
 Third, several of the experiences of beauty in art correspond to experiences of 
Christian spirituality. Pleasure, a sense of the numinous, recognising the invisible through 
the visible, distinguishing between the sacred and the common, and a contemplative gaze 
are shared by both those pursuing beauty in nature or art, and those seeking God. The fact 
that artists and art critics describe the procedure of understanding beauty in art in such 
similar terms to those who speak of meditating on God is striking. Therefore, to study the 
experience of beauty alongside the study of Christian spirituality will undoubtedly yield 
fascinating parallels.  
 Fourth, several of the practices and skills needed to experience beauty in art 
correspond to what is needed for Christian spirituality. These include the use of the 
imagination as a form of perception, the pursuit of disinterested pleasure in the object, the 
practice of immersion into the object to understand it on its own terms, and careful 
contemplation. If the skills for recognising beauty overlap with the skills to experience the 
presence of God, a rich vein of spiritual experience can be mined here. Indeed, it may be 
that the student of Christian spirituality needs to “de-secularise” technical aesthetic 
discussions and unite what was divorced during the Enlightenment: art and religion.  
 Fifth, though the study at hand concerns spirituality in general and not exclusively 
corporate worship, Christian spirituality and worship requires art. At the very least, music 
and poetry are commanded (Ephesians 5:19; Colossians 3:16), and the act of corporate 
worship cannot be performed without art. This art should be beautiful, and a study of 
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beauty, and God’s beauty in particular, has many practical ramifications. Beauty and 
Christian spirituality inevitably intersect when the topic is corporate worship.  
 Finally, beauty, like spirituality, eludes perfect definition, while being understood 
through encounter. Both the academic or philosophical study of beauty (aesthetics) and the 
academic study of Christian spirituality are attempting to swim the Tiber: objectively—
through academic rigour—define and describe what can only be known subjectively, 
through immersion in the experience of God and beauty. This apparent disadvantage 
becomes an advantage when embracing the constraints of the study: simultaneously 
recognising that an objective study must do its rational work, while urging the affective 
knowledge gained subjectively to lend its aid. Beauty and spirituality call for the 
understanding of where objective and subjective realities meet. 
 These six reasons provide reasonable justification for researching a form of 
Christian spirituality in pursuit of God’s beauty. A study of God’s beauty, both as an idea 
and as an experience, is eminently practical and helpful to the discipline of Christian 
spirituality.  
4.4.2. Practical Value 
The first chapter set out several ways that a Christian concern with beauty has 
practical value. First, a study in apprehending God’s beauty not only provides Christians 
with a sense of assurance of the reality of their faith, but it provides a cogent witness and 
apologetic to the non-Christian world.  
Second, a study in spirituality based on God’s beauty can correct a faulty 
epistemology, and replace it with a correct one. Knowing beauty is more like knowing 
persons than gathering scientific data, and this can return Christians and non-Christians to 
ask the right questions when pursuing religious knowledge. 
Third, a study in beauty supports the development of Christian ethics and 
godliness.  
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Fourth, a study that seeks a method for apprehending God’s beauty will necessarily 
enhance and strengthen the church’s corporate worship, by encouraging aesthetic maturity 
and better understanding of the aesthetic mode of perception.   
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the research problem: what would be the nature of an 
Evangelical Protestant Christian spirituality predicated upon seeking and finding God’s 
beauty? Having done so, it set out nine supporting questions to be answered in this study. 
The extent of the study was described with four delimitations. The study’s key terms, 
spirituality, beauty, objective and subjective, were defined, and the presuppositions of the 
researcher were set out. The chapter then listed and explained the study’s value to 
spirituality and its practical value to Christianity. 
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Chapter 5. Research Methodology 
5.1. Introduction 
 This chapter will set forth the methodology, structure, and matters of formatting for 
this study. 
5.2. Research Methodology 
5.2.1. Methodologies for Conceptual Argumentation 
The study seeks to understand a hypothetical model of spirituality based upon 
apprehending God’s beauty. As the nature of such research is a study of philosophical, 
theological, and aesthetic matters, the methodology of research will be qualitative.  
 Since the question is not of an empirical nature, quantitative or scientific methods 
of research are not appropriate. Instead, extensive reading of scholarly literature on the 
topics of beauty, spirituality, aesthetics, epistemology, and historical theology, require the 
qualitative approach. 
 Several different methodologies will be used in the conceptual argumentation of 
this study. In some cases, the method will be comparative, as differing views on beauty, 
aesthetics and epistemology are compared and contrasted. A certain amount of polemical 
methods will be employed, for atheistic or secularist views often necessarily clash with the 
presupposed Christian view. A good deal of epistemological discussion will take place, 
particularly in chapter eight, analysing and critiquing the foundations of knowledge that 
certain views are built upon.  
 Primarily, though, the study will be a synthetic one, combining previously related 
ideas from history, aesthetics, epistemology and theology to form a new model.  
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5.2.2. Disciplines for Academic Spirituality 
 The academic study of Christian spirituality has an interdisciplinary character. 
Schneiders (2005:7) points out that in such a study, two layers of interdisciplinarity are 
active. First, the constitutive disciplines, which necessarily function in relation to the 
subject. These would be Scripture and Christian history, for these supply the positive data 
of Christian religious experience.  Second, the problematic disciplines relate to the 
particular problem being studied, which could be psychology, sociology, literature, or 
some other field of study. With these two layers in place, Schneiders suggests that 
theology comes into play, related both to the constitutive and problematic disciplines. 
These are now described in relation to this study.  
5.2.2.1. The Constitutive Disciplines  
 In this particular study, chapter six will cover the constitutive disciplines of 
exegesis, biblical theology, and Christian history. An investigation of the Bible’s own 
treatment of beauty will consider an exegesis of certain key words that have to do with the 
idea of beauty, along with a consideration of literary forms and thematic elements related 
to beauty. It will engage the literature that covers how God’s beauty has been treated by 
Christian thinkers, both past and present, and more generally, by philosophers of beauty. 
Primary sources will include the works of theologians and philosophers dealing with 
beauty. Of particular interest will be Christian thinkers who placed the apprehension of 
beauty as central to their system.  
Chapter six will seek to summarise and compare theologians, philosophers and 
other relevant writers on the matter of beauty in general, and God’s beauty in particular. 
Secondary sources will be from those writers, historical or contemporary, who assume 
God’s beauty to be a real transcendental quality or property and relate it to aesthetics, 
liturgics, or the arts.  
The broader cultural conversation regarding beauty will be examined, as 
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Christianity does not exist in a cultural vacuum. The chapter will bring the discussion of 
beauty into the current era, as the model of Christian spirituality must be lived in the 
present day.   
The conclusion of chapter six should summarise how the Bible and Christian 
history have understood God’s beauty and pursued it in spirituality, and what the broad 
contemporary consensus on beauty is. 
5.2.2.2. The Problematic Disciplines 
 Chapter seven will be the first of the problematic disciplines, dealing primarily 
with aesthetics. Here the study will turn from objective to subjective, seeking to 
understand how beauty has been experienced, particularly in art. Art’s relationship to 
religion will be explored, to justify the examination of aesthetic methodologies in art. 
Certainly, beauty exists in many other realms, but art’s focused attention on beauty, and its 
inseparability from religion, make it a necessary aspect of this study.  
Here the primary sources will be those writers that have compared the experience 
of beauty in art to that of religion. The writers who have delved into theological aesthetics 
will be studied. Of particular interest will be understanding this experience from various 
aspects: the aspect of perception, the aspect of expression, the aspect of interpretation, and 
the aspect of the evaluation.  
Again, a synthesised definition of the subjective experience of beauty will be 
attempted. The chapter will seek to answer the most outstanding objection to a standard of 
beauty existing outside the subject, that is widely differing perceptions and tastes in 
beauty.  
The matter of taste in art will be considered. A set of experiences and responses for 
the perception of beauty that can be applied to Christian spirituality should emerge from 
chapter. 
 With both an objective and subjective definition in hand, the relation between the 
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two will be approached in chapter eight. Here a second problematic discipline will be 
considered: epistemology. 
The division between subject and object plagues the question of beauty. This 
division will be considered historically. Chapter eight will begin by considering the 
broader epistemological conversation regarding how objective realities and subjective 
perceptions relate, beginning with classic and medieval views, going into the Cartesian 
dichotomy and its development during the Enlightenment, culminating in the impasse 
presented by secular and post-secular thinkers, where the concept of correspondence 
between objective and subjective worlds is, for the most part, denied. 
The matter of correspondence theory will be considered. The question of 
correspondence in matters ethical and aesthetical will be considered. Other theories of 
truth will be examined, and a theory of apprehending transcendentals for Christian 
spirituality will be set forth. The chapter will consider several Christian responses to the 
supposed dichotomy between objective and subjective knowledge, namely Augustine, 
Blaise Pascal, Jonathan Edwards, Owen Barfield, C.S. Lewis and Michael Polanyi. A 
synthesis of these proposals will be made which will constitute a theory of apprehending 
beauty in spirituality, and again provide a set of responses and postures for the 
apprehension of beauty.  
5.2.2.3. Theology 
 Finally, chapter nine will attempt to outline this model by drawing on the findings 
of the previous three chapters, using Schneider’s (2005:10) third interdisciplinary layer, 
theology. McGrath (1999:32) points out the negative implications for spirituality of a 
“detached” approach to theology. Conceiving theology in purely informational terms is 
harmful to the study of spirituality, which rightly understood, is relational.  
The research of the previous chapters will be summarised to present the proposal 
for the apprehension of God’s beauty. Once established, a model for shaping such 
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apprehension will be set forth. Developing Jonathan Edwards’ views on “consent” will be 
particularly helpful here. The theology will be particularly that of the theologians of the 
affections, whose writings have dealt with rightly ordered desire, as the corresponding 
response in the subject to God’s perceived beauty. Particular attention will be paid to 
Augustine, Jonathan Edwards, and C. S. Lewis. 
 Drawing on some of the insights from Radical Orthodoxy, it will recommend 
certain spiritual disciplines, suggesting how these disciplines may foster the kind of 
response that corresponds with God’s beauty.  
The goal will be to produce a description of the experience of Christian spirituality 
in which God’s beauty is pursued, and subjectively experienced, along with the methods 
and disciplines that constitute it.  
5.3. Referencing and Formatting 
  This study makes use of standard British spelling and punctuation, with two 
exceptions: the Oxford comma is utilised, and double inverted-commas are used. In-text 
citation is used, with rare educational footnotes. In-line and bibliographical citation 
follows the Harvard method, mostly using the “Stellenbosch University” option within 
Zotero software (Stillman, 2018). Kindle editions without page numbers reference the 
cited sections using the § symbol. Classical works are cited by their title, book, chapter, 
and section or question. The consulted editions and their modern date and translation are 
listed in the bibliography, titled “Works Cited”. 
The bibliography references all works consulted, while educational footnotes 
include additional references for the reader’s further study. Abbreviations of the titles of 
books of the Bible follow the SBL Handbook of Style. Divine pronouns are not capitalised.  
  59 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 This chapter has outlined and justified the research methodology employed for this 
study. It has detailed the structure of the study to be followed in succeeding chapters, and 
explained the formatting to be used.  
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Chapter 6. Objective Beauty: The Idea of Beauty in Scripture and 
Christian History 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
 Evangelical Christian spirituality looks to the Bible as the authoritative document 
defining faith and practice (McGrath, 1999:18). Beyond the Bible, sources of knowledge 
such as reason, experience, and tradition also play supporting roles. If God’s beauty refers 
to an aspect of God’s being or creation (and not merely an inner experience limited to the 
human consciousness), the idea of God’s beauty as a real and objective property should be 
found in the Scriptures and referenced in the writings of Christians after the apostolic era. 
This chapter will consider the idea of God’s “objective” beauty, from Scripture itself, and 
in the writing and thinking of Christians.  
The chapter will examine beauty in Scripture both exegetically and theologically, 
by considering words with a semantic range that includes the idea of beauty, and by 
considering whether beauty is developed as a theme within Scripture. 
The study will then survey beauty in the intellectual tradition of Christianity. This 
will also reveal which Christian spiritualities have held God’s beauty as a central concept. 
The chapter will reference writings of some non-Christians, insofar as they significantly 
influenced Christian thought or broader societal thinking about beauty.  
The goal of the investigation will be to see if the idea of beauty as an “objective” 
reality beyond subjective pleasure finds support in Scripture and Christian history.  
6.2. Beauty in the Bible  
 Finding the idea of beauty in Scripture requires both the “worm’s-eye view” and 
the “bird’s-eye view”. The worm’s-eye view is the consideration of particular Hebrew and 
Greek words with the semantic domain of beauty, alongside the literary form of Scripture 
itself. The bird’s-eye view is the broader canonical theology of the Bible that contains the 
notion of beauty.  
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 Of course, the very selection of these words could be labelled as arbitrary, based as 
it is on the chosen definition of chapter two. Nevertheless, the chosen definition will be 
tested against the testimony of Scripture. Simultaneously, the semantic areas associated 
with beauty will help modify or expand the working definition of beauty if necessary.  
 The initial problem with a study of beauty in the Bible is that little in Scripture 
corresponds exactly to classic ideas of beauty, particularly as a philosophical concept of 
harmony, proportion or as one of the transcendental triad alongside truth and goodness. As 
Edmund Clowney pointed out, Hebrew writers did not think of God as the Greeks thought 
of Apollo (Crain, 2003:38).  
A second problem is that the English equivalents of Hebrew words can be variable. 
These include words such as glory, beauty, excellency, honour and majesty (Lindsey, 
1974:122), so a word-search on the English word beauty in English translations of the 
Bible will not yield illuminating results. Moore (2004:159) adds to this list of English 
equivalents the words loveliness, comeliness, pleasantness, delightfulness, and excellence, 
commenting that “what was regarded as beautiful in the mind of Old Testament writers 
was what their contemporaries felt drawn to in their affections, what they found pleasant, 
appealing, or desirable, what they took delight in observing”. 
 In other words, the concept of beauty is more of a categorical concept for biblical 
writers, encompassing terms such as “light, splendour, majesty, pleasant, and fitting” 
(Crain, 2003:38). One might argue that the Hebrews took the experience of beauty for 
granted, without seeing a need to define it abstractly or conceptually. Beauty is more of an 
adjective than a noun in Hebrew thought, more a descriptor than an idea considered in 
itself. The Hebrew mind, given to describing the works of God, was not prone to 
philosophise on metaphysical concepts.  
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6.2.1. Exegetically Considered 
 
6.2.1.2. Old Testament  
1)  Hebrew Words 
 
 Dyrness (1985:422) suggests that beauty was not an isolable entity in Hebrew 
thought, for they regarded it as an aspect of the totality of the meaning of the created order. 
He nevertheless identifies seven word groups associated with beauty. Bushell, Tan and 
Weaver (1992) record the frequency of these words, with their various grammatical 
forms.3  1. ybic., occurring thirty-one times in thirty verses, with five forms, meaning “honour, 
outward splendour, meriting admiration” (BDB, 7993), and “ornament, splendour” 
(HALOT, 7855).	2. rap, occurring twenty-one times in twenty verses, with fourteen forms, associated 
with the ideas of crowning, beautifying, bringing splendour, and glorifying (BDB, 
7550). The variant noun	tr,aep.ti  is used forty-nine times in forty-eight verses, with 
10 forms, meaning beauty, glory, splendour, ornament”(BDB, 7552). 	3. 	dmoh., occurring twenty-seven times in twenty-six verses, with fifteen forms, 
meaning “desire and try to acquire, crave, covet” (HALOT, 2611); as a noun it 
means pleasant, lovely, or precious. As a noun, it occurs sixteen times in sixteen 
verses, in five forms.	4.  Hpey' occurring fifty times in forty-six verses, in fourteen forms; the noun ypiy\ is 
used nineteen times in nineteen verses, with six forms. These words refer to the 
outward beauty of a person, sometimes God’s own presence, the highest natural 
perfection (BDB, 460).	5. Hw,an’, occurring ten times in ten verses, in 2 forms; the variant ha’n’ occurs three 
                                               
3 Appendix A provides the precise verse references for all the occurrences of these words. 
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times in three verses, in two forms, referring to that which is beautiful or lovely, 
and that which is fitting, becoming, or suitable (HALOT, 5300).	6. ~[n, occurring sixteen times in sixteen verses, in eight forms; meaning pleasant, 
delightful, or lovely (BDB, 6191); the variant ~y[in’ occurs thirteen times in thirteen 
verses, in four forms, meaning “agreeable, pleasant, lovely” (HALOT, 5588) 	
7. Rd;h], occurring thirty-eight times in thirty-seven verses, in thirteen forms, carrying 
the ideas of swelling, honour, adorn, glorify (BDB, 2291). 
 Davidson (2000:199) has a list of fourteen Hebrew words that reference beauty. 
Omitting the overlaps between her list and Dyrness’, she mentions a further five: 	
8. bAj, occurring five hundred and fifty-three times in five hundred verses, with 
thirty-one forms. This word has a broad semantic range that includes the ideas of 
good, joyous, pleasing, usable, suitable, lovely, friendly, good in quality, morally 
good (HALOT, 3016).	
9. DabK', occurring two hundred times in one hundred and eighty-nine verses, in ten 
forms, is the most common word for glory: weighty, burdensome, impressive in 
appearance, splendid, magnificent, distinctive, honourable, and glorious (HALOT, 
3675). Martin (1990:10) suggests that “glory was a concept intermediate between 
divine transcendence and those manifestations of divine immanence”.     	
10. hw’n’, occurring once in Exodus 15:2, meaning to adorn or beautify (BDB, 5955).	
11. ha,r.m;, occurring one hundred and sixteen times in ninety-three verses, with fifteen 
forms, referring to seeing, outward appearance, sight, vision, and what is good-
looking (HALOT, 5035).	
12. Rp,v,  occurring four times in four verses, in three forms, meaning to be beautiful, 
fair, comely, or goodliness (BDB, 10285). 
Summarising this data, Loader (2011:664) suggests “that the essence of beauty is that 
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which impresses”.  
 Two observations stand out regarding beauty in the vocabulary of the Hebrew Old 
Testament. The first is that, in the Hebrew beauty-vocabulary, the ideas of splendour, 
majesty, honour, and glorious mingle with the ideas of pleasure, desire, attractiveness and 
enjoyment. Interestingly, this represents a union of what, in Enlightenment thought, would 
be divided into separate realms of objective qualities and subjective experiences. For the 
Hebrew mind, no division, it seems, existed between what was lovely and loving it, 
between the desirable and its desire, between splendour and its admiration.  
 Second, Hebrew writers are describing a phenomenon, not defining an idea. The 
phenomenon is that of encountering persons, objects or events of beauty: both what those 
persons, objects or events are, and the responses they engender or merit in those beholding 
them. At this stage of pre-speculative intellectual history, no division existed between the 
experience and considering the experience in the abstract. As Lewis (2014:57) points out, 
the modern dilemma is  
either to taste and not to know or to know and not to taste—or, more strictly, to 
lack one kind of knowledge because we are in an experience or to lack another kind 
because we are outside it. As thinkers we are cut off from what we think about; as 
tasting, touching, willing, loving, hating, we do not clearly understand. The more 
lucidly we think, the more we are cut off: the more deeply we enter into reality, the 
less we can think. 
The Hebrews were clearly on the tasting end of the spectrum (Ps. 34:8) and display no 
consciousness of such a dilemma. They give no hint that they are attempting to abstract the 
experience into objective, speculative concepts. Consequently, to attempt to define beauty 
based upon Hebrew descriptions will likely be an elusive exercise. Instead, the Old 
Testament writers are pointing to a shared value, even an ultimate value, found in creation. 
Words that mean attractive, splendid, precious, fitting, and lovely clearly refer to the same 
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idea summarised in the more Western term beauty. The broad overlap of these words, with 
no effort to single out one word as the true locus of meaning, suggests multiple synonyms 
for a phenomenon that the Hebrew mind saw no reason to delineate, only one to point to, 
and to invite participation in. Indeed, as Loader (2011:659) points out, there are many 
metaphors for beauty, using images from fruit, jewellery, scents, and the like, which do not 
use any of the words previously listed. Beauty and art in the Hebrew Bible are social and 
religious phenomena, aesthetics within a religious covenant, “the reflection upon beauty 
and art of a community that defines itself as the people to whom God has appeared and 
graciously spoken” (Ferreter, 2004:137). To look for a speculative, abstract notion from a 
pre-speculative society would be an anachronism. Instead, the lexical evidence is abundant 
that the Hebrew mind experienced all that moderns connect with beauty, both as an 
objective value, and as a subjective experience.  
2. Old Testament literary forms 
 In the broadest sense, Scripture not only speaks of beauty, but displays it itself. 
Form cannot be separated from content, and the Scriptures not only speak of beauty, but 
speak in beautiful ways. The Bible is given in aesthetic form. Biblical writers chose to use 
sophisticated literary forms: narrative, poetry, wisdom and other forms that display a high 
degree of craftsmanship.  
 Davidson (2000:41) points out literary structures such as parallelism, chiasms 
(2000:44), and sophisticated narrative structure (2000:113). Robert Alter’s The Art of 
Biblical Poetry (1985) examines in detail the forms in which Hebrew parallelism take, the 
narrativity within biblical poetry, the structures of intensification, indeed, even the 
powerful use of irony, wit, and humour. Literary structure is even used as a narrative 
device (Rand, 2002:213). 
 These literary structures demonstrate implicitly the importance of beauty to the 
Hebrews. Arranging the actual form of the narrative, poems, prophecies, and wisdom 
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literature into recognisable literary structures displays the writers’ desires to communicate 
not only accurately, but also beautifully.  
3. Significant representative texts 
a. “For Aaron’s sons you shall make tunics, and you shall make sashes for them. 
And you shall make hats for them, for glory and beauty” (Exod. 28:40). 
 The priestly garments were not only made for functional effectiveness, but for 
sheer attractiveness and winsomeness.  
b. “Then adorn yourself with majesty and splendor, and array yourself with glory 
and beauty” (Job 40:10). 
 God’s challenge to Job included the demand that Job exude beauty, that he possess 
and display the power to beautify himself in a self-sufficient manner. The clear implication 
is that Job cannot do so; by contrast, God possesses such beauty and can display it at will. 
c. “One thing I have desired of the LORD, That will I seek: That I may dwell in the 
house of the LORD All the days of my life, To behold the beauty of the LORD, And to 
inquire in His temple” (Ps. 27:4). 
 David summarized the central longing of his life: to be always in that place where 
the Shekinah glory manifested, where the Ark dwelt. For David, seeing the beauty of 
Yahweh was his chief desire.  
d. “And let the beauty of the LORD our God be upon us, And establish the work of 
our hands for us; Yes, establish the work of our hands” (Ps. 90:17). 
 Moses completed his song about the eternity of God and the frailty and mortality of 
man with a plea: that the beauty of God would adorn and establish the works of God’s 
people. Only God’s beauty would provide permanence to the fleeting nature of human life.  
e. “Honor and majesty are before Him; Strength and beauty are in His 
sanctuary…Oh, worship the LORD in the beauty of holiness! Tremble before Him, all the 
earth” (Ps. 96:6, 9). 
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The psalmist does not hesitate to ascribe beauty to God. Similarly, holiness itself, 
which comes from God, is beauty, and God’s worshipers are called upon to enter into such 
a beautiful state and thereby know and love God. 
6.2.1.2. New Testament 
 Though the New Testament writers were far more Hellenised than their Old 
Testament counterparts, they retained Hebrew ideas of worship and glory. 
1. New Testament words 
 
 The study is not here concerned with the Septuagint, but only with the twenty-
seven books of the Greek New Testament. Taking Davidson’s work (2000:196) as the 
starting point, one can identify six Greek words associated with beauty.4 
1. ἀstei/oj, occurring two times in two verses (Acts 7:20; Heb. 11:23), in two forms, 
meaning appropriate, well-bred, handsome (BDAG, 1211). 
2. euvpre,peia,, h, occurring one time in one verse (Jas 1:11), in one form, meaning fine 
appearance or beauty (BDAG, 3278). 
3. kalo.j, occurring one hundred and one times in ninety verses, in sixteen forms, this 
word has a broad semantic range, including the ideas of beautiful, good, useful, 
free from defects, or fine (BDAG, 3900; Gingrich, 3364). This is Plato’s primary 
word for beauty (Farley, 2001:20). 
4. prosfilh,j, occurring one time in one verse (Phil 4:8), in one form, defined as 
“pleasing, agreeable, lovely, amiable” (BDAG, 6351). 
5. fai,nomai, appearing thirty-one times in thirty-one verses, in nineteen forms, “to 
appear as something”; in some contexts, such as Matthew 23:27–28, “to appear as 
beautiful” (Gingrich, 6672). 
6. w`rai/oj, occurring four times in four verses (Matt. 23:27; Acts 3:2, 10; Rom. 
                                               
4 Again, Bushell, Tan and Weaver (1992) record the frequency of these words, with their various  
grammatical forms, listed in Appendix A. 
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10:15), in three forms, with “the broad range of the idea of timeliness, including 
esp. association with prime periods, such as fruit at its peak and humans in youthful 
blossoming, readily invites the idea of a valued object as beautiful” (Danker, 
6972). 
To this list, one can add the following words: 
7. megaloprepou/j, occurring one time in one verse (2 Pet. 1:17) in one form, meaning 
magnificent, sublime, majestic (BDAG, 4756). 
8. kosme,w, occurring ten times in ten verses in nine forms, meaning to put in order; 
“to cause something to have an attractive appearance through decoration, adorn, 
decorate” (BDAG, 4364). 
9. do,xa, occurring one hundred and sixty-eight times in one hundred and fifty-one 
verses, in five forms, meaning brightness, splendour, radiance, magnificence, 
glory, honour, fame, recognition, majestic beings (BDAG, 2077). 
New Testament writers display continuity with their Old Testament counterparts, 
describing beauty, rather than defining it. Again, the mixture of the subjective notions of 
pleasantness to the beholder, and attractiveness in the object display the fact that no such 
dichotomy seemed to exist in their minds.  
2. New Testament literary forms 
 Aesthetic literary structures are equally abundant in the New Testament. Chiasm is 
evident in Matthew, Mark, John, 1 Corinthians, Galatians, 2 Timothy, Philemon, Hebrews, 
Jude, and Revelation (Davidson, 2000:93). The Gospels each display a sophisticated use of 
selected events, summaries, discourses, travel episodes, interludes, and speeches to paint a 
portrait with a particular emphasis (2000:128). The intense scrutiny of form criticism 
applied to the Gospels in the past two centuries has, at the very least, made people aware 
of the literary structures of the Gospels and given readers methods to understand units 
within the Gospels (Bock, 2002:187). In summary, New Testament writers remain in 
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harmony with their Old Testament counterparts, seeking to convey content in an 
aesthetically pleasing form.  
3. Significant representative texts 
a. “And this I pray, that your love may abound still more and more in knowledge 
and all discernment, that you may approve the things that are excellent, that you may be 
sincere and without offense till the day of Christ” (Phil. 1:9–10). 
 Significantly, Paul’s prayer asks that the love of the Philippians, once enlarged 
both in knowledge and wise discrimination, would then perceive those things that are 
intrinsically excellent. The excellence of those things is present, independent of the 
Philippians’ agreement or lack thereof. When their love reaches a place of maturity, they 
will perceive the beauty that was there all along. 
b. “Finally, brethren, whatever things are true, whatever things are noble, whatever 
things are just, whatever things are pure, whatever things are lovely, whatever things are of 
good report, if there is any virtue and if there is anything praiseworthy—meditate on these 
things” (Phil. 4:8). 
 Among the quality of thoughts that Paul wishes the Philippians to dwell upon is the 
category of what is true, and the category of what is lovely, or beautiful. If one of these is 
entirely “subjective”, so must the others be. Likewise, if one is objectively real, so must 
the others be. In a list such as Philippians 4:8, one does not expect the various qualities to 
be uneven or disparate with regard to their objective or subjective status. 
6.2.2. Canonically and thematically considered 
 Beauty is not treated as a discrete philosophical concept in Scripture, but that is very 
far from saying it is a minor concept in Scripture. The idea of beauty is present in the first 
chapters of the Bible, as God creates and then makes the evaluative judgement that it was 
“good”. This clearly is not a judgement of morality or ethics, but an aesthetic judgement 
(Spiegel, 1998:42). The Bible opens with God creating a cosmos which was aesthetically 
  70 
 
pleasing to himself, including man in his own image. Human beauty is a work of divine 
artistry (Loader, 2011:664).  
 Immediately, God commits the stewardship of the world to his image-bearers, 
essentially charging them to bring more order and beauty to the world, and so glorify him 
(Gen. 1:28). The Creator charges man with sub-creation, bringing the same order and beauty 
to the world, that God brought out of the formless void of Genesis 1:2. The “aesthetic 
impulse is built into the created order” (Gordon, 2012:22).  
 Man’s sin introduces complexity, and now some beauty is dark and deceptive 
(Loader, 2012:348). Man’s rebellion demonstrates that, left to itself, the race will not 
image forth the beauty of God. Genesis 1–11 proves that without intervention, humankind 
degenerates into savagery (Schreiner, 2013:631).5 Even in its fallen state, humankind still 
constructs things of beauty out of creation. Loader (2012:102) lists Scripture’s catalogue 
of man’s beautiful sub-creations: artisans’ work, mining and jewellery, beautiful music, 
words, wisdom, and pleasant food.  
 God selects Abraham to create a nation of kings and priests (Ex. 19:6), who will 
mediate God’s kingdom and beautiful glory on Earth. Israel’s history through the periods 
of the Patriarchs, the Exodus, the Conquest, the Judges, the United and Divided 
Monarchies, the Exile and the Post-Exile shows that Israel could not keep its covenant 
obligations. A new and better way was to come in Israel’s greatest son—the divine 
Messiah.  
 In Jesus Christ comes the glory of God made manifest (John 1:14–18; Heb. 1:3). 
He is not merely made in God’s image as man, but he is God’s image, being fully God 
(Letham, 2011:§307). Declaring a kingdom that is in some forms present, and in some 
form unrealised, he calls men to repentance and belief in him, so that the image of God in 
                                               
5 Scholars disagree over whether the first eleven chapters of Genesis represent narrative, allegory, or a  
literary framework. Regardless of chosen hermeneutic, most would agree that they represent an attempt to  
explain humankind’s origin and its subsequent fall and descent into violence and evil. 
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them may be restored, beyond even the glory of the first unfallen Adam. His death and 
resurrection is then explained in the Epistles as the means to union with God, and entrance 
into the kingdom.  
 By union with Christ, a process of beautification has begun in the believer (2 Cor. 
3:18), which will consummate at the end of all things (Lindsey, 1974:319). Christ is 
committed to beautifying his Bride, the Church (Eph. 5:25–27). The church is now an 
embassy of this glory, displaying the beauty of God to the world (1 Pet. 2:9), witnessing to 
God's glory through the beauty of their good works (1 Pet. 2:12). As the church acts as 
ambassadors of the glorious God, and ministers of reconciliation, they spread the glory of 
God.    
 The book of Revelation predicts the final judgement that will bring the ugliness of 
evil, with its curse, to an end (Rev. 21:4), and bring in the perfection of a faultlessly beautiful 
New Heavens and New Earth, enjoyed by those who have been beautified by God’s grace.  
 Some biblical theologies claim that the dominant theme of Scripture is concerned 
with the spread of the glory of the Lord, encompassing creation, fall, redemption and the 
eschaton. For example, biblical theologian James Hamilton (2006:83) argues that a 
compelling case can be made that no theme is more primal or ultimate in biblical theology 
than the glory or beauty of God. 
6.2.3. Summary 
 The exegetical data of Old and New Testaments lead one to the conclusion that the 
phenomenon of beauty was commonplace for biblical writers. Its objective and subjective 
aspects are combined in an array of descriptive words. The literary forms of Scripture 
speak to an implicit link in the minds of the biblical writers between truth and beauty—
truth is to be communicated beautifully. Accurate propositional content must be clothed in 
literary forms that indicate the affective response such truth about God deserves. Finally, 
the motif of God’s glory in Scripture, from Genesis to Revelation is unmistakably a 
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prominent, if not dominant, theme in several literary genres (Loader, 2011:8). Taken 
together, one can confidently assume that the idea of God’s beauty (if perhaps not the 
identical words as used in modern parlance), is strongly rooted in the texts and themes of 
Scripture. Beauty is a reality in the Scriptures. 
6.3. Beauty in Classical and Christian Thought 
 
6.3.1. Introduction 
 
 Having considered how beauty is represented by the writers of Scripture, the next 
logical step is to consider the development of this idea in intellectual history, with 
particular reference to Christian intellectual history. The Christian era represents the 
intersection of Hebraic thought with Greek philosophical categories. A competent study of 
the idea of beauty in Christian intellectual history must begin with classical and pre-
Christian views. From there, a survey of writers and thinkers representative of early 
church, medieval, Reformation, Enlightenment and modern eras will provide a tour of the 
development of the idea. The chapter will then attempt a synthesis of this data.  
6.3.2. Classical and pre-Christian Writers 
6.3.2.1. Plato 
 Though pre-Socratic thinkers spoke about beauty, the classical thinker that most 
influenced later Christian thinking was Plato. Platonism and neo-Platonism dominates the 
intellectual landscape of the early church. Platonic thinking would influence that most 
influential voice of the early church era, Augustine, as Aristotle would influence the 
heavyweight of the Middle Ages, Aquinas.  
 According to Farley (2001:19), Plato, the author of the famous “truth, goodness, 
and beauty” triad, wrote during an era of Hellenic demythologising of older Olympian 
myths and cosmogonies. In those myths, the great theme was explaining the presence of 
order amidst chaos, permanence amidst change. Hesiod, the cosmologist of the Homeric 
age, describes Eros as the most beautiful of the gods, and the one who generates gods and 
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chaos. Generative power of being is beautiful. Beauty brings about order in the struggle 
with chaos.  
Plato takes up the questions of desire, order and beauty in Philebus. He considers 
what is the proper object of desire and argues that it should be what is highest and best—
what is truly real. Here, Plato uses the word ἔρως to describe this desire, no longer the 
beautiful god who generates being, but the thirsty desire for what is highest and best. Since 
what is best and most real cannot be temporary, the highest and best must be the 
constitutive and distinctive form (εἶδος) of things. Clearly, these are Plato’s 
demythologised gods—distinctive Forms that true knowledge apprehends. To apprehend 
these is to apprehend something that is good—καλός—or beautiful. Forms are beautiful, 
being is beautiful, but all these differentiated forms are ordered under the transcendent 
Good (Farley, 2001:20). Plato used the term beauty interchangeably with the concept of 
the good (for example, Phaedrus 246E), not restricting beauty to sensory or aesthetic 
matters, but referencing it with respect to ethics, and metaphysics (Tatarkiewicz, 
1970:113). John Paul II (1999:3) writes that the Greeks coined a term which embraces 
both: καλοκαγαθία, or beauty-goodness.  
 In his earlier writings, Plato seems to have accepted the Socratic and Sophistic 
definitions of beauty as suitability and pleasure, respectively (Gorgias, 474D). As his 
thinking developed, he rejected the subjectivistic view of beauty as whatever one enjoys. 
He also saw that suitability for an evil end could not qualify as beauty, since beauty was 
not evil. In his later writings, Plato accepted a Pythagorean definition and added his own 
(Philebus, 64E). The Pythagorean concept saw beauty as order, measure, proportion, 
consonance and harmony. Plato’s own additional concept was the notion just described—
the object of ἔρως—ideal beauty, an eternal, spiritual, ultimate Idea of beauty surpassing 
understanding (Tatarkiewicz, 1970:115). Beauty is what people desire to contemplate and 
be connected to, for it is pure, touches truth and creates true virtue (Thiessen, 2005:§219).  
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 As Bychkov (2008:198) points out, from Plato’s time, ideas of the divine were 
associated with the aesthetic notion τὸ καλόν, signifying a high degree of excellence of 
any kind, including the connotations “awesome” or “magnificent.” Stripped of the 
temporal and sensuous, Plato’s idea of the beautiful was much closer to a purely religious 
experience, in contrast to so much in modern aesthetics (García-Rivera, 2005:347). Indeed, 
Plato’s idea of progression in man’s perception of beauty develops from enjoying 
particular instances of beauty, to general beauty, to non-material beauties to the beauty of 
knowledge, to knowledge of the Beauty (Louie, 2013:§669). For that matter, Plato 
believed the one who reached this place of perception becomes “like the form of beauty he 
loves; he becomes, for example, truly virtuous and immortal, or nearly so” (Sircello, 
1990:23).  
  It was for this reason that Plato was sceptical, or at least cautious, of the role of 
artists in the city-state (The Republic, 605A), for their work imitates nature, which is 
already an imitation of the ideal Forms (Jantzen, 2002:432). Plato wanted a purely spiritual 
love of what was ultimately Real.  
 Plato’s position would become one side in the medieval battle between nominalism 
and realism and would have lasting implications in the understanding of beauty from a 
Christian point of view. His adoption and expansion of the Pythagorean view of beauty 
would form the foundation of what Farley (2001:17) calls “the Great Theory of Beauty” 
that predominated in the Christian West until the Enlightenment. His view of beauty as an 
ultimate and eternal real value would naturally be adopted by Christians as referring to the 
very nature of God.  
6.3.2.2. Aristotle  
 Plato’s pupil would both build on his master and refute him. Whereas Plato 
speculated on beauty as an ideal, Aristotle was happy to study the particulars of beauty in 
art. His occasional and elliptical remarks on beauty must be reconstructed from 
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fragmentary references. Aristotle seems to have believed beauty is two things: that which 
is valuable in itself, and that which supplies pleasure (Rhetoric, 1366a, ix, 3). Tatarkiewicz 
(1970:151) summarises his view: “all beauty is goodness, but not all goodness is beauty; 
all beauty is pleasure, but not all pleasure is beauty; beauty is only that which is both 
goodness and pleasure.” Like Plato, Aristotle saw beauty and moral goodness as 
fundamentally connected (Skillen, 2002:36). 
 Within this definition, Aristotle wrote of the three properties of beauty: order, size, 
and proportion (Metaphysics, XIII, 1078a, 31). Order meant a suitable arrangement, or a 
suitable proportion between the parts. Size similarly referred to suitability: size or 
dimensions suitable to the given objects. Proportion (symmetria) was very closely 
identified with order. Aristotle also mentioned the importance of limitation: that only 
objects of a limited size can be perceived and so please us (Rhetoric, 1409a, ix, 2). 
Perceptibility was a condition of unity in art, which provided the greatest satisfaction 
(Tatarkiewicz, 1970:151). 
 The classical era bequeathed the church with beauty as a philosophic concept 
corresponding to excellence, the form of which was found in ever-ascending perfection 
from the created order to the divine.  
6.3.3. The Early Church 
6.3.3.1. Ante-Nicene and early post-Nicene Writers 
 Writers of the first through fourth centuries were not involved in any major 
controversy regarding divine beauty. Certainly the controversy regarding images and use 
of icons became a dispute in the seventh through ninth centuries, but this debate does not 
affect the question of the real or objective nature of beauty, merely the appropriateness of 
representing God for worship. Louie (2013:§692) summarises four themes related to 
beauty in these early writers: the best creaturely beauty is the spiritual beauty of the saints, 
Christ is the manifestation of the beauty of the Father, God is beautiful and the source of 
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all that is beautiful in the world, and the Holy Spirit is the beautifier of the saints and the 
mediator of the knowledge of divine beauty. Plotinus (A.D. 204–270), a non-Christian 
Greek philosopher, influenced many Christian writers with his neo-Platonism, though he 
challenged the Platonic idea of beauty as harmony and proportion (Farley, 2001:20). 
Plotinus associated being with beauty (Harrison, 1992:37) and, like Plato, believed that 
beauty must be resident in the beholder in order to perceive it outside of himself (Sircello, 
1990:22). 
 For the most part, developed thinking about beauty must wait for the post-Nicene 
writers Pseudo-Dionysius and Augustine. Early writers deal with beauty in passing, or as 
an understood concept to make other points. Nevertheless, the Platonic ideas about 
ultimate beauty being manifested in the particular is clearly present in their views on the 
Incarnation.  
 Justin Martyr (100–165) was the first to take up the theme of the vision of God, 
communicated through Christ as the image of God, in Dialogue with Trypho (CXXVIII). 
Origen (185–254) similarly wrote of Christ in De Principiis (I, ii, 6–8). Basil the Great 
(330–379) referenced true spiritual beauty in On Psalm 29:  
But beauty, true and most lovely, which can be contemplated by him alone who has 
purified his mind, is that of the divine and blessed nature. He who gazes steadfastly 
at the splendour and graces of it, receives some share from it, as if from an 
immersion, tingeing his own face with a sort of brilliant radiance. Whence Moses 
also was made resplendent in face by receiving some share of beauty when he held 
converse with God (Homily 14, 221).  
Gregory of Nyssa (330–395), in On Virginity (X–XI), similarly spoke of the impossibility 
of perceiving God’s infinite beauty, though the approach to heavenly beauty must be made 
through purifying ourselves. Similar ideas can be found in Irenaeus (130–200), in Against 
Heresies (II, xiii), and in Hilary of Poitiers (315–367) (The Trinity, II, 49). At this early 
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stage of history, these writers’ chief concern was to ground beauty in God, explain how 
Christ images forth God’s beauty, and enlarge upon the Platonic idea that only the 
beautiful can perceive beauty.   
6.3.3.2. Augustine 
Augustine (354–430), bishop of Hippo, is unquestionably the most influential 
theological and philosophical figure of the first millennium A.D. Augustine was trained in 
philosophy and rhetoric, and after a season among the Manicheans, was converted to 
Christianity. His own struggles with sensuality made the topics of desire, love, and beauty 
of particular concern to him.  
 Sadly, Augustine’s specific work on beauty has been lost. He nevertheless spoke 
clearly on beauty in several of his extant works. So important was beauty to Augustine, 
that he sometimes used Beauty as a name for God (Jantzen, 2002:435).  
 Augustine was a Christianiser of the Great Theory of Beauty. Numerous times 
Augustine affirmed that equality is the main principle of beauty. Harmony and unity are 
reducible to equality (De Vera Religione, XXX, 55). Like the classical thinkers, Augustine 
was happy to affirm that beauty is a matter of ratio, or the relations of the parts of the 
beautiful object to each other and the whole (Martin 1990:20). It was he who coined the 
venerable formulation for beauty: form, proportion and number (De Ordine, II, xv, 42). 
Thus, God as Trinity is beautiful because nothing in him is unequal (Bychkov, 2008:199). 
 Nevertheless, Augustine was ambivalent regarding created beauty. Channelling 
Plato, his suspicion about creaturely beauty was that while it could lead men to the source 
of beauty—God—it could also become a distraction (Harrison, 1992:42). Likewise seeing 
an ascending ladder of beauty from lower beauty to divine beauty, Augustine saw the 
Incarnation as the manifestation of divine beauty, meant to lead man from the senses to the 
intellect, from scientia to sapientia, from incarnate beauty to divine beauty (Harrison, 
1992:44). Augustine did not see the body as evil, though he certainly saw physical matter 
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as a lower form of ultimate beauty. The issue was loving things for God’s sake or loving 
them in isolation from God. Bedford (2012:48) helpfully summarises: 
For Augustine, the problem lies not in the beauty of the world or the pleasure of the 
senses but in the distortion of that reality in a way that we no longer enjoy it for 
what it really is (for example, a delicious pear that satiates our hunger) but seek in 
it the satisfaction of our deepest thirst that only God can satiate. If we believe that 
“beautiful things” can quench our thirst for the transcendent, our constant 
disappointment will drive us to continue searching for some other new “beautiful 
thing” to satisfy us. 
Perhaps Augustine’s most helpful statement on beauty, is one where he made it clear that 
beauty is real and exists apart from the observer, and has an “objective” existence, to use 
the contemporary parlance. “If I were to ask first whether things are beautiful because they 
give pleasure, or give pleasure because they are beautiful, I have no doubt that I will be 
given the answer that they give pleasure because they are beautiful” (De Vera Religione, 
XXXII, 59). Beauty is not beauty because it gives pleasure, but beauty is what gives 
pleasure to those with beauty within them. For Augustine, this beauty in the Christian that 
can perceive God’s beauty, is God’s love. It is in Christ’s love that his beauty lies, and 
only love in the beholder is able to see this beauty (Harrison, 1992:235). Faith in revealed 
beauty is inseparable from love. 
 By imitating Christ, in faith and love, man receives Christ’s form or beauty. By 
loving, people are made beautiful (Harries, 1993:61). This important insight will recur 
later in the work of Jonathan Edwards, and will be a significant tool in answering 
Cartesian dualism. Beauty has an independent character, but it is recognised as beautiful 
by an analogue of beauty in the beholder.  
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6.3.3.3. Pseudo-Dionysius (c. 500) 
 Pseudo-Dionysius, so named because his sixth-century work is written under the 
pseudonym of Dionysius the Areopagite of Acts 17:34, was the first to establish a kind of 
theological aesthetics seeking a synthesis between Christian doctrine and Neo-Platonism 
(Thiessen 2005:§600). 
 Dionysius believed that beauty has an independent existence, because it is a 
fundamental name for God. God is the source and cause of all things; therefore Beauty 
himself is what makes things beautiful (Bondi, 2001:5). So deeply did Dionysius develop 
the concept of beauty as a perfection of the divine being that later ages accused him of 
heterodoxy or even heresy (Lindsey, 1974:125). Like Augustine, Dionysius taught that to 
perceive the beauty of God, believers need to be transformed by it, purified, illuminated 
and brought into transfiguring union (Louth 2004:69).  
 Continuing the ideas of Christian Platonism, Dionysius saw a ladder of 
participation in the beauty, or light, of God, from the lowest creation, all the way up to 
God himself (García-Rivera, 2005:354). Invisible beauty is communicated through the 
hierarchies of visible beauty (De Coelesti Hierarchia, III). Beauty is the source of all 
things, and the goal of all things. All things conscious and inanimate are constantly 
returning to God, even as they proceed from God (Louie, 2013:§714).  
 Dionysius’ theology was apophatic and mystical, but his The Divine Names did 
provide a synthesis between biblical, patristic and Neo-Platonic thought, centred around 
the idea of beauty (Thiessen, 2005:§280).  
 Perhaps what is most remarkable about the first Christian millennium, at least from 
a contemporary perspective, is how little the idea of beauty is challenged. Beauty’s real 
and independent existence is simply assumed, and naturally reasoned to be an attribute of 
God or God himself. The Great Theory of Beauty is personified in the Triune God, 
Platonic ideas of lower and higher beauty are explained in terms of the Incarnation 
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mediating beauty to humankind. Beauty and celebration characterises Byzantine 
spirituality through the sixth to eighth centuries (Louth, 2004:76). This settled sense of 
God as beauty would come to some of its most beautiful expressions in the Middle Ages. 
6.3.4. The Medieval Church 
 While theological conservatives often associate the Middle Ages with a period of 
theological stagnation, others view the medieval church as the nearest thing to a fully 
Christian culture. Wilson and Jones (1998:§83) suggest that the medieval period is the 
closest one has to a maturing Christian culture, and it was deeply characterised by a love 
of beauty. Indeed, what was unchallenged in the medieval worldview, before the ferment 
of nominalism, was the idea that the transcendentals of truth, goodness and beauty were 
real. For medieval Christendom, reality was not reducible to material reality; it was 
profoundly and essentially moral. Created reality was an analogue of eternal and 
permanent realities. No voice captures the medieval consensus as clearly as that of Thomas 
Aquinas. 
6.3.4.1. Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274) 
 Aquinas was the leading voice of the medieval church on the matter of beauty. 
Appropriating Platonic thought, but more especially Aristotelian thinking, Aquinas is the 
closest to a developed theory of beauty in the Middle Ages. Aquinas did not deviate from 
the Great Theory, but developed it.  
 For Aquinas, beauty is comprised of three criteria: integritas (perfection of form), 
claritas (the splendour of proportioned form) and consonantia (harmony of proportioned 
form) (Summa Theologica, I, xxxix, 8). Integrity refers to the ideal form of something,  
when it corresponds to the form of an object as a whole. Clarity is probably Aquinas’ 
attempt to reconcile the classical ideas of proportion with the medieval fascination with 
light. In some ways, Aquinas’ idea of clarity is similar to the biblical idea of glory (Martin, 
1990:25). An object’s clarity is the communicability of its form, particularly if it can 
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communicate its ontological form beyond its physical appearance (Louie, 2013:§768). 
Most important to Aquinas is proportion (consonantia) for it refers to a fitness and 
harmony in all of reality. His idea goes beyond static ratios or proportions and includes 
any harmony in a dynamic sense: an ear that can hear music, an eye that can see colour, a 
mind that can understand reality.  
 Aquinas believed it is particularly appropriate to associate beauty with the Son: 
“wholeness, because he truly possesses the nature of the Father, who is perfection itself; 
right proportion, because he is the express image of the Father; and radiance, because he is 
the Word, the resplendent light of understanding” (Sherry, 2007:8). 
 Aquinas saw beauty as a real transcendental, almost identical with the Good. In the 
Summa Theologica (I, v, 5), he writes, 
Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they 
are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is 
praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the 
appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of 
an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, 
beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please 
when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in 
things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind—because even sense is 
a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. 
His distinction between beauty and goodness is that goodness is an object’s desirability 
and relates to the appetitive part of man (that which desires), while beauty is an object’s 
form, and relates to the cognitive aspect of man (that which perceives). Beauty then 
becomes inseparable to the human’s cognitive perception of an object’s super-sensual 
form (Louie, 2013:§778). Aquinas still regards beauty as an objective value, but has 
moved the idea of beauty one step closer to the modern view of the subjectivity of beauty. 
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6.3.4.2. Bonaventure (1221–1274) 
 Lesser known than Aquinas, the Italian Franciscan theologian Bonaventure 
likewise upheld Platonic ideas about beauty. In his work In Reductio Artium in 
Theologiam, Bonaventure made it clear that he shared the Pseudo-Dionysian notion of a 
hierarchy of beauty (Viladesau, 1999:113). In The Journey of the Mind Into God, he wrote, 
If, then, delight is the conjunction of the harmonious, and the likeness of God alone 
is the most highly beautiful, pleasant, and wholesome, and if it is united in truth 
and in inwardness and in plenitude which employs our entire capacity, obviously it 
can be seen that in God alone is the original and true delight, and that we are led 
back to seeking it from all other delights (II, viii). 
Other medieval theologians who touch on beauty are worth mentioning in passing. For 
Julian of Norwich (1342–1416), ἔρως is a desire for union, which characterises man and 
God. It is what stirs God to seek man in redemption, and it is what stirs man to seek God 
(Ahlgren, 2005:38).   
Medieval theologians in general took a more positive view of the created order 
than their early church counterparts, though they do not depart from Platonism. Nicolas of 
Cusa continued the Pseudo-Dionysian tradition. 
 If anything, the medieval church represents a development of the Christianised 
version of the Great Theory of Beauty. Existence, or being itself, is beauty; therefore, 
God’s being is ultimate beauty. Platonic ideas are retained, Trinitarian concepts are 
elucidated in relation to beauty, and ideas of light are connected to beauty.  
Farley (2001:22) points out four inconsistencies in medieval thinking. First, if 
beauty was at the heart of being, why did beauty not extend to all other Christian doctrine? 
Second, if all objects possess some beauty, why did asceticism have such power during 
this era? Third, how does beauty, if imagined as proportion, relate to dynamic change? 
Fourth, if God, who is not composed of parts, is beauty, how can beauty be proportion or 
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symmetry? Particularly the third and fourth questions would come back to affect and 
challenge Christian thinking about beauty during the Enlightenment. 
 A greater change was at work in medieval thought, one which will occupy the 
focused attention of chapter eight. Aristotelian thought was provoking a move away from a 
focus on universals and towards particulars. William of Occam’s nominalism would lead 
ultimately to doubt over transcendentals, which would lead directly to the epistemological 
scepticism of Descartes, Bacon, and Hume. Nicolas of Cusa’s mystical bent moved the 
focus from the Platonic ladder to the human soul, hastening the advent of humanistic 
thinking (Garcia-Rivera, 2005:355). The humanist’s motto, Man the measure of all things, 
was to influence thinking about art and beauty. Some of this would be corrected in the 
Reformation, but not all. 
6.3.5. The Reformation Period 
 
 The Protestant Reformation did not take aim at beauty. Martin Luther was 
concerned with the relationship of faith and works, and so wrote no theology of beauty. He 
did not oppose the use of images, as Ulrych Zwingli did. Luther’s love of music is well 
known, but Luther attempted no detailed discussion of beauty.  
 John Calvin had more to say. As Calvin understood it, the contemplation of God’s 
beauty on the great stage of nature is a performance that absorbs the whole of creation 
(Lane, 2001:1). In beholding the beauty in creation and redemption, believers see the glory 
of the Creator. More important than created beauty is the ethical life—the life of service to 
God and man. One’s service then points to God, but the world and work is no longer 
sacramental, in Calvin’s vision, enchanted with God’s presence (Louie, 2013:§832).  
 Schaeffer (2005:82) believes the Reformation began ridding the church of 
humanistic distortions that had infiltrated it from the time of the early church through the 
Middle Ages. This included equating the authority of the church with the authority of the 
Bible, adding human works to Christ’s work, and synthesising biblical teaching and pagan 
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thought. At the same time, nominalism gained a boost in the thinking of some of the 
Reformers, notably Luther. 
 The Reformation did not greatly affect the Christian conversation about beauty, 
concerned as it was with matters related to faith, works, grace, penal substitution and the 
church. With its favourable approach to the idea of vocation, it arguably contributed to one 
of the greatest blooms of Christian beauty in music, art and poetry that would come to 
flower in the fifteenth through eighteenth centuries. It is that period, the period of the Early 
Enlightenment and the Puritans, to which the chapter now turns.  
6.3.6. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
 The period from 1600 to 1750 is significant for the Christian idea of beauty for two 
reasons. First, Cartesian rationalism, British empiricism and other epistemologies came to 
affect the conversation about beauty and moved the focus from beauty as an objective 
value to beauty as a subjective experience. Second, it was during this era that Jonathan 
Edwards, America’s premier philosopher-theologian, wrote his treatises on beauty. 
Edwards represents the high-point in Protestant writing on beauty, and perhaps remains 
unsurpassed in his thinking on this topic. For this reason, it is fitting to devote considerable 
space to this era, and to Edwards in particular.  
6.3.6.1. Intellectual Milieu of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries 
 The Enlightenment's shift away from classical ideas about beauty can be seen in 
the ideas of several men. Renaissance suspicion of metaphysics began to find temporary 
refuge in rationalism. Rene Descartes (1596–1650), enamoured by the successes of an 
application of Newtonian principles to the natural realm, believed that beauty in music 
could be reduced to ratios. His Compendium Musicae (1618) suggested that ratios of 
duration and rations of intensity explain which music pleases. Early Enlightenment figures 
were not ready to give up the Great Theory, but wanted principles by which the human 
consciousness could verify it was perceiving beauty. Similarly, Nicolas Boileau (1636–
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1711) attempted to lay down rules for the language of poetry, by writing them in verse in 
L’Art Poétique. 
 A move away from this approach is seen in Dominique Bouhours (1628–1702). In 
The Art of Criticism (1705), Bouhours argued that the judgment of beauty was not to be 
considered the same kind of mental exercise as that of working out mathematical 
questions. Jean-Baptiste Dubos (1670–1742), influenced by John Locke, argued in Critical 
Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music (1748) for an enjoyment of art based on its 
affective qualities, rather than through rational reflection. The French naturalism of the 
philosophes was seen in Denis Diderot (1713–1784) who believed that observers judge 
things to be beautiful for utilitarian reasons: the beautiful thing nearly perfectly fulfilled its 
role. Joseph Addison (1672–1719) located beauty within the human psyche, as one of the 
pleasures of imagination, as did Thomas Hobbes, who saw beauty as the object of a 
distinctive human appetite (Farley, 2001:33). Frances Hutcheson (1694–1746) wrote An 
Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725) and taught that beauty 
is a universal sense in mankind, even seeing pleasure in beauty as a theistic proof (Louie, 
2013:§1337). Hutcheson defined beauty as uniformity amidst variety, but rejected the idea 
that beauty is a matter of correspondence (Scruton 2009:46). For Hutcheson, beauty was 
the combination of an idea, and a sense perception, which meant that beauty was located 
within the human being (Farley, 2001:34). 
 David Hume (1711–1776) took subjectivism to its logical end. Hume taught that 
sentiment had reference to nothing beyond itself, and therefore had no moral quality. 
Sentiment towards art or beauty reflected the internal state of the person perceiving, not 
any objective qualities in the thing perceived (Scruton, 2002:133). Hume did not abandon 
the Great Theory entirely, agreeing that the experience of beauty within human passions is 
evoked by objects that have an order or construction of parts. However, Hume argued that 
it was utility that made these seem beautiful (Farley, 2001:35). 
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 This growing empirical subjectivism was to meet some opposition in Anthony 
Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713) particularly in his popular work on beauty, 
Characteristics (1711). Shaftesbury saw beauty as a judgement of reason (Louie, 
2013:§1065). Shaftesbury emphasised the disinterested attitude of the judge: attending to 
the thing of beauty itself, to protect the purity of the form from its effect on the observer 
(Scruton, 2009:26). Shaftesbury thus moved the focus to the artistic process itself, away 
from the object (in Cartesian rationalism) and the subject (in empiricism).  
 All this push towards beauty as an aspect of human psychology meant the 
conversation about beauty moved away from a discussion of harmony, proportion, or unity 
and towards the motif of taste. In fact, at this early stage, the attention to taste as a theme 
in the discussion of beauty was an attempt to prevent the complete subjectivisation of 
beauty, and to retain some level of objectivity by defining standards of taste. Even Hume 
argued for refined taste: the ability to perceive objects fitted to evoke such pleasure 
(Farley, 2001:36). “In many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts”, Hume 
writes in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, “it is requisite to employ much 
reasoning in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be 
corrected by argument and reflection” (Danto, 2002:41).  
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762) seems to have coined the term 
aesthetics. Baumgarten used the term to refer to judgement of good and bad taste, defining 
taste in his Metaphysica (1739) as the ability to judge using the senses and not the 
intellect. For Baumgarten, beauty was nothing less than perfect sense knowledge 
(Thiessen, 2005:§2574). 
 Thus the Enlightenment departed from the classical and traditional Christian 
notions of beauty as being or as a property of God. Notions of symmetry and harmony 
were challenged by discoveries in the natural sciences that revealed the particularity and 
complexity of the physical universe. A growing sense of the individual’s subjective 
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consciousness and a growing awareness of cultural diversity further challenged simplistic 
ideas of equality, symmetry and harmony (Treier, Husbands & Lundin, 2007:§35).  
Cartesian, mathematical approach to beauty had been scorned by the naturalism of the 
philosophes. Hume’s work had created a scepticism that aesthetic judgements were 
anything more than inner dispositions. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson suggested beauty was 
external to the observer, but denied any transcendental basis for such beauty. Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, and Joseph Addison substantially agreed that the observer of beauty would 
exhibit disinterestedness (Stolnitz, 1961:141). An increasingly secularized intellectual 
world was now struggling to account for taste apart from any theological moorings. The 
newly-coined term aesthetics was to become a distinct discipline within philosophy, 
focused mostly on the beaux arts, rather than a basis for ethics, or as one of three 
transcendentals that explained immanent reality. This was the philosophic environment 
that confronted Jonathan Edwards by the time he penned The Nature of True Virtue in 
1756.  
6.3.6.2. Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758)   
 Edwards’ view of beauty was fundamental to much of his theology. Farley 
(2001:43) goes as far as to say that in Edwards’ interpretation of philosophical and 
religious themes,  
beauty is more central and more pervasive than in any other text in the history of 
Christian theology. Edwards does not just theologize about beauty: beauty 
(loveliness, sweetness) is the fundamental motif through which he understands the 
world, God, virtue and ‘divine things’.  
Similarly, McClymond and McDermott (2012:§1116) write:  
Beauty is fundamental to Edwards’s understanding of being. It is the first principle 
of being, the inner, structural principle of being-itself. This stress on beauty set 
Edwards apart from other Protestant authors...One might interpret the whole of 
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Edwards’s theology as the gradual, complex outworking of a primal vision of 
God’s beauty that came to him in the wake of his conversion experience. 
Edwards regarded God’s beauty as his most distinguishing attribute. Writing in Religious 
Affections, Edwards stated, “God is God, and distinguished from all other beings, and 
exalted above ‘em, chiefly by his divine beauty. They therefore that see the stamp of this 
glory in divine things...see that in them wherein the truest idea of divinity does consist” 
(WJEO, 2:298).  
 Edwards’ views on beauty are understood within the context of the subjectivist turn 
of the mid-eighteenth century, which “experienced a crucial shift in the history of 
aesthetics from beauty as being to beauty as human self-transcendence”, from an external 
property to a human sensibility (Venter, 2010:187). Edwards sought to avoid the 
objective/subjective dichotomy inherent in some forms of British empiricism and other 
epistemologies (Martin, 1975:113). What set Edwards apart from his contemporaries, and 
what makes him so relevant to the contemporary discussion, was his ability to combine 
subjective and objective aspects of beauty in a theory grounded in God’s beauty. Moody 
(2005:105) states that beauty appealed to Edwards because it seemed to be a way to form a 
concept of objectivity that could be subjectively channelled. 
 Edwards’ discussed beauty in many of his writings. His work The Mind gives one 
of the clearest explications of his vocabulary of beauty. Here Edwards presented a classical 
or neoclassical ideal of beauty (McClymond & McDermott, 2012:§1176). In A 
Dissertation Concerning The Nature of True Virtue (1749), Edwards argued for God’s 
beauty being the ground of all other forms of beauty (Spiegel, 1998:41). Its companion 
work, A Dissertation Concerning the End For Which God Created the World continues the 
thesis that the ground of being is God’s own happiness, not the creature’s.  
  In The Mind, Edwards defended his own form of the Great Theory of Beauty: 
beauty consists in a relatedness between entities. The relatedness may be an exact 
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correspondence, such as one finds in geometry, or a more sophisticated proportionality, 
such as one finds in music (McClymond & McDermott, 2012:§1173). Having said that, 
Edwards embraced the idea that beauty could include disproportion as well as proportion. 
“What seems to be disproportionate in a narrow context might appear proportionate in a 
broader context” (§1173). An opposite situation occurs when something appears to be 
beautiful when taken in a narrow context, and yet appears disproportionate, or even ugly, 
when considered in a larger context (§1186). When things disproportionate, unequal or 
irregular are harmonised, it intensifies the beauty of the whole. In Edwards’ sermon “The 
Excellency of Christ”, he demonstrates how apparently opposing attributes in the person of 
Christ make him as beautiful as he is (Mitchell, 2007:41). 
 Mitchell (2007:37) explains: “Edwards calls the beauty of exact correspondence 
simple beauty. He calls the beauty of proportionality complex beauty. These kinds of 
beauty fit into a larger classification called secondary beauty”. Secondary beauty applies 
to physical things as well as abstract concepts or immaterial matters. A well-ordered 
society can be beautiful. A harmonious community can be beautiful. Well-executed justice 
can be beautiful.  
 At this point, it is vital to point out that for Edwards, beauty was not a concept one 
could divorce from God (Strachan & Sweeney, 2010:§679). Edwards is distinct in this 
respect. While other writers “claim that aesthetic experience points to the goodness of 
God, Edwards claims that true aesthetic experience is inseparable from the perception of 
God” (Louie, 2013§1522). The aesthetic experience is not merely a gift from God; he is 
the very essence of the aesthetic experience (§1520). 
 Thus, for Edwards, primary beauty is the relatedness between persons, and 
Edwards traces beauty back to the first and primary person: God himself. Edwards laid 
stress in his writings on this kind of beauty. In Edwards’ thinking, the usual concepts of 
beauty, such as abstract proportionality or harmony in created forms of beauty, were really 
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to be understood only as symbolic counterpoints to a higher kind of correspondence, that 
of wills in persons. Correspondence or symmetry, or harmony between persons—
intellectual or volitional beings—was what Edwards called “consent”: a term that 
suggested volition, affection, and love to God’s and to one another (McClymond & 
McDermott, 2012:§1137). Directional activity tending toward union was, to Edwards, 
found in nature—a stone “consents” to the law of gravity, but this is only a type of love in 
the spiritual world. Reality, in its most basic form, is relational and dispositional, not 
static, self-contained substances (Venter, 2010:186). 
 Thus, at the fundamental level, beauty is being’s consent to being. God’s 
benevolence toward being in general and toward other benevolent beings is the essence of 
beauty (Hodges, 1995:66). God’s relatedness to himself and to his creatures is primary 
beauty. Edwards was not claiming that beauty and existence are essentially the same. 
Existence is fundamental to agreement, and agreement is at the heart of beauty. Parting 
from the ancients and some medievals, Edwards said that being, or existence, is 
fundamental to beauty, but it is not beauty itself. Beauty is consent, and primary beauty is 
being’s consent to being. The greater the scale of being, the higher the potential for 
agreement, and therefore for beauty. Beauty is harmonious benevolence. Being is the 
ground of beauty. 
 Edwards anticipated the objection to grounding beauty in God himself. Complete 
simplicity cannot be beautiful, for it has no relations of proportionality. Similarly, in 
primary beauty, a solitary person cannot display this consent, of loving union with himself 
or herself. In order for God to be beautiful, God must have proportionality and consent in 
God’s being (Mitchell, 2007:38). Edwards solved this problem elegantly, by putting 
forward the relatedness of the three Persons in the Godhead as the essence of primary 
beauty. The Trinity is the ground of proportionality and consent to Being. Edwards 
explained in The Mind: 
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As to God’s excellence, it is evident it consists in the love of himself…But he 
exerts himself towards himself no other way than in infinitely loving and delighting 
in himself, in the mutual love of the Father and the Son. This makes the third, the 
personal Holy Spirit or the holiness of God, which is his infinite beauty, and this is 
God’s infinite consent to being in general (WJEO, 6:364). 
He goes on to say: “Tis peculiar to God that he has beauty within himself, consisting in 
being’s consenting with his own being, or the love of himself in his own Holy Spirit 
whereas the excellence of others is in loving others, in loving God, and in the 
communications of his Spirit” (WJEO, 6:365). Louie (2013:§3143) writes that for 
Edwards, God is beautiful only because God is triune. Unlike many other writers, for 
Edwards beauty is not one of many attributes of the simple divine essence, but a “moral 
perfection of God, which is embodied in the triune life of God” (§3143). God’s love for 
God is God’s beauty and his chief glory.  
 With this theocentric view of beauty, Edwards explained all other forms of beauty, 
which he termed secondary beauty. Beauty in the universe is essentially an enlargement 
and overflowing of the divine life (Delattre, 2003:281). It is essentially the beauty of 
harmony or proportion, and in Edwards’ mind, can be manifested in several ways.  
 The believer himself is a special recipient of God’s beauty. Beauty is what genuine 
religion looks like (Mitchell, 1975:42). Virtue within a believer is those qualities of heart 
which combine to love God or express benevolence to being in general, and even love for 
his creation (Wooddell, 2007:86). A believer’s beauty is simply a reflection of God’s 
beauty. To love God is to love what he loves, which is to becomes as he is, and to reflect 
his beauty (Wooddell, 2011:§2018). At the societal level, a perfectly harmonious society 
wherein active and mutually supportive social consent takes place would be an example of 
secondary beauty (Martin, 1975:112).  
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 Edwards thus developed a sound philosophical system that could ground beauty in 
God, while finding a way to explain how such a transcendent beauty could be manifest in 
immanent reality. In so doing, he was both maintaining the classical notions of 
transcendent beauty, upholding a Christian view of God as the ground of beauty, while 
responding to the philosophes and others who had doubted beauty’s objectivity on the very 
grounds of its manifest variety. Edwards turns the argument around: the large varieties of 
beauty are emanations of God’s beauty. Secondary beauty is an analogy for primary 
beauty. All secondary beauty ultimately points back to the ground of beauty: being’s 
consent to being. 
 When Edwards turned to deal with the subjectivity of beauty in the experience of 
observers, he again formulated a theocentric response to the eighteenth-century discussion 
of “taste”, in his use of the term sensibility. Delattre (1968:3) suggests that beauty and 
sensibility are the “objective and subjective components of the spiritual life” in Edwards’ 
writings. Martin (2013:138) identifies two word groups used interchangeably throughout 
Edwards’ works: an “affections group” (affections, consent, love, will, pleasure, 
inclination, and disposition) that describe the action of an intelligent being toward other 
intelligent beings (the actions of the subject); and a “beauty group” (beauty, glory, 
holiness, proportion, and excellency) that describe both the object of consent and the result 
of mutual consent. 
 Balancing objective and subjective sides of beauty so that neither eclipsed the other 
was what Edwards’ intricate theory of sensibility and “sense of the heart” attempted to do 
(McClymond & McDermott, 2012:§1194). Some of Edwards’ work on sensibility was a 
response to Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson. In The 
Nature of True Virtue, Edwards referred to Hutcheson by name three times (Aldridge, 
1951:35). Martin (1990:28) believes that Edwards was a “Platonic empiricist”. But he was 
by no means a parrot of popular philosophy.  
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 For Edwards the “sense of the heart” was an appreciation of beauty that is given to 
a person by God. In his Treatise on Grace, Edwards writes that “the first effect of the 
power of God in the heart in regeneration, is to give the heart a divine taste or sense, to 
cause it to have a relish of the loveliness and sweetness of the supreme excellency of the 
divine nature” (WJEO, 21:174). Edwards believed that beauty is definitely something 
subjectively experienced, in On the Nature of True Virtue sounding like one of the earlier 
philosophes: 
 It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation of 
beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called “beautiful”; 
and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things that it 
stands connected with; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving 
the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and consequences. 
(WJEO, 8:619). 
Edwards, however, went beyond Locke’s view that the mind is merely passive in the 
process of perception. Edwards believed that the organ that sensed beauty was the “habit 
of mind”, where sense-ideas received through regular physical channels are ordered in 
their true relational context by the mind, and then delighted in by the mind (Lee, 
1976:390). Edwards believed the imagination is before the inclination: the imagination 
reveals the relations between ideas; the inclination takes pleasure in them (Lee, 1988:156).  
But at the heart of this, was the work of regeneration. Edwards sought to explain 
the ordering activity of the mind and its predisposition toward one thing and not another, 
in terms of its regenerate or unregenerate state. Regenerate hearts are given a new 
inclination, and with it, the ability to see as beautiful what could not be seen before. A 
human being, once given a new habit of mind, could experience the transcendent beauty 
that is God. Equally so, an unregenerate person may well perceive other forms of 
secondary beauty, but lacking the God-given sense of the heart, may yet fail to see the 
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primary beauty that is God. Edwards believed that the Scriptural word “spirit” referred to 
the affections of the mind. If a person obtains new affections, these are part of one’s 
essence, and if one’s essence has changed, one also has a new nature. Such a one 
participates in the divine nature, which explains the consequent love for divine beauty. By 
partaking of God’s love for God, one now has a sensibility for primary beauty (Louie, 
2013:§2627). 
 In this way, by referring to sensibility, habit of mind, or the affections as the faculty 
that perceives or fails to perceive beauty, Edwards placed the blame for failing to see God’s 
beauty at the door of the unbelieving, hard heart, while upholding the truth that God is 
beautiful to the heart ready to see him. Put simply, just hearts have increasingly just 
sentiments. Indeed, for Edwards, the essence of true virtue is “benevolence to being in 
general”. When a human being showed the same “consent” towards God, which could be 
variously understood as faith, belief, hope, obedience, or love, he or she was displaying true 
virtue, or spiritual beauty (McClymond & McDermott, 2012:§6424). God’s love for God 
manifest in a believer was the believer’s relish for God’s beauty.    
 By grounding all beauty in God’s loving relatedness to himself, and developing that 
definition to encompass all forms of beauty, Edwards could ground beauty in ultimate reality 
while acknowledging the diversity in the experience of beauty. Diversity in aesthetic taste 
is satisfactorily explained by the habit of the mind, be it regenerate or unregenerate. 
Therefore, for Edwards, the philosophes were correct to say that much beauty is known by 
experience, but wrong to deny that any ontological structure of beauty existed. The 
perception of beauty lay not merely in some neutral innate sense, but in inclinations of the 
heart, which could be regenerate or unregenerate. Thus, only believers could sense and enjoy 
the primary beauty of God and, having done so, would be even more capable of sensing and 
enjoying secondary beauty.  
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 As mentioned in chapter two, Edwards managed to draw from several theories of 
beauty and harmonise them by modifying them all. Beauty as being, beauty as an attribute 
of God, beauty as one of three transcendentals, beauty as a subject’s pleasure came 
together in the nature of true virtue: being’s cordial consent to being in general.  
 Edwards also managed to undermine and transcend the conventional duality of 
subject and object. For Edwards, beauty is not a property; it is a disposition. It is objective 
in the sense that it is an actual state of affairs—the way God relates to himself and his 
world—but it is subjective in that it is a heartfelt disposition: relation and consent on the 
part of God. Beauty is simultaneously objective and subjective (Farley, 2001:47).  
 On the one hand, the seventeenth and first half of the eighteenth century launched a 
deeper consciousness of the meaning of beauty in art criticism and taste, while on the other 
it sowed the seeds for beauty’s eventual demise in Western aesthetics (Farley, 2001:38). 
Coming as he did in the era when thinking about beauty wrestled with this duality and 
began siding with subjectivism, Jonathan Edwards is a watermark in the history of 
Christian thinking about beauty. Unfortunately, though Edwards provided a compelling 
answer to the subjectivist trend, the successors of the early Enlightenment thinkers would 
take subjectivism in beauty to its logical end. 
6.3.7. The Late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries 
 The philosophical discussion of beauty in the Enlightenment period after 1750  
took a decidedly secular turn. Few Christian voices make a significant contribution in this 
period, and one is obliged to survey the non-Christian voices that came to shape the 
conversation. Aesthetics became more interested on the meaning or experience of knowing 
the beautiful, rather than in experiencing God’s beauty, more concerned with locating the 
spiritual dimension of beauty in the psychology of the human mind. This is most clearly 
seen in this period’s most prominent voices on beauty, Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel 
(García-Rivera, 2005:357). 
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6.3.7.1. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) 
 Immanuel Kant sought to stabilise the growing subjectivisation of knowledge by 
categorising which domains of human knowledge and experience could be judged 
empirically or rationally, and which could not. He desired to show that humans are not 
reducible to external cause explanation, but exhibit a kind of self-transcendence in their 
experience. Kant, in his three Critiques, sought to prove that reason and sense experience 
are necessarily severed, and the human being is divided into separate and “non-
communicating faculties of reason, will, and emotion” (Davidson, 2000:235). Kant 
juxtaposed judgments of taste to instrumental and moral judgements (Lorand, 1994:400). 
Human reason was incapable of knowing anything beyond the natural world investigated 
by empirical science, such as religion, morality, or metaphysics (Pearcey, 2010:§1767). 
 Kant’s Critique of Judgement suggests that the aesthetic experience has nothing to 
do with the object per se but exists wholly in the mind of the subject (Markos, 
2010:§1428). Kant, unlike Jonathan Edwards, does not see beauty as a manifestation of 
God’s nature. Rather, it is the human vocation to impose “self-legislated lawfulness” upon 
the sensible world (Louie, 2013:§6795). The human mind does not, as Locke had 
suggested, passively receive sense impressions through the senses, but actively orders and 
arranges those impressions, imposing order upon the world. Reality as one perceives it is a 
world structured by human consciousness (Pearcey, 2010:§1840). Beauty, morality, and 
religion are part of the inner order that the human mind places upon its perceptions. 
Although these things are “impossible to know”, they are “morally necessary to suppose” 6 
(Pearcey, 2010:§1817). 
 For that reason, Kant set about describing a basis for making judgements about 
beauty. Kant would not recognise or endorse the relativism or nihilism found in modern 
discussions about beauty. His intention was nearly the opposite: to provide a stable and 
                                               
6 Cited from Kant’s 1885 Introduction to Logic, London: Longmans, Green, & Company, IX, 60. 
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universally valid form of judgement for beauty. In his Critique of Judgement he asserted 
that while aesthetic judgements are subjective, yet they can claim universal validity 
(Thiessen, 2005:§2598). 
 In his third Critique, Kant gives aesthetics its own a priori principle. Morality or 
utility cannot help one judge beauty. Instead, one must judge based on its “purposiveness 
without purpose”: perceiving order in a thing of beauty, which serves no particular 
utilitarian purpose. The mind is imposing order on what would otherwise appear 
disorganised, and herein is the pleasure of beauty.  
 For Kant, the pleasure in beauty is an “entirely disinterested satisfaction,” pleasure 
bereft of desire (Nehamas, 2000:393). Aesthetic judgement is one in which the subject is 
not seeking to use the object as a means for personal interests but is able to enjoy it for 
itself (Scruton, 2009:27). Aesthetic judgement is thus disinterested, universal (in intent) 
and noncognitive (based on direct personal experience) (O’Hear, 2011:179). 
 Some of Kant’s concern with self-transcendence is seen in his treatment of the 
topic of the sublime. Edmund Burke’s A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) was the most influential work on this subject. 
The sublime referred to that way in which human emotions are gripped by an order of 
things which they cannot master, predict, or fully comprehend. This experience was to be 
differentiated from beauty, which was understood always to be pleasurable (Farley, 
2001:37). Kant regarded distinguishing the two as fundamental to understanding the 
judgements of taste. He saw the experience of the sublime as a valuable moment of human 
self-transcendence, being conscious of the vastness of nature, but affirming one’s 
willingness to obey the moral law in spite of it. Sublimity can therefore rise above mere 
need or appetite (Scruton, 2009:73).  
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6.3.7.2. Lesser Lights and the Romantics 
 Romanticism was another reaction to the early Enlightenment’s overemphasis on 
objective knowledge. Stressing the importance of beauty, feeling, intuition, and 
imagination, it in some ways hastened the division between fact and value, object and 
subject. Theologians such as Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834) stressed 
that religion was a matter of intuition and feeling, while beauty was increasingly expressed 
in panentheistic terms (Thiessen, 2005:§2615). Friedrich von Schiller (1759–1805) argued 
that man is most himself in the aesthetic dimension of his life (Vanhoozer, 1987:33). 
Space precludes a detailed examination of other lesser lights of this period, such as 
Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829), and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1759–
1805) (Martin, 1990:55). A similar concern with self-transcendence is seen in Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788–1860). He wrote on how grasping an idea of something, beyond its 
utility, allows humans to transcend their self-interest. The act of pure contemplation allows 
a person to become absorbed entirely in its object (Farley, 2001:61). Beauty is the quality 
of the object that facilitates knowledge of its idea.   
 Self-transcendence continues to be a theme in philosophy during this period, but 
not always with reference to beauty. Farley (2001:56) demonstrates that Søren 
Kierkegaard (1813–1855) and Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) illustrate a strand of Western 
philosophy in which self-transcendence is discussed with little or no place for beauty.  
 The Romantics’ desire to preserve beauty through endorsing Kant’s division 
became more reason for secularists to relegate it to the margins of life. It was Georg Hegel 
who predicted this demise.  
6.3.7.3. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) 
 Hegel’s aesthetic theory was perhaps the most comprehensive in modernity. Hegel 
did not expend much space on what constitutes beauty. He was more interested in in a 
work of art's meaning and purpose. For Hegel, art expressed a culture’s outlook and 
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worldview. A culture’s idea about reality is given sensuous form in its artworks. These 
manifestations are that culture’s self-expression. The most beautiful work of art is the one 
which best and most fully expresses the idea, and not whether it corresponds to some 
universal criterion of beauty. Art’s aim is to reveal truth in pleasing, sensible form (Savile, 
1989:127).  
 Hegel saw the peril of subjectivity. The emphasis on the experience of the subject 
meant that art no longer expressed religion, or satisfied human spiritual needs, as it once 
had. Art was increasingly produced for art’s sake. The most important aspects of life in 
modern culture were now expressed by reflective thought, and through the sciences instead 
of the fine arts. The history of art had, in some ways come to an end. Romantic, realist and 
impressionist art were a long way off from the spiritual-aesthetic heights of religious arts 
in earlier periods (Thiessen, 2005:§2616). 
 The eighteenth century had become acutely aware of human consciousness, and its 
relation to knowledge. Both the earlier rationalism and the later empiricism of the 
seventeenth century had now been found inadequate to later thinkers. The transcendental 
idealism of Kant and Hegel came to own the epistemological day. Kant had divided life 
into the phenomenal world (the world which can be empirically measured) and the 
noumenal world (concerned with value and meaning), and had attempted to bridge these 
through his three Critiques (Schaeffer, 2005:160). Unfortunately, he did not succeed in 
unifying these two areas of human experience. Instead, he managed to sow the seeds of the 
eventual demise of modernism’s obsession with pure objectivity (Bauder, 2011). With this 
demise would come a growing scepticism that beauty represented anything outside the 
beholder, or anything within being itself. Beauty was increasingly associated with art, and 
not ethics or religion, and the experience of beauty was understood as an inner experience 
of finding order in external phenomena. 
  100 
 
 Romanticism actually borrowed from Kant and entrenched the division between 
noumenal and phenomenal. While attempting to protect beauty, intuition, and emotion, 
Romanticism actually opened the door for what would become existentialism, and later, 
postmodernism. 
 Hegel’s speculations about culture increased the sense that beauty was relative to 
each culture. His predictions of art’s declining role in an increasingly technologically-
driven culture were correct, and perhaps hastened the relegation of art to a specialisation 
irrelevant to answering the concrete questions of reality asked by a materialist culture. 
Beauty was increasingly passé, a concept connected to medieval speculative metaphysics, 
inner preference, religion, or effete arts. Though few today are thoroughgoing Kantians, 
Kant’s central insight—that human consciousness constructs and orders sense 
perception—would come to dominate most thinking about beauty. It is in the nineteenth 
century that the first occurrence of the phrase “beauty is in the eye of the beholder” is 
found, in the book Molly Bawn (1878) by Margaret Wolfe Hungerford. Lundin 
summarises concisely:  
By the end of the eighteenth century, then, a new and powerful understanding of 
beauty and the arts had planted its flag on the Western intellectual landscape and 
staked its claim to a sizeable plot of cultural ground. The aesthetic realm was 
governed by a set of interlocking assumptions that had at their base the belief that 
science disclosed a cosmos governed by law and necessity, while the spirit’s inner 
drama played itself out in oppositional freedom...The creation of an aesthetic 
domain and the elaboration of a doctrine of the fine arts were meant to establish the 
epistemological authority of sensory perception and to secure the spiritual rights of 
beauty. To that end the eighteenth century placed the arts side by side with the 
sciences in a setting in which each was to become increasingly impervious, even 
incomprehensible, to the other” (2007:§1892). 
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After Edwards, the vocabulary of beauty in Christianity falls nearly silent until the 
twentieth century. A tidal wave of Enlightenment epistemologies almost overwhelms what 
had been a several millennia-long consensus on beauty as a real property. After Edwards, 
few theologies speak of God as beautiful, or beauty as a real transcendental.  
6.3.8. The Twentieth Century and the Contemporary Era 
 
 As the loss of shared ultimate values took its toll, the twentieth century came to be 
marked by pluralism, and ultimately, nihilism. Optimism about human progress through 
science received a grievous wound in World War One; after the Holocaust and Hiroshima, 
such optimism was mostly dead. The work of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche turned into the 
existentialism of men such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, and Gabriel Marcel. 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) saw nothing of beauty in nature or even in the 
transcendent self, seeing it rooted in the will to power and writing that “nothing is so 
conditional, let us say circumscribed, as our feeling for the beautiful” (Lundin, 
2007:§2022).  
 Existentialism would come to influence the schools of structuralism and post-
structuralism, represented by men such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. Arthur 
Danto (2002:37) writes that by 1965 “reference to the creation of beauty was omitted from 
the enabling language for the National Endowment for the Arts, presumably because 
beauty had largely disappeared from the artistic agenda”.  
 Strangely, or perhaps fittingly, it was in this aesthetically arid period that the 
vocabulary of beauty returned to theology. Roman Catholic theology returned to the 
concept of the beauty of God in this period with such writers as J. Pohle (1852–1922), F. 
Diekamp (1864–1943), Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988) and J. Berthier (1923–1994) 
(Lindsey, 1974:126).  
 Protestant and Evangelical theologians were slower to appropriate their 
Edwardsian heritage. Theologians such as Anders Nygren, Jaroslav Pelikan, Gerhard 
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Nebel, and Eberhard Jungel tended to be hostile to classical ideas of beauty, and 
essentially anti-aesthetic in approach (Farley, 2001:68). Crain (2003:30) notes that within 
Evangelicalism no mention of beauty is found in the theologies of Louis Berkhof or 
Millard Erickson, and only a passing mention in Wayne Grudem. An entire school of 
existentialist theology would develop, known as Neo-orthodoxy, including men such as 
Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr (Pearcey, 2010:225). These men, 
drawing from their Kierkegaardian roots, were more prone to consider beauty. Karl Barth 
is the leading name among them.  
6.3.8.1. Karl Barth (1886–1968) 
 Barth wrote several times on the beauty of God, but avoided beauty as a dominant 
aspect in his view of God. Barth identified the beauty of God as the manifestation of the 
glory of God: the sum total of the divine perfection in irresistible self-manifestation 
(Lindsey, 1974:127). Barth wanted to keep theology Christologically centred, and 
therefore wanted beauty to refer to the form in which God’s beauty is revealed in Christ. 
Barth even objected to representing this beauty in art, since the beauty of God revealed in 
Christ is “an alien beauty which judges all other forms of beauty” (de Gruchy, 2001:6). 
Barth eschewed formal definitions of beauty, fearing they will lead to aestheticism. 
Instead, “for Barth, to say that God is beautiful is to say that God’s self-revelation is totally 
pleasant and enjoyable to human beings” (Louie 2013:§4440). 
 For all this, Barth continued the dichotomy between reason and perception of 
beauty, maintaining the two-storey view of reality brought about by Kant and Kierkegaard. 
Religious experience (and therefore aesthetic experience) can take place apart from reason 
or fact (Schaeffer, 2005:176). This would deny any correspondence between being and 
beauty.  
 Among other Protestant theologians, William Dean, spoke positively of beauty, 
though he did so from the perspective of A.N. Whitehead’s process philosophy (Farley, 
  103 
 
2001:74). He argued for the inadequacy of the concepts of “the true”, “the good” and “the 
holy”, and sought to show that only the experience of “the beautiful” is intrinsically 
valuable (Lindsey, 1974:129). 
 Roman Catholic theologians do not struggle with the same antithesis between 
Christianity and the classical tradition, felt by so many Protestant theologians. Western and 
Eastern Catholicisms developed by way of engagement with the heritage of ancient 
Greece, and do not wrestle with the same anti-Hellenic posture. Of all the twentieth 
century Catholic theologians, Hans Urs von Balthasar is the most prominent voice on 
theological aesthetics.  
6.3.8.2. Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905–1988) 
 After a silence of two hundred years since Edwards, a silence only barely 
interrupted by some twentieth-century voices, in 1961 Swiss Catholic theologian published 
the first volume of his seven-volume magnum opus, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological 
Aesthetics (Howard, 2011:4). Von Balthasar advocated theological aesthetics, not 
aesthetic theology. Theology must determine the aesthetic categories from the data of 
revelation—the touchstone and source of truth—rather than resorting to the extra-
theological categories of a worldly philosophical aesthetic (Crain, 2003:34). Balthasar, like 
Barth, does not see beauty as a divine attribute, and is wary of its power to control 
theology. He does, however criticise both Catholicism and Protestantism for eliminating 
the aesthetic from theology.  
  In these first seven volumes, the focus is on the contrast between worldly beauty 
and divine glory, between τὸ καλόν of Plato and God’s DabK in the Old Testament. Both 
beauty and glory are enrapturing, but glory results in mission in Israel, whereas Platonic 
beauty tends to terminate in static contemplation (Oakes, 2007:§2177).  
 Beauty is the study of God’s glory made manifest. To contemplate beauty is to 
contemplate divine trinitarian love, revealed in Christ. On this point, Balthasar sounds like 
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Barth, yet he departs from Barth by returning to a theory of form, similar to Aquinas’ 
concept of clarity. “When this form is perceived by people, they recognize it as the beauty 
of the world” (Louie, 2013:§6813).  
 While Balthasar’s contribution to the discussion is voluminous, it appears to 
remain arcane for all but dedicated students of Von Balthasar. Jonathan Edwards remains 
peerless as a theologian of beauty whose theory was coherent, intelligible and accessible  
to the serious reader.  
 Other significant theologians of beauty in the twentieth century include Patrick 
Sherry, John Navone, Paul Evdokimov, Richard Viladesau, and Nicolas Wolterstoff, some 
of whom are quoted in this study.  
 In summary, the twentieth-century Christian contribution to the idea of beauty 
included considering the relationship between theology and beauty: whether beauty arose 
from trinitarianism, theology proper, creation, or soteriology, and whether a theocentric or 
anthropocentric theological method should shape the definition. Theological aesthetics 
also considered whether Christianity could comfortably assimilate older Hellenic views on 
beauty, or whether these views should be opposed, whether noetic sin had made beauty a 
feature only of the eschaton, or something part of the created order even its current state 
(Farley, 2001:79). Some theologians wrote copiously on the relationship between 
Christianity and the arts, with Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich, and Hans Küng being the most 
prominent earlier voices on this topic. It did not seriously tackle Kantian dualism, 
existentialism or structuralism. Indeed, its most prominent voices (the Neo-orthodox 
school), perpetuated existentialism, while others returned to Thomistic categories (Jacques 
Maritain), or, as in Von Balthasar’s case, were too eclectic to categorise. 
6.3.8.3. The Postmodern Anti-Aesthetic 
 Chapter one described the postmodern attitudes towards beauty, including a 
hostility toward beauty, and its stated reasons. Philosophically speaking, postmodernism’s 
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roots lie in the existentialism of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, which was taken further by 
Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Karl Jaspers. Vanhoozer (1987:37) suggests that 
Jacques Derrida is where Western metaphysics essentially comes to an end. “What began 
with Kant positing an autonomous realm of beauty (that is, aesthetic objects and aesthetic 
judgments) has now expanded to include all of life” (1987:39). Chapter eight will give 
further attention to the epistemology of postmodernism. Since the focus here is the history 
of beauty in Christian thought, the chapter’s concern is to understand the aesthetic of the 
period broadly defined as postmodern.  
 Farley (2001:1) asserts that beauty is simply no longer a category that postmodern 
Western societies use for self-understanding. Worship, politics, education and even the arts 
are largely conducted without that notion. Nevertheless, as mentioned in chapter one, 
beauty has experienced a renewed interest. Though the ideas of postmodernism dominate 
the academic, political and media conversation, many of the working population still hold 
to the older traditional ideas about beauty (Farley, 2001:4).  
 Primarily, postmodernism is an orientation toward the modern. On the one hand, it 
is an attitude of social resistance to certain modes of thought that it deems oppressive, 
making it a form of idealism. On the other, it is a radical critique which eschews 
discourses of reference, value, reality, depth, presence and meaning (Farley, 2001:3). In 
this alienation from meaning, the result is a cynical culture of narcissism: essentially an 
anti-aesthetic. Beauty becomes the enemy: a throwback to systems of thought that posit 
ultimate values, transcendentals, and realist metaphysics. Beauty is a mask that oppressors 
use to cover the ugliness of life and disguise their modes of oppression. 
 Nevertheless, beauty as a deep value still survives in traditionalist, antiquarian and 
religious strands of culture, even though the powerful institutions and leaders of dominant 
discourse have eschewed beauty. What militates against beauty among the masses is the 
sensibilities inculcated by such a society: pervasive marketing, consumerism, and the 
  106 
 
elevation of titillating and salacious entertainment. Contemporary society lives with a 
paradox: an aestheticisation of life seen in society's continual immersion in popular music 
and media images, alongside a hostility towards beauty itself by the cultural elite. Popular 
art gluts itself on the loud, garish and kitsch, while simultaneously high art has created a 
cult of the ugly. Perhaps it is less of a paradox and more of cause-and-effect: despising of 
one thing must create a vacuum for another. This philosophical anti-aesthetic combined 
with the popular hunger for kitsch and sentimentalism bleeds into contemporary Christian 
thinking, as chapter two demonstrated.  
  The twentieth century’s failure to re-establish beauty at the heart of worship and 
spirituality is seen in the anti-aesthetic of the postmodern era, and the Christian forms of 
the same. While the explosion of interest in theological aesthetics appears heartening, it 
must be grounded in biblical epistemologies if such interest is to reverse the anti-aesthetic 
trends of the postmodern.  
6.4. Summary of Historical Study 
  
 Christian thinking about beauty developed from the pre-speculative acceptance of 
the phenomenon in the Hebrew Scriptures, to the assimilation of Platonic ideas about 
beauty as harmony and proportion. For the first fifteen centuries of the Christian era, 
beauty was identified with being, and with God’s being as the essence and ground of all 
being. Beauty as a property outside the beholder and as a phenomenon recognised 
pleasurably within the beholder was virtually unchallenged from the penning of the Old 
Testament through to the Reformation period. What is most remarkable, from the modern 
point of view, is how the unity of beauty’s subject and object is assumed for most of this 
period, where Cartesian or Kantian dualisms are yet unknown. It is also noteworthy that 
very early in the Christian conversation about beauty, a subject’s moral fitness is seen as a 
prerequisite for rightly perceiving beauty.  
 The classical and medieval consensus regarding beauty began to break up as 
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humanism and nominalism made their way into philosophy. The pursuit of epistemological 
certainty apart from divine revelation, alongside the growing sense of the interior 
consciousness of the human subject and her perceptions led to the secularising intellectual 
currents of the eighteenth century. Beauty suffered alongside religion, relegated to that 
which is impossible to know but necessary to suppose. At first, this emphasis would lead 
to the discussion of taste, but ultimately it would relegate beauty to an entirely inward 
experience within the human consciousness (Stolnitz, 1961:194). Jonathan Edwards 
provided a compelling answer to rationalism, empiricism and eighteenth-century 
epistemologies, but like his contemporary J. S. Bach, his value seems to have been most 
appreciated after his lifetime.  
 The twentieth century brought something of a renaissance of beauty in theology, 
but much of it remained grounded in existentialism, and little work was done to overcome 
the Kantian dualism that still prevailed in epistemology. The postmodern anti-aesthetic 
attitude continues to be the cultural norm, relegating beauty to isolated strands of 
nostalgic, traditionalist or antiquarian sub-cultures.  
6.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter’s study of Scripture and history, one can observe a unanimity on the 
topic of beauty that ran from the authors of the Old Testament until the time of John 
Calvin. This consensus was that beauty was real, and either the essence of being, or a 
property of being. Beauty was to be identified with God. Subject and object were two 
inseparable parts of one phenomenon: beauty-pleasure, though only beautiful souls would 
recognise beauty. 
 As the West embraced nominalism over realism, confidence in transcendentals 
weakened. An obsession with rationality, epistemological certainty, logic, and human 
psychology grew. By the end of the eighteenth century, a division existed between 
  108 
 
perceiving subjects and perceived objects, between values and facts, between the 
noumenal and phenomenal, between mind and matter.  
 Looking back, one must determine if this break with an older consensus 
represented an advance towards a better and truer knowledge of the world, or a regression. 
If it represented progress, one must conclude that the abandonment of beauty as a property 
of being or the created order was a needed change.  
 Were one to combine the testimony of Scripture and the consensus of all Christians 
convinced by some form of metaphysical realism, one would see it as a regression. The 
Enlightenment recognition that the human mind contributes to the perception of reality 
was a helpful insight, but relegating all “noumenal” knowledge to an internal ordering 
propensity in the human mind was fatal to belief in beauty beyond the beholder.  
Identifying standards of taste was necessary once the differences in perceptions and 
kinds of beauty amongst subjects and cultures were recognised. Regarding taste as both an 
imposed order upon reality and simultaneously as a universally binding judgement was, 
however, speaking out of both sides of one’s mouth. Once some form of idealism, 
existentialism or deconstructionism had been embraced, beauty as a real property of God 
or the world could not be rescued. Theological aesthetics built upon these foundations 
must eventually face the same fate as their secular philosophical parents.  
 How has the working definition of beauty proposed by this study held up under the 
findings of this chapter? Chapter two defined beauty in its essential form as God’s relation 
to himself and his works: a dynamic, relational and moral unity of pleasure and excellence 
in the Trinity and the created order.  
First, the study of Scripture has verified that as far as the writers of the Old and 
New Testaments were concerned, the phenomenon of beauty is a real property of God, 
persons and the world.  
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Second, the historical survey showed that nearly all premodern Christians 
grounded beauty in God’s being. Until the seventeenth century, a consensus existed that 
beauty can be said to be “objectively” real, to use the modern connotation. For 
premoderns, beauty is essential to being, and since humans are part of being, no tension is 
felt between object and subject.  
This approach received a blow during the Enlightenment. Enlightenment 
philosophers’ obsession with finding epistemic certainty apart from divine revelation 
appears misguided to a Christian, but the positive contribution of this period was to 
distinguish the knower and the known, the beholder and the beheld in far more self-
conscious terms. Ancient and medieval Christianity was too content to define beauty as a 
static property in Platonic terms. The Enlightenment confronted the church with questions 
of change, questions of varying perceptions, questions of subject and object. Jonathan 
Edwards’ response provided a way for beauty to be both objective and subjective, to be 
both related to being and to have a dynamic relationship to being. Beauty, for Edwards, is 
a real property in objects, perceivable when the perceivers meet certain conditions. 
Edwards verifies and nuances the working definition of beauty as personal, moral and 
dynamic: God’s relationship of pleasure in his own excellence.  
 After Edwards, no theologian provided so comprehensive and cohesive a view on 
beauty, in this researcher’s opinion. Jonathan Edwards is, to many, the pinnacle of 
Protestant thinking on beauty. Having said that, Edwards died in 1758. His work must be 
considered in relation to Kant, existentialism, structuralism, post-structuralism, and 
deconstructionism. In particular, some compelling answers need to be made to the question 
of Kant’s “two-storey” epistemology, as well as postmodernism’s simultaneous 
aestheticisation of life and celebration of the cult of the ugly. One’s understanding of 
apprehending beauty will need to include these developments to be a theory relevant to 
contemporary times, and useful for this study’s model of spirituality. 
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 Having established the Scriptural and historical basis for viewing God’s beauty as 
an “objective” phenomenon worthy of pursuit, attention must now shift to the “subjective” 
side of beauty. Understanding the experience of beauty in art, and relating art to religion 
may shape the understanding of apprehending God’s beauty, and will prepare the ground 
for this study's proposals regarding a model of spirituality that incorporates both.  
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Chapter 7. Subjective Beauty: The Pursuit of God’s Beauty and 
Aesthetic Experience 
7.1. Introduction 
 Having established that the beauty of God has been regarded as a real and 
“objective” quality by the majority of Christians in history, a study in Christian spirituality 
must necessarily turn from the notion of objective beauty to the subjective pursuit and 
apprehension of beauty. Since Christian spirituality is concerned with the experience of 
Christians seeking God, a crucial link in this study is to consider the broader human 
experience of pursuing beauty, and to find parallels to such a pursuit in Christian 
spirituality. What is the human subject’s experience of seeking and finding beauty? 
Further, if God’s beauty is more than an intellectual concept to be known purely through 
mental cognition, what mode of perception and method of pursuit should one adopt to 
discover this beauty?   
 The partner in this study will naturally be that area of human life that has pursued 
beauty both within religion, and apart from it: art. Art is certainly not the only domain of 
life in which beauty is found. Human relationships, nature, mathematics and the sciences 
could all be mined as sources of beauty. Art does, however, provide a studied methodology 
of pursuing beauty. This methodology will be useful to this study. 
Art and Christianity have experienced a fractious relationship—sometimes 
inseparable, sometimes hostile, but never irrelevant to the other. At various points, purist 
supporters of the one have suspected the other of corrupting its integrity. Nevertheless, 
both have needed the other: Christianity has needed tangible expressions of divine beauty 
(or of the worshipper’s expression of apprehending it), and art has needed an ideal greater 
than itself. Indeed, Emil Brunner (1937:499) stated, “It is our duty to reflect on this 
remarkable relation between art and religion”. 
 If art and religion are deeply—perhaps inseparably—related, then the pursuit of 
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one will inform the pursuit of the other. Specifically, one of the aims of art has been the 
pursuit and incarnation of beauty. One may then find in art certain modes of approach, 
methods of understanding, and postures of perception that will inform a pursuit of beauty 
in Christian spirituality. While artistic theories on what constitutes beauty are legion, what 
is of more interest to this study are the methods art supplies for the subjective aspect of 
pursuing beauty, and its record of the experience of apprehending beauty. What does a 
seeker of beauty do and experience when seeking and finding beauty? 
 The relevant material on aesthetics, art and religion, and theological aesthetics is 
too vast to competently cover if the focus of this chapter is not properly qualified. Three 
qualifications are in order. First, this chapter will not attempt to define and critique the 
field of theological aesthetics. The findings and insights of various scholars in these fields 
will be instructive, but no attempt will be made to define or develop a distinct theological 
aesthetic. Second, this chapter will not explore the relationship between art and religion in 
any serious historical and sociological sense. It will suffice to establish the parallels and 
similarities between both. Third, no attempt will be made to develop or defend a particular 
theory of art criticism, but the chapter will draw out the salient features of the aesthetic 
experience.  
 This chapter will aim to establish art and religion as partners in the pursuit of 
beauty, describing the differences, similarities and tensions. It will then consider the nature 
of the aesthetic experience in four stages. Once again, the aesthetic experience in art is 
chosen to demonstrate a methodology of pursuing and experiencing beauty that may find 
close parallels in Christian spirituality. These parallels will then be drawn out and studied, 
as the basis for a method of apprehending God’s beauty in Christian spirituality. 
7.2. Art and Christian Spirituality  
7.2.1. The Similarities Between Art and Religion  
 Though the link between art and religion should be self-evident, a secularised age 
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has separated the two, creating artless religion and non-religious art. Dupré (2000:69) 
reminds readers that for most of human history, what is now restrictively called “art” 
provided the symbols and forms for what people now refer to as “religion”. These two 
were indistinguishable, for all of life was religious, and art expressed life in its totality. 
The Enlightenment severed this union, and centuries later, the Enlightenment’s 
descendants see no self-evident link between the two. Therefore, a justification of the 
relationship of art to religion, and specifically to Christian spirituality, is in order. Seven 
statements can be given that demonstrate the overlapping relationship of these two 
domains of human experience.  
1) Art and religion both deal with ultimate realities. 
 Art and religion are sourced in, and aim at, an explanation of ultimate reality. The 
term ultimate reality refers to reality beyond matter and empirical verification: the regions 
of truth, morality and beauty. Both art and religion are concerned with these questions. 
Brown (2000:§1354), citing Clive Bell, writes that both religion and art are expressions of 
the “emotional significance” of the universe. Pope John Paul II (1999:9) wrote of the 
connections of both to ultimate reality:  
Even beyond its typically religious expressions, true art has a close affinity with the 
world of faith, so that, even in situations where culture and the Church are far 
apart, art remains a kind of bridge to religious experience. In so far as it seeks the 
beautiful, fruit of an imagination which rises above the everyday, art is by its 
nature a kind of appeal to the mystery. Even when they explore the darkest depths 
of the soul or the most unsettling aspects of evil, artists give voice in a way to the 
universal desire for redemption. 
Julian Johnson (2002:49) suggests that art is concerned with the extraordinary, the “outer 
limits of our experience”, and that it expresses a human longing to realise ourselves as 
something greater than we are. Indeed, Karl Rahner (1982:27) concludes that some 
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“‘religious art’ may be well intended and painted by pious people, but it is not genuine 
religious art because it does not touch those depths of existence where genuine religious 
experience takes place”. Hendricks (1988:109) agrees that both religion and the arts seek 
the “world beyond this world yet hidden within it”. He goes on to list and compare 
religious categories for describing ultimate reality with artistic ones:  
Religious categories for describing this ultimate reality are: mysterium tremendum, 
numen (Otto), sacer (historians of religion) ens realissimus (Medieval philosophy) 
Universal spirit (Hegel), Urgrund (romantic idealism via Tillich). Aesthetic 
categories for expressing this ‘world beyond’ the world that is conveyed through 
worldly experience are: Dasein (Heidegger in Poetry, Language, Thought); 
inexhaustibility (Stephen David Ross); the knowledge of being related to being 
(Ricoeur in The Rule of Metaphor), a deeper unspoken order, the fact that order 
exists (Michael Foucault in The Order of Things). 
Ultimate, transcendent reality, and its relationship to the everyday and mundane, has 
sometimes been described with the terms sacred and profane. Mircea Eliade wrote 
voluminously on this topic, explaining that the sacred in religious societies is something 
set apart from the profane space outside, and so provides access to that which is higher, 
eternal, and ultimately real. The profane is an experience of fragmentation, disorientation, 
and chaos (Brown, 2000:§3266–3273). This experience of what is higher, ultimate, and 
real, is unavoidably fleshed out in art.  
 Tillich (1990:317–329) enumerates various types of religious experience: the 
sacramental or numinous realism, mystical religion, prophet-protesting, religious 
humanism, and ecstatic-spiritual. These all encounter transcendent reality, and all use 
symbolism and sacramentalism to varying degrees, making art essential to the expression 
of this experience.  
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 The reverse, or corollary is equally true: If the idea of God includes ultimate 
reality, all art that expresses ultimate reality expresses God, whether it intends to do so or 
not. Art can at points take the form of religion, and religion the form of art, to speak to 
ultimate things. Art can communicate religious significance, even if it operates outsides 
institutional religion (Brown, 1989:111). Wherever art turns to the absolute, to the “wholly 
other”, it intersects with religion (Van der Leeuw, 1932:332–337). 
 Religion and the arts both pursue meaning, meaning that explicates ultimate reality.  
2) Art and religion both seek to incarnate transcendent realities. 
 Beyond pursuing ultimate realities, both religion and the arts seek to give 
perceptible expressions to these ultimate realities, that would remain otherwise invisible. 
This is particularly important for Christianity as an incarnational religion (Gaebelein, 
1985:62). Art, when used by Christians, should not seek to fabricate a non-existent reality. 
Imagination, intangibles, and the nonverbal in art should still correspond to a genuine, 
ultimate reality (p. 83). Harries (1993:43) states that Christianity’s special insight, in 
contradistinction to Platonism, is that “the divine beauty is to be seen in and through the 
particular, of which the Incarnation is the supreme expression”. 
 Religion, which by definition deals with more than merely material reality, must 
grapple with how its ultimate realities will be fleshed out. Brown (2000:§2018–2032) 
suggests four categories of how the invisible and visible meet in religion: negative 
transcendence where God appears only as the Absent One, signified only by the depth of 
the artfully expressed yearning; radical transcendence, where God is the infinitely distant 
One whom humankind cannot approach, though that Other can approach them; proximate 
transcendence, which is sacramental; and immanent transcendence, where the sacred is 
altogether immersed in the ordinary. Each of these will vary in the degree to which the 
transcendent is mediated and expressed in the immanent, that is, material realities.   
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 Art seeks to make perceptible the “world of the spirit, of the invisible, of God”, 
giving form and meaning to what is otherwise ineffable (John Paul II, 1999:10). Art is a 
kind of mediation of transcendence using immanent creation. Begbie (1991:228) concurs 
that art is an engagement with the physical world involving one’s tangible acts of sensation 
as much as one’s non-physical faculties.    
 Art reproduces the world’s rhythms, sounds, colours and shapes, and so calls into 
existence a “duplication of beauty as being” (Farley, 2001:111). Thus, art incarnates a 
worldview (Pearcey, 2010:§208). Richard Weaver (1948:19) defined a developed culture 
as “a way of looking at the world through an aggregation of symbols, so that empirical 
facts take on significance and man feels that he is acting in a drama”. 
 According to Brunner (1937:499–503), this incarnational ability does not only 
make the invisible visible, it functions as a unifier of the body and the spirit, where the 
spirit is corporealised, and the body is spiritualised, re-uniting what has sometimes been 
sundered in Christianity. A Platonic element in Christianity has been suspicious of 
materiality and physicality. For example, Augustine is often accused of having a deep 
suspicion of the body. Bedford (2012:48) argues that Augustine had no problem with the 
beauty of the world or the pleasure of the senses but was concerned about using beautiful 
things to quench a thirst that only God can satisfy. Still, Christianity has at times struggled 
with a tension between the spiritual and the sensuous, contributing to a suspicion of art.  
 Christian spirituality pursues communion with God, and this communion can be 
mediated by “aesthetic structures which create, facilitate or sometimes even require a 
triune meeting between the work of literary art, the spiritually awakened human person, 
and the divine life of God revealed by faith and reason” (Jeffrey & Maillet, 2011:§916–
918). O’Meara (1988:214) claims that the forms of art are not objects of perception, but 
media, and similarly in religion the text, the law, the liturgy, and the church building are 
not the object but the media. Both use the sensuous to mediate the spiritual, the immanent 
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to communicate the transcendent. 
3) Art and religion both point to another cosmos. 
 Emil Brunner (1937:499–503) noted that art does not lie in the perception of 
something which is present in this world, but in the desire to go beyond that which already 
exists, because that which is present does not satisfy man. Man seeks a better world, a 
world of perfection—a redeemed world. Both art and faith call one to seek another world: 
perfected, idealised, or merely different. Art uses symbolic meaning that transports its 
audience beyond its material nature, recreating the world (Johnson, 2002:70). Religion, 
too, while using words, books, food, or music, points to a world beyond this one. Symbols 
enable humans to engage distant, future or even merely possible states of affairs (Scruton, 
2007:12). 
 When one experiences a work of great art, one knows more about self, others, this 
world, or the next (Barzun, 1974:75).  
The imagination calls us to leave our personalities behind and temporarily to 
inhabit another’s experience, looking at the world with new eyes. Art invites us to 
meet the Other—whether that be our neighbor or the infinite otherness of God – 
and to achieve a new wholeness of spirit (Wolfe, 2011:22). 
Brown (1989:109) suggests it is because humans are embodied, thinking and feeling 
beings that they must be engaged through forms that “imaginatively encompass and orient 
us within something like a world”. As one inhabits such a world religiously, such worlds 
actually reveal the realities to do with religion and the soul. 
4) Art and religion both seek a similar form of knowledge. 
 Since the Enlightenment, and particularly since Immanuel Kant, knowledge of 
ethics, beauty and religion have been considered, in Kant’s words, “impossible to know, 
but morally necessary to suppose”. Such agnosticism comes from the view that beauty and 
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goodness possess no form of empirical verification. Chapter eight will consider the 
appropriate epistemology for beauty and religious truth, but it  is sufficient to say at this 
point that art and religion pursue very similar, if not overlapping, kinds of knowledge, the 
kind unobtainable by rational deduction or empirical investigation. 
 Packer puts it well:  
I question the adequacy of conceptualizing the subject-matter of systematic 
theology as simply revealed truths about God, and I challenge the assumption that 
has usually accompanied this form of statement, that the material, like other 
scientific data, is best studied in cool and clinical detachment. Detachment from 
what, you ask? Why, from the relational activity of trusting, loving, worshipping, 
obeying, serving and glorifying God: the activity that results from realizing that 
one is actually in God’s presence, actually being addressed by him every time one 
opens the Bible or reflects on any divine truth whatsoever (1990:6). 
McGrath (1996:107) agrees, disputing the idea that God’s revelation is the mere 
transmission of facts and affirming that it is rather God’s self-revelation and involvement 
in human history, supremely through the Incarnation of Christ. God’s revelation is 
knowledge of a person, and personal knowledge is moral knowledge or knowledge of 
beauty.  
 Stiles (1997:208) avers that the aesthetic provides a means for teaching 
transcendent ideas, “reaffirming divine mystery, and validating the sense of awe that God 
inspires in the faithful”. Whereas logic has limits, knowledge of an aesthetic kind can 
accept, ponder and even revel in the mysteries of the Trinity, the Incarnation, or any other 
theological paradox or mystery. To be made in God’s image is to have radical openness to 
the transcendent, and a receptivity to what God reveals, personally or symbolically 
(Viladesau, 1999:70–71).   
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 The knowledge that art and religion provide is the broadest and most foundational: 
the very frame of perception, the locus of value. This knowledge provides the lens through 
which a society does its thinking and explanatory work. As Martland (1981:12) puts it, 
“Art and religion come first; the sciences follow. The first declares or determines what is, 
perhaps secondarily declaring or determining what needs to be done; the second responds, 
and does”. 
5) Art and religion are both concerned with creation.  
 Christianity gives an explanation of existence or being that is essentially an 
explanation of creation. Understanding the world to be made by God, Christianity explains 
the nature of humankind, its purpose, and the future of the created order in light of this. 
Redemption is inextricably linked to creation, for redemption’s ultimate effects include 
redeeming creation itself (Rom. 8:18–25). 
 The arts, as material (sound, paint, words) are necessarily part of creation. Artistic 
work is an act of sub-creation, not creating ex nihilo as only God can, but creating by using 
creation. Gaebelein (1985:73) suggests that the arts find their deepest sanction in the 
creative aspect of God. Munson & Drake (2014:§458–519) remind one that art and music 
function with general revelation the way preachers teach from special revelation, their 
“text” being creation itself, and their sermon being the work of art produced. Revelation 
through creation maintains a literacy with God’s works, and therefore with God’s being.  
 Indeed, humankind made in God’s image includes naming the animals, which was 
giving further form to what had been created (Dyrness, 1972:164–165). Humankind was to 
till the ground, subdue and order the creation, extending the goodness of God’s creation 
from the perfect Garden to the entire Earth, making an Eden of the whole world. This is 
nothing less than the task of artfully beautifying the world, shaping creation into 
meaningful beauty that would more clearly reflect the Creator. Creation already sings 
God’s praise, as the Psalms make clear. Begbie (1997:109) sees the arts as part of the 
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calling to “voice creation’s praise, to extend and elaborate the praise which creation 
already sings to God”.  
6) Art and religion are both concerned with transformation. 
 In giving explanations of ultimate reality, both art and religion call for a response. 
Both speak in ways akin to that of a prophet, calling for some kind of change (Brown, 
1989:111). Because both deal with what is ultimate, both ought to be reverential in attitude 
toward things. Since both give value and serenity, both are “profoundly regenerative” 
(Martin, 1972:69). Hans Gadamer argues that a particular experience of a work of art 
transforms people, in a way that defies a dogmatic or discursive description of that 
experience. Such knowledge is participative, and necessarily transformative (Cole, 
1999:362). 
 In presenting one with other worlds, art becomes prophetic, showing what is ugly, 
unjust, or untrue in this world, and how the recipient should respond (Brown, 1989:110). 
One is drawn out of oneself, corrected of provincialism and selfishness, and enters a richer 
world created by another (Lewis, 1961:138–139). Through entering the world described by 
the artist (or by Revelation), one is returned to one’s own world, transformed in some way. 
7) Art and religion both depend on the other.  
 
 Scripture is the final authority for Christians, and Scripture is itself a work of art: a 
work of literature that contains poetry, epistles, Gospels, wisdom, narrative, apocalyptic 
and other genres (Loader, 2004:265). The Bible being used liturgically is itself an act of 
aesthetic reception. Scripture commands the use of at least two forms of art: poetry 
(psalms, hymns and spiritual songs) and music (Eph. 5:19; Col. 3:16). Christian worship 
therefore requires art, even if restricted only to the art of the Bible, such as the exclusive 
use of psalmody.  
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 Art similarly requires religion, even if it borrows the themes and questions that 
religion claims to answer. When art fails to deal with transcendent matters, it withers into 
kitsch and sentimentalism or self-referential trivialities, and fails as art.  
 Religion without art lacks the power to attract and must rely on a dry dogmatism 
(De Gruchy, 2001:3). Art without religion lacks a moral centre or a cohesive transcendent 
vision on which to pattern itself. 
 In summary, art and religion were inseparable for most of history, and even in a 
secularised age, continue to require one another. Both search for transcendent meaning; 
both incarnate that meaning visibly; both point to other worlds; both seek the same kind of 
knowledge; both are concerned with creation; both seek transformation, and both require 
the other. They use similar vocabulary; they are viewed as analogous by various 
disciplines; they have analogous experiences; they serve a similar end (Hendricks, 
1988:111). What one finds to be true of the one will, at the very least, find parallels in the 
other. A search for a Christian spirituality in pursuit of beauty will be well served by 
considering the pursuit of beauty in art.  
 Having said this, not all art will serve this purpose, precisely because, since the 
Enlightenment, a form of art that is divorced from religion has emerged. This kind of art 
must be identified, and its dangers enumerated. 
7.3. The Tensions of Between Religion and Art 
 Though a suspicion of the arts has been present in Christianity since the earliest 
centuries, the wedge between art and faith is a relatively recent phenomenon. The 
circumstances and effects of this divorce are now considered. 
7.3.1. The Divorce of Art and Religion 
 As chapter six showed, man has philosophised about beauty for centuries. The 
concept of beauty as a discrete discipline within the study of philosophy, however, came 
about only in the eighteenth century (Lundin, 2007:§1819–1823). It was in this period that 
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Alexander Baumgarten coined the term aesthetics, and elaborate explanations of taste and 
the form of the arts were developed. In an attempt to define all forms of human knowledge 
without reference to tradition or religion, thinkers began classifying the “fine arts” as those 
human artefacts that exist primarily for the sake of their beauty (Brown, 2000:§117). Until 
that point, “aesthetic” art had not been distinguished in any way from the “liberal arts” 
(such as grammar or mathematics) or from the “mechanical arts” (such as manufacture, 
various crafts or forms of artisanship) (Brown, 2000:§1094). Now a special category of art 
without any utilitarian purpose was developed. Art increasingly became museum art 
instead of everyday objects that were artistically made (Barrs, 2013:§478). 
 This non-religious aesthetic form of art was soon to become valued for itself, 
creating “art for art’s sake”. Art was now on its way to becoming an autonomous entity, 
divorced from worship, ethics, or religiously useful effects on the head and heart. Instead, 
these works of art were valued as badges of social status, goods to be marketed or 
components of a “growing culture industry” (Barzun, 1989:6). 
 Indeed, the avant-garde averred that taste for this new form of autonomous art 
would be contaminated by religious or moral interests. As Brown (2000:§239) puts it, 
“The taste for art was in principle divorced, therefore, from the spiritual taste that had been 
spoken of by scholastics, mystics, and Puritans alike”. 
 A Christian who believes in God’s creating of the world ex nihilo could never grant 
some kind of autonomy or self-sufficiency to created beauty. Autonomous art is ruled out 
in any theistic worldview (Asproulis, 2012:156). Therefore, art emerging from this 
areligious, autonomous, and self-contained aesthetic will be of limited value to a Christian 
spirituality seeking paths to God’s beauty.  
In fact, the more art becomes inward and entirely concerned with self-expression, 
the more inaccessible it becomes to others, because if art if simply an expression of the 
artist, it fails as communication to others.  
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7.3.2. Art as a Surrogate Religion 
 At the same time that art became valued for itself, certain thinkers were looking to 
art as a surrogate or substitute religion for the Christian faith, a faith that was then under 
attack during the Enlightenment. Rousseau led the way to Romanticism, which was a kind 
of reconstruction after the hard scepticism of rationalism and empiricism. The Romantics 
did not abandon reason, but demanded a complement in the form of the “religion of art” 
(Barzun, 1974:26). Witvliet (1996:61) believes art as a surrogate religion came through 
Romantics such as Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) and Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854). 
Other notable Romantic voices were William Blake (1757–1827), Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge (1772–1834) and Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882). Art was looked to as a 
substitute form of spirituality, providing parallel senses or tastes for the infinite, as 
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) described it (Brown, 2000:224). For those for 
whom the old religions had lost their hold, art was a “gateway to the realm of spirit” 
(Barzun, 1974:30). 
 The idea of art as a religion must be rejected by Christians. De Gruchy (2001:10–
11) remarks that art can enhance faith, but it is not a replacement for faith. Art may draw 
people in, but the ethical commitment contained in faith is not identical to the aesthetic 
experience. Art cannot redeem humankind. Brunner (1937:499–503) agrees that the danger 
of art is  
taking the reflection for the reality, or at any rate of resting content with it. Thus art 
becomes a substitute for faith, which is sought because it does not demand 
decision, as faith does, but merely the attitude of a spectator, or of one who is 
swayed hither and thither by the artistic influences around him; that is, it is not a 
real devotion, it is merely aesthetic. 
The aesthetic has a seductive allure, in which the enjoyment of art can be corrupted into an 
enjoyment of freedom from responsibility (Brown, 2000:§3632).  
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 Indeed, beauty has the power to allure one into creating and worshipping false 
gods. And as Jacques Barzun (1974:92) points out, once it becomes clear that autonomous 
art has  
no unity, no eternity, no theology, no myth, no minister, its cult can only fall into a 
worship of the instrument—idolatry. And to say idolatry is to say failure, for what 
is wrong with idolatry is that it is a dead stop along the way to the transcendent.  
Art for art’s sake, and art as a surrogate religion will not assist in the pursuit of a 
spirituality rooted in seeking God’s beauty, precisely because they are atheistic or 
irreligious at heart. While they may still possess insights, one will be better served by 
considering voices not entrenched in either of these positions.  
 With an understanding of the many parallels between art and faith in place, and 
recognising the dangers, the next logical step is to consider the components of the aesthetic 
experience or the mode of aesthetic perception.  
7.4. The Aesthetic Experience  
 Witvliet (1996:36–38) helpfully summarises the components of the appropriation 
of aesthetic and art forms as occurring in four stages: 1) perception, 2) immediate 
response, 3) interpretation, and 4) evaluation. These four will serve as the structure for 
describing the aesthetic experience and its parallels in Christian spirituality.  
7.4.1. Perception  
 Perception is the initial encounter between a human subject and the aesthetic object 
or experience. Visual, audio and other sensory forms of perception bring the object or 
experience into focus, and the subject begins experiencing its attributes. Although 
perception is an obvious feature of aesthetics (the Greek term aisthetikoj meant 
“perceptible”), a more critical consideration of perception will be helpful for seeing the 
parallels with spirituality. 
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 Two areas of perception interest the one pursuing a method of apprehending God’s 
beauty: first, the notion of receptivity long held by artists and worshippers alike; and 
second, the matter of “disinterested pleasure” held since the eighteenth century as 
necessary to purely apprehending beauty. 
7.4.1.1. Receptivity 
 Several Christian thinkers have written of the importance of receiving an artwork 
as opposed to using it. C.S. Lewis wrote incisively of this in An Experiment in Criticism 
(1961). Lewis suggested that to receive a work, the subject must exert his or her senses to 
conform to the pattern created by the artist. Conversely, using a work of art is treating it as 
a mere aid to selfish activities. When art is used, it cannot introduce one to new worlds or 
transform; it can only brighten, relieve, or palliate one’s life (1961:88).  When one uses art 
for one’s own ends, a work of art has no chance to work on a person, meaning one meets 
only oneself in the work (p. 85). Consumers of art do not lay themselves open to what the 
work in its totality might do to them; they merely treat it as a means to their own selfish 
ends (p. 16).  
 True receptivity begins by laying aside individual preconceptions, interests, and 
associations. Positively, one must then look, listen, read, or feel, as the case may be. The 
seeker must go on perceiving until he or she has perceived what is there. This is essentially 
a form of surrender. Lewis writes, “Look. Listen. Receive. Get yourself out of the way. 
(There is no good asking first whether the work before you deserves such a surrender, for 
until you have surrendered you cannot possibly find out)” (1961:19). Johnson (2002:128) 
echoes this sentiment, suggesting that the value of music as art only appears when the 
listeners set aside their subjective demands and priorities, and quiet their own thoughts, for 
then the music can begin to exert its demands on them. Hodges (1995:71) similarly advises 
the receptive listener to listen humbly, that is, “without an agenda of finding a melody to 
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hum or a rhythm to tap your foot to”, and to resist the temptation to invent stories 
regarding what the music is about. 
 This kind of perception is contemplation, and must be distinguished sharply from 
distraction. Johnson (2002:122) points out that distraction is “entertainment functioning as 
avoidance”, while contemplation is  
engagement and a deeper involvement. It’s no coincidence that the term 
‘contemplation’ is shared by art and religion: the contemplative attitude points to a 
way of being that is essentially open to the encounter with an Other. 
Distraction is another term for amusement and entertainment. Scruton (2009:101) 
distinguishes the true work of art from the false by distinguishing the experience of the one 
from the other. In the true work of art, it is not one’s own reactions that are interesting, but 
the meaning and content of the work. Entertainment is not interested in cause, but only in 
effect—whether the work had pleasant effects on oneself. Though true art also entertains, 
it does so by creating a distance between oneself and what it portrays, allowing a 
disinterested sympathy for its subject matter, rather than evoking vicarious emotions of 
one’s own (p. 102). This distance is what enables receptivity and contemplation. “The 
purpose of this distance is not to prevent emotion, but to focus in it, by directing attention 
towards the imaginary other, rather than the present self” (p. 104).  
 Pieper (1952:7) even distinguishes contemplation from observation, which he sees 
as a tense activity:  
To contemplate, on the other hand, to ‘look’ in this sense, means to open one’s 
eyes receptively to whatever offers itself to one’s vision, and the things seen enter 
into us, so to speak, without calling for any effort or strain on our part to possess 
them. 
The act of active contemplation is a kind of art itself. It is the learning and practice of 
“ways of approaching art—modes of perception, ways of being open, receptive, patient, 
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humble, and nonliteral” (Johnson, 2002:125). These are ways less known in a culture 
devoted to consumerism, and the commodification of art and religion. When art or religion 
is just one more product to be used for one’s own ends, the active perception of latent 
beauty will elude one. The nature of the beautiful object—be it a human work or God 
himself—determines the mode of approach. Johnson (2002:125) describes the problem:  
Approaching music differently means living differently. Our contemporary object-
use of music is a product of our lifestyle. Ironically, we think our standard of living 
so high and advanced compared to that of others around the world and that of our 
ancestors, yet we have no time to properly contemplate anything at all. A 
contemplative mode of being is essentially denied to our generation.  
Contemporary culture has come a long way from the days of Joseph Addison, who wrote 
in Pleasures of the Imagination (1712),  
One of the Final Causes of our Delight, in any thing that is great, may be this. The 
Supreme Author of our Being has so formed the Soul of Man, that nothing but 
himself can be its last, adequate, and proper Happiness. Because, therefore, a great 
Part of our Happiness must arise from the Contemplation of his Being, that he 
might give our Souls a just Relish of such a Contemplation, he has made them 
naturally delight in the Apprehension of what is Great or Unlimited. Our 
Admiration, which is a very pleasing Motion of the Mind, immediately rises at the 
Consideration of any Object that takes up a great deal of Room in the Fancy, and 
by Consequence, will improve into the highest Pitch of Astonishment and Devotion 
when we contemplate his Nature, that is neither circumscribed by Time nor Place, 
nor to be comprehended by the largest Capacity of a Created Being” (p. 9). 
Contemplation is an act of attention that receives the artwork as a gift, not an object to be 
used, but as something to be meditated upon and lived with (Brown, 2000:§1958). 
Attentiveness of this kind has even been likened to prayer (Saliers, 2002:185). Beauty 
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requires that one be both giving up oneself to the work and receiving it (Milbank, 2003:6). 
  The matter of receptivity is open to misinterpretation. One misinterpretation is an 
overemphasis on the notion of “disinterested pleasure”. 
7.4.1.2. Contemplation and Disinterested Pleasure  
    Immanuel Kant blazed the trail for considering beauty in a disinterested fashion. 
By this, Kant meant that to perceive beauty, one must be detached from any moral, 
practical, or religious interests attached to the beautiful object. Any enjoyment of beauty 
must be entirely for the sake of the object’s beauty, and not for any utilitarian function that 
the beauty may serve. As noted in the previous chapter, “purposiveness without purpose” 
was Kant’s guide to beauty.   
 Some define disinterested pleasure as a suspension of egotism, which allows the 
kind of perception spoken of in the last section. This type of reflection is sympathetic, 
rather than objectifying (Nichols, 1980:98–100). It involves being both attached and 
detached, though these may not necessarily be simultaneous (Newton, 1950:21). Scruton 
(2009:26) writes that “[W]e call something beautiful when we gain pleasure from 
contemplating it as an individual object, for its own sake, and in its presented form”. 
 Pieper sees disinterested pleasure as an extension of the division between liberal 
and servile arts: the liberal arts being those forms of human activity that are an end in 
themselves, the servile arts those that have some practical or utilitarian end beyond 
themselves (1952:19). 
 The idea of disinterested pleasure has come under fire. Zemach (1997:33–34) 
criticises this approach as disingenuous: it claims that every interest that motivates self-
serving action is “interested” and then “discovering” that the aesthetic interest alone is 
disinterested.  
If you listen to music for its own sake, that does not mean that you do not listen to 
it for your sake, for by listening to it you satisfy yourself, not the music!...To 
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engage in an activity for its own sake is to be genuinely interested in it, not the 
opposite, as Kant has it. 
Begbie (1991:191–197) notes seven problems associated with Kant’s synthesis of 
Enlightenment aesthetics: 1) One gravitates away from the physical world toward the 
mind. 2) Art is divorced from action. 3) Form and order are created and imposed on the 
plurality of the world by the human mind, not discovered. 4) A work of art is isolated from 
the particularities of life. 5) A distinction is made between aesthetic knowledge and 
knowledge inherited from ancestors.  6) One fails to provide a convincing account of the 
universal validity of aesthetic judgements. 7) One turns toward the solitary thinking self as 
the centre of existence and meaning.  
 With these seven concerns in mind, Begbie believes that “the notion of 
disinterested contemplation in the arts—with its sharp split between subject and object—” 
is ultimately Descartes’ rationalism and scepticism transported into the arts (1997:110). 
Indeed, why would one need to be completely disinterested, except to provide some 
equivalent of detached rational or empirical investigation, only now with reference to the 
arts? Elaine Scarry (1999) points out that only a masochist would insist that only aversive 
contemplation is the right kind.   
 Wolterstoff (1980:193–99) regards the Western idea of high art as a profoundly 
secularized institution. He criticises the idea of disinterested contemplation and 
disinterested pleasure. From the Christian viewpoint, he sees three problems with 
disinterested contemplation. First, art is not to be divorced from responsibility, and 
participation in art should be an active use of responsibility. Second, art as disinterested 
pleasure seems to seal off art hermetically from the rest of life, which is a violation of 
integrity and wholeness of life under Christ. Third, the claims of ultimacy made by art 
must be resisted by Christians. Wolterstoff believes the church should repent of the elitism 
that sees the best use of art as pure perceptual contemplation, and seek again an art that 
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expresses the community’s worship.  
 How does one reconcile these contrary approaches to disinterestedness in 
contemplation? To the degree that disinterested pleasure represents a restating of the 
notion of receptive perception, it is a helpful idea: protecting an object of beauty from 
being “used” for selfish ends, thereby obscuring its qualities. To the degree that 
disinterested pleasure represents an Enlightenment extension of the religion of art by 
seeking a pure, detached appropriation of aesthetic qualities removed from all other 
considerations, it represents a faulty, and perhaps conceited, epistemology. It creates 
artificial distinctions between art and worship, and introduces an ultimately self-defeating 
approach to beauty.  
 How does this view of receptivity inform a Christian spirituality in pursuit of 
God’s beauty? The study now considers the religious equivalent of aesthetic receptivity.  
7.4.1.3. Christian Spirituality Equivalents 
 From the point of view of Christian spirituality, receptivity has a recognisable 
biblical term: humility. Humility is the soul’s denial of pre-eminence, taking its rightful 
place as a creature, a child, and a servant. Humility is a posture of surrender to reality, 
admitting that life is not about pleasing and glorifying oneself (Ps. 115:1). 
 God is not an object to be used for humankind’s own ends. God does not have 
instrumental value for some higher or other end. He possesses absolute value, and unless 
those that seek him desire him for himself, they cannot apprehend him. God must be loved 
for himself. God’s beauty must not be loved as a means to some other end. Contemplation 
of God is complete surrender to the being God is, laying aside one’s own preconceptions, 
interests, and associations. The encounter with God is one of surrender to his revelation of 
himself. Anything less is latent idolatry: desiring to find ourselves, or an image of God 
convenient to ourselves, in the encounter with God.  
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 Seeking God must be sharply distinguished from amusement and entertainment, 
where ephemeral feelings and whimsical passions are the goal and measure of success. If 
God is to be contemplated, one’s eyes cannot be upon individual or private comfort with 
the experience, but upon the qualities and attributes of God, however comfortable or 
threatening they may be. 
 Similarly, in Christian spirituality, a response of pleasure in God, but not primarily 
in oneself finding pleasure in God, represents an extension of humility, which is joy, 
gratitude, and adoration. This is merely enjoyment of God for who he is, not as an 
instrument to some other end.  
Conversely, a response of detached “worship” of God, where supposedly all 
personal pleasure is to be shunned and never sought, represents a species of pride. When 
this happens, the worshipper begins to change places with God, from beneficiary to 
benefactor. This misguided patronising of God is what the author mocks in Psalm 50:8–14, 
reminding Israel that the commanded sacrifices were not to meet a need in God. Worship 
that avoids a shallow narcissism can veer into the opposite ditch: pride in how stoically 
and joylessly it offers God worship.  
 A valid aesthetic mode begins with receptive perception. One can tentatively 
suggest that a valid pursuit of God’s beauty likewise begins with a humble and teachable 
perception of God. 
7.4.2. Immediate Response 
 Witvliet (1996:36) describes the next stage of the aesthetic experience, immediate 
response, as “immediate, unpremeditated, almost instinctive”. A response to what is 
perceived is essential to the aesthetic experience. Art is not an object but an activity, “an 
engagement between the affective consciousness and self-contained, significantly 
structured objects” (Johnson, 2002:126).   
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 This response is usually an affective response before it is a rational one. Beauty, or 
sublimity, has immediate psychological effects, such as awe, reverence, and a feeling of 
one’s significance in the cosmos, according to Stiles (1997:197). Art can project an 
affective world corresponding to some region of human experience (Wynn, 2000:323). 
The art points towards the sacred, echoing what one would feel in the world of the artist 
while one is still in one’s own, allowing one to participate in it before one is there (p. 325).   
 This immediate response is not the final judgement of the soul upon what it is 
encountering, only its initial reaction. To take this superficial reaction as determinative of 
something’s beauty or value is the mistake of the immature, untrained, or even obtuse. As 
a later section will demonstrate, some of a person’s preferences need to be re-formed, so 
that future encounters with similar beauty will produce a more fitting immediate reaction. 
This ability to recognise excellence is seemingly what Paul has in mind when he prayed 
for the Philippians:  
And this I pray, that your love may abound still more and more in knowledge and 
all discernment, that you may approve the things that are excellent, that you may be 
sincere and without offense till the day of Christ, being filled with the fruits of 
righteousness which are by Jesus Christ, to the glory and praise of God (1:9–11) 
Immediate responses are not carefully planned responses, and are therefore indicative of 
the already-formed character. When Christlike character is present, the more or less 
immediate responses are those that love what God loves and hate what God hates. 
 After perception and immediate response, the process of interpretation begins.    
7.4.3. Interpretation  
 A work of art communicates meaning, and meaning is to must be interpreted. 
Meaningful art explains aspects of the world, and the experience of being human. Dorter 
(1990:37) believes art expresses truth at four levels of experience: 1) emotions, 2) cultural 
values, 3) sensory experience, and 4) the elusive significance of one’s experience.  
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 Art embodies meaning by using materials that can be perceived by the senses. 
Nichols (1980:98–100) claims it does this through two means. First, it uses an iconology, a 
pattern of symbols analogous to a language. Second, this iconology possesses a “singular 
affective quality”. If rightly approached, the artwork will express these affections. The 
ability to decode and rightly interpret this symbolism is sometimes called the faculty of 
imagination.  
 Imagination has the current popular association of unreal flights of fancy. 
Chesterton (2012:78) helps clarify the full meaning of the word:  
But imaginative does not mean imaginary. It does not follow that it is all what the 
moderns call subjective, when they mean false. Every true artist does feel, 
consciously or unconsciously, that he is touching transcendental truths; that his 
images are shadows of things seen through the veil. In other words, the natural 
mystic does know that there is something there; something behind the clouds or 
within the trees; but he believes that the pursuit of beauty is the way to find it; that 
imagination is a sort of incantation that can call it up. 
Imagination is then the form of interpretation that is noticeably active during the aesthetic 
experience and is in fact active at other times. At least two interpretive functions of 
imagination are apparent: cognitive interpretation and symbolic seeing. 
7.4.3.1. Imagination as Interpretive Cognition.  
 In the first place, imagination is the interpretive lens of all intelligent perception. 
Moral imagination is the tool by which people perceive reality concretely. Since there is 
no such thing as a brute fact, the imagination is that faculty  
which gives form to thought—not necessarily uttered form, but form capable of 
being uttered in shape or in sound, or in any mode upon which the senses can lay 
hold. It is, therefore, that faculty in man which is likest to the prime operation of 
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the power of God, and has, therefore, been called the creative faculty, and its 
exercise creation (MacDonald, 1895:2).  
By imagination humans make something: they make sense of the world. Imagination is not 
restricted to the aesthetic realm, but is operative in every sphere of human activity 
(MacDonald, 1895:6). Enlightenment epistemology teaches that man is a tabula rasa, 
recording sensory experiences in a more or less direct fashion. Those who reject such a 
view understand imagination as both creative and receptive: receiving sensory impressions 
from the world, and creatively synthesising and assigning them meaning. Wegener 
explains:  
What is given in sensation and association is shaped, ordered by complex 
operations of selection, discrimination, extension, interpolation, and the like into 
something perceived. So habitual, so pervasive, and normally so successful are 
these functions of discriminating and synthesising attention that it is only rarely 
that we may find the world dissolved momentarily into a congeries of minimally 
organised elements which we referred to as visual fields, auditory stimuli, or 
streams of images—and even these are already to some extent discriminated 
(1992:40). 
In other words, interpretation through imagination happens so habitually that it is often 
confused with perception. In light of this, one should not think of the four stages of the 
aesthetic experience as four discrete moments in time; instead, perception, immediate 
expression, and imaginative interpretation happen almost simultaneously, while retaining a 
logical order. 
 McIntyre (1987:159–166) explains that the imagination is the whole mind working 
in certain ways. He suggests some of the ways that imagination is a form of interpretation 
of all reality. The imagination selects from the mass of material with which the mind is 
ordinarily confronted and concentrates upon the salient and significant features. 
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Imagination synopsises and integrates all it selects. It creatively and constructively puts 
together diverse elements into unitary form. 
 In other words, interpretation is fundamental to any perception and comprehension 
of reality. A brute fact is a mute fact. All facts are interpreted. Weaver (1948:20) argues 
that a rational being’s goal should be to arrive at “an imaginative picture of what is 
otherwise a brute empirical fact”, giving significance to the sound and fury of his life. A 
larger, integrated, interpretive understanding of the world is what imagination supplies.  
 Edmund Burke described imagination thus:  
The mind of man possesses a sort of creative power of its own; either in 
representing at pleasure the images of things in the order and manner in which they 
were received by the senses, or in combining those images in a new manner, and 
according to a different order (A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and 
Beautiful, 17).  
 Imagination can, while remaining entirely rational, unite phenomena and noumena 
(Milbank, 2011:44). 
 Other prominent Christians have thought this way. Ward (2011:62) claims that C. 
S. Lewis saw imagination as the “organ of meaning” and the “prius of truth”. Jonathan 
Edwards saw the aesthetic sense or the imagination as being not a separate faculty, but the 
active tendency of the entire self that determines the direction of all the functions of the 
human person (Lee, 1988:150). He saw the imagination as functioning before the 
inclinations or affections—the imagination reveals the relations between ideas; the 
inclination takes pleasure in them (p. 156). 
 In summary, imagination is that act of the human being that can filter, integrate, 
synthesise, and give meaningful cognitive shape to all that is perceived. Without 
interpretation, raw sensory data would remain a meaningless welter of impressions. 
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Imagination is then not unique to the aesthetic experience, though perception of art makes 
one more conscious of its workings. 
7.4.3.2. Imagination as Symbolic Seer 
 More than simply cognitive interpretation of empirical data, imagination is the 
capacity to see beyond and behind the sensory data. Imagination is perceptive of aspects of 
reality hidden from the unimaginative (McIntyre, 1987:159–66). Imagination may well be 
a form, or perhaps the essence of, what it is to be made in the image of God, for 
imagination can recognise all of creation as a work of art and symbol, the visible revealing 
the invisible (Milbank, 2011:34). It can see analogues of transcendent truths in immanent 
reality. In so doing, the imagination awakens a “homesickness for the absolute” (2011:44). 
MacDonald explains why this is possible:  
For the world is—allow us the homely figure—the human being turned inside out. 
All that moves in the mind is symbolized in Nature. Or, to use another more 
philosophical, and certainly not less poetic figure, the world is a sensuous analysis 
of humanity, and hence an inexhaustible wardrobe for the clothing of human 
thought. Take any word expressive of emotion—take the word emotion itself—and 
you will find that its primary meaning is of the outer world. In the swaying of the 
woods, in the unrest of the “wavy plain,” the imagination saw the picture of a well-
known condition of the human mind; and hence the word emotion (1895:9).  
Imagination does this through analogy. Analogies provide bridges from the known to the 
unknown. “This is like that”, says the analogy. Analogy is fundamental to aesthetic 
experience and is basic to one’s knowledge of God (Clowney, 1993:249). Whether it is the 
system of signs contained within music, poetry, painting, sculpture, or whether it is the 
word pictures of Scripture, analogy enables the subject to see beyond and behind material 
experience.  
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 Several “invisible” worlds open up to the imaginative seer. First, the world 
described by the artist, with its experiences and affections, is a mini-cosmos that a subject 
may enter and experience. Second, the worlds of the past and future can be seen and 
experienced through imagination—seeing what was, and what may be, though it is not 
visible in the present. Third, the worlds of what is absent to us: what is happening to others 
in other places, other places on Earth, or in the universe. Imagination enables 
understanding the landscape of Antarctica, the terrain of Mars, or the state of one’s 
relatives in another city. Fourth, worlds that are not but may be or should be: perfect 
worlds, fantastic worlds, transformed worlds, the world as it might be (McIntyre, 
1987:159–66). Change, hope, longing, and desire are all impossible without this seeing 
function of imagination. 
 In light of these two descriptions of imagination, it should be clear why 
imagination is fundamental to the aesthetic experience. Art is both a sensory experience 
needing interpretation and synthesis, and a set of analogies needing decoding. Imagination 
enables not only the recognition of what is being experienced, but an understanding of 
symbolic significance that transports beyond the work of art itself. If art and religion are 
deeply linked, one should then find in Christian spirituality an equivalent for imagination.  
7.4.3.3. Christian Spirituality Equivalents 
 If imagination interprets and lays hold of reality, whether seen or unseen, the 
corresponding biblical trait would be faith. Faith is the “substance of things hoped for, the 
evidence of things not seen” (Heb. 11:1). Faith understands reality in a certain way, and 
believes in unseen realities that shape what is seen. Faith is not restricted to believers, 
though unbelievers may eschew the term. Without faith, the human mind cannot enter into 
existence at all, even at the most elementary point (Lynch, 1973:60). 
 Of course, when it comes to spiritual realities, imagination is indispensable. Faith 
seeks to understand the divine harmony that integrates and explains all of reality 
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(MacDonald, 1895:35). Faith is not so much a one-time burst of belief, as it is the 
pervasive way of looking at the world, the interpretive lens that refers all sensory and 
intellectual data to the revelation of Scripture. As God reveals himself to the individual, 
the imagination or faith is shaped, so as to continue to understand God, the world and self 
in a particular way. Green explains:  
God does not appear, on this interpretation, to address the intellect, the feelings, or 
the conscience separately; and it does not require a subsequent theory to relate the 
various human faculties to each other and to revelation. Imagination is not so much 
a particular faculty as the integration in human experience of the various human 
abilities and potentialities (1989:151). 
The world of God’s beauty, which is real and yet not immediately apparent, opens up to 
the eye of faith and imagination: the world of heaven, the accounts of the past and future in 
Scripture, the world of God’s work in other places besides one’s immediate surroundings, 
the world as it might be if God’s will were done on Earth as it is in Heaven. 
 If God as Beautiful is to be pursued, the faculty or posture of faith, understood at 
least in part as imagination, must be used. God’s beauty must be considered, not as some 
kind of direct sensory experience, but as an integrative, synoptic, interpretive 
understanding of what God reveals about himself and the world. Imagination is not 
creative flights of fancy, but a correct interpretation of both general revelation and special 
revelation, both of which are analogous in nature. God’s use of symbols, both in Scripture, 
and in the created order, function as analogies to “see” God’s unseen beauty.  
 A Christian spirituality that pursues God’s beauty will recognise that faith is far 
more than mental assent to propositional statements. Faith is a whole-soul embrace of truth 
that both sees and enables the observing of God’s beauty in the Word and the world.  
 Interpretation leads to the fourth and most complex aspect of the aesthetic 
experience: evaluation.  
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7.4.4. Evaluation 
 Once an artwork has been interpreted, it is inevitable that one forms a judgement 
about the work. Everyone makes aesthetic judgements; some are more conscious of this 
process, and art critics make a living from doing so (Witvliet, 1996:38).  
 To understand the matter of evaluation and judgement, several themes must be 
considered. First, in a culture of aesthetic relativism, the importance of judgement must be 
established. Second, a suggested method of evaluating the beauty of an artwork should be 
set forth. Third, the question of good and bad taste in people’s judgements must be 
examined, and reasons suggested for widely differing tastes.  
7.4.4.1. The Importance of Judgement 
 Judgement is necessary once one has interpreted the meaning of an artwork. Since 
meaning is always present, an interpretation of meaning must necessarily lead to an 
evaluation. Is it true? It is false? Is it trivial? Is it banal? Is it misleading? Is it 
manipulative? Is it ennobling? Is it transformative? In short, is it good and beautiful? 
To refer to an object as beautiful or ugly is to refer to the quality of the object, 
while also expressing a positive or negative response to it and suggesting that others ought 
to respond in the same way. Such an evaluation expresses a threefold judgement: a 
judgement on the object’s form, a judgement on its pleasurability, and a judgement that 
others should judge similarly (Goldman, 1990:23). 
 Judgement is important to a Christian because it is sin that prefers the 
epistemological, moral and aesthetic relativism that nullifies judgement. “Sins like sloth, 
lust, and pride may play a part, but most fundamentally our attraction to aesthetic 
relativism suggests an aversion to God’s glory” (Munson & Drake, 2014:§337–338). If 
humans are indeed fallen, then they may be prone to deceive themselves about pleasure. 
Humans may like what they should not like, and hate what they should love. Munson and 
Drake state that postmoderns dislike beauty and want to conflate it with preference so that 
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they do not have to think about what their pleasures mean or signify (2014:§266). 
 Eliot (1964:233) reminds those desirous of good literary judgement that they need 
to be acutely aware of two things at once: “what we like,” and “what we ought to like”. 
These two levels of evaluation are crucial to distinguish. The first level has to do with a 
subject’s preferences. The second level has to do with the merits of a work. It is not 
inherently elitist to believe that some aesthetic judgements are better than others. Indeed, 
every artist, in striving for excellence, makes that assumption. An honest evaluation may 
recognise that a work of art is good, even though the subject finds no personal pleasure in 
it. This honest assessment allows those experiencing art to admit where their own 
preferences are perhaps immature or deformed, where a work appeals to parts of people 
that are underdeveloped in them. Horton (2017:8) states: “Whereas the immature approve 
of what they like and disapprove of what they dislike, the mature are able to approve what 
they dislike and disapprove what they like, or are inclined to like”. Distinguishing these 
two levels of evaluation is both extremely difficult to consistently maintain, and necessary 
for any informed discussion over the beauty or merit of art (Witvliet, 1996:39).  
 Once this distinction is made, it follows that aesthetic discernment is something 
that can be learnt through diligent study, and even repentance. Just as no one is born wise, 
so no one is naturally aesthetically wise (Munson & Drake, 2014:§314). Failing to see the 
necessity of growth in aesthetic discernment will keep people intractably committed to 
personal preferences, defending their likes and dislikes as if they are essential to their very 
identities. This explains why so many Christians have taught on the need for receptive 
perception, as discussed in a previous section. Without surrender to an artwork, one cannot 
see its merits; one sees only oneself and one’s own reactions. If those reactions are 
immature, one may prevent oneself from moving towards greater and more profound 
beauties, confusing superficial responses with the intrinsic truth, goodness, or beauty of a 
work (or lack thereof). 
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7.4.4.2. The Process of Judgement 
 How does the judgement of beauty proceed? Aesthetic judgement cannot always be 
fully expressed in words. More often, the process of judgement can be demonstrated, or 
pointed out, through repeated acts of comparative looking and listening (Brown, 
2000:§3955). Often the attraction to beauty is “ineffable and escapes analysis” (Milbank, 
2003:1). Nevertheless, several Christian authors give helpful evaluative questions.  
 Barrs (2013:§778–918) suggests eleven criteria to determine whether an work of 
art represents God’s truth, goodness and beauty.  
• First, we need to ask whether giftedness from God is evident in the work.  
• Second, we should look for the dedicated development of the artist’s gift.  
• Third, we should find a commitment by the artist to use his gifts for others as well 
as for his own fulfilment.  
• Fourth, there will be humble submission to the rules of one’s discipline, respect for 
its traditions, and a readiness to find freedom of expression within these forms and 
within the forms of God’s created order.  
• Fifth, one must ask, is this work of art true, true to the moral realities of the world, 
as understood by Christians? 
• Sixth, one needs to bring any work of art before the bar of moral criteria.  
• Seventh, one must ask questions about appropriate continuity between the form and 
the content of a given work of art.  
• Eighth, in art as in any other area of human endeavour, one needs to look for 
technical excellence.  
• Ninth, one should have a concern for how well a work of art reflects the integrity 
of the artist.  
• Tenth, one should expect to see integrity in the work itself.  
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• Eleventh, one should be aware that simple entertainment is fine in almost all art 
forms, for God has created us to enjoy his gifts and to enjoy one another’s gifts.  
Caldecott (2009:32) writes that Christopher Alexander trained people to test the level of 
their response to objects by asking the following six questions: 
1. Which is the more attractive of these two objects? 
2. Why do you like that which you like best? 
3. Which gives you the most wholesome feeling? 
4. Which of them better represents your whole self? 
5. If you had a choice, which would you spend eternity with? 
6. Which of them would you be happier to offer to God? 
Christian judgement of art should be able to find its justification in Scripture. 
Yount (1995:86–87) gives four Scriptures as principles to evaluate music in worship: 
Principle 1: “You shall have no other gods before Me” (Exod. 20:3). 
Principle 2: “Let all things be done decently and in order” (1 Cor. 14:40). 
Principle 3: “I will sing with the spirit, and I will also sing with the understanding” 
(1 Cor. 14:15). 
Principle 4: “Beware lest anyone cheat you through philosophy and empty deceit, 
according to the tradition of men, according to the basic principles of the world, 
and not according to Christ” (Col. 2:8). 
Hodges (1995:73–74) suggests three principles of evaluating an object of art. First, it must 
be understood that Aquinas’ proposed qualities of beauty (unity, proportion, clarity) 
describe the object, not the listener. Second, to understand how these three relate to an art 
form, the listener must have some understanding of the art form. Third, understanding 
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beauty as something beyond one’s own preferences helps one see what is good even when 
one is not pleased by it. 
 These suggestions by no means exhaust the various approaches to evaluating a 
work of art. They sample the ways that humans have wrestled with the difficult task of 
separating beauty from personal preference, and provide suggested principles that allow 
beholders to go beyond themselves to see what is there. 
 It would be wishful thinking to believe that, should these evaluative criteria be 
applied, Christians would obtain universal consensus on what is beautiful, good, or true. 
Instead, the debate over beauty represents vastly differing judgements of beauty. In art, 
these differing judgements are sometimes considered under the term “taste”. 
7.4.4.3. The Question of Taste  
 Although the term taste is today associated with elitist aestheticism, the topic of 
taste was a primary one for aesthetic theory in the eighteenth century among writers such 
as Hume, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, and Immanuel Kant.  
 In the same century, Edmund Burke defined taste in A Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Sublime and Beautiful as a complex of three factors: sensory perception, the pleasures 
of imagination, and the conclusions of the reasoning faculty (Philosophical Enquiry, 24).  
Taste attends to “the formal, expressive, and imaginative qualities of the aesthetic object, 
which please in the very process of being perceived” (Brown, 2000:§1126–1127). Taste is 
the ability to rightly discern and respond to aesthetic qualities. “[I]t has three elements or 
facets: perceiving, enjoying, and judging” (2000:§58–59). 
 If this is true, it is possible for taste to be better or worse, more discerning or less, 
acute or dull. Moore (2004:170) suggests that “aesthetic taste is a spiritual gift and a 
discipline that must be cultivated like any other if it is to serve the purposes of God’s 
beauty in our lives”. Taste goes beyond preference, for to call something beautiful is to say 
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more than just, “I like it”, but to “make the claim public in some way” (Brown, 
2000:§2814–2817).   
 Taste may even be sinful. Brown (1989:152–154) suggests four forms of sinful 
taste. First, there is the Aesthete, who glories in creation, but not in the Creator. Second, 
one finds the Philistine, who cannot appreciate anything artistic or aesthetic, things which 
“cannot be translated into practical, moral or religious terms”. Third, one meets the 
Intolerant, who elevates his own standards to the level of absolutes. Fourth, there is the 
Indiscriminate, whose radical aesthetic relativism embraces all aesthetic phenomenon 
without discriminating between the superficially appealing and that which has lasting 
value.  
 A difference in taste is more than a difference in preference. A difference in 
preference represents the symptom of differing taste, not its very essence. Differing taste 
produces differing preferences, but those preferences are not the sum and substance of 
differing taste. Differing tastes may, in the end, “correspond to the difference between two 
sorts of beauty which themselves differ in kind” (Newton, 1950:18). That is, bad taste is a 
taste for bad things, the love of what ought not to be loved.  
 This judgement is highly controversial in a postmodern age so some caveats are in 
order. First, taste is rooted in a broader cultural context, and cultures are not universal. 
Second, judgements of taste do not function like logical theorems, valid scientific 
inferences or valid moral claims. Taste can, contra the Roman maxim, be a matter of 
legitimate dispute. An element of freedom is built into the pursuit of beauty (Scruton, 
2009:141).  
 With all that said, some form of consensus should be sought, otherwise no 
discussions of beauty could take place. How does one explain differing tastes in beauty? 
Four explanations are offered below. 
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1) Aesthetic Maturity 
 A common view is that art is a matter of spontaneous pleasure and immediate 
delight. The idea that one’s ability to discern beauty is a discipline that can be practised is 
unfamiliar to many Christians. This has not always been the case. Brown writes: 
Christian theologians were once well acquainted with the idea that the best art often 
delights only with difficulty, and through difficulty. Jonathan Edwards wrote, 
“Hidden beauties are commonly by far the greatest, because the more complex a 
beauty is, the more hidden is it.” Augustine, likewise, in The Trinity and On 
Christian Teaching, celebrated the aesthetic rewards of difficult art, including 
sacred allegory and scripture, whose veiled meanings in the harder passages both 
ward off the undisciplined and attract the devoted (2000:§3981–3984). 
The idea that art should be immediately accessible, familiar, and gratifying partly comes 
from enculturation in an age of commodified entertainment and pervasive amusements. 
Such enculturation, however, does not change reality: beauty is to be discerned, and 
discernment can be developed.  
 Even David Hume, as radical a critic as he was of moral or aesthetic theory not 
grounded in empiricism, spoke of the need for qualified critics who could find general 
principals of approbation or blame (Witvliet, 1996:46). Hume writes in Of the Standard of 
Taste (1757) that,  
though the principles of taste be universal, and, nearly, if not entirely the same in 
all men; yet few are qualified to give judgment on any work of art, or establish 
their own sentiment as the standard of beauty (#23).     
What kind of person is “qualified”? Hume answers, 
Strong sense, united to delicate sentiment, improved by practice, perfected by 
comparison, and cleared of all prejudice, can alone entitle critics to this valuable 
character; and the joint verdict of such, wherever they are to be found, is the true 
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standard of taste and beauty” (Of the Standard, #23).  
Of course, only people with good taste could recognise judges of good taste, so how does 
one escape circularity? Hume suggested that such people “are easily to be distinguished in 
society, by the soundness of their understanding and the superiority of their faculties” (Of 
the Standard, #27). Of course, Hume meant the polite, literate, civilized, and financially at 
ease of his day. But even the views of the aesthetic elite must be corroborated by a group 
of peers; their verdicts must be joint (Of the Standard, #23). All this shows that even an 
empiricist such as Hume recognised that much in the debate over taste came down to 
expertise, not mere preference. 
 Edmund Burke saw the cause of bad taste as a defect of judgment due to lack of 
natural intelligence, or a lack of training and exercise in judgement. He added that 
ignorance, inattention, prejudice, rashness, levity, obstinacy, and all other passions that 
pervert the judgement, will pervert the ability to perceive beauty (Philosophical Enquiry, 
24). Taste, according to Burke, improves as judgement improves, by growth in knowledge, 
and better attention to the object, and by frequent exercise (Philosophical Enquiry, 27). 
 These writers take it for granted that taste can be developed, improved, and refined. 
By frequent practice, regular comparison, and by hearing the views of critics, one can 
grow in aesthetic sensitivity, and thereby mature aesthetically. This growth produces the 
very circularity that Hume speaks of. Beauty is “what the reliable critic discerns, and the 
reliable critic is the one who discerns what is beautiful” (Scruton, 2009:146).  
 Taste engages much of the human soul. It perceives, appreciates, and appraises. 
Because it requires “thought and imagination, sense and sensibility, it is an integral part of 
our humanness, our loves, our existence as embodied and living souls” (Brown, 
2000:§2899–2904). If so, aesthetic maturity must be closely related to other dimensions of 
morality and maturity, including responsiveness, wisdom, love, and discernment. An 
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overall maturity of character is related to aesthetic maturity, and the corollary is that 
aesthetic immaturity is a defect in one’s overall maturity.  
    Some differences in taste can be ascribed to the aesthetic maturity or immaturity 
of the subjects who are viewing the objects of art. If, as the Greeks said, Beautiful things 
are hard (Republic, IV, 435c), one would expect the mature to be able to patiently and 
carefully discern such beauties, whereas the immature and impatient will pass them over.  
2) The Narcissism of Sentimentalism and Kitsch 
 A second reason for differing taste is explained by the allure of sentimentalism in 
art. Since art provokes an affective response, some art manipulates and attempts to 
overwhelm with a gross manipulation of the emotions. Art that trades in sentimentalism is 
sometimes called kitsch, for it cheapens the aesthetic experience by giving a shallow 
substitute.  
Milan Kundera, author of The Unbearable Lightness of Being, wrote this much-
cited description of kitsch: 
Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: how nice to 
see children running on the grass! The second tear says: How nice to be moved, 
together with all mankind, by children running on the grass! It is the second tear 
that makes kitsch kitsch (as quoted by Begbie, 2007:§475–477).  
When in the grip of sentimentalism, people are not moved by the beauty of the object, 
people are moved by how moved they are. They feel deeply the depth of their feelings; 
they fall in love with their love. The art becomes merely something used to obtain what 
seems to them a moving experience. The only way this is possible is when the qualities of 
the object perceived possess only superficial schemas of beauty that are instantly 
recognisable and provoke familiar emotions. Objects of true beauty resist this treatment; 
they insist on one’s submission to them; they insist on honest scrutiny. But as Scruton 
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(2009:191) shows 
Kitsch, the case of Disney reminds us, is not an excess of feeling but a deficiency. 
The world of kitsch is in a certain measure a heartless world, in which emotion is 
directed away from its proper target towards sugary stereotypes, permitting us to 
pay passing tribute to love and sorrow without the trouble of feeling them.  
Sentimental art evades or trivialises evil, presenting a fiction of an unfallen present world, 
and so allows its viewers to wallow in pleasant feelings. The sentimentalist is emotionally 
self-indulgent (Begbie, 2007:§437), loving, grieving, hating, pitying, not for the sake of 
another, but for the sake of enjoying love, grief, hate, and pity. Sentimental art denies the 
need for sacrifice in approaching beauty, but in so doing deprives feeling of depth and 
reality. 
 Sayers (1964:17) terms such art “amusement art” and notes that what people get 
from it “is the enjoyment of the emotions which usually accompany experience without us 
having had the experience”. Nothing in such an aesthetic experience reveals people to 
themselves; it merely enhances and inflates an image of themselves as they fancy 
themselves to be.  
 Kaplan (1966) gives one of the more extensive treatments of this kind of art in his 
article “The Aesthetics of the Popular Arts”. Kaplan identifies at least four serious 
problems with sentimental art. These will become important in distinguishing true worship 
from the false. 
 First, sentimental art trades in familiarity for the sake of ease. In sentimental art, 
the forms are stereotyped. What is a stereotype? It is not a true form, but merely a 
blueprint, an index, a digest. Since the consumer of sentimental art wants recognisable 
fare, sentimental art omits whatever is outside the limited horizon of what one knows 
already. It reduces what actually is into what the consumer would pre-judge it to be. It 
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crystallizes the consumer’s prejudices: reducing life not into a reflection of what is, but 
into what he or she already believes it to be (1966:354).  
 In short, sentimental art is simple in the sense of being easy. One cannot look to it 
for a fresh vision, or turn to it for new directions, or find unexplored meanings. Kitsch 
entertains by trading in familiarity and by trafficking in familiar emotion. It does not need 
to be excellent in itself; it simply needs to be effective in bringing certain feelings to mind, 
evoking past satisfactions, producing nostalgia, and in providing occasions for reliving 
experiences. In other words, the emotions one feels with sentimental art are not expressed 
by the particular song, painting or poem; they are merely associated with them. Consumers 
of sentimental art lose themselves, not in the work itself, but in pools of memory 
(1966:357). 
 Second, the consumers of sentimental art have no demands placed on them. They 
look only for outcomes, and are impatient with development or unfolding. They are tracing 
mere shapes, apprehending the work in a second-hand sense, but not receiving the work 
for itself.. Form in good art is precisely what invites true participation, creative perception, 
and diligent interpretation. Good form places demands on its recipients. Its form even 
arouses a certain amount of fear and tension: one must accept ambiguity and plunge in, 
exposing oneself to the possibility of change. One will emerge from an encounter with 
good art somewhat changed, with one’s views adjusted, one’s understanding broadened, 
one’s desires shaped (p. 356). 
 Kaplan argues that this is precisely the encounter that humans want to avoid, and 
which popular art enables this avoidance.. Instead of perception, there is mere recognition 
(p. 355). Discrimination is cut off, as consumers instantly recognise the stereotype. Since 
they instantly recognise the materials, the materials of popular art are only instrumental, 
and without inherent value.   
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 Third, sentimental art provides an emotional experience without perspective (p. 
358). The consumers of such art feel, but they feel without understanding. They have little 
perspective on their feelings; they merely wallow in them. Serious art deepens feeling, 
giving it content and meaning, providing a mirror for the mind. One’s own emotions 
become meaningful as one sees their details, and as one understands the interconnections 
that give them meaning. Sayers (1964:15) explains that art reveals a certain “mental or 
spiritual experience—sin, grief, joy, sorrow, worship”. Because the experience is now 
more carefully articulated, the subject more fully understands his own experience. The 
subject now truly recognises the expression: it is no longer something happening to him, 
but something happening in him. Sayers sees in this creative act a trinity: “Experience, 
expression and recognition; the unknowable reality in the experience; the Image of that 
reality known in its expression; and power in the recognition; the whole making up the 
single and indivisible act of creative mind” (1964:15). 
 Kaplan says, “Popular art wallows in emotion while art transcends it, giving us 
understanding and thereby mastery of our feelings” (1966:358). Sentimental art is, once 
again, narcissistic, making one’s feelings the subject matter, and indeed the goal of the 
aesthetic experience. Consumers of sentimental art are not drawn out of themselves, but 
driven deeper into loneliness. They love what they know; therefore they love what is 
familiar. Popular art is always familiar, always reminds them of what they already know, 
and is therefore deeply attractive to the laziest parts of their souls. 
 Serious art has depth, while kitsch is correspondingly shallow. It leaves human 
feelings just as it finds them, formless and immature. It evokes them so quickly that they 
have no root in themselves. Kaplan writes, “They are so lightly triggered that there is no 
chance to build up a significant emotional discharge” (1966:359). Sayers likewise says that 
such art “dissipates the energies of the audience and pours them down the drain” 
(1964:11). This is what Kaplan says is most distinctive of sentimental art. Sentimentality 
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has a deficiency of feeling, words without weight, promises without fulfilment. 
Paradoxically, sentimentality is also excessive, abandoning emotional restraint. Kaplan 
writes, “Sensibility becomes sentimental when there is some disproportion between the 
response and its object, when the response is indiscriminate and 
uncontrolled…Sentimentality is loving something more than God does” (1966:360). 
 Art is sentimental not when it calls for intense feeling, but when it calls for more 
than the artist or the audience can understand or apply significantly to the object. There is 
simply not enough to be understood, and this vacuity of meaning is intentional. The “tear-
jerker” elicits tears, but why one weeps is outside the occasion and beyond one’s 
perception. 
 Sentimentality moves in a closed circle around the self (Kaplan, 1966:360). Such 
art only has significance in light of the viewer. He sees himself in its materials, with the art 
providing easily recognizable prototypes to project himself upon. While good art calls one 
to empathise and give oneself to the aesthetic experience, it rewards one by transforming  
the self. Sentimental art takes people as they are and leaves them the same, with the 
illusion of having been deeply affected. In truth, they have felt deeply, but only in orbit 
around themselves, drawing out of them what they already know and love.  
 Sentimental art’s self-centeredness hollows and flattens people, emptying them of 
perspective on their own feelings. In essence, in becoming emptier people, they are 
becoming more bored through the medium that was supposed to alleviate their boredom.   
 Fourth, sentimental art provides a childish escape. All art is “escapist”. That is, all 
art enables a temporary escape from reality. Serious art is different to sentimental art in 
how it enables this escape, and for what reason. Real art may show the world that is, or 
even the world as it might be. Sentimental art simply shows the world as consumers would 
have it. Sentimental art may be said to suffer from too little fantasy as from too much: it 
simply does not do enough with its materials (1966:362). Instead of working far enough to 
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confer reality on its products, it stops short, letting its prettified depictions of life-as-we’d-
like-it-to-be substitute for the real. 
 The difference between real art and effects can also be spoken of as the difference 
between imagination and fantasy. Whereas real art appeals to the imagination, effects elicit 
mere fantasy. “Both fantasy and imagination concern unrealities; but while the unrealities 
of fantasy penetrate and pollute this world”, the unrealities of the “imagination exist in a 
world of their own, a world in which [people] wander freely and in a condition of 
sympathetic detachment” (Scruton, 2009:104).  
 Real art helps its participants to escape, not from reality itself but from their own 
unimaginative experience of it. They are returned more aware, more alive to the profundity 
of life in God’s world. Popular art simply gives pleasure with the illusion of true 
imagination. Its consumers do not escape to reality, for no reality is even depicted. The 
line between fantasy and reality is blurred. 
 Real art gives those who receive it a kind of objectification, in which they are able 
to see themselves in perspective. The self and the world are understood rightly. They see 
people as God sees them, with divine objectivity. Sentimental art is all-too human, and 
ultimately childish. Its consumers want pleasure without change, an escape from pain and 
ugliness without altering a thing within. And so they escape into non-existent worlds 
where they are already experiencing pleasured and existing as beautiful. Sentimental art 
turns its back on a world it has never known (Kaplan, 1966:363). 
 The problem is not the symbolism in popular art, for all art makes use of the 
symbolic. Instead, popular art attractively packages the world by glossing and varnishing 
it. It prettifies, delighting with sound, shape and colour in overpoweringly sweet doses. 
The escape comes through shutting out the reality, and then envisaging a world in which 
its consumers are the heroes, the overcomers, the desired lovers, the powerful, beautiful 
people. It is a world of man’s own making, where everything is selected and placed in 
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one’s own interest. Defects are polished and characters flattened, lest they evoke pity 
instead of soothing sentimentality. One quickly recognises the stereotypes and fills them 
with the feelings one knows he or she is supposed to have. 
 Once again, sentimental art is an exercise in narcissism. It assures that prejudged 
values are correct, and that very narrow perspectives are the correct ones. All art is 
illusory, but serious art aims to return one to reality, being illusory without being 
deceptive. Sentimental art is a “tissue of falsehoods” (Kaplan, 1966:361). 
 In summary, sentimental art appeals to human vanity, self-centredness, and 
egotism. Popular art is where humans go to indulge the love of self, and to escape into 
worlds of their own making. Popular art trades in the familiar, the easy, the shallow, and 
the childish, because these appeal to what is most selfish in all.  
 Sentimentalism is then worse than an aesthetic faux pas, it trades in falsehoods. It 
distorts the realities to which it claims to allude. It cannot generate action appropriate to 
what it claims to represent, for it falsifies the experience from the start, giving instead a 
placebo emotion.  
 For this reason, sentimentality is a form of art hostile to what Christianity purports 
to teach: a denial of self, so as to worship the glory of Another. Harries (1993:60) goes as 
far as saying that “Kitsch, in whatever form, is an enemy of the Christian faith and must be 
exposed as such”. Kitsch is not only an aesthetic failure, but a moral and spiritual failure, 
too. Christ’s beauty is not a sentimental prettiness, and therefore sentimental art has the 
potential of leading into idolatry. Scruton similarly claims that kitsch is not primarily an 
artistic phenomenon, but a disease of faith (2009:191). 
 Differences in taste are explained not only by differing levels of aesthetic maturity, 
but by the human propensity to prefer what is easy, familiar, and flattering. Here the 
difference is not mere preference, but whether art will be used selfishly or sacrificially, 
whether it will be an act of learning or an act of narcissism, whether it will be a childish 
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encounter with ourselves or a receptive encounter with reality. Since Scripture describes 
man’s propensity for self-deception, and his inclination towards self-worship, it is no 
surprise that sentimental art is popular and that unreflective people consider it their 
preference.  
3) Cultural Formation and Deformation  
 Taste is never shaped in isolation. Art occurs within a community, within a 
tradition (Witvliet, 1996:26). T. S. Eliot’s essay, “Tradition and the Individual Talent” 
(1919) demonstrates that artistic creation does not take place in a vacuum. Artists inherit 
forms and conventions from the past upon which they build, or from which they depart. If 
a tradition is thought of as a culture stretched over time, then artists are dependent upon 
culture for their artistic creations, whether they perpetuate or innovate.  
 Taste is no different. Taste is “culturally shaped, and likewise evolves in relation to 
living traditions” (Brown, 2000:§364).  
 Culture can be defined as T. S. Eliot suggested, “the incarnation of a religion” 
(1949:27). At the heart of any culture is Richard Weaver’s “metaphysical dream”, its 
unspoken but ever dominant vision of ultimate reality. From this vision, it creates worship, 
art, jurisprudence, custom, and social order. Faulkner (1996:206) agrees that “culture is 
perhaps best defined as the collective behaviour (together with the resulting artefacts) of a 
society engaged in acting out (symbolizing) its most deeply held and cherished shared 
beliefs and convictions”. Understood this way, culture is formative. As the composer, 
Julian Johnson, puts it, 
Culture is not something you choose: it confronts you with an objective force. To 
be sure, it is a composite product of individual consciousness and is amenable to 
our own work upon it, but it is far from being a matter of choice. Culture is no 
more a matter of choice than having two legs or being subject to gravity is; one can 
no more reject culture than reject electricity or weather (2002:117). 
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If culture is formative, one would expect most of human judgement to be shaped by 
example and exposure. A community of shared taste is the norming norm for aesthetic 
perception (Brown, 2000:§381–382). Tastes are first received before they are scrutinised 
or even challenged. People begin their lives as members of a culture and identify with its 
loves and hates; it is only later that they begin to question if they wish to continue to own 
all that the culture holds dear.  
 Were humans all still living in isolated folk cultures in which they were united by 
religion, language, and geographical region, this study would have to consider how 
different folk cultures have approached beauty, and how taste should be related cross-
culturally. Even if folk culture were still predominant, Scruton (2009:142) reminds one 
that cultural variation does not imply the absence of cross-cultural universals, nor that 
those universals are not rooted in human nature, nor that they do not feed into human 
rational interests at a very fundamental level. 
 The peculiar difficulty faced by the Christian world in the current era is the fact 
that folk cultures are mostly extinct, and that mass culture has infiltrated nearly every 
place in the world. Dawson (1948:214) says of mass culture,  
[T]he new scientific culture is devoid of all positive spiritual content. It is an 
immense complex of techniques and specialisms without a guiding spirit, with no 
basis of common moral values, with no unifying spiritual aim…A culture of this 
kind is no culture at all in the traditional sense—that is to say it is not an order 
which integrates every side of human life in a living spiritual community. 
This mass culture is driven by the commodification of all things, including religious and 
artistic artefacts, so that they become prostituted into the service of commerce. Faulkner 
(1996:206) sees the two most deeply held and cherished shared beliefs and values of mass 
culture transposed directly into the art forms of popular or sentimental art to be as follows: 
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1.  A belief in the individual’s right to pursue self-satisfaction, self-fulfilment, and 
self-gratification. 
2. Confidence in the potential of modern science to create for us an ever improving 
quality of life, coupled with a fascination with the technology that is the result of 
modem science. 
The kind of art that most clearly corresponds to the first belief is what we 
disparagingly call kitsch (art that makes us feel good about feeling). The art most 
properly aligned with the second belief centres on, in the words of Calvin 
Johansson, “media, presentation and image”. 
To Faulkner’s second point, Neil Postman (1985:10) adds that the medium is more like a 
metaphor, working by unobtrusive but powerful implication. A culture given over to 
popular taste will be one that emphasises what is more entertaining, such as exciting 
images, rather than text. When image dominates in a culture, a religion of the Word 
suffers.   
 In such a culture, taste is necessarily deformed, and such deformity reinforced. 
Indeed, only the mentality of the marketplace would define art as entirely a matter of 
individual choice, like products to be purchased and consumed. Only a member of mass 
culture would see an eclectic selection of cultural products as “personal style”. “The 
equating of cultural choice with personal style signals the end of an understanding of 
culture as something related to objective spirit” (Johnson, 2002:117). 
 Mass culture does not, and perhaps cannot, communicate transcendent ideals. Its 
art forms, made as they are to sustain narcissistic interest, are not capable of sustaining the 
Christian vision of a holy, glorious, and beautiful God (Myers, 1989:182). A culture of 
easy listening and easy living leads to the atrophy of imagination, to simplistic sentiment, 
and to despairing sentiment (Vanhoozer, 2001:149). 
 When people are dominated by the sensibilities of mass or popular culture, it 
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deforms taste in all the directions that Christian aestheticians have warned against: using 
art instead of receiving it, taking immediate responses as the “truth” of the work, 
promoting aesthetic relativism, and creating an appetite for narcissistic art.  
 Differences in taste can certainly be credited to the shaping force of culture. To 
what extent a person is embedded in in mass culture will have a proportionate shaping 
influence on such a one’s aesthetic taste.  
4) Natural Preference   
 A fourth reason for differences in taste is simply the natural and differing 
preferences of individuals. Having accounted for aesthetic maturity, propensities to prefer 
what is selfishly easy and self-affirming, and the shaping influence of culture, what 
remains is the differing inclinations and interests of people. As Harries (1993:24–25) 
points out, “[T]here are many kinds of beauty and whilst all forms will be characterised by 
wholeness, harmony and radiance, they will have these attributes in different ways”. If one 
then imagines a spectrum of truly beautiful things, one may still expect aesthetically 
mature people to find differing preferences within that spectrum.  
 Two caveats are in order. First, such differences are not put down to “personal 
style”, a term which usually refers to an eclectic menagerie of beautiful and ugly, one 
which is supposedly immune from criticism simply because such a collection represents an 
individual’s choice. Second, aesthetically mature people will be able to recognise why 
another object of beauty, while not one’s own preference, has merit and should be judged 
to be beautiful, or conversely, disdain an object as unworthy, in spite of the fact that it may 
be preferred by oneself or a close companion. The focus is not on freedom to choose; the 
focus ought to be on supplying plausible justification for one’s choices, giving warrant for 
one’s loves, not expecting the fact that one loves something to be justification in itself for 
that love.  
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 In summary, the question of good taste is not a simple one. Aesthetic maturity is 
needed, but relativism rules the day in our postmodern world. Narcissism, sentimentalism 
and kitsch provides an alluring and deforming effect on good taste. This bad taste is widely 
promoted through the media and structures of mass culture. Preference plays a role in 
explaining discrepancies over good taste, but preference has a far smaller role than 
aesthetic immaturity, loyalty to sentimental art, and cultural deformation. 
 How does this discussion of judging with good taste relate to Christian spirituality? 
7.4.4.4. Christian Spirituality Equivalents  
 The fourth and final aspect of the aesthetic experience must be compared to the 
Christian virtue of discernment.  
 Christian love is itself an act of discernment or judgement. Love is a statement of 
worth, because it attaches desire and admiration to objects or persons and expresses 
pleasure in them. Love is to be purified by growth in knowledge, and in discerning 
judgement. Paul says so explicitly in Philippians 1:9–10: “And this I pray, that your love 
may abound still more and more in knowledge and all discernment, that you may approve 
the things that are excellent, that you may be sincere and without offense till the day of 
Christ”. 
 Before and after Christians love something, they judge its value, and their pleasure 
in something declares their love of it. Psalm 29:2 describes worship as declaring God’s 
value: “Give unto the LORD the glory due to His name; Worship the LORD in the beauty 
of holiness”. 
 Scripture calls upon Christians to first consider the qualities of something before 
attaching their love to it. “Test all things; hold fast what is good. Abstain from every form 
of evil” (1 Thess. 5:21–22). Knowledge and understanding combine to produce wisdom: 
discerning judgement. This evaluative pursuit of what is intrinsically good is precisely 
what true evaluation is after. Separating what one loves from what one ought to love is as 
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important in the Christian life as in art. In pursuing God’s beauty, both in the Word and the 
world, a Christian is to be evaluating whether something reveals or distorts that beauty.  
 The question of taste is to be compared to discernment. Paul prays that when the 
Philippians’ love is grown in knowledge and discernment, it will enable them to approve 
the things that are excellent. While the context may be dealing with relationships, the 
principle can certainly be extended. In other words, they will love what they ought to love, 
approve of what they ought to approve. They will be aesthetically mature. The writer of 
Hebrews describes the very same powers of discernment as the mark of the mature  
But solid food belongs to those who are of full age, that is, those who by reason of 
use have their senses exercised to discern both good and evil (Heb. 5:14). 
Rightly ordered loves enable further good judgement and the love of the beautiful. One is 
reminded of Jonathan Edwards’ idea that those with holy affections will love what is holy; 
those with a sensibility for God’s beauty will perceive God’s beauty, those beautified with 
holy affections will love God’s beauty. 
 In short, the four explanations for differences over aesthetic taste correspond to 
differences in discernment.  
First, the less aesthetically mature have less discernment. Aesthetic maturity is 
equivalent to other forms. As Brown (2000:§320–321) put it, “[T]aste at its most 
encompassing is no less crucial to religious life and faith than is intellectual understanding 
and moral commitment”. One of the most unfortunate divisions brought about by 
Enlightenment’s secularisation of beauty is that aesthetic sensibility need bear no relation 
to spiritual maturity. Loving God’s beauty will grow in proportion to overall spiritual 
growth in Christlikeness and godly wisdom. 
 Second, sentimentalism and narcissism destroy the ability to judge wisely. As 
sentimentalism destroys taste, it also destroys wise and discerning love. Narcissism, 
shallowness, laziness and vanity are condemned in Scripture as sins, and all sins mar 
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fellowship with God (Prov. 26:12–16; 27:4; 1 Cor. 13:4–6; Phil. 2:1–4, 21; 2 Tim. 3:2–4). 
The same attitude that produces and consumes sentimental art will warp desire for God, 
for it will nurse infantile, and possibly idolatrous, notions of God. Sentimental love will 
love God as a means, and not as the end, and as an instrument for one’s own feelings. 
Sentimental love will love its own love, will covet the feeling of its own worshipful 
feelings. Wisdom and discernment will recognise the allure of idolatrous self-love and of 
worship forms that make a graven image of its own emotions. Pursing God’s beauty will 
mean eschewing selfish, narcissistic and shallow forms and methods of pursuing God, and 
the desire to know God through sacrifice and receptive teachability.  
 Third, as culture shapes taste, so wisdom is shaped in communities of wisdom. The 
fear of the Lord can be taught (Ps. 34:11). Likewise, Proverbs emphasises the importance 
of choosing wise company. “He who walks with wise men will be wise, But the 
companion of fools will be destroyed” (Prov. 13:20). “Evil company corrupts good habits” 
(1 Cor. 15:33) Christians are shaped by example and exposure as much as anyone else. 
Discernment within a community of reverence becomes a kind of catechism for 
discernment. “Remember those who rule over you, who have spoken the word of God to 
you, whose faith follow, considering the outcome of their conduct” (Heb. 13:7). 
Negatively, Christians are told to limit their exposure to the world system, by not loving it 
(1 John 2:15–17) or befriending it (Jas. 4:4). To the degree that mass culture represents 
forms of what God frowns upon, Christians should limit their exposure and participation in 
it. Paul counsels Christians to avoid being squeezed into the world’s mould, and rather to 
be transformed by the renewing of their minds (Rom. 12:2). Christians cannot avoid mass 
culture, but they can avoid deeply identifying with its idols and sensibilities. Pursuing 
God’s beauty will mean identifying with communities of wise judgement, and limiting 
exposure to that which dulls one to the glory of God. 
  161 
 
 Fourth, wise discernment will still be shaped by individual conscience. Two 
Christians committed to loving rightly, may choose differing convictions on certain 
doubtful matters.  
One person esteems one day above another; another esteems every day alike. Let 
each be fully convinced in his own mind. He who observes the day, observes it to 
the Lord; and he who does not observe the day, to the Lord he does not observe it. 
He who eats, eats to the Lord, for he gives God thanks; and he who does not eat, to 
the Lord he does not eat, and gives God thanks” (Rom. 14:5–6).  
Mature, self-denying, sober believers will still exercise preference, and will understand 
how differing preferences within a spectrum of what is good can still be pleasing to God. 
Pursuing God’s beauty will mean acting from an informed conscience consecrated to God.  
 Christians are to evaluate beauty. Their evaluation is their love acting with 
discrimination, with self-denying humility, shaped by examples of ordinate love, and 
informed by conscience. This is the spiritual equivalent of aesthetic “good taste”.  
 The methodology of art supplies Christian spirituality with a recognisable approach 
to apprehending God’s beauty: humbly seeking God in self-denying surrender, interpreting 
God’s analogies in his Word, and wisely judging what is truly excellent. 
7.5. Conclusion  
 This chapter has considered the subjective aspect of God’s beauty, the pursuing 
and experiencing of the beauty of God. To do so, it turned to that part of human life 
intimately concerned with a methodology of pursuing beauty: art. To find if this was a 
plausible association, seven ways that art and religion are overlapping pursuits were 
considered.  
 Christians borrowing from art’s understanding of the aesthetic experience should 
not do so uncritically. Some post-Enlightenment art has postured as a surrogate religion, 
causing it to become either museum or concert-hall art, removed from worship and faith, 
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or to be looked to as that which will provide salvation, redemption and transcendent 
fulfilment. Such art, and its associated approaches, can have only passing interest for 
Christians in pursuit of God’s beauty. 
 With those qualifications in place, the chapter considered the four aspects of the 
aesthetic experience: perception, immediate response, interpretation, and evaluation, and 
related them to Christian spirituality.  
 Perception is the initial encounter with the art object. Various Christian and non-
Christian voices called for a receptive form of perception, for getting oneself out the way 
so as to receive the work for its merits. The notion of disinterested pleasure, if rightly 
understood, is merely an extension of this. The chapter considered that this receptivity is 
akin to humility. Pursuing God begins with self-denial, with the willingness to focus on 
God as the end and not as a means to be used.  
 Immediate response refers to the more or less spontaneous responses to a work of 
art, particularly in one’s affections.  
 Interpretation was understood to be the act of understanding, synthesising, and 
comparing so as to understand what is being perceived through the imagination. 
Imagination was then compared to faith: the act by which a believer understands analogies 
in both special revelation and general revelation.  
 Evaluation was considered as the moment of judgement: judging both if one loves 
the object of art, and if one ought to love it. The chapter considered the importance of 
judgement, and it tackled the question of taste, seeing taste as necessary to evaluate good 
from bad. Four reasons for differing taste were given.  
 The analogue in Christian spirituality for this aesthetic evaluation is wise 
discernment. Wise discernment is developed in the same way that taste is developed: as 
Christian maturity grows, as selfish and childish ways are identified and abandoned, as 
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worldliness is eschewed and fellowship among likeminded Christians is fostered, and as 
conscience is informed and respected. 
 One of the unfortunate fruits of the Enlightenment is the tendency to regard the 
aesthetic experience as one separate from faith. In fact, if this chapter has demonstrated 
anything, it has shown that the aesthetic experience has a religious character, and the 
religious experience is aesthetic. Art requires humility, faith, and wisdom, just as Christian 
spirituality requires receptivity, imagination, and good judgement. These are not disparate 
experiences, except if one subscribes to the notions of non-religious art or artless religion.  
 Indeed, the aesthetic experience is actually the mode of perceiving the broadest and 
most universal things in life: beauty, values, persons, and ethics. As the next chapter will 
show, it may be the proper mode to receive any truth at all. Eliot (1949:29) wrote, 
Esthetic sensibility must be extended into spiritual perception, and spiritual 
perception must be extended into esthetic sensibility and disciplined taste before 
we are qualified to pass judgment upon decadence or diabolism or nihilism in art. 
To judge a work of art by artistic or by religious standards, to judge a religion by 
religious or artistic standards should come in the end to the same thing. 
Pursuing God’s beauty does not require the adoption of an unfamiliar or secular aesthetic 
mode of approach. It merely requires that one unite what is unjustifiably sundered by 
Enlightenment secularism. The Christian in pursuit of understanding God’s beauty should 
abandon the Enlightenment’s view of autonomous human knowledge in the pursuit of 
beauty, understanding that persons, beauty, and goodness cannot be discovered through 
mere reason, or through empirical investigation and experimentation. One need only 
understand that in authentic moments of worship, one has been in the “aesthetic mode” all 
along: humbly receptive, faithfully interpreting, and discerningly judging.  
 Having considered both objective and subjective aspects of beauty, it becomes 
necessary to consider how even a valid subjective methodology may be considered 
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successful in apprehending the objective reality of God’s beauty. Given the still widely-
believed Cartesian division between subject and object, what is a Christian epistemology 
that can unite subject and object, and assure one that beauty’s truth has been apprehended? 
The next chapter will consider this question.  
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Chapter 8. The Epistemology of Beauty: Christian Proposals for 
Reconciling “Subjective” Perception and “Objective” Transcendentals 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 A Christian spirituality based on a pursuit of God’s beauty could be criticised as 
pursuing nothing more than a “subjective” value. Beauty is widely considered to be 
subjective knowledge: inward experience known only to a perceiving subject, and therefore 
questionable as to its objective reality. Defined thus, subjective knowledge has no 
necessary correspondence to the outside world. Thinkers in the modernist tradition still 
hold that some forms of knowledge can be known objectively, while transcendental values 
such as beauty, cannot. A spirituality in pursuit of God’s beauty would, to them, be 
confusing private or individual preference with religious devotion. 
 Conversely, those in the postmodern tradition take subjectivism to its logical 
conclusion. According to them, whatever is outside the consciousness of the subject cannot 
be known independently or separately of that subject; indeed, any claim to “objective” 
knowledge would once again originate from within a subject, meaning the claim would be 
circular or incoherent. A claim to know anything comes from a subject; how then could 
any subject claim access to a knowledge independent of his or her own cognition? For 
postmodern philosophers, to speak of beauty as a reality in both subject and object is 
meaningless; the only reality that can be understood is the inner reality of pleasure or 
displeasure.  
 Christian spirituality as an academic discipline does not commonly take up this 
question. God’s beauty is assumed to be independently real, but no correspondence 
between perceiver and Perceived is sought. Subjectivism and the existential experience of 
the spiritual often dominates, with little thought of establishing real contact between 
subject and object. 
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 Discussing this epistemological aspect of beauty cannot be indefinitely deferred or 
altogether shelved. If no contact or correspondence between God’s actual beauty and a 
Christian’s perception of such is possible or describable, Christian spirituality that speaks 
of God’s beauty may justly be accused of creating comfortable or useful fictions. 
Dismissing altogether the need to secure some form of epistemological correspondence 
between objective realities and subjective perception may seem nobly fideistic to some, 
but it also appears suspiciously postmodernistic, insisting that the only important reality is 
the internal one humans impose upon their experience.  
 Conversely, simply assuming that God’s beauty exists, but making no effort to 
reconcile perception with reality may be an experiential form of begging the question, 
merely assuming what one is required to prove. Some kind of correspondence theory of 
beauty is worth investigating. 
 Seeking correspondence between subject and object is not necessarily a pursuit of 
some modernistic vision of empirical verification. The Enlightenment project of seeking 
“objective” verification in hopes of obtaining epistemological certainty has surely failed, 
as this chapter will show. The Enlightenment’s failed project does not mean Christians are 
forced to choose between postmodernism’s pure subjectivism or modernism’s rationalism, 
empiricism or idealism. Christians convinced of a realist metaphysic do not have to 
uncritically and completely embrace a premodern epistemology, acting as if they are deaf 
to the epistemological critiques and objections of the last five hundred years.  
 This chapter will seek to examine several Christian proposals for establishing 
reasonable correspondence or contact between objective and subjective realities in regard 
to God’s beauty. In so doing, it will examine the form of knowledge and the methods 
necessary for a spirituality that wishes to make correspondence between a subject’s 
perception and an object’s beauty.  
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 Epistemology, as a philosophical discipline, has not typically studied the 
knowledge of beauty. Aesthetics has taken up the question of judging beauty, and chapter 
seven gave itself to that study. Epistemology proper, however, has considered the 
epistemology of transcendentals, such as morality, ethics, truth, and God. Beauty is one of 
the transcendentals, and in studying a broader epistemology of transcendentals, one is 
studying an epistemology of beauty.  
 To frame the problem, this chapter begins with an overview of the history of 
thought on the question of relating subject to object from premodern thought through to 
the present day. The study then turns to the question of correspondence in matters ethical 
and aesthetical, and describes four models of truth, and considers if any could function as a 
model for beauty. Once an appropriate model is selected, the study then considers four 
suitable Christian realist proposals on this matter. The differences and similarities are then 
summarised into an epistemological model for a Christian spirituality in pursuit of God’s 
beauty.  
8.2. The History of the Subjective-Objective Dichotomy 
8.2.1. The Problem Stated 
 The subject-object dualism present in contemporary thought has not always been a 
fixture of philosophy. The current form of the debate developed only during the 
Enlightenment, and the terms have now taken on meanings quite distinct from their 
original use. Markos (2010:132) writes of the “divided house analogy” used by Francis 
Schaeffer. Man lives in an epistemological world divided between two worlds. A fully 
“objective” downstairs is the realm of science and the empirically verifiable “real world”. 
Here man is rational but not free, for all is mechanically determined. The fully 
“subjective” upstairs is the realm of religion and the arts, where man is free but irrational, 
for nothing is rationally verifiable or historically grounded. Man may live on one of the 
floors, but cannot dwell in both at once (Schaeffer, 1972:39). 
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 In this scheme, “subjective” refers to experiences, beliefs, or values that may be 
felt by the subject as inner realities, but have no necessary correspondence to a reality 
without outside the subject. Barzun and Graff write: “In loose speech ‘subjective’ has 
come to mean ‘one person’s opinion,’ usually off or false; whereas ‘objective’ is taken to 
mean ‘what everybody agrees on,’ or correct opinion....” (1992:174–175). On the other 
hand, the meaning of “objective” has also been distorted. Lukacs (2002:88) describes the 
“antiquated” notion of objectivity held by some: “an absolute and antiseptic separation of 
the observer from the subject or object of his observation”.  
 Beauty falls victim to such divided-house analogies, and to such definitions of 
subject and object. In such a philosophic milieu, to speak of God’s beauty can have no 
meaningful referent outside the subject; such speech refers merely to a subject’s pleasure 
in certain ideas.  
Such a sharp division between inner and outer worlds, interpretation and 
perception, mind and matter, and facts and values, is a result of an epistemological 
discussion in Western philosophy. That discussion is now traced in very broad terms in 
three sections: premodern, modern, and postmodern. 
8.2.2. Premodern Views of Subject and Object  
 It may be surprising for a contemporary observer to learn that premoderns did not 
wrestle with the question of the conflict between subjective and objective knowledge. At 
the risk of too broad a generalisation, it appears ancients understood themselves as 
participants in reality, and [they understood that] sense perceptions of the world outside 
the observer were appearances. The appearance was a kind of conjunction between reality 
and the perceiver. For example, the phenomenon of a rainbow is real and is perceived as 
such by a subject, but it does not represent a concrete object with independent existence 
outside of the observer. It requires a subject to perceive the phenomenon of a rainbow. 
And yet the phenomenon is not merely a psychological one; it represents something real in 
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the world. Subject and object combine. Premoderns saw all appearances like the rainbow. 
Bauder (2011) comments, 
By this, they did not suppose that no world existed externally to and independently 
of their awareness. They were quite sure that it did. What they lacked, however, 
was a direct means of encountering that external reality. The enterprise of 
philosophy arose (at least in part) because of the desire to find ways of working 
past perceptions to a knowledge of things as they really were. 
For premoderns, the world was a cosmos that functioned as a set of signs that pointed 
beyond itself, beyond nature to super-nature (Smith, 2014:27). 
 The ancients’ concept of participation in reality is mentioned by Owen Barfield 
(1965) in his thoughts on the subject-object dichotomy. In studying primitive society, 
Barfield found that as far back as one can go, human consciousness does not merely 
perceive objective, inert matter, but perceives immaterial realities “expressed by, or 
within, the material” (Di Fuccia, 2016:168–169). Similarly, Lukacs (2002:27) believes that 
before the eighteenth century became consciously aware of the notion of imagination, the 
much older idea was that of inspiration, recognising that the observer is inseparable from 
what he or she observes. 
 One form of this was the ancient Greek belief in universals. Plato understood that  
knowledge of the external world is verified through access to permanent, unchanging 
universals. In other words, certainty is not obtained through an interrogation of particular 
phenomena, but by knowing to what ideal form or essence the material phenomena 
correspond (Meek, 2003:28). Objects are like the primitive subject, and subjects are 
themselves very complex objects. A sharing takes place between them, so that it is not 
possible to say that the subject has a kind of “ontic priority” (Di Fuccia, 2016:117). 
 Here, beauty cannot be thought of as one person’s private experience. Beauty is a 
real universal and instantiated in the material world in various forms. Perceivers 
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participate in reality and experience the essence of beauty as they rightly respond to its 
incarnations in material reality. The appearances of beauty combine both subject and 
object, material and immaterial. 
 Augustine represents a Christianised neo-Platonism, with his own contributions. 
He distinguishes subject and object, without seeing them as dichotomous. Augustine 
distinguishes the human mind, its power to know, and oneself as the object of knowledge. 
There must be a subject that can know and love; there must be an object to know and love. 
Augustine used this distinction for his theory of the Trinity (Allen & Springsted, 1985:73). 
 In the Middle Ages, understanding was divided between ratio and intellectus. Ratio 
is the more discursive, rational thought that can examine, define, reason, and perform 
abstractions. Intellectus is the simple, contemplative vision of reality, that receives truth 
(Pieper, 1952:9). Faith was understood as the correct posture to receive knowledge of the 
world. The world was a true cosmos, an undivided whole that someone could rightly parse 
if rightly related to it. At the heart of it, knowledge of the world was still participatory, and 
the belief in universals allowed individuals to understand the meaning of the phenomena 
or appearances, as they encountered them. 
 During the Middle Ages, universals came to be seen as an impediment to the 
advance of knowledge. Weaver (1948:3) believes the defeat of logical realism by 
nominalism in the Middle Ages was the crucial event in Western culture, and its turning 
point. For thinkers such as Caldecott (2009:123), philosophical nominalism is the source 
of secular modernity, modern individualism, and a disenchanted world. Nominalism 
reduced the natural order to a “realm of valueless, formless individuals” (Peters, 2009:16). 
 William of Occam (1300–1349) is most associated with the doctrine of 
nominalism, which denied the existence of universals. According to nominalism, 
universals such as beauty, truth, or goodness were simply names that humans use to 
explain concepts, but these do not have real or independent existence. Gordon (2012:16) 
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explains that “Within a Nominalist framework, there is no beauty within Reality itself; 
‘beauty’ is a mere name employed to impose meaningful structure onto a Reality that has 
none”. 
 Charles Taylor believes nominalism was actually sourced in an attempt to protect 
God’s sovereignty and power. Nominalists like Scotus saw a problem in making God 
conform to a notion of “goodness” higher than or above him. To keep God free, essences 
and independent “natures” were to be done away with (Smith, 2014:42). 
 Whatever the original motives for its creation, nominalism ultimately banishes the 
reality perceived by the intellect, and posits as reality only that which is perceived by the 
senses. In doing so, nominalism severed faith from reason. Religious truth might rest upon 
divine authority and find evidence from internal experience, but reason was no longer the 
concomitant support of faith. Now reason rested upon a supposed harmony between mind 
and nature (Dupré, 1998:25).  
Realism believes reality is in itself meaningful and that meaning is more or less 
discoverable, while nominalism denies or is agnostic regarding meaning in reality and 
restricts its discussion to how meanings developed in language or culture. Nominalism 
regards names as convenient labels. In God’s case, however, naming precedes creating: 
God spoke, naming the creation, and it came to be. Meaning or naming preceded the 
existence of the thing; the name is not a mere interpretation after the fact.  
For Christian Theistic Realism, by contrast, there is naming/meaning before there 
is created reality, and naming/meaning after there is created reality. Furthermore, in 
the case of God, the two namings, and the reality they name, correspond. There is a 
true correspondence, such Realism would say, between naming and nature” 
(Gordon, 2012:18).  
By the fourteenth century, William of Occam’s influence progressively invaded Oxford, 
Paris and practically all European universities. The late Middle Ages then saw the final 
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divorce of reason and Revelation (Gilson, 1938:87–88).  
 Early forms of this divorce are also seen in Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). Aquinas 
wrote before William of Occam, but a shift was already noticeable. Aquinas moved from 
the faith position of Augustine and Anselm to a position that allows for reason to verify 
Revelation (Gilson, 1938:81–82). For Aquinas, natural reason is common to pagan and 
Christian alike; human reason can attain to the truth. Aquinas was attempting to steer a 
middle path between realism and nominalism. But this was simply the precursor to a full 
flowering of nominalistic ideas in the form of autonomous human reason in the 
Enlightenment and Modern era. The unity of subject and object were about to be severed. 
8.2.3. Enlightenment and Modern Views of Subject and Object  
 The nominalist turn at the end of the Middle Ages allowed for a rejection of 
scholasticism and its increasingly humanistic view of reason. The Enlightenment really 
began in the thought of men like Francis Bacon (1561–1626) and Rene Descartes (1596–
1650) (Gunton, 1985:3). Francis Bacon sought a kind of mathematical certainty for all 
branches of human knowledge (Gilson, 1938:29). Descartes was willing to defer to no 
intellectual authority higher than the “light of natural reason” (Scruton, 2002:29). He used 
doubt to find certainty, seeking a “common, neutral, indisputable rational foundation” for 
indisputable knowledge (Hughes, 2011:5). Descartes reduced epistemological certainty to 
his famous Cogito ergo sum. Mind was divided from—if not imprisoned within—matter, 
and matter would soon become inert and sterile. 
 Scepticism about the reliability of the senses leads to the idea that perception and 
reason are entirely different. Here, the mind is passive when relating to the material world, 
but active when interpreting its experience in the rational form of language (Gunton, 
1985:12–13). According to Taylor (1998:93), the Cartesian view is one of the great 
disintegrating philosophies of all time, setting the mind against the sensory and the 
intuitive. Participation is all but dead: objects exist without observers, subjects perceive 
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passively and then choose to interpret these perceptions.  
 Descartes’ ideas, followed by rationalist and empiricist versions of epistemology, 
introduced the notion that knowledge involves a subject-object division. The human 
consciousness assumed the role of judging what is true of reality (Feinberg, 2001:56). 
Beauty was not yet denied, but it was in a precarious position. With the mind now taking 
the leading role, beauty was no longer an essence to be participated in, as much as it was 
an objective pattern to be observed.   
 Smith (2014:70–71) writes that Charles Taylor captures the shift from “imagining 
our cosmic environment as an ordered, layered, hierarchical, shepherded place to 
spontaneously imagining our cosmic environment as an infinite, cavernous, anonymous 
space”. 
Meaning is moved from the world to the mind. Meaning no longer inheres in 
things, it becomes a property of minds who perceive or judge meaning internally. External 
objects may be a catalyst for perceiving meaning, but the meanings are self-generated by 
the subject. Later on, Kant will say that the meanings are imposed upon things by the mind 
(Smith, 2014:28–29).   
 Cartesian ideas would develop into rationalism and empiricism. Whereas Descartes 
saw the mind holding innate ideas, John Locke (1632–1704) saw the mind obtaining all its 
contents from without (Gunton, 1985:18). The mind is a tabula rasa, and ideas of beauty 
are ideas gained from experience and sense perception (Scruton, 2002:87). Once beauty 
had become a kind of property or pattern found in objects, the focus had to shift towards 
methods that allow a subject to recognise that pattern. It is not surprising, then, to see the 
discussion of taste and sensibility develop in the eighteenth century. The growing 
subjectivisation of what cannot be proven with autonomous human reason or empirical 
observation must lead to “rules” for recognising patterns of beauty. 
There were voices of protest against this hard subject-object dualism. Bishop 
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Berkeley (1685–1783) denied the existence of mind-independent objects, to secure the 
primacy of intelligent, rational perception, by the mind of God first and then by God’s 
image-bearer. Often misunderstood, Berkeley was overturning the idea of perception as a 
passive process, pointing out that perception is a rational process (Gunton, 1985:27).  
 David Hume (1711–1776) took empiricism to its logical end. Hume accepted the 
idea of passive perception and active reason, and went on to show the impotence of such 
reason to truly penetrate the surface of the sensory world (Gunton, 1985:21). Morality, 
truth, beauty, and the existence of God are not ideas that can be demonstrated either 
logically or empirically. Hume’s law is sometimes taken to be that no ought can be 
inferred from an is; values cannot be deduced from facts (Scruton, 2002:131). Although 
Hume gave place to the importance of custom and tradition, his theories were the true 
derivations of Cartesian doubt. Common-sense claims to objective knowledge are 
systematically broken down, until all that is left is subjective experience. Incoherently 
though, Hume’s theory left no space for the unity of identity of the subject himself. Pure 
objectivism led to subjectivism, which ended up wiping out the subject.  
 Common sense realism, developed by Thomas Reid (1719–1796), was a response 
to the scepticism of David Hume. Reid argued that all people had commonly held 
concepts: effects have causes; the material world is real; good and evil exist. Reid held that 
the universal concepts are necessary for functioning in the real world. Theoretical 
philosophy may deny them, but practice renders them, in Reid’s thought, self-evident 
(Pearcey, 2010:170–171). Common sense realism provided a third way through the 
dichotomies of materialism and rationalism (Dixon, 2003:101). Reid’s ideas found some 
support in antebellum American philosophy (McConnel, 2003:650), but did not gain much 
currency in the wider philosophical world. 
 The dead ends of Cartesian rationalism and Humean empiricism were to be 
harmonised by Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) idealism. Kant essentially taught that 
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sensory experience and human reason are severed. The human will, while rational, is 
focused on moral or ethical reality, while the emotions responds to aesthetic matters 
(Davidson, 2000:235).  
 Kant simply assumed that Locke’s pattern was correct: for knowledge to be worthy 
of the name, it must be certain (Gunton, 1985:5). But the realm of knowledge needed to be 
divided, between those matters that can be empirically and rationally proved, and those 
that cannot. Things-as-they-appear-to-us, those objects of rational or empirical inquiry, 
Kant named phenomena. Things-in-themselves, those values and transcendentals, are not 
objects of human knowledge, and Kant named them noumena (Feinberg, 2001:56). This is 
not to say Kant remained agnostic on noumena. On the contrary, Critique of Judgement is 
his work dedicated to how noumena may be parsed. Ironically, Kant insisted that 
subjective judgements could have universal validity. He was no modern relativist. His 
dualism nevertheless opened a Pandora’s box that led to modern relativism (Markos, 
2010:102). 
 For all this, Kant was a child of the Enlightenment. Knowledge is exclusively 
discursive in Kant, as opposed to the receptive and contemplative view of premoderns. 
Knowing, in Kant is work, according to Pieper (1952:8). Kant posits a priority of the 
rational understanding, with the mind supplying what it cannot discern (Gunton, 1985:24). 
Kant’s phenomenology and later existentialism are descendant of Descartes, for they all 
begin with the mind as the starting point of reality; they all use doubt as a method of 
procedure to gain certainty; they all distrust the idea that one’s inner and outer senses are 
integrated with the will and intellect and have a cognitive power in themselves (Taylor, 
1998:105). 
 Allen and Springsted (1985:170) summarise:  
Thus Kant, instead of helping, has driven an even larger wedge between ourselves 
as knowers and what it is we seek to know. In his attempt to restore objective 
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connections between the things we are aware of, Kant has indeed brought together 
the subject or knower and the object. But the subject and object are phenomena 
only, so that we are utterly cut off from any knowledge whatsoever of ourselves 
and of objects. 
Kant’s division between phenomena and noumena would create what one might call 
adherents of those two respective realms. Positivists were willing to go beyond Kant to 
abandon the concept of the noumenal altogether. Whatever cannot be verified by empirical 
means may be, for all practical purposes, non-existent. This then applies to morals, God, 
and beauty (Feinberg, 2001:58).  
 Similarly, foundationalism is the theory of knowledge which posits that beliefs are 
justified when justified by other beliefs which are self-evidently true. Beliefs which need 
no justification become then the foundation of all other beliefs. These beliefs are 
sometimes called “properly basic beliefs” (Feinberg, 2001:57). When a belief cannot be so 
grounded, the Enlightenment saw it as irrational to hold such a belief.  
 On the other hand, some Romantics felt that science had discredited Christianity 
and saw Kantian noumena as the epistemological way out. Kant’s upper story of the 
noumenal could be safely protected from the lower story of empiricism, rationalism and 
materialism. Spirit, freedom, meaning and beauty could be cultivated in the separate space 
allocated for transcendentals (Pearcey, 2010:181). Milbank (2011:33) sees some forms of 
Romanticism as more than an attempt to restore the role of imagination, but as an attempt 
to regard and experience material and spiritual objects beyond the self as truly real. 
Romanticism tended to isolate the imagination and to forget that poetic knowledge is also 
cognitive (Taylor, 1998:117).  
Georg Hegel’s (1770–1831) idealism attempted to deal with the problem by 
suggesting that reality is a continuum. Subjects and objects are different from one another, 
but not wholly unrelated or alien: the known object is the “subject’s object” (Allen & 
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Springsted, 1985:175). Hegel’s close associate, Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854), 
“proposed an ‘absolute identity’ as the absolute whose indifference is both subjectivity and 
objectivity” (p. 171). 
Another German idealist who took up the problem was Schopenhauer (1788–1860). 
He is known for his anti-dualism of subject and object, but his was more an existential 
concern than an epistemological one. His thesis was that participative knowledge, 
knowledge of something for itself (not for merely utilitarian uses or theoretical reasoning), 
allowed one to transcend self-preoccupation. In this state of pure contemplation, being 
absorbed entirely in the object, subjectivity recedes. This very experience is a form of 
beauty for Schopenhauer: “the quality of the object that facilitates knowledge of its idea” 
(Farley, 2001:60–61). 
Idealism and phenomenology were attempts at retaining both subjective and 
objective forms of knowledge. But having accepted dualism as a basic premise, they were 
doomed to wrestle with the basic Cartesian premises of doubt or mind-matter duality. 
 Existentialism began as another way of responding to Kant’s dualism. The 
objective realm of nature was severed from the subjective realm of human consciousness. 
Kierkegaard (1813–1855) could be mistaken as a Romanticist, but he criticised it for 
taking too easy a view of the problems of human existence (Ramm, 1962:50). Instead, 
Kierkegaard was the father of existentialism. For Kierkegaard, God is Subject and never 
Object. God cannot be known as objects are known, but only as a person is known. Thus 
God cannot be proven by objective means (Ramm, 1962:53). Christianity is a personal, 
religious, existential truth, and so the supreme test is inwardness or subjectivity. Knowing 
is opposed to believing. Knowing is accepting on rational grounds, while believing is to 
risk all on objective uncertainty (Ramm, 1962:63). Existentialism would develop into the 
postmodern philosophies of the twentieth century. 
 Rationalism, empiricism, idealism, romanticism, common sense realism and 
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existentialism were the fragmented wrestlings of Western philosophy after the collapse of 
the medieval consensus. The denial of essences and the mind-matter division had produced 
anything but the epistemological certainty that Western philosophy had hoped for when it 
jettisoned religious authority. Meek (2003:34) critiques the Enlightenment’s desire for 
certainty as self-refuting:  
What of the ideal of certainty itself? If I must accept as true only those claims of 
which I am certain, what about the claim that I must accept as true only those 
claims of which I am certain? Am I certain of it? What reasons would I use to 
prove it? The ideal does not even meet its own standard. It is a claim of which I 
cannot be certain. We might say that it is an expression of faith. 
Berkeley represents the triumph of the subject, where the existence of objects independent 
of a subject is denied. Kant represents objects known as “things-as-they-appear”, while 
“things-in-themselves” are utterly unknowable. Hume reduces objects to sense qualities, 
and reduces the self to sense qualities. Overemphasise the subject, and objects tend to be 
lost (as in Berkeley). Overemphasise the object, and the subject is lost (as in Hume). It is 
doubtful if many today would assert that the Enlightenment had succeeded in solving the 
problem it had created. 
 The result of the Enlightenment was a two-storey view of truth: an objective 
category for matter, subject to empiricism’s exacting methods; and a subjective category 
for mind and transcendentals, subject to an increasingly existential outlook. By the late 
nineteenth century, the philosopher George Santayana could assert that intellectual 
judgements are judgements of fact, while aesthetic and moral judgements are judgements 
of value (Pearcey, 2010:99) 
 Beauty had gone from a real universal, to a property of objects understood by the 
mind, to a relational property sensed by those with taste, to a construct of the mind 
imposed upon objects. Kant’s early transcendental idealism would blossom into the 
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existentialism of postmodernism: a full blown subjectivism and an anti-aesthetic.  
 Modernism’s trust in autonomous reason would collapse during the twentieth 
century, and with it, the last vestiges of holding to a doctrine of real transcendentals. As 
will be shown in the next section, existentialism, phenomenology, subjectivism, pluralism, 
relativism, and deconstructionism would come to characterise postmodernism.  
8.2.4. Postmodern and Post-Secular Views of Subject and Object  
 The hunger for a perfect source of knowledge that would provide objective 
certainty was broadly typical of the Enlightenment. The postmodern rejection of this is 
what Clark (2003:121) calls the rejection of “source-foundationalism”.  
 Pearcey (2010:237) believes that European thinkers who had suffered under 
totalitarian regimes during World War II began teaching that totalitarianism was sourced 
in “totalising” metanarratives. A “totalising” metanarrative is any account of reality that 
focuses on a single dimension of human experience in order to explain much or all of life, 
elevating its own explanation to an absolute.  
 Alongside this, the continental school of postmodern philosophy had been pursuing 
space for human freedom within a deterministic world. If the nature of reality is essentially 
materialistic, the transcendentals of freedom, rationality and ethics require an artificial 
space. Scientism, positivism, and materialism have imposed a kind of tyrannical 
reductionism on epistemology, as Hume demonstrated. Therefore, room is made for 
human consciousness, even if the basis for that consciousness cannot be traced to a 
structure in reality (Pearcey, 2010:227).  
Husserl’s (1859–1938) intentionality of consciousness is a concept in 
postmodernism which asserts that the subject-object dualism is a fiction. Objects are 
always objects of consciousness, and consciousness is always the consciousness of objects. 
No noumena, things-in-themselves or transcendentals unrelated to human awareness 
actually exist (Allen & Springsted, 1985:199).  In reality, the subject-object dichotomy has 
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not been solved by Husserl: objects have simply been merged into the subject. 
Subjectivism has triumphed. 
 Schaeffer (1972:41) sees postmodern existentialism in the three forms, that of Jean-
Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Heidegger (1889–1976), and Jaspers (1883–1969). Sartre’s 
premise was basically “existence precedes essence”. No God exists, no human nature 
exists and essence as intellectual constructions vanish with the mind that conceived them 
(Scruton, 2002:275). For Sartre, the desire for an objective moral order is a loss of freedom 
(p. 278). Positivism died and was replaced with linguistic analysis, represented by 
Wittgenstein (1889–1951). Wittgenstein represents nominalism taken to its extreme point: 
one cannot look outside linguistic practice for the thing that governs it. Indeed, 
Wittgenstein represents a final demolition of Descartes’ only certainty: first-person 
existence. Kant and Hegel’s desire to remove the self from enquiry, has been reached in 
Wittgenstein (p. 294). 
 Craig and Moreland (2003:§3577–3696) describe postmodern epistemology as 
anti-realist, regarding reality as a socio-linguistic construction. Postmodern epistemology 
is characterised by several rejections: rejecting correspondence theories of truth, rejecting 
rationality as objective, rejecting foundationalism, rejecting meta-narratives, and rejecting 
the referential character of language. Feinberg (2001:65–66) believes that postmodernism 
is an “anti-worldview”: it destroys elements necessary for a worldview, such as God, 
purpose, meaning, and a correspondence view of truth. Postmoderns typically adopt a 
coherentist model of knowledge, in place of correspondence or any form of 
foundationalism (Feinberg, 2001:67). 
 Johnson (2002:26) points out the unwitting disservice that society does to itself 
when it denies the possibility of objective judgements. Individual judgements are only 
meaningful by virtue of the possibility of there being a goal of a correct judgement. When 
such a goal is denied, it not only devalues the judgements of individuals, but the very 
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notion of individuals themselves.  
 Peters (2009:214) believes postmodernism fails to grasp the inseparability of two 
forms of humility: acknowledging humankind’s limits as epistemological interpreters and 
their dependence as metaphysical seekers. Ironically then, postmodernism succumbs to the 
same weakness of modernism: faith in human autonomy.  
8.2.5. Summary 
 From this survey of epistemology, the reader can see what has been lost and 
gained. The concept of beauty as a real essence was lost through nominalism. Participation 
of subject with object was replaced by the Cartesian idea of a subject’s consciousness 
being separate from the existence of the object, and the need to perfect some method of 
rational or empirical neutrality so as to rightly perceive an object’s true properties. Hume 
began to show the impossibility of knowing transcendentals, while Kant’s transcendental 
idealism became the method for retaining noumena: impossible to prove, but morally 
necessary to suppose as patterns imposed upon reality by the mind. The division of subject 
and object reaches its apex following Kant. Positivism carries Kant’s empirical approach 
to phenomena to its logical end, while existentialism becomes the necessary outworking of 
his idealism applied to noumena. Postmodernism takes subjectivism into relativism and 
deconstructionism, denying any totalising narrative of beauty, while restoring the active 
place of the subject to perception. 
 Postmodernism has done Christianity a favour in dismantling positivism and 
destroying the idea of objective certainty and the neutrality of the observer. It has actually 
echoed something said by Augustine: reason cannot function autonomously, for the 
observer’s disposition affects interpretation (Peters, 2009:157). Indeed, postmodernism’s 
critique of pure and perfect objectivity has been affirmed by those who may not agree with 
the conclusions and epistemologies of the leading postmodern philosophers. Lukacs, for 
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example, after recognising that quantum physics itself was challenging the idea of 
“Mechanically-Causal or Mathematical Certitude”, wrote:  
There was no longer any Duality. There was no longer any absolute separation of 
Mind and Matter. The world no longer consisted of Objects and Subjects. There 
was no Science without Scientists. There was—there is—only one kind of human 
knowledge” (2002:150). 
On the other hand, postmodernism has harmed Christianity by claiming universals are 
ontologies of violence: totalising meta-narratives imposed by one group upon another. 
Beauty becomes nothing more than another example of will to power. Transcendentals are 
impossible to know; all that matters are internally coherent, personal systems of order. 
Truth is no longer what corresponds to reality; truth is merely the internally coherent and 
practically useful understanding of a single human consciousness. 
 The current post-secular milieu has dealt Christianity a decent hand in rightly 
recognising the active role of the subject in perception, while harming it by continuing to 
deny the very possibility of a subject accessing knowledge of a transcendental such as 
truth, goodness or beauty. The question of how transcendentals may be apprehended is 
where this study now turns. 
8.3. Epistemological Models for Apprehending Transcendentals 
8.3.1. Introduction 
 Relating a subject’s perception to the realities of a transcendental object is difficult. 
Dupré (1998:29) writes that “philosophy has found nothing but insoluble problems in such 
a neat division between a purely ‘mental’ concept and a purely ‘real’ object”. Attempting 
to find perfect harmony between the mind and world was what led Kant to radically 
reverse the correspondence theory. 
 For all this, Christian spirituality assumes that some relationship is possible. “The 
lived experience of God by his people”, as a definition of spirituality combines subject and 
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object in one unitary expression. 
Clark (2003:349) defines truth as “constituted by correspondence of linguistic 
utterances to mind-independent states of affairs”. Is it legitimate to pursue correspondence 
for transcendentals? 
8.3.2. Correspondence and Transcendental Truth 
 Naturalism and positivism have held sway over popular opinion, claiming that 
truth, as found in correspondence models, belongs only to the empirically verifiable realms 
of human experience. Similarly, existentialism has cut the root of any pursuit of 
correspondence between existential realities and external realities.   
 Naturalism (a close cousin of positivism) is a form of religion, and in the opinion 
of Johnson (2000:§1401–1404), an extremely dogmatic one. Naturalism holds some basic 
convictions about the nature of reality (that it is material) or that knowledge comes 
ultimately through the senses and scientific investigation, and these convictions are held 
by a kind of faith. This kind of positivism has hardened into an ideology. Berlinski 
(2009:56–57) writes that the ideology of naturalism and positivism is that only the 
sciences are true, and thus becomes the very worst of “totalising” narratives: 
If by means of this argument it also follows that neither mathematics, the law, nor 
the greater part of ordinary human discourse have a claim on our epistemological 
allegiance, they must be accepted as casualties of war. 
But more than one kind of truth exists. Aesthetic truth can be an instance of truth if it 
represents something real, something existent in reality. Begbie (1991:228) believes that 
art is able to disclose truth, truth beyond and outside the subjective experiences of the 
artist. The artist’s subjective experience is by no means the primary or even vital source of 
knowledge surrounding a work of art. This kind of aesthetic truth is amenable to certain 
forms of evaluation. To suggest that truth is only that form of knowledge obtained through 
empirical verification is to beg the question. History, experience, and Scripture all show 
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that truth is what corresponds to reality, and reality consists of more than material 
phenomena. Beauty, morality, reason, and personhood are as much real features of reality 
as material phenomena are.  
 Sherry (2005:§5832–5833) writes, “Beauty is indeed subjective, in the sense that it 
is a matter of our reactions to the perceived properties of things, and people may disagree 
about this as about so many other matters. But it does not follow that these properties are 
unreal or our perceptions illusory”. 
 Objects of beauty, such as art, are classified as “cultural artefacts”. Barzun 
(1989:14) reminds one that these objects of culture are not analysable, nor “graspable by 
the geometrical mind”. Art by nature is a synthesis of the world, fusing form and content; 
to use upon art those forms of empirical analysis that separate objects into their component 
parts is to misunderstand the very way art communicates.  
Further, to live in a culture is to submit to broadly agreed-upon conventions that 
have validity beyond individual interpretations. A purely subjective, individually-defined 
meaning has nothing to do with the idea of culture (Johnson, 2002:76). Though objects of 
beauty do not submit to scientific tests for truth, their presence in culture calls for a shared 
conversation as to their meaning and truth.  
 De Gruchy (2001:1) remarks that aesthetics deals with more than the arts. Instead, 
he sees it as an attempt to perceive reality in ways other than “rational enquiry and moral 
endeavour”. The realities communicated by beauty deal with dimensions of human 
existence necessary for a full-orbed human existence, and yet not articulable in the 
languages of maths and science. 
According to Sommerville (2006:41), even respected voices such as Harvard 
philosopher Hilary Putnam and Nobel economist Amartya Sen, are challenging the 
fact/value dichotomy. They point out that the definition or perception of facts depends on 
concepts, and concepts are always subject to criticism and value judgements. Even 
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scientific hypothesis selection often depends on non-scientific values, such as beauty, 
coherence, or simplicity. 
 Cole, following Gadamer, believes that the truth encountered in aesthetics is a 
“contingent truth”, a truth in which the horizons of an observer are fused and mingled with 
the horizons of the work of art, leading to a new understanding (1999:350–351). 
 Such truth is not immediately transparent. Scruton (2009:140–147) encourages a 
circumspect and modest approach in pursuing some kind of objectivity in aesthetic 
judgements. He notes that taste is rooted in the broader cultural context, that taste is not a 
logical deductive argument, and that an attempt to lay down fixed, objective standards will 
threaten the creativity of art. Having made those provisos, he asserts that cross-cultural 
universals exist, and that objectivity in the aesthetic realm is not the same as the pursuit of 
universal acclaim. One aims to persuade, not prove, whether or not one’s interlocutor 
embraces the object as beautiful. Finally, he argues that rules of taste exist, which are no 
guarantee of unanimity, but they provide guides for honest critics. Adler (2000:159) 
speaks of taste as a kind of “proportion between the complexity of the object and our 
capacity for apprehending it intuitively”. Such statements do not lend weight to the 
mangling of the term “subjective” into meaning “biased” or “unreliable” or “a personal 
preference with no purchase on the judgements of others”. These statements simply report 
a reality already known: some forms of truth require more critical, nuanced forms of 
judgement.  
 This all argues for the possibility of some kind of apprehension of the truth or 
reality of the object of beauty by a perceiving beholder. Chapter six showed that 
premodern believers took this reality for granted. Myers (1989:98) points out that 
Philippians 4:8 calls on believers to reflect on what is excellent, not merely on what they 
feel is excellent. Pure subjectivism is excluded by Scripture: reality includes that which is 
excellent, and God commands believers to find it and reflect upon it. Wooddell 
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(2011:§1350–1351) asserts, “Beauty, like ethics, has to do with value, and value is 
objective, grounded in the nature of God”.  
 If transcendentals are a legitimate pursuit of veridical pursuits, how might that 
pursuit take place? Four theories of truth are commonly put forward in philosophical 
discussions. These four are now defined in turn.  
8.3.3. Correspondence Theory 
 A correspondence theory of truth states that true statements correspond to reality. 
That is, they adequately depict “aspects of a mind-independent world” (Clark, 2003:322). 
Correspondence theory holds that there can be a more or less exact correspondence 
between linguistic propositions and the realities to which they refer.  
 Moderns and positivists have held to some form of correspondence theory of truth, 
though only for their preferred domain of material phenomena. Typically, a human’s 
sensory or rational faculties can be used to find what is true of the material world 
(Feinberg, 2001:59). Positivism teaches a kind of correspondence between statements and 
material reality.  
 Many Christians, too, have held to some kind of correspondence theory, seeing the 
propositions of Scripture referring to realities, either using language that is univocal, 
equivocal, or analogical. As Dupré (1998:30) puts it, “Still religious truth must submit to 
the rules of correspondence. For truth in religion claims to correspond to what ultimately 
is”.  
8.3.4. Coherence Theory 
 The coherentist theory of truth, advanced by Brand Blanshard, is that truth is a 
fully coherent set of beliefs (Clark, 2003:333). Dupré (1998:31) defines it as “an internal 
articulation [that] organically integrates the separate elements into a unity of meaning”.  
 Coherence models of truth are favoured by postmodern philosophers. Since no 
external, mind-independent states are accessible to the postmodern philosopher, truth is 
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essentially an internally harmonious interpretation of reality.  
8.3.5. Praxis Theory 
 
 The pragmatic theory of truth redefines truth in terms of its usefulness. Charles 
Sanders Pierce, William James, and John Dewey are the thinkers mainly responsible for 
the pragmatic theory. Clark (2003:334) gives the formalized statement of the theory: “The 
proposition p is true if and only if p is useful or pays off”. 
 According to Jeffrey and Maillet (2011:§547–548), Richard Rorty, believes that  
“(1) there are degrees of truth, and (2) what is true for one person or group may not be true 
for another, to the degree that the truth of a proposition may not in fact be determined or 
even clarified by testing and debate”. 
8.3.6. Disclosure Theory 
 
 Dupré (1998:38) writes, “[R]eligious disclosure is truth that, in its essentials, 
refuses to submit to external criteria”. Truth is disclosed to the religious subject through 
participation and illumination. Disclosure theory does not possess an universally 
accessible or unbiased quality which empirical philosophy demands, but instead requires 
an personal involvement and commitment. The critic must himself be in some way 
acquainted with the experience of religious truth. Aesthetic experience falls under the 
same restrictions (Dupré, 1998:37). 
8.3.7. Evaluation of the Models 
 
 These four theories of truth provide four options for overcoming the severed 
relationship between subject and transcendental object, present since the rise of modernism 
and postmodernism. Each of these options is now considered in turn.  
 The coherence theory of truth cannot account for the most strongly held claim of 
religious truth, that such truth originate outside of its own system of truth (Dupré, 
1998:33). Coherence theory is cut off from the world, since by its own definition, truth is a 
“function of a belief’s relations within one’s system of other beliefs with no reference 
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whatsoever to a reality outside the system” (Craig & Moreland, 2003:§3538–3542). In so 
doing, coherence theory suffers from an imprecise definition of coherence (§3517–3518). 
 Praxis theories of truth suffer from a confusion of means and ends. To argue for 
truth-claims being verified if they are useful or pay off only raises more questions: What is 
useful and to whom? Useful for what end—productivity, freedom, health, wealth, 
knowledge, power? Why should one of those ends be regarded as more useful than 
another? If means are justified by the ends they achieve, the onus is on the pragmatist to 
explain why the end should be sought as an absolute good. One might ask the pragmatist 
the first question of the Westminster Confession: what is the chief end of man? It seems 
praxis theories can only survive within coherence theories, or else they are forced to 
become correspondence theories that grapple with ultimate ends. 
 Correspondence theory holds out more promise. A correspondence theory is 
criticised on the grounds that the correspondence relation is too mysterious to admit into 
one’s view of reality (Craig & Moreland, 2003:§3434–3436). Christians need not feel the 
force of this objection, since they presuppose the existence of mystery and invisible 
realities. Postmodern philosopher Richard Rorty sees the correspondence theory of truth as 
a muddled, unhelpful and sterile distinction between appearance and reality (Peters, 
2009:213). Cory (1925:397) regards as “unsophisticated” a definition of truth which 
regards truth as “the agreement or correspondence of our judgments with the realities to 
which they refer”. He nevertheless believes that what is desirable is  
some highly refined and dynamic correspondence theory...elaborated by men like 
Bertrand Russell, Whitehead, and Broad, among whom an incomplete but a fair 
degree of agreement prevails. At the moment of verification a judgment which has 
been working must do more; it must correspond in some way with the objects to 
which it refers and it must be independent, as true, from all our likes and dislikes 
(p. 400).  
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Meek (2003:136) critiques the idea of exact linguistic correspondence as leading to 
sterility. Statements cannot exhaust the reality of what they state or describe, since the acts 
of knowing include dimensions that defy verbalization.  
However, for all these objections, correspondence theory provides a clear analogue 
between subject and object. Correspondence is what any realist metaphysic would expect: 
perceived and interpreted reality has some correspondence with the external world as made 
by God.  
 Disclosure models recognise an aspect of epistemology celebrated by Christians 
from Augustine to Calvin: truth is God’s prerogative to communicate. Delio (2008:150) 
sees theology as a form of practical knowledge that must involve the perceiving subject in 
the spiritual realities perceived. Participation in the spiritual life is fundamental to this kind 
of knowledge, which Delio calls “a habitus affectivus, a disposition midway between the 
speculative and the practical whose goal is wisdom”. This sounds much like the 
participative knowledge seen in the premoderns. The danger in disclosure theory, however, 
is that religious experience may claim self-authentication, which smacks of 
Kierkegaardian existentialism.  
 Of these models, a modified correspondence theory that incorporates the subject’s 
participation in perception, combined with a form of disclosure theory holds out the best 
promise for apprehending the reality of God’s beauty. Correspondence theory need not 
subscribe to simplistic notions of absolute, precise correspondence between statements and 
the extra-mental world (Clark, 2003:350). Meek (2003:137) suggests, 
Instead of correspondence, let us speak of contact. We lay hold of an aspect of the 
real. I think we also need to replace the term certainty. When we speak of 
epistemic success, truth claims that engage the real, the notion of an exhaustive 
certainty or justification is not only impossible, it is unwanted. It doesn’t do justice 
to the rich fabric of human experience, rooted as it is in our bodies and connecting 
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us to a three-dimensional world, and all of it a motion through time oriented toward 
the future. I suggest that a better term is confidence. 
Whether one follows Meek’s terminology or not, the point is taken. The kind of 
correspondence with God’s beauty that Christian spirituality pursues is not the kind that 
could quantify it or speak of it in univocal language. Nor would such a spirituality summit 
a kind of epistemological Everest, exhausting the meaning of God’s beauty. Such a model 
would genuinely make contact with the beauty that is God’s and speak of such contact 
with humble confidence. 
 Such a modified model of correspondence would incorporate the unity of subject 
and object that was unnaturally severed by the Enlightenment, while also including the 
rejection of autonomous reason provided by postmodernists. It would recognise the role of 
interpretation that the subject has, while maintaining a stance of Metaphysical Realism. 
 Portions of such a model have already been proposed in partial forms by different 
individuals at different times. The study now turns to the works of six Christians, grouped 
into four approaches to apprehending transcendental truth. These six do not exhaust the 
possibilities for modified correspondence theories for truth or beauty. They do meet the 
criteria suggested: all are Christians, all are philosophical Realists, all recognise the 
participation of the subject in the act of perception, and all reject autonomous reason and 
Enlightenment dualism. 
8.4. Christian Realist Proposals 
8.4.1. Introduction  
 No one lives in an intellectual vacuum. The philosophy of the day may begin 
among intellectual elites, but it makes its way into the websites, the newspapers, the 
schools, the films, the social media, the songs and the advertisements of a society. The 
average person does not study epistemology; instead, categories of knowledge find their 
way into the popular vocabulary. It is not unusual to hear a blue-collar worker calling 
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certain judgements “very subjective”, or to hear a high school student speak of “objective 
analysis”. If so, Christians are not immune to this process either. They may wish to believe 
that their philosophy is purely “biblical”. In reality, such Christians merely smuggle in 
their philosophy and consider it biblical. The Bible has no categories of subjective and 
objective, but one routinely hears preachers using the terms. As theologians point out, the 
Trinitarian categories of ousia or essentia, and hypostases or personae, were not biblical 
words, but categories were borrowed from philosophy as helpful constructs to explain the 
biblical data. Philosophy affects Christian thought.  
 What remedy is there for Christians who have unwittingly accepted Enlightenment 
epistemologies, but now consider them self-evidently true, or at least coherently plausible 
within their grid of Christian doctrine and practice? Lewis suggests an answer: 
Every age has its own outlook. It is specially good at seeing certain truths and 
specially liable to make certain mistakes. We all, therefore, need the books that will 
correct the characteristic mistakes of our own period. And that means the old 
books. All contemporary writers share to some extent the contemporary outlook – 
even those, like myself, who seem most opposed to it...None of us can fully escape 
this blindness, but we shall certainly increase it, and weaken our guard against it, if 
we read only modern books. Where they are true they will give us truths which we 
half knew already. Where they are false they will aggravate the error with which 
we are already dangerously ill. The only palliative is to keep the clean sea breeze of 
the centuries blowing through our minds, and this can be done only by reading old 
books. Not, of course, that there is any magic about the past. People were no 
cleverer then than they are now; they made as many mistakes as we. But not the 
same mistakes. They will not flatter us in the errors we are already committing; and 
their own errors, being now open and palpable, will not endanger us (2014:219–
220). 
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Lewis’s advice is well-taken. Hearing from Christians of varying eras, Christians who did 
not accepted subject-object dualism, or Cartesian scepticism, or Husserl’s intentionality of 
consciousness may remind Christians of epistemologies long abandoned or forgotten. 
They may bring fresh insight and solutions for impasses that were not present in their time.  
 Of the six Christians surveyed, one is premodern, two wrote during the 
Enlightenment, and three were twentieth-century authors. This spread gives the advantage 
of perspective from each era. 
8.4.2. Augustine and Pascal: Loving Intuition 
 
 Augustine of Hippo (354–430) and Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) are separated by 
more than a millennium, but are philosophically very close to one another. Augustine and 
Pascal held to a kind of affective rationality: the idea that right loves will correctly shape 
reason and further cognition. A recent work on Pascal and Augustine, The Logic of the 
Heart (Peters, 2009:10), contends that  
human reasoning on ultimate issues of human life is inextricably bound up with 
those affections and feelings that reveal to us our proper place in creation. Reason 
can function properly only when reason is informed by the intuitions of the heart, 
as nurtured by historically constituted traditions of belief and practice. 
Augustine, rescued from a life of debauchery, gave much attention to the question of 
desire and love. Love, in turn, affects cognition, rationality, and interpretation. Love is 
what inspires man’s search for knowledge (Harrison, 1992:148). Reason depends on the 
heart, on a proper, ordered love, caritas, for it to fulfil its purpose. From the Augustinian 
point of view, both believer and unbeliever must demonstrate a humble and loving attitude 
toward the message of God’s grace to grasp its rationality (Peters, 2009:157).  
 For Augustine, knowledge of a thing required possession of it, and people are not 
in possession of it until they love it. Augustine’s expression “delightful contemplation” 
combined both rationality and desire, intuitive knowledge and delight (Taylor, 1998:29–
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30). Augustine called the effort to contemplate God by faith, to passionately investigate 
Revelation through reason intellectus. This understanding is human reason using loving 
faith to reach the light of the beautific vision (Gilson, 1938:18–19). God’s love is his 
beauty, and only love in the beholder is able to see this beauty. 
 In other words, human beings are primarily beings of love and desire. Contra the 
Enlightenment, people are not thinking machines. The human will is the seat of love and 
the faculty of choice. Rightly ordered love informs faith, for faith engages the whole 
human being: intellect and desire (Peters, 2009:66). To have faith is to trust God, to love 
him or yearn to love him as one’s greatest good (p. 69). 
Augustine held to the ancients’ view of participative knowledge, but added to this 
his doctrine of illumination. Augustine’s major innovation was to emphasise an interior 
quality of religious truth. God teaches each individual soul, though this teaching is always 
in agreement with the testimony of Scripture and tradition (Dupré, 1998:22). Whether 
secular truth or sacred, whether it be the saint or the sinner, perception of truth is by 
illumination (Ramm, 1962:155).  
 What this meant is that Augustine could explain right perception of essences such 
as beauty or truth through right relationship to God. Faith in God places the perceiver in a 
posture to receive illumination, and to fully participate in and understand the world. For 
Augustine, faith precedes reason. There is only one sense in which reason precedes faith, 
and that is that revelation can only come to a rational soul (Ramm, 1962:158). Loving, 
trusting desire for God is at the heart of right reason and understanding about the world. 
  One can summarise Augustine’s view of knowing transcendentals by saying that 
faith, working through love, is prerequisite to knowing and understanding. Pieper concurs, 
stating that philosophy only truly possesses its object in the act of lovingly searching for it 
(1952:113). 
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 Blaise Pascal, a Jansenist philosopher-theologian, mathematician, physicist, and 
inventor gave the world his uneven but brilliant Pensées. Pascal took up intellectual arms 
against Cartesianism by continuing the Augustinian approach to knowledge.  
 Pascal divided the cognition of humans into the heart and the Geometric Mind. The 
heart is the intuitional centre of knowing, also called by him “sentiment”, “Instinct” or 
“Inspiration” (Ramm, 1962:41). Intuition is the spontaneous awareness of reality, “a 
nondiscursive act of the intellect that grasps first principles without the aid of proof by 
demonstration” (Taylor, 1998:61–62). Pascal saw the heart as the intuitive centre of the 
human being which sees things synoptically (Ramm, 1962:39). Like Augustine, Pascal 
believed that knowing God entails loving God, which means affirming God is the ultimate 
good in life, and surrendering one’s autonomous being to his authority. 
 Pascal saw the heart as the unity of cognition and will (Peters, 2009:172). It is from 
the heart that man can know the truth. “We know the truth not only through our reason but 
also through our heart. It is through the latter that we know first principles, and reason 
which has nothing to do with it, tries in vain to refute them” (Pensées, Frg 110).   
 This is tantamount to saying that faith is the first principle. Pascal, however, was 
not a pure fideist. The knowledge of God through Christ is the supreme first principle for 
knowing the nature of self and of the world (Peters, 2009:172). For Pascal, faith is rational, 
even though it goes beyond reason. Faith provides the best explanation of the human 
condition (Peters, 2009:94). 
 Indeed, faith as a first principle is by no means unheard of, epistemologically 
speaking. Frame (1987:§4471–4474) suggests that the attempt to build up human 
knowledge from pure experience or from reason alone cannot succeed, for they rebel 
against one’s creatureliness. Therefore, beginning with faith is not a betrayal of the 
epistemological enterprise. 
 The problem, as Pascal saw it, is man’s pride. Until sin is removed, man is not 
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admitting his intuitions, which will warp his reason (Ramm, 1962:43). Pascal’s strategy 
was not to appeal to a set of indubitable premises. Instead, Pascal’s hearer must become a 
certain kind of person—one who honestly and humbly acknowledges his or her own 
inadequacy to perceive the truth. Humankind, therefore, only knows itself through the 
heart (Peters, 2009:94). For Augustine and Pascal, epistemological certainty is more of a 
“spiritual and ethical certainty rooted in faith” and developed by participation within a 
historical community of fellow believers (Peters, 2009:35). 
 In summary, when the subject approaches reality with the commensurate humility-
faith-love, he or she will perceive what is there. Humble, believing love is the necessary 
posture to encounter reality and to reason rightly about it. Maritain (1952:23) agrees that a 
true form of knowledge exists which is not rational, but is knowledge through union or 
inclination, where the intellect is at play with affective inclinations and dispositions of the 
will and is being guided and directed by them. Taylor (1998:52–53) calls emotional 
knowledge “poetic knowledge”, where the “subject-object, juxtaposed like metaphor, 
produces the third thing, the immaterial idea of the thing, and possession (love-knowledge) 
of the universal concept”. 
 Subjects cannot know objects unless they are rightly related to those objects by 
loving them correctly. One cannot know how to love a single object without relating it to 
the universe of objects. One cannot know the correct ordering and relationship of all 
objects in the universe unless one loves the Author and Creator of all objects and loves 
objects for his sake. Humble, believing love toward God, in the right order, and to the right 
degree, is the basis of all progress in knowledge.  
8.4.3. Jonathan Edwards: Consenting Sensibility 
 This study has spent considerable space on Jonathan Edwards’ views on beauty. 
Edwards again rewards in the area of epistemology. Edwards sought to avoid and 
overcome the objective/subjective dichotomy. Beauty, for Edwards, has both objective and 
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subjective aspects (Venter, 2010:189). “Beauty had an effect, and the effect was an affect 
(i.e., feeling)” (McClymond & McDermott, 2012:§1196). 
 Edwards, on first appearance, placed beauty within the subject, since he defined it 
as the heartfelt benevolent consent to being in general. This makes beauty a function of 
persons willing and loving, not an abstract quality of essence. But this does not make 
beauty merely subjective. Benevolence, for Edwards is not a mere feeling, sensation, or 
pleasurable sensibility. Beauty is agreement, consent, and an active form of benevolence.  
Conversely, beauty is not purely “objective”, if what is meant by that term is a 
mere property of independent existence. Edwards did, however, see beauty as objective in 
that it reflects a real state of affairs. Louie (2013:§6787–6790) points out that Edwards did 
not see beauty or sublimity as an object. Rather, it is a perception of a reality: the reality of 
God’s relationships. Natural objects are sublime when they serve as metaphors or 
analogies for God’s sublimity. In Edwards’ ontology, beauty is not an accidental attribute 
of reality; beauty is the world’s very essence. Beauty would, on the one hand, be present in 
its order, proportions and consent, even if humans were not there to see it. On the other 
hand, such beauty would be meaningless without human perception, like communication 
without an audience (§2348–2353). Subject and object are here combining. The sublime as 
experienced in space and time as some sort of phenomenon may be an interpretation of the 
human subject, but it has “universal validity because it is based on divine interpretation. 
God intends those phenomena to be a metaphor of himself” (Louie, 2013§7194–7196). 
Farley summarises: 
Edwards’ analysis (metaphysics) has thus undermined and transcended the 
conventional duality of the subject and the object. In primary beauty the deepest 
objective constitution of God and human beings coincides with a self-transcending 
disposition. Beauty is at the same time subjective and objective, both being and 
sensibility (2001:47). 
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For Edwards, beauty provided a way to explain a structure of existence that is objectively 
real, and yet may not be perceived equally by all (Moody, 2005:104). With the idea of 
beauty, Edwards could explain what is real and true, regardless of varying perceptions, 
while explaining why saints and angels have a sensibility towards recognising beauty. 
Souls that have been and are being beautified have the consenting disposition to see as 
beautiful God’s own consenting disposition. One’s frame of mind, or disposition enabled 
the apprehension of the beautiful; but that frame of mind is itself an instance of beauty 
(Martin, 1975:113). 
 Edwards echoed Augustine and Pascal in his view of how the affections shape 
reason. Edwards saw reason as crucial for evaluating the validity of Christianity’s truth-
claims, but believed that the evidence could only be accurately assessed by those who 
“possess the proper moral and spiritual qualifications” (Wainwright, 1995:3). Edwards 
believed there is a causal connection between spiritual perception and rational persuasion 
(p. 39). “The mind infers the truth and reality of the things the gospel contains from its 
perception of their spiritual beauty” (p. 31). The qualification is the right frame of mind, 
the sense of the heart, the consenting disposition. The sense of the heart involves the will 
and inclination because when the mind is sensible of spiritual beauty “that implies a 
sensibleness of sweetness and delight in the presence of the idea of it” (WJEO, 2:272). 
 Edwards believed that being by nature drives towards union, and love willingly 
consents to that union and actively seeks it (McClymond & McDermott, 2012:§6455–
6457). For Edwards, reality was grounded in consent and beauty (Martin, 2013:192). If the 
very essence of reality is a dynamic love, then only those who harmonise with that love by 
loving it are acting according to the nature of things.   
 In The Nature of True Virtue, Edwards attempted to show that benevolence, or love 
is the mechanism that underlies the spiritual sense. If benevolence is founded upon the 
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nature of reality, then benevolence is the key to understanding and perceiving reality. 
Wainwright (1995:34–37) identifies four arguments Edwards makes for this. First, 
Edwards showed that love or benevolence agrees with the nature of things. The ground of 
reality is God with his infinite and omnipotent love. Human love is a fitting response to 
reality. Second, delighting in benevolence also agrees with reality. Third, delighting in 
benevolence is the same as perceiving its beauty. Fourth, this spiritual perception of the 
redeemed is veridical, and coincides with reality.  
 “Infused benevolence is the basis of a new epistemic principle; a sense of the heart 
that tastes, relishes, and perceives the beauty of holiness (i.e. benevolence)” (Wainwright, 
1995:42). Again, like Pascal, Edwards saw sin as the distorter of right reasoning. Sin 
distorts reasoning: immersion in temporal concerns distract people from attending to ideas; 
sensory dependence causes man to substitute words and signs for ideas, and “disordered 
loves make it difficult for us to appreciate natural goods and evils” (p. 48). Why would 
intelligent critics reject plausible, relevant evidence for God? Edwards argues that man's 
sinful inclinations distort man's thinking about God (p. 148). 
 Edwards agreed with Pascal and Augustine in saying that humble, believing love is 
the basis of right perception. Yet he went beyond them in stating that such love is the 
creaturely mirror of the love God has for himself and his works. Beauty and the sense of 
beauty are not divided, as Descartes would have it. The perceiver is fundamental to 
recognising God’s beauty, but the perceiver must have been brought into a loving state in 
relationship to God. God’s beauty is “objectively” real, but only perceivable by the one 
beautified with the consenting disposition. 
 Edwards clearly saw love as fundamental to understanding:   
[T]he Father understands because the Son, who is the divine understanding, is in 
him. The Father loves because the Holy Ghost is in him. So the Son loves because 
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the Holy Spirit is in him and proceeds from him. So the Holy Ghost, or the divine 
essence subsisting in divine love, understands because the Son, the divine idea, is 
in him. Understanding may be predicated of this love, because it is the love of the 
understanding both objectively and subjectively. God loves the understanding and 
the understanding also flows out in love, so that the divine understanding is in the 
Deity subsisting in love. It is not a blind love. Even in creatures there is 
consciousness included in the very nature of the will or act of the soul; and though 
perhaps not so that it can be so properly be said that it is a seeing or understanding 
will, yet it may truly and properly [be] said so in God by reason of God’s infinitely 
more perfect manner of acting, so that the whole divine essence flows out and 
subsists in this act” (WJEO, 21:133–34). 
Further, Edwards’ view of love pushes one beyond desire and delight into the concept of 
union. “Consent” is not simply pleasure, but the desire for compete conformity, for total 
union of wills and desires. Beholding beauty cannot be separated from becoming part of 
that beauty.  
8.4.4. Owen Barfield and C.S. Lewis: Imaginative Rationalism  
Owen Barfield (1898–1997) and C. S. Lewis (1898–1963) were British 
intellectuals of the twentieth century. The two were close friends, and both were members 
of the informal Inklings group, a society of literary comparison and enjoyment. Barfield 
was instrumental in the conversion of Lewis from atheism to theism and eventually to 
Christianity, though Lewis never embraced Barfield’s Anthroposophy.  
 Both Barfield and Lewis challenged the prevailing positivism, naturalism, and 
materialism of their day. What marks Lewis and Barfield out as exceptional is that they did 
not do so by appealing to existentialist epistemology, as their contemporary Karl Barth 
did. Both were inveterate realists, who saw the value of reason and evidence. Instead, both 
appealed to imagination as an organ of meaning and proper interpretation of reality.  
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 The imagination, for Barfield, was the organ of perceptive interpretation that 
mediated between object and subject. Di Fuccia (2016:5) describes Barfield’s approach to 
subject and object. Both exist in a kind of “polar tension”, neither completely independent, 
nor dependent on their polar opposite. Subjective knowledge is not wholly found or 
sourced in the subject’s mind, or as a passive recipient of phenomena. Instead, the subject 
participates in the object. The subject is neither wholly passive, nor wholly active. 
Meaning is not entirely immanent, but is known by participation in being’s transcendent 
source. Barfield saw phenomena neither as wholly the inner perception of subject, nor 
wholly something without that forces itself on man’s senses, but something between the 
two (p. 49). 
 Barfield wrote in Speaker’s Meaning: “[T]he concept of an object without a subject 
is as abstract as the concept of a surface without a depth and as futile as that of a back 
without a front” (Barfield, 1967:115). 
 Nature, for Barfield, is what the ancients thought it was: symbolic. The imagination 
is what is needed to perceive and interpret the appearances of phenomena. The imagination 
merges objective and subjective realms. It is reason at its most exalted, apprehending 
things as they are, the best vehicle to truth (Di Fuccia, 2016:83–84).  
 Barfield agreed with Kant’s active role of the subject, but challenged Kant’s 
nominalism. Instead, drawing from Coleridge, Barfield saw the active imagination playing 
a crucial role in perception, unveiling and understanding the symbolic nature of reality (Di 
Fuccia, 2016:84). Milbank sees this as a poeticising of reality, where everything is 
revealed as a work of art and a symbol (2011:34). Coleridge’s view of imagination 
influenced Barfield greatly.  
 According to Milbank (2011:35), Coleridge saw the imagination as “the living 
Power and prime Agent of all human Perception”. Using imagination is a form of sub-
creation or re-creation by which humans seek meaning and unity in what they experience, 
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dissolving phenomena and then re-creating them. Coleridge was influenced by idealism, 
but also by German romanticism. Barfield was more deeply influenced by Coleridge’s 
Platonism, seeing reality as symbolic (Di Fuccia, 2016:71–72). Coleridge argued that there 
is a use of imagination that is not merely fanciful, but which mediates between passive 
sense and active intellect (Gunton, 1985:32). 
 Barfield took special aim at scientism. Scientism is to be distinguished from 
science. Science may employ the empirical method, whereas scientism becomes an 
ideology, insisting that the empirical method is the only valid way of knowing anything. 
As a result, positivist notions of reality insist on a kind of “verificationist” notion of truth, 
imagining that one can obtain direct access to one’s primordial way of being. This kind of 
correspondence sees imagination and metaphor as escapism or as sheer fantasy. Those 
who understand the imagination as the organ of perception and interpretation see metaphor 
as foundational to understanding the world (Bryant, 1989:97). 
 Barfield was not against science, but against scientism, with its rejection of 
imagination. For Barfield, the fatal flaw of science is that it actually eliminates the object 
of its enquiry or study, for by eliminating imagination, one cannot properly understand the 
whole or the unity of the object (Di Fuccia, 2016:167). He appreciated the work of 
quantum scientist David Bohm, who suggested that particles are not dead objects moved 
by forces, but contain their own qualities, such as inertia. Similarly, Barfield saw the role 
of the subject as an active participant in the observational system. If objects “know” they 
are being observed, then the subject shapes the outcome of an experiment. Pure, neutral 
objectivity is impossible (Di Fuccia, 2016:187). 
 Barfield’s epistemology might be summarised thus: pure objectivity is non-
existent. Perception or observation is not mere passive sense impressions. The perceiving 
consciousness regulates and interprets what is seen through imagination. But Barfield 
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diverges from Kant, who would said that ideas are merely in men’s minds, but not real 
(regulative, but not constitutive). Barfield believed what is real—the true essences—are 
mediated to people through what they perceive. Perception is itself the work of 
imagination, interpreting synoptically what it receives through the senses (p. 81). Instead 
of dividing subject and object, Barfield believed human subjects participate with objects to 
create the interpretation that the imagination construes.  
 C. S. Lewis was as much a realist as Barfield was. Indeed, Lewis argued 
vehemently for moral realities. The Control of Language: A Critical Approach to Reading 
and Writing, was published in 1939 as a textbook for upperform students in British 
schools. Alex King and Martin Ketley, the authors, could hardly have known that their 
work would stir the ire of Oxford don and Christian apologist Lewis. But ignite his 
indignation it did, and the result was one of Lewis’ most important books, The Abolition of 
Man. 
 In his first chapter, “Men Without Chests”, Lewis graciously gave King and Ketley 
the pseudonyms Gaius and Titius, and to The Control of Language he gave the title The 
Green Book. But beyond his civility towards their persons, Lewis gave no quarter when it 
came to his criticism of their book. For within the book, Lewis found an error that was 
pernicious and destructive, and one with the power to subvert young minds. King and 
Ketley commented on Coleridge’s experience of hearing two tourists see a waterfall, one 
describing it as “sublime”, the other calling it “pretty”. Coleridge endorsed the former and 
was disgusted at the latter. King and Ketley wanted their readers to see this valuation 
through modernist eyes. They wrote: “When the man said This is sublime, he appeared to 
be making a remark about the waterfall…Actually…he was not making a remark about the 
waterfall, but a remark about his own feelings. What he was saying was really I have 
feelings associated in my mind with the word “Sublime”, or shortly, I have sublime 
feelings’” (Lewis, 2001:2). And here Lewis released his truth bloodhounds. Beauty, or 
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sublimity according to King and Ketley, is not a real attribute of persons, places, things or 
ideas in the universe. Beauty is not something that can be predicated of another with any 
coherent meaning. Instead, beauty simply refers to pleasure in the subject. Beauty is the 
happy approval of observers. From there, a logical connection is quietly made: people are 
not to make judgements of value about the world, calling things true, good or beautiful. To 
make value judgements about the world would be to assume a meaningful universe that 
can be judged for meaning—including its beauty. Here was existentialism mangled and 
mixed with a clumsy positivism. The result was the denial of moral reality, or at least of 
the possibility of making value judgements about it. 
 Lewis knew that this view was an Enlightenment revision, and an anti-Christian 
one. He wrote,  
Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be 
such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or 
incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but could 
merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence or our contempt (Lewis, 
2001:14–15). 
“Debunking” the world of objective beauty or morality has a disastrous effect, in Lewis’ 
view. Once the world is emptied of objective value, and such is transferred to the internal 
consciousness of the subject, soon the same process begins with the subject. The subject is 
emptied, as the mind itself is explained away, until “the Subject is as empty as the Object” 
(Kilby, 1964:103). 
Indeed, this is the meaning of the title The Abolition of Man. If there is no God, and 
no foundation for value judgements, then man himself is abolished. Man’s thoughts and 
judgements are no more significant than leaves rustling or a pond rippling (Piper, 
2014:131). 
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 Lewis pointed out that the critic of objective aesthetic or moral values is caught in 
the dilemma of self-refutation, for in the very act of rejecting objective values, the author 
proved his or her belief in a non-subjective value, namely, his or her own. To pontificate 
on the non-existence of values is a value judgement itself, and one to which the author 
feels everyone should subscribe (Kilby, 1964:101). Lewis would not live long enough to 
see the most stringent forms of postmodernism, but his prophetic anticipation of and 
refutation it are present in The Abolition of Man in embryonic form. The one claiming that 
no transcendental truth exists is making that claim for more than oneself, and thereby is 
giving one’s negative statement a claim of universal validity. But if universal validity is 
impossible, then such a claim is self-refuting.  
 In his essay, “The Poison of Subjectivism”, Lewis (1967:73) defended moral 
realities. In his view, humans can no more invent value judgements than they could invent 
a new primary colour. Even debating over whether a certain moral or rule is good or bad 
assumes that there is an ultimate standard to which one can compare moral rules. This 
points to the permanence of morality, and its presence as a universal essence, not as a 
pragmatic utility. 
 Lewis, like Barfield, believed the imagination was primary for perceiving moral 
realities. Lewis was an inveterate realist. Piper (2014:138) believes that Lewis used 
imagination because it could reveal dimensions of reality more deeply than reason. Lewis’ 
Chronicles of Narnia may have had an equal or greater effect in proselytising Christianity 
than any of his works of Christian apologetics. McGrath (2014:130) states that Lewis’ 
imaginative reason bridges the chasm between modernity and postmodernity. By giving 
both imagination and reason a place in his arguments, Lewis testified that both were part 
of a greater whole. 
 Ward (2011:62) explains that Lewis defined reason as “the natural organ of truth”, 
imagination as “the organ of meaning”, and meaning itself is “the antecedent condition of 
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both truth and falsehood”. Imagination is therefore, for Lewis, “the prius of truth”: before 
something can be either true or false, it must mean”. Lewis saw human reason as inert 
unless it were first supplied material to reason about. Imagination supplied those materials 
(pp. 60–61). Lewis saw reason and imagination existing in a collaborative, not competitive 
relationship (McGrath, 2014:128). In Lewis’ thought, reason is the faculty of analysis that 
seeks objectivity, inspects matters, and breaks them into their constituent parts, whereas 
imagination tastes and participates in what it perceives (Vanhoozer, 2014:93). 
 The imagination is a synthetic, synoptic power that allows one to fit things together 
into meaningful forms. The imagination engages mind, will and emotion, not merely the 
discursive mode of analysis or logic (Vanhoozer, 2014:99). Scruton (2007:12) describes 
this synoptic power of imagination as a unity of experience and thought, a coming together 
of sensory and the intellectual. Scruton believes that this places the meaning of aesthetic 
experience outside the reach of science. Beauty communicates meaning in immediate, 
sensory form. 
Again, Chesterton:  
But imaginative does not mean imaginary. It does not follow that it is all what the 
moderns call subjective, when they mean false. Every true artist does feel, 
consciously or unconsciously, that he is touching transcendental truths; that his 
images are shadows of things seen through the veil. In other words, the natural 
mystic does know that there is something there; something behind the clouds or 
within the trees; but he believes that the pursuit of beauty is the way to find it; that 
imagination is a sort of incantation that can call it up (2012:§1482–1487). 
Lewis told T. S. Eliot that he believed in the kind of imagination that was “a truth-bearing 
faculty” (Ward, 2011:76–77). Swedberg (2010:82) believes that Lewis was a fideist:  
not in the sense that faith is contrary to reason, but in the sense that it is only 
through faith that one can know Christianity is true. Things such as reason, the 
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imagination and the search for joy play important roles, but they cannot produce 
certainty. Only faith can do that—faith defined as the voluntary surrender of the 
individual’s will to the person of God and complete trust in him. 
Lewis and Barfield can then both be called imaginative rationalists, for both saw the place 
of reason (and used it persuasively), but both saw reason functioning only when in the 
service of a greater organ of truth: imagination. Perception is not passive, but an active 
construal into a “grid”, which is the imagination. Lewis and Barfield understood that this 
grid of pre-apprehension is fundamental to reason functioning properly.  
 Dupré (1998:29) reminds the reader that no facts are perceivable without a “screen 
of interpretation that converts data into objects or facts”. Some forms of Christian 
epistemology, such as presuppositionalism in the tradition of Cornelius van Til (1969), 
point out that uninterpreted facts do not lead to knowledge, since facts only make sense 
once interpreted (Clark, 2003:276–27). In other words, facts only make sense within a 
particular perspective, which requires gaining that perspective before the interpretive 
process begins. Indeed, ultimate questions or worldviews are incapable of proof. Whatever 
one uses to “prove” a worldview, becomes more ultimate in authority than what is being 
proved. Furthermore, what counts as proof or evidence comes from within the worldview. 
Worldviews are hermeneutical matters of interpretation (Hughes, 2011:7).  
 Imagination, understood as the active lens of the interpretive perception of reality, 
is fundamental to knowledge. This lens is to be shaped by those forms that appeal to 
imagination, as studied in chapter seven. When the Christian imagination is in place—
understanding the universe as God has revealed it to be—it will participate in that moral 
universe with ordinate affection towards it, and so rightly judge its truth, goodness, and 
beauty.  
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8.4.5. Michael Polanyi: Personal Knowledge and Indwelling 
 Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) was a Hungarian-British physicist and philosopher. 
Considered to be a polymath, Polanyi’s philosophical works Personal Knowledge and 
Tacit Knowing have been widely hailed by Christians and non-Christians alike for their 
postmodern reply to positivism, without succumbing to the utter subjectivism of Derrida, 
Foucault, and Jaspers.  
 Schaeffer believes that Polanyi successfully deconstructed positivism, but was left 
with pure cynicism in epistemology (1972:48). This surely goes too far. Polanyi was by no 
means agnostic about contacting reality. Polanyi taught that people can know the world, 
not infallibly or with omniscience, because they are both part of the world and are able to 
transcend it through perception, imagination, and reason (Gunton, 1985:48).  
 Polanyi argued that the dichotomy between the natural sciences and everything else 
undermines all forms of human knowing, including the natural sciences (Gunton, 
1985:38). As a scientist himself, Polanyi noticed that the scientific endeavour was not an 
action of pure, antiseptic neutrality on the part of the scientist. After all, the scientist’s 
choice of research interest did not come through pure objectivity. The exclusion of certain 
facts, a particular focus on others, and moments of insight within the process of research 
all point to a very different kind of knowing than that asserted by positivism or naturalism. 
Polanyi was here similar to Thomas Kuhn in arguing that science does not operate with 
pristine objectivity (Feinberg, 2001:68).  
 As seen with Barfield’s interest in Bohm, much science undermines the subject-
object duality. Pearcey (2010:231) points to the discoveries in particle physics that have 
partly collapsed the distinction between subject and object. A particle under one set of 
conditions, functions as a wave, while it functions as a particle under different conditions. 
She writes, “The wave/ particle duality seems to destroy the ideal of scientific objectivity”. 
 Polanyi’s epistemology involved the ideas of focal and subsidiary awareness, 
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personal knowledge and indwelling. 
 Polanyi distinguished between focal awareness and subsidiary awareness. Focal 
awareness is what the perceiving mind focuses upon, while subsidiary awareness refers to 
those peripheral, complementary but still necessary parts of knowledge that the mind is 
using without being focally aware of them. Once an object has become part of subsidiary 
awareness, it is part of tacit knowledge. For example, a pianist has focal awareness on the 
music, but tacit awareness of the keys (Gunton, 1985:39–40). Subsidiary awareness and 
focal awareness are mutually exclusive (Polanyi, 1958:57). 
 Meek (2003:84) describes the process:  
On the way to achieving a pattern, before we ever reach it, and if we are ever to 
reach it, we begin to rely subsidiarily on the particulars that previously we were 
simply looking at. We must struggle past looking at them to get inside them in a 
way that defies verbal expression. It has to happen that we start relating to them in 
this alternative way for our act of knowing ever to be achieved.  
Knowing is never a matter of passively absorbing sensory data. Knowing involves 
perceiving patterns, and consciously interpreting them. As one integrates focal awareness 
with subsidiary awareness, one comes to contact reality. The profundity of the integrated 
pattern and the richness of its pattern then suggests that one has contacted reality (Meek, 
2003:135). 
 Polanyi also spoke much of personal knowledge. By this he meant that human 
knowing is always an exercise of personal responsibility. Instead of Enlightenment 
philosophy’s notion of minimising or even eliminating the personal responsibility of the 
knower (by calling it “objectivity”), Polanyi insisted the knower must submit to reality as a 
responsible knower (Meek, 2003:147).  
 Consider how persons know one another. A friendship relationship involves two 
people seeking to know one another through mutual, voluntary disclosures. These 
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disclosures occur as trust is extended, as a devotion to one another is demonstrated. If a 
man became interested in a woman and sought to learn of her by seeking to “objectively” 
gather facts about her by hiring a private investigator, following her discreetly and taking 
notes, and interviewing her associates, she would not be flattered. His “objective” 
approach would feel intrusive, even criminal, for by treating her as an object, he would 
have diminished his capacity to treat her as a subject. Knowing persons requires 
commitment and earned trust.  
 Polanyi argued that all knowing is like that. A knower is a person, and what is 
known is personlike in its responsiveness to the ways of the knower. Quantum 
indeterminacy has shown that what was assumed to be dead, inert “matter” is responsive to 
human observation. The “object” appears to have a form of mind and mystery of its own. 
The knower is half of the knowing process, and must be willing to approach reality as a 
responsible, submissive knower if knowing is to truly occur (Meek, 2003:177). 
 Of course, this presupposes that reality is what the Bible says it is: a cosmos 
created by a personal God. Therefore, reality itself is a gift. Gunton (1985:50) writes,  
What I want to suggest is that what Berkeley took to be self-evidently true, we 
should take as a proposal for consideration. According to him, we know the world 
because God gives it to people to be known. Polanyi believed that, too.  
If, as Edwards believed, the heart of being is God’s dynamic love within the Trinity, and 
creation is an extension of that love, then the appropriate response to a gift is a highly 
personal form of knowing. Knowing is an act of responding to the gift of reality, to the 
gesture of love by God. In order to know, one must love. Love, rather than interrogating 
matter for information, is the way one should relate to the world (Meek, 2014:17). To be 
human is fundamentally to be open to an “outside”, be that outside “benevolent or 
malevolent” (Smith, 2014:29).  
 This leads to Polanyi’s notion of indwelling. In this scheme, the senses are not 
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passive, but act upon the world so as to receive its meaning. Since matter is not foreign to 
the human being, one can indwell the world in an active and loving engagement with it. 
Polanyi assumes the possibility of success of knowing the real world, whereas the 
Enlightenment assumed the fallibility of the senses and the possibility of delusion. In 
contrast to the safety fences erected by the Enlightenment, Polanyi takes the risk of 
personal commitment as the only possible route to contacting reality (Gunton, 1985:41). 
 Indwelling is loving in order to know. By empathetically putting oneself inside the 
thing one wants to know, and taking it inside, one extends welcome, trust, and caring 
attentiveness (Meek, 2014:48). The moment of mutual indwelling in which   
one person gives himself or herself and receives another is a moment of communion with 
the object of the knowing quest. Meek describes it thus: 
Our love invited the real; the real comes into our love and flourishes there. The 
relationship we have with it is invested, compassionate, connected. It’s not a 
mercenary help-yourself. We didn’t invite it by exhibiting that attitude. Now it 
stands before us in our delight and wonder. Now it stands before us in mutual 
consent (2014:101). 
One cannot help hearing echoes of Jonathan Edwards: consent, union, and mutual 
indwelling. The language is unmistakably Trinitarian, the ideas hearken back to the Greek 
church fathers’ idea of perichoresis: the mutual indwelling and love of the three persons of 
the Trinity. Renard (1948:71) writes that “knowledge is union, an immaterial or intentional 
union, between the knowing subject and the known object”. 
 Polanyi forces the choice between two very different theories of knowledge. One 
theory sees knowledge as a form of information collection to gain power and domination, 
a tool to conquer and control. The other sees knowledge as the path to communion: the 
loving relationship of joy, peace, and fruitfulness (Meek, 2014:93). One might argue that 
Francis Bacon’s approach to knowledge has brought great power, and great mastery over 
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nature.7 Indeed, it has, and with it has come modern man’s profound alienation, insecurity, 
and terrifying hostility to himself and the created order.   
 Loving, personal indwelling is much of what the Bible calls faith. Faith is a 
necessary ingredient of all knowledge, for it is the act of personal submission to the pattern 
of reality. Faith does not oppose reason; it sustains reason (Meek, 2003:173–174). Polanyi 
(1958:312) calls this the “fiduciary rootedness of all rationality”. Here one cannot help 
hearing echoes of Augustine and Pascal. 
 How has Polanyi helped the project of overcoming subject-object dualism? He has 
opposed the Kantian division of separate categories for different kinds of knowledge. He 
has demonstrated that all knowledge requires personal commitment. He has carried 
through the implications of the universe being a gift: that it ought to be received and 
known with love and submission, not interrogated and observed with coldness. He has 
shown that the perceiving human is already part of the created order, and so is in union 
with it, but has the kind of consciousness that can transcend it. Humankind must use these 
faculties to lovingly indwell objects of knowledge, to discover their given meaning. 
Humans must exercise faith that the focal and subsidiary patterns will coalesce into an 
integrated pattern as they pursue God-given meaning and contact with reality. 
8.4.6. Summary and Implications for Christian Epistemology and Beauty 
 
 The six individuals and four proposals surveyed have presented a wealth of 
insights. Furthermore, in important ways, the four models have agreed and harmonised 
with one another. Four repeated themes are now summarised. 
 1) The primacy of faith-love. Pascal, Augustine, Edwards, Lewis, and Polanyi are 
unanimous on the point that faith and love are fundamental and prerequisite to right 
knowledge. The nature of reality is itself a form of love. The universe is a gift. The ground 
                                               
7 Though the phrase “knowledge is power” does not occur in Bacon’s writings, the phrase ipsa scientia potestas  
est" (“knowledge itself is power”) occurs in Bacon's Meditationes Sacrae (1597). 
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of being is the dynamic love of the Trinity. Unless a human’s epistemological posture 
harmonises with this ontology, all hope of correct perception and interpretation is lost. The 
human’s sin will not only warp his or her cognitive faculties, it will destroy the 
receptiveness necessary to indwell and participate with created reality. Augustine calls it 
caritas; Edwards calls it consent: Polanyi calls it indwelling. All point to the same notion: 
humans, as creatures, must harmonise with their Creator and his creation by assuming the 
posture of trust, grateful love, and submission. Scripture suggests the very same thing, 
saying that the affection of reverential trust, submission and love is foundational to any 
further knowledge or love:  
“The fear of the LORD is the beginning of knowledge, But fools despise wisdom 
and instruction” (Prov. 1:7). 
“The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom, And the knowledge of the 
Holy One is understanding” (Prov. 9:10). 
God’s beauty can only be seen by those willing to receive this beauty, not by those who 
“objectively” study it. As Navone (1996:79) puts it: 
God is not an object to be known among other objects. No object/creature is self-
explanatory. God is known as the transcendent explanation for all objects/ 
creatures. Similarly, nothing makes sense out of context. God is the Ultimate 
Context in and from which all objects/creation make sense or has 
sense/meaning/purpose. Being Itself, the One/True/Good/Beautiful Itself, is the 
measure of all created reality which possesses existence and its transcendental 
qualities by participation. Apart from its Ultimate Context, all creation is ultimately 
absurd or meaningless. 
John Calvin saw the act of praise as combining subjective and objective. In prayer, one is 
shaped by what one desires. At the same time, the objective aspect of religious devotion 
emerges as the worshipper projects an ontological reality onto its object of worship (Lane, 
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2001:16). Faith-love erases the subject-object dichotomy when it comes to God’s beauty, 
by submitting both one’s perception and ability to receive knowledge to him, lovingly 
waiting upon him to grant illumination, and enable one to see. As Charles Spurgeon 
(n.d:142) puts it, 
The blessed man has God already, and for this reason he seeks him. This may seem 
a contradiction: it is only a paradox. God is not truly sought by the cold researches 
of the brain: we must seek him with the heart. Love reveals itself to love: God 
manifests his heart to the heart of his people. 
2) The importance of imagination. Participative knowledge is at the heart of 
Christian realism. Knowledge of reality is mediated through the imagination, which might 
be thought of as faith’s architectonic. An entire structure of understood reality is furnished 
through the mind’s perception and interpretation. If this “metaphysical dream” is shaped 
by Christian revelation, its analogies and metaphors will convey meaning that corresponds 
to what is real. If the imagination is shaped by wrong metaphors, it will fail to interpret 
sensory data correctly. For example, if the imagination is primarily Cartesian, objects will 
be dead, inert and lifeless things, to be passively inspected and reflected upon. If the 
imagination is Kantian, objects are similarly dead, but ready to receive the imposition of 
humanly constructed ideas of beauty. If the imagination is positivist, matter is primary and 
mind secondary: objects exist in their own right, and minds (which are self-conscious 
objects) attempt to describe them. If the imagination is postmodern, there are no objects, 
only one’s own consciousness, meaning objects in the consciousness may be manipulated 
at will. A Christian imagination is conversely profoundly trinitarian, creational and 
redemptional. It views reality as the work of the Triune Creator, and therefore invested 
with meaning. Creation functions symbolically to teach. As creatures, humans are part of 
this meaning-saturated order; but they are simultaneously sub-creators, who are made in 
God’s image. One’s imaginative perception is a creaturely act of sub-creation: creatures 
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submitting and indwelling creation to receive their Creator’s message. The Christian 
imagination is redemptive too, for creation is understood as cursed and groaning for 
renewal, one’s own perceptions are marred by sin and needing grace, and the story of 
creation itself is only properly understood as a redeemed gift from Father to Son and Son 
to Father. Nature (creation) and grace (redemption) are deeply wedded and prominent in 
the Christian imagination. Without this, perception will be skewed. 
 3) The necessity of ontological and dispositional union. All four proposals 
understand that true knowledge only comes from “possessing the object in love” 
(Augustine), “consent to being” (Edwards), “participation” (Barfield) and “indwelling” 
(Polanyi). These are all different ways of saying the same thing: union. To know 
something, a person must somehow be a part of it, and it a part of that person. The degree 
to which one severs this union and treats an object of knowledge as completely distinct 
from self, is the degree to which one limits his or her true understanding of it. This union is 
to be both an actual, ontological union and second, a union of disposition: consenting to 
another’s existence by desiring to love it. The six writers this section has examined all see 
an existent ontological union between subjects and other objects in the universe because 
humans are part of the creation. Schaeffer (1972:60) writes,  
The same reasonable God made both things, namely, the known and the knower, 
the subject and the object, and he put them together. So it is not surprising if there 
is a correlation between these things.   
This ontological union needs to be acted out experientially. In essence, no object should be 
“objectified”; all should be “subjectivised”. Taylor (1998:73) clarifies that truth which is 
subjective “is truth that one has made one’s own—the observer is now engaged in the 
thing through connatural knowledge, and one has, through sympathy, participated in the 
reality”. 
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 Union is the only model that can adequately explain how both subject and object 
are involved when beauty is both present and beheld. Jenson (1995:151) sees this in its 
theological context: 
Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, but vanishes if it is not the assertive quality of 
the thing perceived. Beauty is also the objective harmony of things, which yet is 
not given if it is not given for a subject. On this polarity of what is and what is 
perceived to be, Western reflection has foundered ever and again. Which is to say 
that Western reflection has foundered ever and again on God, who is God because 
what he is and what he perceives himself to be are neither confused nor separated. 
4) The need for illumination. Beginning with Augustine, each of the writers examined saw 
the essentiality of God’s gracious work of enlightenment. Edwards included illumination 
in his view of the sense of the heart, the regenerated capacity to understand and love the 
things of God. C. S. Lewis saw illumination as vital, as seen in his oft-quoted remark: “I 
believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen: not only because I see it, but 
because by it I see everything else” (1996:106). Polanyi (1958:129) similarly said, 
“‘Illumination’ is then the leap by which the logical gap is crossed. It is the plunge by 
which we gain a foothold at another shore of reality”. 
 All of these recognise that the presence of grace mingled with nature is necessary if 
true knowledge is to result. Truth is not sterile information to be extracted (note the 
contemporary term “data-mined”) but knowledge to be voluntarily revealed. This 
disclosure comes at God’s own pleasure, and no method of invasive “study” will obtain it 
without divine permission.  
 How then should faith-love, imagination, union, and illumination be integrated into 
a modified correspondence-disclosure model for apprehending the beauty of God?  
First, faith and love must be present to understand and apprehend God’s beauty. If 
God’s beauty is largely his love towards his own glories, then only love for what God 
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loves can unlock this beauty. The reader must take seriously the Pascalian, Augustinian 
and Edwardsian warnings about how sin will affect perception. Love must be cultivated—
not merely the love that one might like, but the love that corresponds to God’s love.  
 Second, one must understand that God is not an object to be studied. His beauty is 
not an amusement or pleasure to be pursued for selfish ends. Instead, one must 
submissively participate with God in all perception, allowing the imaginative faculties he 
has given and the imaginative, analogical way he has revealed himself in the Word and the 
world to shape one’s perception of his beauty. Humankind has been delegated the faculty 
of sub-creation (imagination), but it must be shaped by reverent submission to the 
imaginative forms revealed in the Word and shaped by the historical communities of 
believers, not by secular or atheistic forms. Only then will these properly function to “re-
create” the appearances of objects as God would have Christians see them. More to the 
point, the right functioning of imagination will enable Christians to apprehend the beauty 
of God.  
 Third, one must embrace and pursue union with God. Scripturally, union with God 
through Christ is a major theme of Paul’s writings. The means of this union ontologically, 
both in creation and redemption, must be understood. Beyond the positional union of the 
believer, Christian spirituality must then pursue practical, experiential union. This may 
take the form of beholding God in his Word and works, of conforming to God’s nature, 
and of sharing God’s delight. In acts of practical and experiential consent, Christians 
practise their position, they become what they are, and it is in this place of experiential 
union that they can expect to understand and apprehend the beauty of God.  
 Fourth, one must ask for and wait for illumination. One can no more independently 
know God than one could independently will oneself into existence. The right mode of 
seeking can no more automatically bring the knowledge of the beauty of God than a suitor 
following a set of procedures could automatically win the one he is pursuing. A voluntary 
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disclosure and “consent” is necessary in human relationships; Scripture teaches that God is 
only known through his own choice to reveal himself (Matt. 11:27). Imagination, as 
Augustine would remind one, cannot function without illumination. Again, only through 
submissive participation with God in the means of his self-disclosure, will such 
illumination bring the truth of God’s beauty. 
8.5. Conclusion 
 
 In pursuit of finding real contact between the “object” (God’s beauty) and the 
“subject” (the Christian perceiver) this chapter turned to the philosophical discipline of 
epistemology, with special focus on subject-object dualism. It began by justifying this 
approach: Christian spirituality claims to be dealing with reality, not pleasant fictions. If 
God’s beauty is a reality, and Scripture encourages the act of beholding it, a Christian 
spirituality in pursuit of God’s beauty should be able to explain what method it employs 
for assuring the subjects that their experience of God’s beauty is not a self-generated 
illusion. The idea that some kind of correspondence between beholder and beauty is 
possible remains highly controversial.  
 To understand the controversy, the chapter explained the current popular 
definitions: subjective is viewed as the highly personal and probably unreliable form of 
private judgement, while objective is defined as independently existent, and empirically 
verifiable facts. The chapter then rehearsed the history of this dualism. 
 Premoderns were found to be largely exempt from subject-object dualism. 
Nominalism, originally an intra-scholastic theological debate, denied the existence of 
universals and loosed upon the world a steady scepticism about faith. Human reason came 
to gain priority over faith. This introduced a dualism between mind and matter, between 
subjects and objects. It also changed the nature of perception from participation to passive 
absorption followed by internal, rational investigation. Kant held that the ideas of beauty 
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were human constructs or patterns that subjects imposed upon perceived objects. Kant’s 
two-storey approach to knowledge was a crucial turning point in Western philosophy.  
 Romantics sought to maintain a place for noumena with appeals to imagination, 
though sometimes at the expense of sacrificing the ultimate reality of noumenal 
experience. Existentialism grew out of this soil. By the end of the twentieth century, 
beauty was a totalising meta-narrative, an ontology of violence, and correspondence theory 
was naïve and deluded.   
 The study then turned to consider if perhaps the Enlightenment took a wrong turn, 
and if the premodern world was correct in seeing moral realities, essences, and universals. 
Several contemporary authors affirmed that truth does not belong solely to the hard 
sciences, but other forms of truth exist: affective truth, moral truth, aesthetic truth. 
 Next, the matter of apprehending these forms of truth was studied. Four models of 
truth were described: correspondence theory, coherence theory, praxis theory, and 
disclosure theory. Coherence theory was found to be lacking in its own definition, and 
useless for pursuing realities outside of an artificial system. Praxis theory suffered from a 
narrow focus on means without defining ends in light of human nature and purpose. 
Correspondence theory held out the most promise for the purposes of the study, since it 
asserts that ideas or propositions in a subject can correspond to the nature of things outside 
the subject. Disclosure theory echoes Augustine’s recognition that illumination was 
needed for all knowledge. A modified correspondence-disclosure model that incorporates 
participation was suggested. 
 The study then turned to four Christian realist proposals to provide such a model. 
Augustine and Pascal demonstrated the need for a loving disposition of the heart. Loving 
faith combined with illumination is necessary to know God and know truth.  
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 Jonathan Edwards showed that a disposition of benevolence, or “consent” was 
fundamental to living in harmony with the nature of reality. The disposition towards loving 
union is fundamental to knowledge.  
 Owen Barfield and C. S. Lewis separately showed the importance of imagination to 
perception. The imagination is a kind of mediator between subject and object, construing 
sense impressions into an interpreted whole.  
 Michael Polanyi showed the personal nature of all knowing. Apart from personal 
commitment, investment, and submission, reality cannot be parsed. Knowing is never 
passive cognition, but an active and receptive process of integrating focal and subsidiary 
awareness.  
 These four proposals delivered four distinctives necessary to a Christian realist 
correspondence model for beauty. First, the need for faith-love in one’s approach to God. 
Second, the necessity of a Christian imagination: a faith-filled architectonic that views 
reality primarily as a creation by a Triune Creator parsed by creatures who are sub-
creators. Third, the essentiality of union: an ontological and a dispositional union with the 
object of knowledge is necessary to properly love, know and understand it. Fourth, the 
requisite of illumination. God’s voluntary self-disclosure and enlightenment of the heart 
and mind is fundamental to understanding God’s beauty.  
 The chapter has shown that the subject-object division is most unfortunate. Objects 
do not exist, in their fullest sense, without the sub-creators who are perceiving subjects. 
Perceiving subjects do not make their own reality, but make contact with and apprehend an 
already-existent one, but one that requires correct interpretation. The premodern vision 
was much closer to the idea of reality presented in Scripture and in much of Christian 
philosophy.  
 One cannot turn back the clock. One can retrace one’s steps, though, and find 
where thinkers took a wrong turn. In this writer’s view, that wrong turn was nominalism, 
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followed by Cartesian dualism and its philosophical offspring. The dilemma for Christians  
pursuing God’s beauty is that they cannot simply adopt a premodern imagination, as if 
they were changing garments. Nor should they do so, were they able to, since some of the 
insights brought about by the conversation in Western philosophy, such as the importance 
of the perceiver’s interpretation, are not hostile to Christianity, but harmonise with what 
Scripture has always affirmed. Instead, by using the insights of Augustine, Pascal, 
Edwards, Barfield, Lewis, and Polanyi, Christians may tentatively hold forth a model of 
perception that answers to the twenty-first century, but returns them to a biblical model of 
a moral universe in which they participate.  
 It now remains to synthesise the findings from Scripture, historical theology, 
aesthetics, and epistemology into a model of Christian spirituality that apprehends the 
beauty of God. This will be the project aim of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 9. A Proposed Model of Spirituality for Pursuing and 
Apprehending God’s Beauty 
 
9.1. Introduction 
 The various streams of this study must now coalesce into its stated goal: to suggest 
a model of Christian spirituality based upon apprehending God’s beauty. Schneiders 
(2005:7) states that academic Christian spirituality conducts its research through an 
interdisciplinary approach: constitutive disciplines, problematic disciplines, and theology.  
As pointed out in chapter five, the constitutive disciplines, which necessarily 
function in relation to the subject, are Scripture and Christian history. This constituted the 
research of chapter six.  
The problematic disciplines relate to the particular problem being studied, and in 
the case of this study, were aesthetics and epistemology. Chapters seven and eight 
considered aesthetics and epistemology in light of the particular problem at hand: 
apprehending God’s beauty.  
Finally, theology must come into play, as it relates to both disciplines. Chapter nine 
will attempt to marry the findings of chapters six, seven, and eight with theology, so as to 
suggest a model of spirituality built upon and around the idea of apprehending God’s 
beauty.  
 The chapter begins by summarising and combining the disciplines researched thus 
far. It initially summarises two sets of findings within the constitutive disciplines: the 
nature of God’s beauty from Scripture and history, and the perception of God’s beauty 
from aesthetics and epistemology. A definition, or more likely, a description of the nature 
of God’s beauty is distilled from the research, particularly that of chapter two, which aids 
in the model of spirituality. Findings from the biblical and historical study, the aesthetic 
study, and the epistemological study regarding the apprehension of beauty are then 
summarised. A conclusion will be drawn regarding the key to perception of God’s beauty:  
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correspondent love is fundamental to apprehending God’s beauty. The idea of 
correspondent love is then tested against and developed through philosophy, Scripture, 
Christian history, and aesthetics, with theology dominating. 
 The study then moves to the proposed model of spirituality, which is a model of the 
shaping of correspondent love. After justifying the approach, the model is considered as 
five theological constructs: the pattern of correspondent love, the position for 
correspondent love, the process of correspondent love, the posture of correspondent love, 
and the practices of correspondent love. In each of these, findings from earlier chapters are 
harmonised with Scripture, with Scripture providing the regulative principle. The model is 
then summarised. 
9.2. Summary of Constitutive and Problematic Disciplines 
9.2.1. Introduction 
 Christian historical and systematic theology, aesthetics, and epistemology are very 
different fields of study. The various findings of this thesis may seem disparate and 
eclectic unless they are distilled and harmonised. To do so, the findings are now 
summarised topically as the nature of God’s beauty and the apprehension of God’s beauty. 
This will aid the reader in understanding the proposed model of spirituality set forth in this 
chapter. 
9.2.2. Summary of Findings Regarding the Nature of God’s Beauty  
 The study suggested that the beauty vocabulary found in Scripture, the beauty of 
Scripture’s literary forms, and the biblical theme of God’s glory all demonstrate that the 
idea of God’s beauty is very much present in Scripture. Scripture sees the experience of 
beauty as beautiful in itself and teaches that righteous ones delight in what is delightful. 
Unlike the Cartesian idea of neutral observation, Scripture insists that the moral qualities 
of the observer affect whether one regards the truly beautiful as beautiful (Tit. 1:15). 
Augustine represents the most developed premodern Christian thinking on beauty, seeing 
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the importance of sanctified loves in the beholder in order to perceive God’s beauty.   
Four theories of beauty and their derivatives were examined: the transcendental 
theories, the classical theories, the subjective theories, and the theological theories.  
 Jonathan Edwards’ theory was found to be the best: “being’s cordial consent to 
being in general” (WJEO, 8:620). Edwards combined insights from each of the theories, 
while being primarily theological. His theory was different from his Christian forbearers, 
though. Instead of resting on the medieval idea that God’s beauty was equivalent to his 
being, Edwards insisted that the beauty of God is God’s interaction with his being. Beauty 
is not a static property: it is God’s dynamic, give-and-take of pleasure and excellence in 
himself and all that reflects him.  
Of course, for Edwards, God’s consent is not grounded on consent, for that would 
lead to infinite regress. God’s consent rests not on beauty, but on being itself. God’s being 
“simply considered” is what virtuous benevolence consents to (Spohn, 1981:403). God 
delights in his own being in its undivided, infinite essence. Jenson (1995:147) writes that 
“the specifically triune God is beautiful, and whatever he perceives on the pattern of his 
own self”. Necessarily, God’s undivided essence includes God’s love. But God’s beauty is 
God’s “godness” in dynamic self-appraisal. Love and delight are the glory that illuminates 
them, as white light gives colour to objects. God’s beauty is then “the Most Lovely loving 
the Most Lovely”. When God delights in his being, and celebrates and radiates pleasure, 
this is his beauty. God’s essence irradiated in delighted self-communication is God’s 
beauty and God’s love.   
What does a Christian spirituality based upon apprehending God’s beauty pursue? 
It pursues the experience of God’s love for God, found in the Holy Spirit. Is pursuing 
God’s beauty then loving God’s love? No, it is seeking to appropriate that love in a 
correspondent form by delighting in God’s being, simply considered. Certainly, to love 
someone’s love and to love that person is inseparable. Loving someone’s love is loving the 
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deepest part of that person. But the ground of this delight is God’s being, simply 
considered. In sum, a spirituality that pursues the apprehending of God’s beauty is one in 
which the subject experiences and participates in God’s delight in God and all that reflects 
him. Loving God as God does is pursuing God’s beauty. 
How is this experience or participation obtained? 
9.2.3. Summary of Findings Regarding the Apprehension of God’s Beauty  
Jonathan Edwards’ theory of beauty not only gave a compelling definition of beauty (see 
above), but ably reconciled subjective perception and objective existence by using the idea 
of spiritual sensibility. God gives the regenerate believer new inclinations¾holy 
affections¾that can understand and delight in God’s beauty. This concept of “consent”, 
“true virtue”, or “holy affections” is the bridge or point of contact between subject and 
object. Both the study in aesthetics and epistemology revealed ways that beauty can be 
apprehended and experienced, which find parallels in Christian spirituality. 
9.2.3.1. Findings from Aesthetical Study 
Chapter seven pursued the question of beauty’s perception in art, not because other 
forms of beauty found in nature, science, human relationships, or other realms of human 
life are irrelevant to the question at hand, but because the discipline of aesthetics describes 
methodologies for perceiving beauty. Aesthetic methodology was then considered, after 
justifying the kinship between art and religion.  
 The aesthetic experience was found to be composed of four elements: perception, 
immediate response, interpretation, and evaluation. These were examined and found to 
have very direct equivalents in spirituality: humility, faith, and discerning love.  
9.2.3.3. Findings from Epistemological Study 
The epistemological question of relating subjective perception to objective 
transcendental qualities was taken up in chapter eight. Four models of truth were 
considered for perceiving transcendentals: correspondence theory, coherence theory, 
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praxis theory, and disclosure theory. It was found that a modified correspondence theory, 
combined with some form of disclosure theory, best accommodates the notion of 
perceiving real transcendentals. Six Christian realists were surveyed for contributions to 
such a model.  
The epistemological study found that the perception of transcendent beauty 
requires a complex of humility-faith-love, a Christian imagination shaped by creation and 
redemption, union with the beauty both ontologically and dispositionally, and a 
dependence upon divine illumination. 
9.2.3.4. Summary of Apprehension 
The research from chapters six, seven, and eight have some very noticeable 
similarities and overlaps.  
Scripture and Christian history showed that God’s beauty is a reality, but perceived 
by those whose hearts are righteous. Those with caritas (Augustine) or holy affections 
(Edwards) would be able to perceive God’s beauty.  
 Aesthetics echoed this idea, showing that unselfish receptivity (humility), 
imagination in interpretation (faith), and good taste (wise discernment) are necessary to 
see beauty.  
 Epistemology showed that for correspondence between a perceiver and beauty, the 
perceiver needed to exhibit humility, imaginative perception and participation, 
benevolence and submission toward the object. 
 One can see the repetitive refrain here. Perceiving God’s beauty requires humility 
and receptiveness. Perceiving God’s beauty requires Scripture-saturated faith, which is the 
related to the aesthetic notion of imagination. Perceiving God’s beauty requires a 
disposition of loving union, while remaining dependent upon God for illumination. Jenson 
(1995:152) summarises well: “We must share God’s perception of things to truly perceive 
beauty. This is done through His Spirit”. 
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9.2.4. Conclusions for a Model of Spirituality 
 Combining the conclusions on the definition of beauty with those regarding the 
perception of beauty brings into focus what the proposed model of spirituality must 
revolve around.  
1) God’s beauty is his own consent, love, or affection for his holy being.  
2) Loving this beauty, and necessarily, its object¾God’s being simply considered¾is 
the means of perceiving this beauty. Loving God is the analogue of God’s beauty 
in the creature: a creature participates and shares (and thereby perceives) God’s 
beauty, when loving it and God as God does.  
3) The kind of love that perceives this beauty is of a particular kind: containing 
humility, faith, discernment, benevolence, submission, and union.  
The heart of this study is, then, a simple proposal: a certain kind of love for God will 
enable, and is identical to, the apprehension of God’s beauty. Loving God and his cosmos 
as God does, is both beholding beauty, and becoming beautiful. The perception of God’s 
beauty is an experience known through participative love. 
 The constitutive and problematic disciplines studied have already revealed that this 
love must be carefully defined and qualified. This love must be humbly receptive and 
teachable. It must rightly imagine God as revealed in Scripture. It must guard against self-
love, narcissism, and sentimentalism. It must possess sound judgement and exhibit 
maturity, having been shaped by the best in Christian culture. It must exist within an 
ontological and dispositional union with God. In other words, not merely any love for God 
will result in perceiving God’s beauty. 
 A term for distinguishing this love from counterfeit forms is the term 
correspondent love. Here, the word correspondent is used adjectivally, to describe and 
modify the noun love. Correspondent love refers to love for God that corresponds in 
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degree and kind to God’s own love. As correspondence theory (see section 8.3.2) allows 
transcendentals to be known, so a correspondent love is the means to know God’s beauty. 
Carson (2000:23) cautions that intra-trinitarian love is not a perfect analogue for 
the believer’s love for God. The perfect love of God for God is unique and infinite.  
Though the creature cannot love infinitely as God does, creaturely love may still be 
rightly ordered, in terms of its hierarchy of loves and in terms of the nature of the love, to 
be conformed to the kind of love that perceives God’s beauty through submissive 
participation. When it is rightly ordered (or ordinate, to use the archaic term), it will 
correspond to God’s own love, in creaturely fashion. The degree or quantity, and the kind 
or quality of the love must be rooted in the nature of things: in this case, the being of God 
and his own love for himself.  
 If correspondent love of God is the link between God’s objective beauty and one’s 
subjective perception of it, then the remainder of the study must take up the question of 
correspondent love for God: its definition, and its cultivation.  
9.3. The Idea of Correspondent Love 
 The concept of correspondent love is not well understood today. Leeman 
(2010:41–53) points out that a prevalent cultural narcissism has led to a deformed view of 
love. Among the warped cultural understandings of love are deep-seated individualism, 
Romantic views of self-expression and self-fulfilment, consumeristic tendencies, and anti-
authoritarian ideas of freedom. Section 7.4.4.3 detailed how sentimentalism in art, fostered 
by mass culture, has deformed the idea of love. This sentimentalism has replaced a biblical 
idea of love with an idol. To recover a right view of love, correspondent love must be 
understood. The study moves to examining love philosophically, whether it is an 
involuntary feeling or a voluntary desire that corresponds to an object. It then considers the 
biblical evidence: is love commanded, and is its order and nature ever commanded? The 
section considers what Christians in history have written on the idea of correspondent love. 
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Finally, aesthetics is again enlisted to address this topic.  
9.3.1. Correspondent Love Considered Philosophically 
 To rightly understand what correspondent love is, some philosophical reflection on 
the nature of love is necessary. Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the idea that love may be 
appropriate or inappropriate, moral or immoral, rightly or wrongly ordered, is the notion 
that love is primarily an emotion, an involuntary feeling, that cannot be judged for its 
morality or correctness.  
Thomas Dixon (2003) has documented the history of the term “emotion”. He 
suggests that what was originally a moral category in Christian thought, named affections 
or passions, defining the inclination of the will or the presence of appetites, became a 
psychological category defining bodily or neurological responses. According to Dixon, the 
Christian tradition distinguished between the higher, volitional part of the soul that was 
rightly moved in its voluntary acts as it expressed love in the form of affections (2003:54), 
and the lower part of the soul (the involuntary or irrational part) which did so in the form 
of passions (2003:58). In this view, every passion and affection had two forms, an active 
and a passive, the former being acceptable, the latter, often not (2003:55). In other words, 
love was primarily the will moved in the direction of desire.  
One sees this thinking very early. For example, Augustine united desire (cupiditas), 
fear (timor), joy (laetitia), and sorrow (tristitia) under the single principle of love (amor). 
A right will (voluntas recta) or a good love (bonus amor) would issue forth in appropriate 
affections, but a wrong will or bad love would produce sinful affections (City of God, IX, 
iv).  
Augustine helps clarify that the important matter in judging the morality of a desire 
is its chosen and willed object. “In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious 
soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his 
sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears” (City of God, IX, v). In other words, the 
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object of desire determines the moral quality of the love. Love, according to Augustine, is 
a matter of inclination towards desired objects. Love is a moral response of positive 
inclination towards an object. Therefore, the kind of love may vary significantly when the 
objects desired vary significantly. Put simply, the love corresponds to its object. 
Thomas Aquinas similarly saw love as the direction or inclination of the will 
towards an object, not as an irrational psychological feeling:  
There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. 
The reason is that every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards 
something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest 
in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does 
love consist” (Summa Theologica II, xxvii, Art. IV). 
Aquinas saw all “emotions” as love of some form:  
Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the 
other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody 
desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is 
anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love (Summa 
Theologica, I, xx, Art. I). 
According to Dixon (2003:75), for Jonathan Edwards, “affections” were movements of the 
will informed by the understanding: 
The affections and passions are frequently spoken of as the same; and yet in the 
more common use of speech, there is in some respect a difference; and affection is 
a word that in its ordinary signification, seems to be something more extensive than 
passion, being used for all vigorous lively actings of the will or inclination; but 
passion for those that are more sudden, and whose effects on the animal spirits are 
more violent, and the mind more overpowered, and less in its own command. 
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(WJEO, 2:98).8 
In the premodern Christian tradition, love, as an affection could therefore be appropriate or 
inappropriate, since love could be rightly or wrongly directed. The object of desire 
determined if it was right to desire such a thing, and necessarily dictated the moral quality 
of the love.  
In eighteenth-century Germany, a third faculty of the soul, in addition to 
understanding and will, was introduced—that of feeling. This was endorsed in works by 
Kant and Schopenhauer, in whose works irrational and involuntary feelings were spoken 
of and endorsed as real (Dixon, 2003:70–71). British moralists of the same period began 
departing from a will-centred affective psychology and tacitly introduced a three-faculty 
psychology (understanding, will, and feelings) rather than a two-faculty one 
(understanding and will) (2003:93). Thomas Brown (1778–1820) baptised the term 
emotion in his 1820 Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Dixon, 2003:101). 
For Brown, only intellectual states were active, while emotions were mere feelings that 
were passively experienced. In the traditional Christian understanding, the will was active 
and the intellect passive. Conversely, Brown saw the will as simply the name for 
prevailing passions or emotions. This concept would then be co-opted by influential 
writers such as Thomas Chalmers, and later materialists, such as Charles Darwin, Herbert 
Spencer and Alexander Bain, culminating in its use by William James in 1884, which 
corresponds somewhat to its use today (Dixon, 2003:201–203).   
                                               
8 Edwards showed that affections are found in God, who is a spirit, whereas passions are not. This furthers the case that 
Christians are to love God correspondingly, as God loves himself. “Such seems to be our nature, and such the laws of the 
union of soul and body, that there never is in any case whatsoever, any lively and vigorous exercise of the will or 
inclination of the soul, without some effect upon the body, in some alteration of the motion of its fluids, and especially of 
the animal spirits. And, on the other hand, from the same laws of the union of the soul and body, the constitution of the 
body, and the motion of its fluids, may promote the exercise of the affections. But yet it is not the body, but the mind 
only, that is the proper seat of the affections. The body of man is no more capable of being really the subject of love or 
hatred, joy or sorrow, fear or hope, than the body of a tree, or than the same body of man is capable of thinking and 
understanding. As it is the soul only that has ideas, so it is the soul only that is pleased or displeased with its ideas. As it 
is the soul only that thinks, so it is the soul only that loves or hates, rejoices or is grieved at what it thinks of. Nor are 
these motions of the animal spirits, and fluids of the body, anything properly belonging to the nature of the affections, 
though they always accompany them, in the present state; but are only effects or concomitants of the affections that are 
entirely distinct from the affections themselves, and no way essential to them; so that an unbodied spirit may be as 
capable of love and hatred, joy or sorrow, hope or fear, or other affections, as one that is united to a body” (WJEO, 2:98). 
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Contemporary Evangelicals tend to conflate the concepts of affection and emotion. 
Williams (2003:59) distinguishes them, but nevertheless groups feelings, emotions, and 
affections as overlapping and related ideas. McDermott (1995:40-41) distinguishes 
affections and emotions. According to him, affections are long-lasting, deep, consistent 
with one’s beliefs, involve the mind, will, and feelings, and always result in action. 
Emotions, by contrast, are fleeting, superficial, sometimes overpowering, (often) 
disconnected from the mind and will, and they often fail to produce action. 
 While there is some continuity between affections and emotions, it seems better to 
move away from the term emotion, particularly when defining correspondent love. 
Explaining the distinction between voluntary and involuntary feelings, between desires of 
the will and desires of the body, and between the premodern distinction of affections and 
passions is a worthy goal for Christians intent on precision in this issue (Martin, 
2013:296). 
 How then should one understand correspondent love, philosophically speaking? 
Premodern Christianity understood love as a voluntary, rational inclination of the soul 
towards what it sees as beautiful. On this definition, love may include feelings, but it is not 
itself an involuntary feeling. Love is rational desire that moves towards union.9 Love is 
moved by beauty. When the soul is pure, it loves what is beautiful; when otherwise, it 
loves what is base. The love corresponds to the object. 
Henry Scougal (1650–1678) put it this way: “The worth and excellency of a soul is 
to be measured by the object of its love” (The Life of God, 70). Lewis, in Surprised By Joy, 
(2012:256) similarly writes, “The form of the desired is in the desire. It is the object which 
                                               
9 This should not be misunderstood as suggesting that love is stoic or merely cerebral. Edwards himself wrote, “T]rue 
religion consists in a great measure, in vigorous and lively actings of the inclination and will of the soul, or the fervent 
exercises of the heart” (WJEO, 2:99). Similarly, he said, “If we be not in good earnest in religion, and our wills and 
inclinations be not strongly exercised, we are nothing. The things of religion are so great, that there can be no 
suitableness in the exercises of our hearts, to their nature and importance, unless they be lively and powerful. In nothing 
is vigor in the actings of our inclinations so requisite, as in religion; and in nothing is lukewarmness so odious” (Ibid., 
99–100).  
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makes the desire harsh or sweet, coarse or choice, ‘high’ or ‘low.’ It is the object that 
makes the desire itself desirable or hateful”. In other words, love is appropriate and 
correspondent to the degree that its object is truly God, and his beauty is properly seen and 
understood. 
Love is rational desire towards what a person sees as good and beautiful. What 
does love desire in the beauty seen? As creatures, humans may go toward the object of 
their love either in the form of need or in the form of gift. Lewis (1960:17) classifies these 
as Need-loves and Gift-loves. Need-love looks to the good or beautiful in the Beloved to 
meet a need in oneself; gift-love seeks to enjoy the good or beautiful in the Beloved for 
itself, or to beautify it further. In the case of perfection, beautify does not mean improve; it 
means simply display, magnify, communicate that perfection so that it is more widely 
shown. 
In his essay “The Weight of Glory”, Lewis (1996:25–26) objects to the idea that 
love is primarily the negative ideal of unselfishness. For Lewis, love is positive desire. 
When accused by Kantians of mercenary motives in such love, Lewis answers that when 
the reward that a desire seeks is foreign to the activity, the mercenary accusation may be 
valid. But when the reward is the activity itself in consummation, such as marriage being 
the sought reward of love, such love cannot be accused of selfishness, except if one is 
beholden to Stoic or Kantian ideas. Correspondent love pursues the good of all that God is; 
it pursues the pleasure of God himself. Christians love God because of what God is for 
them, and because of what God is. They love his need-meeting ability, and they love his 
excellence. 
Samuel Rutherford (1600–1661) helps one find balance:  
You object that the truly regenerate should love God for himself: and you fear that 
you love him more for his benefits, as incitements and motives to love him, than 
for himself. I answer: to love God himself as the last end, and also for his benefits, 
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as incitements and motives to love him, may stand well together; as a son loveth 
his mother, because she is his mother, howbeit she is poor; and he loveth her for an 
apple also. I hope that you will not say that benefits are the only reason and bottom 
of your love; it seemeth there is a better foundation for it” (Letters, 49/To James 
Bautie). 
Correspondent love is then the inclination of the will (or desire) towards God for 
all that he is, both in himself and for one’s good. When God is rightly known and desired, 
the desire will be correspondingly holy.  
9.3.2. Correspondent Love Considered Biblically and Theologically 
Is the idea of correspondent love present in Scripture? Does Scripture describe 
what love for God should be? It would seem so. In terms of degree, Scripture makes a 
hierarchy of loves very clear. The first of the Ten Commandments is “You shall have no 
other gods before me” (Exod. 20:3). Deuteronomy 6:4–5 was the positive wording of the 
same commandment. In conversation with a scribe, Jesus explained that the command of 
Deuteronomy 6:4-5 was the ultimate obligation, followed by a second:  
Jesus answered him, ‘The first of all the commandments is: ‘Hear, O Israel, the 
LORD our God, the LORD is one. And you shall love the LORD your God with all 
your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.’ This 
is the first commandment. And the second, like it, is this: ‘You shall love your 
neighbor as yourself.’ There is no other commandment greater than these’ (Mark 
12:29–31). 
It appears that Christ was interpreting the Shema to mean that the uniqueness of God 
demanded an answering form of ultimate love. This statement by Christ can be stated as 
the first of three biblical definitions of correspondent love. 
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1) Correspondent love for God loves God ultimately, and all else for his sake.  
Only God is to be loved wholeheartedly, which is to say, loved ultimately, as the only 
God. A god is one in whom a person places ultimate trust and looks to it for ultimate 
delight. Gods are found at the end of one’s chains of value and are not loved as a means to 
another love (that is, instrumentally), but are loved for themselves (that is, ultimately) 
(Bauder, 2012:6). God alone is to be loved as an end, and not as a means, for no one else is 
the true God. God alone deserves to be loved for himself; all other loves should be 
instrumental to that end (Ps. 73:25–26). Jesus made this clear, when calling for this 
ultimate love to be given to him, as the Son of God: 
He who loves father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me. And he who 
loves son or daughter more than Me is not worthy of Me” (Matt. 10:37). 
If anyone comes to Me and does not hate his father and mother, wife and children, 
brothers and sisters, yes, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple” (Luke 
14:26). 
So when they had eaten breakfast, Jesus said to Simon Peter, ‘Simon, son of Jonah, 
do you love Me more than these?’ He said to Him, ‘Yes, Lord; You know that I 
love You.’ He said to him, ‘Feed My lambs’ (John 21:15–17). 
Similar Scriptures link the command to love or fear God ultimately to man’s ultimate 
obligation: Eccl. 12:13; Deut. 10:12; Prov. 9:10; 1 Cor. 10:31; Col. 3:17. Love is 
repeatedly placed at the head of Christian character (1 Cor. 13:13; 16:14; Col. 3:14;1 Tim. 
1:5; 1 Pet. 4:8; 2 Pet. 1:5–7). Loving one’s neighbour is also granted a kind of summary 
status as fulfilment of one’s moral obligations in Romans 13:9–10, Galatians 5:14, and 
James 2:8. Waltke (1988:9) comments that spirituality could even be defined as love of 
God and love of man. 
If God demands ultimate love, what of other loves? The love of neighbour can 
further be divided into love for Christian brethren (John 13:34), love for family (Eph. 
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5:22–6:4), love for non-Christian neighbour (Rom. 13:9–10; Gal. 6:10) and love for enemy 
(Rom. 12:18–20; Matt. 5:4). The fact that love of neighbour is bundled together with love 
for God implies that the Second Commandment is an application of the First. That is, 
neighbours are to be loved for God’s sake. How so? Three suggestions may suffice. First, 
when loving one’s neighbour, one is loving God by obeying his command to love 
neighbour, and Jesus said that obedience is a form of love for him (John 14:15). Second, in 
loving one’s neighbour, one is loving the image of God still resident in that neighbour 
(Gen. 9:6; Jas. 3:9; 1 John 4:12). Third, in loving one’s neighbour, one is loving what God 
himself loves, for God loves all, including his enemies (John 3:16; Matt. 5:44–45). Love 
for those God loves is counted, in some sense, as love for him (Matt. 25:34–40).  
Loving for God’s sake may be extended from neighbour to all of creation. All good 
gifts are to be received thankfully (1 Tim. 4:4; Jas. 1:17). Creation must be contemplated 
for the way it reveals God and loved accordingly (Ps. 19:1–6; 1 Thes. 5:21; Phil. 4:8). In 
this way, correspondent love is loving God alone for himself, and loving all else for his 
sake. 
This love is a complete “consent” of will to God, making him the chief end and 
desire of all. This love finds complete union in God as the chief end of life, heartily 
making him its desire and delight, reflecting the spirit of Romans 11:36: “For of Him and 
through Him and to Him are all things, to whom be glory forever”.  
2) Correspondent love for God means loving what God loves and hating what God 
hates. 
Correspondent love in the Bible includes the idea of loving what God loves. “You who 
love the LORD, hate evil! He preserves the souls of His saints; He delivers them out of the 
hand of the wicked” (Psa. 97:10).  
Paul’s prayer for the Philippians (1:9–11) is that their love would grow both in 
knowledge (of its object) and in discernment (judging its qualities). The result would be 
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the ability to approve what is excellent (διαφέροντα, “that which is worth more”, Bauer, 
Danker, & Gingrich, 1937), which sounds much like the idea of taste, good judgement, 
and rightly-ordered love. If Paul believes that an appreciation for the excellent is possible, 
a dullness towards the excellent is equally possible, as is a love for what is ignoble, 
inferior, and unworthy.  
Paul’s instructions on what should occupy the Philippians’ thinking in chapter 4:8 
again suggests a form of love that is holy. Similar prayers are seen in 1 Thessalonians 
3:12–13 and Ephesians 3:16–19. Christians are to give love and praise to things 
apportioned to their worth (Naugle, 2008:§654). 
To love what God loves could be a simple definition of the biblical idea of being 
righteous or just. To love as God does is to esteem as God does, to value things as God 
does, both positively and negatively. Rigney (2015:87) writes that this is known as the 
principle of proportionate regard: that one should “value, esteem, and regard things in 
proportion to their value, nature, and worth”.   
Scripture certainly contains the idea that not all loves are of the same kind. Jesus 
rebukes the Pharisees for their man-pleasing, and the comment of the author is: “for they 
loved the praise of men more than the praise of God” (John 12:43). Here the object of their 
love shaped the kind of love into something very different from worship. Malachi records 
a form of “love” for God that lacked all reverence and honour for God, a lack which the 
priests had not yet sensed:  
A son honors his father, And a servant his master. If then I am the Father, Where is 
My honor? And if I am a Master, Where is My reverence? Says the LORD of hosts 
To you priests who despise My name. Yet you say, ‘In what way have we despised 
Your name?’ (Mal. 1:6).  
The priests’ low view of God led to a deficient kind of love. One also sees examples of 
inappropriate, non-corresponding love when syncretism gripped Israel. Even though many 
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Israelites were worshipping Yahweh on the high places, the form of the devotion did not 
please God (1 Kgs. 3:2–3). That is, even though God still retained his place as the only 
God of Israel, the nature of the love offered was warped, being mingled with the Canaanite 
religious imagination. The degree of love may have still been correct, but the quality or 
nature of the love was inordinate.  
 The theme of believers continuing to perform acts of devotion to God while being 
displeasing to him, is found in several places:  
Therefore the Lord said: ‘Inasmuch as these people draw near with their mouths 
And honor Me with their lips, But have removed their hearts far from Me, And 
their fear toward Me is taught by the commandment of men’ (Isa. 29:13).  
Similarly, Jesus rebukes the Ephesian church in Revelation 2:1–5, because even 
though they had all the outward signs of a church that loved Christ, he could see that they 
had left their first love.  
 It is even possible for believers to mistake love for themselves as love for God. The 
Psalmist therefore writes, “Not unto us, O LORD, not unto us, But to Your name give 
glory, Because of Your mercy, Because of Your truth” (Ps. 115:1). Humans may make 
God into their own image and worship that image (Ps. 50:21). 
A simple summary of this is to say that loving what God loves is a holy love. Wells 
2013:§1382) even suggests one should hyphenate the two into “holy-love”. This desire to 
love what God loves is the desire to be fully conformed to his image (2 Cor. 3:18; Rom. 
8:29). It is a delight in God that extends to resembling and reflecting him. Sanctification, 
Christlikeness, godliness, holiness are aimed at resembling Christ, and the deepest 
resemblance is found in the form of one’s loves and desires. Therefore, when Christians 
love what God loves, they will likewise learn to love those things as God loves them, with 
a truthful, holy love. Holy love is a dispositional union with God. His love corresponds 
with believers’; believers’ love corresponds with his.  
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3) Correspondent love for God culminates in an expansive fullness of joy in lived 
communion with God.  
As God is loved ultimately and all things are loved for his sake, as God is loved by loving 
what he loves, this love is experienced and shed abroad by a holy delight in God. This 
fulness is mentioned by Jesus as the experience of communion. 
If you keep My commandments, you will abide in My love, just as I have kept My 
Father’s commandments and abide in His love. These things I have spoken to you, 
that My joy may remain in you, and that your joy may be full (John 15:10–11). 
But now I come to You, and these things I speak in the world, that they may have 
My joy fulfilled in themselves (John 17:13). 
This is what appears to be the idea behind one’s love “abounding” (2 Cor. 8:7; Phil. 1:9; 1 
Thes 3:12; 2 Pet. 1:8) and being “filled with all the fullness of God” (Eph. 3:19). The 
experience of communion is metaphorically compared to being “full”, “filled”, 
“complete”, and “overflowing” (Eph. 5:18; Col. 1:9–10; 2:7; Phil. 1:9–11; 1 John 1:4). 
The joy is complete and expansive, flowing over onto others. Naugle (2008:§345) suggests 
that the happy life is “learning to love both God supremely and the world in the right way 
at the same time”. The experience of ontological and dispositional union with God is one 
of fulness and expansive joy. 
R. Kendall Soulen’s original and unusual work The Divine Name(s) and the Holy 
Trinity (2011) suggests that a trinitarian form of naming God is found in Scripture, which 
he terms the theological, christological, and pneumatological. Soulen posits that the 
theological form of naming is closest to the Father’s work and highlights the uniqueness of 
God, often referencing the Tetragrammaton. The christological form of naming is most 
like the Son in that it incarnates and expresses God more explicitly, particularly in the 
naming of the Father, Son and Spirit. The pneumatological form of naming is like the 
Holy Spirit in that it celebrates God in the form of a variety of metaphors and analogies, 
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such as Light and Bread, with an emphasis on blessing the Godhead. Soulen (2011:§6083–
6141) suggests that these three forms of naming may point to the economic roles within 
the Trinity: the Father beholding and emphasising the uniqueness of the Godhead, the Son 
incarnating and expressing the Godhead, and the Spirit celebrating and blessing the 
Godhead. 
It appears that the three descriptions of correspondent love given above are parallel 
to Soulen’s three namings of the Trinity. Loving God ultimately and all things for his sake 
is parallel to the theological naming, loving as the Father does, emphasising the 
uniqueness of God as end of all things. Loving what God loves is similar to the 
christological naming, loving as the Son does, emphasising the incarnation and expression 
of God’s loves. Loving in expansive fullness of joy corresponds to the pneumatological 
naming, loving as the Spirit does, emphasising the blessing and expansive celebration of 
God. Jonathan Edwards wrote that “it is in our partaking of the same Holy Spirit that our 
communion with God consists” (WJEO, 21:122). 
If so, then one has here a potential way in which a Christian’s love for God 
corresponds to God’s own love for God. Correspondent love for God appears to be a 
creaturely form of trinitarian love.10 Christ seems to suggest that the love shared between 
the Godhead would be the same love developed within believers. 
And I have declared to them Your name, and will declare it, that the love with 
which You loved Me may be in them, and I in them (John 17:26).  
                                               
10 Creaturely love must of necessity be different to the love of an impassible, infinite, immutable, simple being. The 
discussion of the impassibility of God is beyond the scope of this paper. See for example, Bray (2012). Suffice it to say 
that a debate exists between those upholding the impassibility of classic theism (Dolezal, 2017), and those asserting a 
modified theism (such as Feinberg (2001), Frame (1987), Craig & Moreland (2003)), in which impassibility is either 
denied or modified. Thomas Aquinas remains a helpful guide. Aquinas avers that love can be either an act of the 
sensitive appetite, which makes it a passion, or an act of the intellective appetite, which does not. Aquinas suggests love 
in God is the latter. God rejoices and delights in what pleases him, without desiring out of a sense of need. This 
distinction would maintain God as being an affective being, not a passionate one (Summa Theologica, XX, i). Here is 
another reason to distinguish love from the contemporary category of emotion.  
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God’s particular kind of love for himself, both in degree and in kind, is the love this model 
of spirituality is seeking. Such a love loves God ultimately; it loves what God loves with 
holy love; it blesses God and others with an expansive, abounding, fulness of joy. This 
love consents to union with God, inclining towards it with the entire being. To have this 
love reproduced within one will be to possess and exhibit ordinate love (Rom. 5:5; Gal. 
5:22; Eph. 3:16–19). Venter (2015:3) calls this a form of social participative Trinitarian 
spirituality, in which “the human ‘participates’ in the divine fellowship of the Father, Son, 
and Spirit on the basis of the filiation of believers through the work of Christ”. 
 Correspondent love is supported biblically. It is loving God ultimately, loving what 
God loves, and loving in an expansive fullness of joy. This love, both in degree and nature, 
corresponds with God’s own love for himself.  
 9.3.3. Correspondent Love Considered Historically 
It would be an insurmountable task to gather the collective thought of Christians on 
the topic of love for God. Suffice it to say, that many Christians have spoken frequently on 
the degree and nature of rightly ordered love. They have spoken not only on the required 
order of Christian loves, but on their kind. Correspondent love is not a novel concept. 
Augustine is best known for speaking of the ordo amoris.  
When the miser prefers his gold to justice, it is through no fault of the gold, but of 
the man; and so with every created thing. For though it be good, it may be loved 
with an evil as well as with a good love: it is loved rightly when it is loved 
ordinately; evilly, when inordinately. It is this which someone has briefly said in 
these verses in praise of the Creator: ‘These are Thine, they are good, because 
Thou art good who didst create them. There is in them nothing of ours, unless the 
sin we commit when we forget the order of things, and instead of Thee love that 
which Thou hast made.’ But if the Creator is truly loved, that is, if He Himself is 
loved and not another thing in His stead, He cannot be evilly loved; for love itself 
  241 
 
is to be ordinately loved, because we do well to love that which, when we love it, 
makes us live well and virtuously. So that it seems to me that it is a brief but true 
definition of virtue to say, it is the order of love; and on this account, in the 
Canticles, the bride of Christ, the city of God, sings, “Order love within me” (City 
of God, XV, xxii). 
Similarly, Augustine writes of how love itself is worthy of love. 
Because in men who are justly loved, it is rather love itself that is loved; for he is 
not justly called a good man who knows what is good, but who loves it. Is it not 
then obvious that we love in ourselves the very love wherewith we love whatever 
good we love? For there is also a love wherewith we love that which we ought not 
to love; and this love is hated by him who loves that wherewith he loves what 
ought to be loved (City of God, XII, xviii). 
Augustine refers to loving what God loves, to the degree that God does, in On Christian 
Doctrine: 
Now he is a man of just and holy life who forms an unprejudiced estimate of 
things, and keeps his affections also under strict control, so that he neither loves 
what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he ought to love, nor loves that 
more which ought to be loved less, nor loves that equally which ought to be loved 
either less or more, nor loves that less or more which ought to be loved equally. No 
sinner is to be loved as a sinner; and every man is to be loved as a man for God’s 
sake; but God is to be loved for His own sake (On Christian Doctrine, I, xxvii). 
Perhaps best known among his quotes on love is Augustine’s saying: “He loves thee too 
little, who loves anything with thee which he loves not for thy sake” (Confessions, IX, 
xxix). 
Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153) wrote On Loving God. He likewise speaks of 
loving God for himself: “We are to love God for Himself, because of a twofold reason; 
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nothing is more reasonable, nothing more profitable” (On Loving God, I). Similarly, he 
writes, “You want me to tell you why God is to be loved and how much. I answer, the 
reason for loving God is God Himself; and the measure of love due to Him is 
immeasurable love” (Ibid.).  
The anonymous author of Theologia Germanica, most likely writing in the late 
fourteenth century writes, 
And where a creature loveth other creatures for the sake of something that they 
have, or loveth God, for the sake of something of her own, it is all false Love; and 
this Love belongeth properly to nature, for nature as nature can feel and know no 
other love than this; for if ye look narrowly into it, nature as nature loveth nothing 
beside herself. But true Love is taught and guided by the true Light and Reason, 
and this true, eternal and divine Light teacheth Love to love nothing but the One 
true and Perfect Good, and that simply for its own sake, and not for the sake of a 
reward, or in the hope of obtaining anything, but simply for the Love of Goodness, 
because it is good and hath a right to be loved (Theologia Germanica, XLII). 
Thomas Traherne (1636–1674) expresses the idea of ordinate love being the same as 
Christlikeness. 
Can you accomplish the end for which you were created, unless you be Righteous? 
Can you then be Righteous, unless you be just in rendering to Things their due 
esteem? All things were made to be yours; and you were made to prize them 
according to their value: which is your office and duty, the end for which you were 
created, and the means whereby you enjoy. The end for which you were created, is 
that by prizing all that God hath done, you may enjoy yourself and Him in 
Blessedness...For then we please God when we are most like Him. We are like Him 
when our minds are in frame. Our minds are in frame when our thoughts are like 
His. And our thoughts are then like His when we have such conceptions of all 
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objects as God hath, and prize all things according to their value. For God doth 
prize all things rightly, which is a Key that opens into the very thoughts of His 
bosom (Centuries of Meditations, First Century, XII). 
François Fénelon (1651–1715) comments on ultimate love for God: 
Men have a great repugnance to this truth, and consider it to be a very hard saying, 
because they are lovers of self from self-interest. They understand, in a general and 
superficial way, that they must love God more than all his creatures, but they have 
no conception of loving God more than themselves, and loving themselves only for 
Him. They can utter these great words without difficulty, because they do not enter 
into their meaning, but they shudder when it is explained to them, that God and his 
glory are to be preferred before ourselves and everything else to such a degree that 
we must love his glory more than our own happiness, and must refer the latter to 
the former, as a subordinate means to an end (Spiritual Progress, III). 
Brother Lawrence’s (1614–1691) collected letters, known as The Practice of the Presence 
of God, describe his attempt to love all things for God’s sake. He remarks that he was 
pleased “when he could take up a straw from the ground for the love of God, seeking Him 
only, and nothing else, not even His gifts” (The Practice of the Presence of God, 2nd 
Conv., VI). 
Jonathan Edwards also differentiates between loving God as a means or as an end.  
For if we love him not for his own sake, but for something else, then our love is not 
terminated on him, but on something else, as its ultimate object. That is no true 
value for infinite worth, which implies no value for that worthiness in itself 
considered, but only on the account of something foreign. Our esteem of God is 
fundamentally defective, if it be not primarily for the excellency of his nature, 
which is the foundation of all that is valuable in him in any respect. If we love not 
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God because he is what he is, but only because he is profitable to us, in truth we 
love him not at all (WJEO, 3:144). 
References to inordinate affection, or non-corresponding love abound in Christian thought. 
Early church fathers such as Clement, Nemesius of Emesa, and Gregory of Nyssa all 
differentiate between evil passions and good (Martin, 2013:46). Puritans such as William 
Ames, John Owen, and Richard Sibbes wrote much on right affections as opposed to 
inordinate affections (pp. 93–113). 
In his greatest work against positivism and subjectivism, The Abolition of Man, 
Lewis writes: 
Until quite modern times all teachers and even all men believed the universe to be 
such that certain emotional reactions on our part could be either congruous or 
incongruous to it—believed, in fact, that objects did not merely receive, but 
could merit, our approval or disapproval, our reverence or our contempt. The 
reason why Coleridge agreed with the tourist who called the cataract sublime and 
disagreed with the one who called it pretty was of course that he believed 
inanimate nature to be such that certain responses could be more ‘just’ or ‘ordinate’ 
or ‘appropriate’ to it than others (2001:14–15). 
Scruton (2009:197) agrees:  
for a free being, there is right feeling, right experience and right enjoyment just as 
much as right action. The judgement of beauty orders the emotions and desires of 
those who make it. It may express their leisure and their taste: but it is pleasure in 
what they value and taste for their true ideals. 
The so-called “worship wars”, whether ancient or modern, largely are debates over what is 
appropriate love for God, and what is not. Whether it be the matter of images, the order of 
the Mass, the use of an organ, singing in the vernacular, the presence of an altar, the 
presence of statues, crucifixes or candles and incense in worship, or priestly vestments, 
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these all reflect a centuries-old debate regarding appropriate worship, and therefore 
ordinate or correspondent love. 
 The idea of correspondent or ordinate love for God has been present in historical 
Christian thought. Christians have written on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of 
love. The writers surveyed believed that for love to correspond to God’s love, it must be 
accorded to the right objects according to their value and nature, and thereby be of the 
right degree and kind. 
9.3.4. Correspondent Love Considered Aesthetically 
Chapter seven’s study in aesthetics revealed that aesthetic taste cannot be divorced 
from human maturity or good judgement. Art is inextricably bound to religion (see §7.2.1), 
and the judgement of beauty in art is not a wholly different enterprise from moral 
discernment or theological imagination (see §7.4.4.4). Brown (2000:§522–523) writes, “At 
its highest, taste¾as seen especially in the sense of beauty and in the sense of 
sublimity¾enters into the sense of God and the sense of good”.  
Taste is more than a statement of what one likes; it is a reflection of whether one 
likes what one ought to like, as Eliot (1964:233) distinguished. Taste is the state of one’s 
judgement, which is a moral question of wisdom and discernment. Differing tastes 
correspond to the difference between two sorts of beauty, which themselves differ in kind 
(Newton, 1950:18). Frank Burch Brown (1989:152–154) recognised that taste can actually 
be sinful. 
If so, the aesthetic faculty commonly called “good taste” is an instance of what is 
being described with the adjective “correspondent” when one qualifies love. Good taste is 
good judgement, which is as much as saying that one is valuing what ought to be valued, 
and loving what ought to be loved.  
Similarly, chapter seven demonstrated that good taste has opposites, and accounted 
for this in terms of aesthetic immaturity, the ubiquity of sentimentality, and deforming 
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effect of mass culture (see §7.4.4.3). Sentimentalism and love of kitsch turns out to be a 
disordered love, one rooted in narcissism. Such taste is actually a taste for one’s own depth 
of feeling. Objects are not loved for intrinsic beauty; they are utilised as icons for 
nostalgia, as catalysts for familiar and predictable feelings. Again, Kaplan (1966:360) 
writes on sentimentalism,  
Sensibility becomes sentimental when there is some disproportion between the 
response and its object, when the response is indiscriminate and 
uncontrolled…Sentimentality is loving something more than God does.  
This stands in obvious contrast to Lewis’ remark that until modern times people believed 
“that objects did not merely receive, but could merit, our approval or disapproval, our 
reverence or our contempt” (2001:14–15). 
Sentimentalism is also a form of childish escape from the world, by glossing and 
varnishing reality and creating one in which we are the heroes. Again, love of self 
predominates. If sentimentalism, love of kitsch, and bad taste are, as Scruton (2009:191) 
avers, “a disease of faith”, or as Harries (1993:60) suggests, “an enemy of the Christian 
faith”, then bad taste must be equated with disordered, non-corresponding love. Bad taste 
is loving the wrong things, with the wrong kind of love. It is loving the right things too 
little or too sweetly. It is loving things of lesser value more than things of greater value. It 
is exhibiting selfish, narcissistic forms of love. Loving for the sake of self, loving one’s 
own love, loving only what is easy are forms of idolatry, and therefore are inordinate love. 
9.3.5. Summary of Correspondent Love 
Beauty as defined in this study is God’s love for God. The perception and 
apprehension of this beauty by the believer takes place when this love is shared, and 
participated in by union. In order for there to be true correspondence between subject and 
object, the kind of love must correspond with God in appropriate degree and nature. In 
other words, a correspondent love is necessary to know and experience God’s beauty.  
  247 
 
The notion of correspondent love is not novel to this study. Four forms of 
justification have been provided. First, philosophy influenced by Christian thinking has 
asserted that love is the correspondent desire of the will for what it believes is good. What 
makes the love or desire correspondent is the object of its desire. Second, Scripture 
showed that this desire, to be ordinate, must correspond to God’s own love in three ways: 
by desiring God as one’s ultimate good or end; by desiring God and all things as God does 
(with holy desire); and by delighting in God with expansive joy. Third, Christian history 
reveals several writers who asserted that love for God must correspond to God’s nature in 
degree and kind. Fourth, aesthetics confirmed that good taste is an act of right evaluation 
of what ought to be loved, which is akin to the concept of correspondent love. 
Correspondent love eschews self-love disguised as worship, narcissism, sentimentalism, or 
other forms of pseudo-love. 
 Correspondent love, as an idea, is supported by philosophy, Scripture, historical 
theology, and aesthetics. The practice of correspondent love is the key to experiencing 
God’s objective beauty by subjectively approximating this love ourselves.  
Having explained the key to apprehending God’s beauty—correspondent love—
and having defended the premise that such a notion is tenable, the remainder of this 
chapter will consider how this ordinate love may be cultivated.   
9.4. A Proposed Model: Cultivating Correspondent Love for God  
9.4.1. The Problem of Cultivating Desire 
The difficulty in speaking of choosing correspondent desire is that love is not 
merely a mental choice between options. One cannot simply choose to love more than one 
does as a naked act of the will.  
As Tozer (1987:10) writes, “[E]very man is as holy and as full of the Spirit as he 
wants to be. He may not be as full as he wishes he were, but he is most certainly as full as 
he wants to be”. That is, Christians may wish that they loved God more than they do, but 
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they currently love him with as much inclination as they do. Such a statement is not meant 
to be deliberately tautologous. It merely affirms what Edwards writes in The Freedom of 
the Will (1754): the strongest inclination is the choice one makes, and that choice is the 
same as the will. According to Spohn (1981:401), “There is no faculty independent of an 
attractive object”: whatever the mind perceives as the greatest apparent good, the heart 
chooses.  
As has been shown, the Enlightenment introduced a three-faculty view of human 
psychology. It also began viewing the will as a neutral faculty that allows humans a 
libertarian freedom in which contrary options can be weighed and then chosen.  
In Edwards’ view, the human will is not the faculty that decides, it is the decision 
itself. A two-faculty view of human psychology avers that the mind knows the objects of 
desire, and the heart chooses, or loves what it desires as the greatest good. The greatest 
motive always prevails as the thing chosen. In other words, what the will chooses is 
precisely what it loves. This is why it is not strictly correct to speak of “choosing to love”, 
for one is really thereby saying “choosing to choose” or “loving so as to love”. Logically, 
one would be forced to ask, what inclination is leading one to desire such an inclination? 
The same thing would need to be asked of that inclination, till one has an absurd infinite 
regress of choices to choose, with apparently no starting point. 
The will does not choose to love; the will chooses what it loves. One’s chosen 
desires reflect what one thinks it best to choose. Loves can be formed and shaped, but they 
cannot simply be willed into being. In a real sense, as has been shown, love is the will in 
the direction of what it sees as good. One may speak of choosing the good or loving what 
is most beautiful, but not of choosing to love. Such a statement may seek to reflect the 
rational intentionality of love, but it is unwittingly illogical. 
Here then is the problem: if correspondent love is fundamental to apprehending 
God’s beauty, how can his love be experienced, if love cannot simply be willed into 
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being? In other words, how is this love to be obtained?   
Love cannot be willed. Desires can, however, be cultivated. Five methods of 
cultivation are now justified. 
1) Correspondent love is cultivated through a vision of what is beautiful. According 
to Smith (2009:53), humans as worshipping animals are intentional beings, who are always 
inclined towards a vision of something they believe is good. He writes, 
Our ultimate love is oriented by and to a picture of what we think it looks like for 
us to live well, and that picture then governs, shapes, and motivates our decisions 
and actions (Ibid., 53). 
This picture is not a set of abstract ideas, as much as it is an aesthetic idea, an affective, 
sensible picture of what reality is really like or should be like. This corresponds to what 
this study has termed imagination. This is not speculative fancy; it is the non-cognitive 
picture of the deep structure of Reality. Sections 7.4.3.1 and 7.4.3.2 demonstrated that 
imagination is actually at the root of all cognition. It has both a synoptic ability, and a 
decoding ability. It synopsises and integrates all of life, while also understanding analogies 
and truths not present to the senses. Furthermore, section 8.4.4 showed that imagination is 
basic to construing reality, providing the interpretive grid through which subjects 
participate with objects.  
Therefore, the study has shown that a Christian imagination is absolutely 
fundamental to cognition, perception, and interpretation. If correspondent love is the key 
to perceiving God’s beauty, and imagination has been shown to be fundamental to 
perception, it follows that a Christian imagination is fundamental to correspondent love.  
This is the telos to which the human heart is inclined; it is its treasure, to which one 
will always find the heart inclined (Matt. 6:21). The first area of cultivating correspondent 
love will be through the shaping of this imagination or pattern of the Christian life, of the 
world as it is. 
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2) The study has also revealed that correspondent love cannot be cultivated without 
a change in spiritual nature. In his Treatise on Grace, Edwards writes that  
the first effect of the power of God in the heart in regeneration, is to give the heart 
a divine taste or sense, to cause it to have a relish of the loveliness and sweetness of 
the supreme excellency of the divine nature (WJEO, 21:174).  
Indeed, it may be a form of Pelagianism to assert that the affections can simply be 
commanded by an act of human thought or willpower (Cameron, 2012:48). That is, an 
implantation of the divine nature has to be given for the human soul to find relish and 
inclination toward God. 
 The epistemological study revealed that knowledge cannot come without some 
form of union with the object. Section 8.4.6 stated that union was in the thinking of the 
Christian realists surveyed in that chapter, such as: 
• “possessing the object in love” (Augustine) 
• “consent to being” (Edwards)  
• “participation” (Barfield)  
• “indwelling” (Polanyi).  
These are all different ways of saying the same thing: union. To know something, one 
must somehow be a part of it and it a part of one. To the degree that one severs this union, 
and treats an object of knowledge as completely distinct from self, is the degree to which 
one limits his or her true understanding of it. Once again, if union is necessary to know 
and love, then union, or a change in nature or position is necessary to cultivate 
correspondent love. 
The spiritual beauty of the saints is their consent to God’s being, but this consent 
comes only because something of God’s being has been created in the human being. Holy 
love for God cannot come without a new nature. “Beloved, let us love one another, for 
love is of God; and everyone who loves is born of God and knows God. He who does not 
  251 
 
love does not know God, for God is love” (1 John 4:7–8). Ontological union with Christ 
provides the new nature, the new position from which ordinate love for God can grow. The 
second area of cultivating correspondent love will be through the presence of a new nature, 
or position of the Christian life. This new position must be present and remembered. 
3) Correspondent love must be developed though exposure. The  
new nature or position is meant to be fleshed out and experienced. The New Testament’s 
call to Christians is to become what they are, to practice their position, to cause their 
nature to affect their posture (Rom. 6:10–12; Eph. 4:1). Through this actual exposure to 
God’s love, love is cultivated through the experience of it. Edwards reminds one that 
beauty is not known in the abstract, but through exposure:  
It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or sensation of 
beauty, is by immediate sensation of the gratefulness of the idea called “beautiful”; 
and not by finding out by argumentation any consequences, or other things that it 
stands connected with; any more than tasting the sweetness of honey, or perceiving 
the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and consequences 
(WJEO, 8:619). 
The aesthetic study showed in §7.4.1.1 the need to truly receive an object in order to know 
it. Likewise, sections 8.4.2–8.4.5 all showed the essentiality of participation to true 
knowledge. The subject must love, receive, participate, submit, and indwell what he or she 
wants to know. Correspondent love must be cultivated through participative experience.  
This experience of correspondent love for God is cultivated through an inner 
disposition. For Edwards, it was what he termed “consent”: a continued disposition 
towards experiential union with God. The study has already revealed the crucial place of 
humility and faith for the perception of beauty in chapters seven and eight. The continued 
attitude of consent, a posture of desired conformity and union with God is what will fuel 
experiential union with God.   
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The third area of cultivating correspondent love will be through exposure to the 
beauty of God through experience, which one might term the process of the Christian life.  
4) Correspondent love for God is cultivated through repeated practice or nurture. 
Smith (2009:58) proposes that habit is what shapes the heart. Liturgical practices, 
habitually repeated in acts of private and public worship, give physical form and 
memorable expression to an idea of ultimate reality. The human heart needs regular 
nurture in those spiritual practices that give form and expression to correspondent love 
(Smith, 2009:25). The fifth area of cultivating correspondent love will be through regular 
spiritual disciplines, which one might term the practices of the Christian life. 
 Correspondent love for God requires new imagination, new nature, new exposure, 
and new nurture. These four will form the basis for the cultivation of correspondent love, 
and are summarised below: 
a) The pattern for correspondent love: the dominant but background Christian 
imagination of ultimate reality, the telos towards which holy desire moves for 
union. 
b)  The position for correspondent love: ontological union with Christ through the 
triune work of God in salvation, which reveals God and his presence and gives the 
answering holy desires. 
c) The process of correspondent love: the cycle of experiential union, seeking to love 
God ordinately, and to confess and forsake failures to do so. A disposition of 
consent or humility-faith-love, must be present, where through which experiential 
union with God is sought. 
d) The practices for correspondent love: deliberate habits that illustrate and cultivate 
these three. Holy desire is taught, shaped, and expressed through these practices. 
The order of these four is not strictly hierarchical. One could argue that positional union 
comes first, making the other three possible. One could likewise begin with the practices, 
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since they shape and affirm the other three. The process could also be foregrounded, as 
nearest to the actual performance of the three forms of ordinate love. The point is that they 
are more cyclical and interdependent than sequential and distinct.  
 At this point, it will be helpful to summarise the argument in five steps.  
Step one: God’s beauty is his love for his own being.  
Step two: God’s beauty is perceived and apprehended by love for God.  
Step three: This love must be a correspondent love: one which corresponds with God’s 
love in degree and nature.  
Step four: Love is a desire and cannot be willed directly. Correspondent love must be 
cultivated.  
Step five: The study has justified four ways that correspondent love can be cultivated: 
imagination (the pattern), nature (the position), exposure (the process), and nurture (the 
practices). 
 The study now sets out to define and describe each of these four. 
9.4.2. The Pattern for Correspondent Love  
 The pattern for correspondent love refers to what Weaver (1948:18) termed one’s 
“metaphysical dream”. The word dream reminds one that it is not always a conscious 
vision, as much as a vision that stands as the background of all conscious choice. The word 
metaphysical suggests that it deals with reality: the understanding of things as they truly 
are. This is the synoptic vision of the whole of life, that which gives meaning to the parts. 
This is the great interpretive index, giving moral significance through meaning to all that is 
encountered. This is the imagination,11 that aspect of mankind perhaps best described as 
being “in the image of God” (Gen. 1:26–27). Tozer, in The Knowledge of the Holy, 
(1987:11) insists that “what comes into our minds when we think about God is the most 
important thing about us”. 
                                               
11 See sections 7.4.4, and 8.4.3 for how the term imagination is used in this study. 
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What then should inform the Christian imagination that inclines the heart towards 
union with God and ordinate love? If God’s beauty is the ultimate motivator of love, then 
the Christian life should have the idea of God’s beauty at its very core.  
The study defined beauty as “the Most Lovely loving the Most Lovely”. This came 
from Edwards’ definition of beauty: “being’s cordial consent to being in general” (WJEO, 
8:620). God’s loving disposition of union with himself is beauty, and it must be at the very 
core of a Christian imagination. Unpacking Edwards’ definition of beauty leads to at least 
three observations about a Christian imagination based upon God’s beauty.  
1) The Christian imagination should be trinitarian. 
Edwards writes in The Miscellanies (no. 117):  
Again, we have shown that one alone cannot be excellent, inasmuch as, in such 
case, there can be no consent. Therefore, if God is excellent, there must be a 
plurality in God; otherwise, there can be no consent in him (WJEO:13:284).  
God’s beauty as God’s love is impossible if God is a solitary being. Love within God is 
only possible if there is a plurality of persons within the one being of God. Viewing God 
as a plurality of persons in relationship with one another is foundational and fundamental 
to the Christian worldview. In the words of Packer (1990:7), “Sound spirituality needs to 
be thoroughly Trinitarian”.  
 This does not mean that Christians are necessarily always conscious of the doctrine 
of the Trinity. Letham (2004:§310) believes that true Christian experience is 
fundamentally trinitarian at the level of Polanyi’s tacit knowledge. This observation leads 
to a second implied component of the pattern of the Christian life. 
2) The Christian imagination should be personal. 
“Being’s consent to being” (WJEO, 8:620) implies that personal relationship is at 
the heart of existence. Here the term personal refers to viewing reality as fundamentally 
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composed of volitional persons. As section 6.3.6.2 showed, Edwards believed primary 
beauty was the relationship between wills and persons, while secondary beauty was what 
mirrored this in the created order. Venter (2010:186) concurs that for Edwards, reality, in 
its most basic form, is relational, and not static or composed of inert substances. Waltke 
(1988:11) insists that Christians know God in an I-Thou personal relationship, and not as 
an inferred First Cause or as an ideal of beauty. 
Pearcey (2010:147) suggests that the ultimate clash between theistic and 
materialistic worldviews is whether one believes matter created mind, or whether mind 
created matter. The Christian imagination sees the deepest structure of reality being one 
that was created by a mind, and continues to be sustained by that same mind (Heb. 1:3). A 
materialist imagination, which sees the fundamental building-blocks of reality as lifeless 
self-directed particles of matter or energy, must see reality as fundamentally impersonal. 
An impersonal universe is only moral or beautiful by artificial human construct, not by 
nature.  If the foundation of reality is the beauty of Trinitarian God, then for the Christian, 
the pattern of life is fundamentally personal. That is, what is unique to personhood is what 
is truly fundamental to existence.  
 Furthermore, since knowing persons is a fundamentally different endeavour than 
knowing particles, one’s approach to the world must be much closer to Polanyi’s view of 
personal knowledge than to a naturalist’s or materialist’s empirical interrogation of 
phenomena. Life is experienced through receiving it as a gift, through indwelling it, 
through knowing and loving the persons of the Godhead (see §8.4.6). 
 Theologians have wrestled with the question of how the three persons could know 
and love one another and yet remain one God. One proposed solution is the notion of 
perichoresis. 
Perichoresis is a term which came into general use in the sixth century. It was used 
to reflect the relationship of mutual indwelling found within the Triune God (McGrath, 
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1999:50). The three persons maintain individuality, but share in the life of the other two. 
This principle is found in Scriptures that speak of a mutual penetration of the persons: 
Do you not believe that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? The words that I 
speak to you I do not speak on My own authority; but the Father who dwells in Me 
does the works (John 14:10). 
I in them, and You in Me; that they may be made perfect in one, and that the world 
may know that You have sent Me, and have loved them as You have loved Me 
(John 17:23). 
Theologians have taken perichoresis as a means of explaining how the three relate as one. 
Each of the persons fully indwells the other two, so that life and love is shared in the 
closest and most inexpressible union imaginable. 
 Perichoresis suggests that the relationship between persons is primarily one of 
loving delight. Venter (2015:4) remarks that relationality is “the central optic” in a 
Trinitarian spirituality.  
The Father appears to take the role of Beholder, Knower, and Declarer. He beholds 
and loves his own image in the Son, rejoicing in its perfection. Sayers (1964:13) reminds 
readers of the theological saying that the “Father is only known to Himself by beholding 
His image in the Son”. The Father delights to declare the glory and uniqueness of the 
Godhead.  
The Son seems to take the role of Beheld, Known, and Displayer, delighting to 
express and reflect the image of God back to the Father with an answering love to the 
Beholder.   
The Spirit appears to take the role of Beauty, Knowledge, and Diffuser by diffusing 
and revealing the Father’s love for the Son and the Son’s love for the Father. He delights 
to diffuse the display of the Son, so that maximum blessing redounds back to the Godhead. 
He delights to display the glory of the Godhead, communicating beauty and harmony to 
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the world (Sherry, 2007:9). The Son is the self-knowledge of God; the Spirit is the self-
love of God (Louie, 2013:§3360). This is the Augustinian model of the Trinity, which 
Edwards mostly embraced, and undergirds his view of consent and beauty.  
 This concept of personal, relational union is not simply an abstract concept that 
Christians have to meditate on. Instead, it is an idea of what beauty lies at the heart of 
things: being’s consent to being. In fact, Gifford (2011:2) believes that three forms of 
perichoresis are found in Scripture: the trinitarian perichoresis, the hypostatic union (in 
which the two natures of Christ mutually indwell one another), and the believer’s union 
with Christ, in which Christ is in the believer, and the believer is in him. Letham 
(2004:§10051) agrees with this threefold description of union. This corresponds to God in 
himself, God in the world (creation, fall, Incarnation, redemption), and God in his people.  
If so, then this relational perichoresis or mutual indwelling, is a foundational way 
of viewing reality. As Edwards suggested, “consent” is found even in the natural world, 
such as with gravity, where objects are pulled towards others in an apparent symbol of 
union. The desire for union also pervades marriage and sexuality. Union remains at the 
heart of Christian fellowship and is celebrated in the church’s ordinances or sacraments. 
Demarest (2012:§2780–2781) views Evangelical spirituality as focused on the “with-God” 
life, the “manner by which we live in communion with Christ in response to the Spirit”. 
Chesterton (2009:202) suggests that unitarian visions of God have produced cruel 
followers. A solitary person within God cannot but be severe. Polanyi showed that 
indwelling is a necessary way of knowing reality (see §8.4.5). A trinitarian and personal 
view of reality must produce a vision of reality sourced in love. This love finally overflows 
into the gift of glory to God. 
3) The Christian imagination should be doxological. 
“Being’s cordial consent to being in general” (WJEO, 8:620) also suggests that at the heart 
of this relational universe is the idea of gift. Trinitarian reality necessarily implies personal 
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and relational perichoretic reality. But when three infinite persons relate, the relationship 
must be one of gratuitous love. Wilson (2013:76) describes it as follows: 
In the life of the Triune God, the Father freely gives himself to the Son, so that he 
is both fully and eternally the Father and the Son is fully, eternally the Son. 
Likewise, the Son gives himself freely as the Son to the Father, so that each is fully 
and eternally Son and Father. Their giving to each other is the life of the Holy 
Spirit, who in receiving from and giving to the Father and the Son, is fully and 
eternally the Spirit. Moreover, the Spirit is the very gift that the Spirit gives to the 
Father and the Son, desiring that the Father and the Son love each other. From this 
mutuality of giving and receiving, which simply is life, and which may also be 
named as love, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit give life to something other 
than God: creation. 
The God of Scripture is self-sufficient and without needs (Ps. 50:8–15; Acts 17:24–25). 
What God does is not done out of an unmet need or to fulfil something in himself. Instead, 
God acts for his own glory, which is to say, to express and enjoy the radiance of his 
person. Creation is gratuitous, in the sense that it comes from the freedom of God, and was 
not imposed upon God by necessity (Sanders, 2010:64). 
This radiance, or glory, is enjoyed by the other persons of the Godhead, insomuch 
as it might accurately be called a gift from the one to the other. Several Scriptures speak of 
the Father’s gifts to the Son: 
All things have been delivered to Me by My Father, and no one knows the Son 
except the Father. Nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and the one to 
whom the Son wills to reveal Him (Matt. 11:27).   
The Father loves the Son, and has given all things into His hand (John 3:35). 
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For as the Father has life in Himself, so He has granted the Son to have life in 
Himself, and has given Him authority to execute judgment also, because He is the 
Son of Man (John 5:26–27). 
Father, I desire that they also whom You gave Me may be with Me where I am, 
that they may behold My glory which You have given Me; for You loved Me 
before the foundation of the world (John 17:24). 
Therefore God also has highly exalted Him and given Him the name which is 
above every name (Phil. 2:9). 
God…has in these last days spoken to us by His Son, whom He has appointed heir 
of all things, through whom also He made the worlds (Heb. 1:1–2). 
Likewise, Scripture reveals the Son’s gifts to the Father: 
And all Mine are Yours, and Yours are Mine, and I am glorified in them (John 
17:10). 
Then comes the end, when He delivers the kingdom to God the Father, when He 
puts an end to all rule and all authority and power (1 Cor. 15:24). 
This helps one understand that Creation is primarily a gift of glory from the persons of the 
Godhead to one another (Reeves, 2012:50). Beyond that, the Fall, Redemption, and 
Consummation are part of a plan to return the gift increased in value and more reflective of 
the Godhead than even at its pristine creation.  
When the Son is glorified, it glorifies the Father; when the Father is glorified, it 
glorifies the Son (John 13:31–32; 17:4–5; 1 Cor. 15:28; Phil. 2:9–11), and when either is 
glorified, the Spirit carries and reflects this glory and the answering love. Glory is a gift 
the members of the Godhead give one another, and they share equally in its joy. In a sense, 
the gift that each member of the Trinity gives is himself. The loving union of the Godhead 
is a self-giving love. 
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Beauty is trinitarian, relational, and gratuitously doxological. This shapes the 
Christian imagination to see that life is primarily rooted in beauty and self-giving love. 
God has always delighted in himself and gifted himself with glory and answering love. 
The very point of life, the very reason for human existence, is part of this gifting of glory 
from one Person of the Godhead to the other. Worship, discipleship, fellowship, 
evangelism, and missions all fall under this purpose. Human cultural life falls under this 
purpose. The family, the church, human government, and all vocations fall under this 
purpose. Life is bound up within the happiness of the Trinity, and those who seek union 
with this purpose align themselves with ultimate happiness.  
 The pattern for correspondent love is a Christian imagination rooted in “being’s 
cordial consent to being in general” (WJEO, 8:620): a trinitarian God within whom the 
persons mutually indwell one another in a union of self-giving love and delight in each 
other’s glory. This imagination is the backdrop for correspondent love. It is the grand 
Christian narrative, the Christian Story that is to dominate the background of one’s 
knowledge (Smith, 2013:§3499). 
 How is this imagination gained? Much of it will come through the practices that 
will be laid out in section 9.4.5. With that said, no Christian imagination could take place 
without divine disclosure, and no disclosure is possible with union. This leads to the 
second aspect of the model: the position of correspondent love. 
9.4.3. The Position of Correspondent Love 
One’s nature determines much of one’s desire for God. What is inherited from 
Adam and from biological ancestors, partly determines what one desires. Unless the 
human’s sin nature is miraculously transformed, he or she is without power to love God 
ultimately, and without the position or tools to pursue God (Jer. 13:23; Rom 3:10–12; Eph. 
2:1–3). Fallen and deformed human nature does not love God’s beauty until it is radically 
corrected. The effect of regeneration upon one’s relationship with God and one’s 
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consequent potential to abide in him, is foundational to loving God (1 John 4:7–8; 5:1). 
Being goes before doing, though doing influences being. God’s change made to a 
believer’s being is fundamental, for it transforms the Christian’s state and position before 
God. Lewis perceived that a change in the sinner's nature was actually the secret to loving 
God: 
Here is the paradox of Christianity. As practical imperatives for here and now the 
two great commandments have to be translated “Behave as if you loved God and 
man.” For no man can love because he is told to. Yet obedience on this practical 
level is not really obedience at all. And if a man really loved God and man, once 
again this would hardly be obedience; for if he did, he would be unable to help it. 
Thus the command really says to us, “Ye must be born again.” Till then, we have 
duty, morality, the Law (2012:115). 
Scripture’s answer to the question, “How does one love God?” is, “by means of God 
graciously disclosing himself to a new heart” (Exod. 33:13–18; Deut. 30:6; Ezek. 11:19–
20; 36:26–27; Matt. 11:25–27; 1 John 4:19). This divine disclosure is often called the 
“presence of God” (Exod. 33:13–14). For the Old Testament people of God, the presence 
of God was particularly manifest at the Mercy Seat of the Ark of the Covenant in the 
Tabernacle and the Temple (Exod. 25:22; Ezek. 10:18). Moreover, with the coming of the 
Incarnate Son, God’s presence was especially manifest on earth (John 1:1–18). 
The Upper Room Discourse (John 14–17) is partly given to explain how the 
disciples are to know the presence of God after Christ’s departure. After the ascension of 
Christ, the revealed presence of God would be known through union with Christ by the 
indwelling of the Spirit (John 6:56; 14:16–23; 17:23, 26; Gal. 2:20; Eph. 1:3; 3:16–19; 
Col. 1:27). The Spirit of God illuminates believers to know spiritual realities and to love 
them (Eph. 1:15–19). In other words, the basis of experiential communion is positional 
union with Christ (Schwanda, 2014:83). 
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Union with Christ is the foundation of the Christian life, from which all spiritual 
blessings flow (Eph. 1:3). Campbell (2012:§9137–9141) states that in the Pauline epistles, 
virtually every element of Christ’s work is connected in some way to union with Christ.12 
Henry Scougal writes,  
True religion is a union of the soul with God, a real participation of the Divine 
nature, the very image of God drawn upon the soul, or, in the apostle’s phrase, ‘it is 
Christ formed within us’. Briefly, I know not how the nature of religion can be 
more fully expressed, than by calling it a Divine life (Life of God, 44). 
Taylor (1998:63) suggests that apart from union, no knowledge is possible.  
Indeed, C. S. Lewis’ concepts of need-love and gift-love are reconciled in the idea of 
union. The desire to be one with the Beloved is both a sense of need until the union is 
complete, and also a sense of gift: to enjoy the Beloved as an end and not as a means to 
some other end. At the heart of this willing surrender is a union with God effected by 
regeneration. Lewis writes of beauty words that could also be said of love for God:  
We do not want merely to see beauty...we want something else which can hardly be 
put into words—to be united with the beauty we see, to pass into it, to receive it 
into ourselves, to bathe in it, to become part of it. That is why we have peopled air 
and earth and water with gods and goddesses, and nymphs and elves (1996:37).  
Similarly, Edwards states: “That which men love, they desire to have and to be united to, 
and possessed of. The beauty which men delight in, they desire to be adorned with. Those 
acts which men delight in, they necessarily incline to do” (WJEO, 2:394). 
                                               
12 Among the burgeoning contemporary materials on union with Christ include R. Letham, Union With Christ in 
Scripture, Theology,and History (2011); Vanhoozer, Campbell & Thate, In Christ in Paul: Explorations in Paul’s 
Theology of Union and Participation (2014);  J. Billings, Union with Christ: Reframing Theology and Ministry for the 
Church (2011); R. Wilbourne, Union with Christ: The Way to Know and Enjoy God (2016); M. Horton, Covenant and 
Salvation: Union with Christ (2007). 
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 Medieval writers such as Julian of Norwich (1342–1430) agreed, seeing love 
(erwj), as that which draws persons to God, and the corresponding source of the urge to 
seek union with God and the godly (Ahlgren, 2005:51). 
Achieving this union involves a work of all three persons of the Godhead. The 
Father lovingly chooses believers in Christ before the foundation of the world (Eph. 1:4–6; 
1 Pet. 1:2), and so will never condemn them (Rom. 8:34) or forsake them (Heb. 13:5; John 
10:27–29), but rather adopts them into his family (Eph. 1:5) and reserves their inheritance 
(1 Pet. 1:4). His work prompts believers to worship in his presence. 
Through union with Christ (Rom. 6:4–10), the Son’s perfect life, death, 
resurrection, ascension, and high priestly work have propitiated God’s wrath at believers’ 
sin (1 John 2:2), forgiven their sins (Col. 2:13–14; Eph. 1:7), justified them (Rom. 5:1; 2 
Cor. 5:21), reconciled them with to God (Rom. 5:10; Col. 1:21; 2 Cor. 5:18), regenerated 
them, given them eternal life (Col. 2:13; John 1:12), sanctified them (1 Cor. 6:11), and 
seated them with Christ in the heavenlies (Phil. 3:20; Eph. 2:6), making them accepted 
(Eph. 1:6) and completed (Col. 2:9–10). The Son’s work gives believers every permission 
to worship in his presence (Heb. 10:19–22). 
  The Spirit draws, sanctifies (1 Pet. 1:2; 2 Thes. 2:13), regenerates (Titus 3:5; John 
3:3–9), and then indwells believers (1 Cor. 6:19; Ro. 8:9–10) thereby uniting them with 
Christ and imparting the very life of Christ and divine nature (though not the divine 
essence) to them (Gal. 2:20; 1 John 3:24), being the seal and down-payment of their future 
glorification (2 Cor. 1:22; Eph. 1:13–14; 4:30). Since he is God's Spirit, when he indwells 
their spirits, he reveals the things of God (1 Cor. 2:10–13) using the Word of God, and 
illuminates Christ’s beauty to the seeking heart (John 15:26; 16:14), giving believers both 
desires and enablement to love God (Phil. 2:13). The Spirit’s work gives believers power 
to worship in his presence. This prompting, permission, and power speaks of internal 
inclination, not of external constraint. Scougal again: 
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The love which a pious man bears to God and goodness, is not so much by virtue 
of a command enjoining him so to do, as by a new nature instructing and 
prompting him to do it; nor doth he pay his devotions as an unavoidable tribute, 
only to appease the Divine justice; but those religious exercises are the proper 
emanations of the Divine life, the natural employments of the new-born soul (The 
Life of God, 45). 
The work of the Father, Son, and Spirit creates a permanent, ontological union with God in 
Christ. Through this union, a new nature with new inclinations is imparted. The union is 
the means of perceiving the revelation of God, of loving the perceived revelation, and of 
returning love to God.  
No love for God is possible without true conversion and regeneration. Love for 
God requires a new heart, with new relish, new perception. A regenerate believer, through 
his or her union with Christ, is in the presence of God through the indwelling Spirit, and 
can now perceive and love the glory of God as revealed in Christ. For this reason, 
Evangelical spirituality first requires conversion through repentance and belief in the 
Gospel (Rom. 10:9-10). It then insists on true regeneration, and on believers examining 
themselves to know if such a union is theirs (2 Cor. 13:5; 1 John 5:10-12). It further 
disciples believers in the knowledge of their union, explaining their position in Christ, 
before proclaiming the walk that should emerge from it (Eph. 1:3; 4:1). 
In short, correspondent love for God is cultivated through the presence of a true 
ontological union with God. This position supplies a potential. The new nature must 
“become what it is”. It must actually move towards experiential union with God, which is 
the process of correspondent love. 
9.4.4. The Process of Correspondent Love 
Love for God’s beauty is known not only by imagination and through changed 
nature, but also by exposure. The writer of Theologia Germanica wrote, 
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 And he who would know before he believeth, cometh never to true 
knowledge...We speak of a certain Truth which it is possible to know by 
experience, but which ye must believe in, before that ye know it by experience, 
else ye will never come to know it truly” (Theologia Germanica, XLVIII). 
Though the believer is in ontological union with Christ, loving God’s beauty is a matter of 
experientially seeking that union, of consenting or desiring to live in experiential union 
with God. This experiential union with God requires the ontological union, but ontological 
union with Christ does not automatically lead to experiential union. Instead, believers are 
commanded to live in God’s presence, as seen in Christ’s command to “abide” (John 15:1–
7).  
 What does this experiential union look like? Experiential union takes place when a 
believer seeks the experience of the three forms of correspondent love. A wise option is to 
investigate the “shape” of corporate worship, since corporate worship is the most distilled 
and unified form of worship.  
Chapell (2009:99) believes that the common pattern of the order of worship in the 
historical church actually reflects the progress of the gospel in the heart. First, the 
worshipper recognises who God is in adoration. Once that is realised, it leads to an 
understanding of self, and therefore to confession. The gospel then assures of pardon, so 
that the worshipper is led to thanksgiving, petition and more devotion. God provides his 
Word in response to the desire for aid, and the worshipper heeds the instruction, leaving 
with the charge to do so and the promise of God’s blessing. Chapell sees this pattern as the 
sequential flow of the gospel in the heart. This is a process that follows a distinguishable  
order. 
This gospel-shaped process can be adapted for the experience of loving God’s 
beauty in all of life. This process necessarily includes public and private worship, but it 
also includes family life, service, discipleship of other believers, evangelism, one’s 
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vocation, education, avocation, recreation, and entertainment. All of life is to be lived in a 
love for God (1 Cor. 16:14, 10:31). This study’s adaptation of what has been used in 
corporate worship across the ages is a cycle of communing with God and restoring and 
returning to communion when it is temporarily lost.13 
1) Communion and consecration. The sought-after state is communion, in which  
the believer is adoring God in correspondent love: loving God ultimately, loving what God 
loves, and loving in an expansive fullness of joy. Consecration is an active form of this 
adoration-communion. Whatever cannot be loved for God’s sake should not be loved at 
all; whatever can be loved for God’s sake should be consecrated to him (Phil. 4:8). All of 
life should be presented as a sacrificial offering (Rom. 12:1), doing all deeds for Christ’s 
sake (Col. 3:17, 23). All things should be done for God’s glory (1 Cor. 10:31) and all done 
in love (1 Cor. 16:14). This life of God-centred, Christ-focused loving sacrifice is 
performed by depending on God’s enabling grace to do so (1 Cor. 15:10; 2 Cor. 9:8; Col. 
1:29). 
This state of communion is often experienced as the Spirit of God does his work of 
illumination. Sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.6 describes the fundamental importance of illumination 
and divine disclosure to understanding truth. Illumination is the Holy Spirit’s work of 
communicating spiritual realities to a Christian’s spiritual eyes by opening the eyes of a 
believer’s affections (Eph. 1:18) to recognise and experience the reality and beauty of truth 
about God. Riccardi (2013:30) writes that this is at the centre of Christian sanctification, the 
Spirit’s work illuminates  
the glory of Christ to the eyes of our hearts, winning over our affections by the 
delightfulness and beauty of that glory, and causing our affections to conform our 
wills, so that we might will and work for His good pleasure.  
                                               
13 This cycle is the researcher’s adapted version of a cycle given in a lecture by Dr. Kevin Bauder at Central 
Theological Baptist Seminary, Plymouth, MN, January 15, 2010. It is adapted and combined with Chapell’s 
insights. 
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When illuminated, a believer sees spiritual reality, which is to say that the believer sees what 
ought to be loved, and to what degree. This is the state of being the apostle Paul calls being 
“filled with the Spirit” (Eph. 5:18) or being “filled with all the fullness of God” (Eph. 3:19). 
The Spirit is himself the communion between Father and Son, and he is the means of 
experienced union with Christ for regenerate human beings (John 15:26). In the place of 
illumination, a believer is loving God ultimately, loving what God loves, and loving in 
expansive joy.  
Experiential communion is life lived coram Deo, in God’s presence or before God’s 
face. Christian mystical writers have spoken of the ideal of unbroken communion with God 
or practising his presence at every waking moment. Some of these writers have set up an 
unattainable goal, asserting that such unbroken communion should always be direct;14 that 
is, a Christian’s conscious communion with God should never cease, even when going about 
work, solving pressing problems, or communing with other human beings. Very few people, 
however, have the ability to have their inward focus on more than one thing at a time. As 
Polanyi noted in his epistemology, physical eyes are able to see many things in one’s 
peripheral vision and in the background, but they focus on one object at a time (see §8.4.5) 
Communion with God may be a focal awareness or a subsidiary awareness. Communion 
with God does not require that the Christian always be praying, meditating on the Word, or 
otherwise adoring God directly. Indirect communion with God will include loving what God 
has made by admiring God’s handiwork. Indirect communion includes serving God by 
focussing on the task at hand, or by focusing on the person one is serving for God’s sake. In 
these circumstances, Christians are actually turning their gaze from direct communion with 
God to something or someone else, while retaining God in their subsidiary vision. They do 
their work well, or consider carefully creation, or love another person, while keeping God 
as the ultimate, though presently indirect, end of all their actions. 
                                               
14 For example, see Kelly, A Testament of Devotion, (1941:13). 
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Richard Baxter said,  
The intending of God’s glory or our spiritual good, cannot be distinctly and sensibly 
re-acted in every particular pleasure we take, or bit we eat, or thing we use: but a 
sincere Habitual Intention well laid at first in the Heart, will serve to the right use of 
many particular Means (Works, Vol.1, 266). 
This means that the process of ordinate love—in which one loves God ultimately, loves what 
God loves, and lives in expansive fullness of joy—comprehends all of life. This state of 
experiential union will not be unmixed, for what will follow is the second stage of the 
process: conviction. 
2) Conviction and confession. As explained in Chapell’s (2009:99) description of  
corporate worship, confession naturally follows adoration. Conviction is the work of the 
Spirit upon the renewed conscience, alerting the believer to ways he or she falls short of the 
glory of God (John 16:8–11; Heb. 4:12) or fails to love God in ordinate ways. The 
conscience, being stirred by the Spirit’s work, warns the believer before he sins, or accuses 
the believer after sin (John 8:9; Rom. 2:15). Francis de Sales (1567–1622) understood this 
well:  
As daylight waxes, we, gazing into a mirror, see more plainly the soils and stains 
upon our face; and even so as the interior light of the Holy Spirit enlightens our 
conscience, we see more distinctly the sins, inclinations and imperfections which 
hinder our progress towards real devotion. And the selfsame light which shows us 
these blots and stains, kindles in us the desire to be cleansed and purged therefrom 
(Introduction to the Devout Life, I, xxii). 
Confession is the obedient response of the believer to this conviction. It is the agreement 
of the mind and heart with God’s work of conviction (1 John 1:9). The mind agrees with 
the sinfulness of the sin, and accepts the guilt of it (Ps. 51:3–4); the heart agrees it has 
loved what God hates and hated what God loves, sorrowfully revolting against such 
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inordinate love (2 Cor. 7:10), forsaking it to embrace the cleansing blood of Christ. A 
refusal to confess in the believer will lead to a loss of the sense of communion and 
ordinate love, akin to a leanness of soul and spiritual drought (Ps. 106:15; 32:3–4). 
When the believer confesses, it leads to the third stage, as found in Chapell’s 
progress of the Gospel: assurance of pardon, thanksgiving, and deepened devotion 
(2009:99). This study will use the terms cleansing and conformity to describe this third 
stage. 
3. Cleansing and conformity. Confession leads to God’s cleansing of the believer 
(1 John 1:9). The continual cleansing of the Christian is not the cleansing of judicial guilt 
through imputed righteousness, but the sanctifying work of practically imparting Christ’s 
righteousness to the soul (John 13:9–10). The conscience is cleansed from a sense of 
accusation and  of the Father’s displeasure (Ps. 51:12–15) and is re-sensitized to holiness. 
The believer is cleansed from moral defilement (2 Cor. 7:1), as he or she flees from sin (1 
Cor. 10:13; 2 Tim. 2:22), mortifying its power (Col. 3:5), making no provision for it (Rom. 
13:14), and thereby puts off the old man (Eph. 4:22–24).  
Conformity is the progressive likeness to Christ in affection, mind, and action that 
is imparted to the believer who gazes on Christ (2 Cor. 3:18). Through cleansing from 
disordered loves, the believer is now progressively more like Christ in rightly-ordered 
correspondent love. This likeness brings nearness: God communicates himself most to the 
soul that has progressed farthest in Christlikeness (Jas. 4:8; John 14:21; 15:9–10; Eph. 
3:16–19). Nicolas of Cusa (1401–1464) said, 
Hence, I must see to it that, as best I can, I be made more and more capable of 
receiving You. But I know that the capability which conduces to union is only 
likeness; but incapability results from unlikeness. Therefore, if by every possible 
means I make myself like unto Your goodness, then according to my degree of 
likeness thereto I will be capable of receiving truth (Vision of God, IV, xxii). 
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This cycle is, then, meant to be a progressive cycle, in which love for God grows as 
Christlikeness grows.  
 
Figure 1: The Process of Correspondent Love 
 
Jonathan Edwards saw why the cycle would produce greater love for God: 
And ‘tis to be considered that the more those divine communications increase in 
the creature, the more it becomes one with God: for so much the more is it united 
to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him 
becomes more firm and close: and at the same time the creature becomes more and 
more conformed to God. The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that 
is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is 
in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehensive prospect of the 
increasing union and conformity through eternity, it must be an infinitely strict and 
perfect nearness, conformity, and oneness. For it will forever come nearer and 
nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father 
and the Son: so that in the eyes of God, who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its 
infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfillment of Christ’s 
request, in John 17:21, John 17:23: “That they all may be one, as thou Father art in 
me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, I in them and thou in me, that 
they may be made perfect in one” (WJEO, 8:443). 
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St. John of the Cross (1542–1591) wrote in The Ascent of Mount Carmel, “God 
communicates Himself most to the soul that has progressed farthest in love, meaning that 
its will is in closest conformity with the will of God” (The Ascent, II, v).   
Correspondent love is shaped by the experience of loving God, in a gospel-shaped 
cycle of communion, confession, and conformity to Christ.  
This process is undergirded by a posture or disposition that must be continually 
cultivated. What is this disposition? At the heart of Edwards’ view of God’s beauty was 
the notion of “consent”. What did Edwards mean by this? In modern parlance, consent 
refers to approval or assent. Its connotations have to do with informed, mature, and 
voluntary agreement to participate in something or to permit something.  
Consent, in the more archaic sense, referred to agreement in opinion and sentiment. 
The etymology of the word is the Latin word consentire: to feel together. Consent was the 
uniting of affection. McClymond and McDermott (2012:§1139) believe it was a term that 
implied volition, affection, and love. Edwards believed that one could call this consenting 
disposition by different names. “When exerted toward a savior, it is called faith or trust; 
when toward good things promised, it is called hope; when toward excellent persons, love; 
when toward commands, obedience” (McClymond & McDermott, 2012:§4860–4863). 
This represents a posture towards experiential union with God that supports and undergirds 
correspondent love. 
Does Scripture employ a concept similar to Edwards’ “consent”? In several places, 
Scripture speaks of a disposition that is foundational or fundamental to living in loving 
union with God. In some places, it is called humility (Prov. 3:34; Mic. 6:8; Isa. 57:15; Jas. 
4:6, 10; 1 Pet. 5:5). In some places, it is called the fear of Yahweh (Deut. 10:12; Ps. 
111:10, Prov. 1:7; 9:10; 15:33; 22:4; Eccl. 12:13). The New Testament names faith as 
foundational to pleasing God (Heb. 11:1, 6; Gal. 5:6; 1 Tim. 1:5; Eph. 2:8–9; 2 Pet. 1:5). 
Jesus uses the term “abide” to capture the ideas of trust, dependence, obedience, and 
  272 
 
communion (John 15:4–10). The fear of Yahweh and humility are placed parallel to each 
other in Proverbs 15:33 and 22:4. Therefore, one could speak of a disposition named 
“humility-faith-fear-abiding”, but such a term is cumbersome and unwieldy.  
If this posture can be spoken of as a unitary thing, why does Scripture have 
multiple terms for it? A possible answer is that the posture is a complex one, composed of 
different but complementary attitudes, that the Bible treats separately at times, while at 
other times treating them as virtually synonymous.  
A passage like James 4:6–10 suggests this posture is composed of at least three 
attitudes. 
1) Humility. This consists of focussing on another, and being childlike before God:  
“But He gives more grace. Therefore He says: ‘God resists the proud, But gives grace to 
the humble’ (v. 6). “Humble yourselves in the sight of the Lord, and He will lift you up” 
(v. 10). 
The first attribute of the posture of consenting to union is the attitude of seeking 
union with another, in this case, with God. Humility fundamentally denies self (Matt. 
16:24; Mark 8:34; Luke 9:23; 14:26), which refers to denying the impulse to seek union 
with oneself—the fundamental twistedness of sin. Instead, one must go outside oneself to 
seek joy and life in another. According to Meilaender (2006:§202), Augustine taught that 
God wills to draw one out of oneself. To worship God requires a measure of self-
forgetfulness (§146). Humility pursues glorifying and loving God, not self (Ps. 115:1; 2 
Cor. 5:14–15). A life wholly given to God’s glory (Rom. 11:36; Eccl. 12:13), or God’s 
pleasure (2 Cor. 5:9) defines the idea of otherness. John the Baptist’s words capture it: “He 
must increase, but I must decrease” (John 3:30). Ordinate love “does not seek its own” (1 
Cor. 13:5), because it is “poor in spirit” (Matt. 5:3) and longs for the richness of union 
with another. 
Both the study in aesthetics and that of epistemology revealed very similar 
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dispositions as fundamental to perceiving beauty. Chapter seven revealed the importance 
of a receptivity that lays itself open to receive the meaning of a work of art, laying aside 
preconceptions, and surrendering to the work. This was seen as an act of contemplation, 
seeking no acquisitive pleasure in the object (see §7.4.1.1–7.4.1.2). Likewise, the 
approaches of Augustine and Pascal called for a reverent, humble approach to knowing 
(§8.4.2). Rigney (2015:233) writes that at the heart of embracing one’s creatureliness is 
receptivity.  “[G]ratitude is the posture of the soul that most readily increases receptivity” 
(p. 234). 
This kind of unselfish focus on the object as an end in itself and not a means to 
one’s own ends is necessary to correspondent love.  
2) Brokenness. This is composed of the willingness to repent and confess sin.  
“Cleanse your hands, you sinners; and purify your hearts, you double-minded. Lament and 
mourn and weep! Let your laughter be turned to mourning and your joy to gloom” (vv. 8–
9). 
This posture of being willing to be uncovered before God that he might cover the 
sinner, is fundamental to experiential union. Proverbs 28:13 describes it: “He who covers 
his sins will not prosper, But whoever confesses and forsakes them will have mercy”. 
John’s first epistle opens with the contrast between those willing to walk in the light and 
confess their sins, and those who walk in darkness and claim they have not sinned or do 
not sin (1 John 1:5–2:2).  
The aesthetic study (§7.4.4.3) showed that the nature of good art and its 
accompanying good taste was to desire truth and reality, not narcissistic, flattering versions 
of ourselves. People who desire what is stereotyped, predictable, and schematised are not 
interested in growth or transformation, but only the reinforcement of what is familiar. To 
truly consent to union with God and to be willing to confess is to embrace the posture of 
repentance and openness.  
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3) Submission and drawing near to God. This is composed of uniting one’s will with  
God and drawing near to God in communion. “Therefore submit to God. Resist the devil 
and he will flee from you. Draw near to God and He will draw near to you” (vv. 7–8). 
 Fundamental to consenting to union is the willingness to unite one’s will with 
another’s. Another word for will is desire, for what a man wills is what he desires. The one 
who submits to God desires to match his own desires to God’s, to bring them under God’s, 
to give God’s desires final veto over his own. The posture for experiential union is one of 
re-moulding one’s desires to reflect Christ’s. In experiential union with God, the call is to 
total submission to God’s will. The presence of the slave and servant metaphor in 
Scripture embodies this idea. In the Hebrew culture, the indentured servant could 
voluntarily forgo his earned freedom with a public declaration of  loving servitude to his or 
her master: “I love my master…I will not go out free” (Exod. 21:5). Submissiveness is the 
posture of chosen, voluntary subordination of individualistic freedom, so as to unite with 
another. Jesus taught that submission was one of the marks of love. Jesus himself 
embodied submissiveness in his ministry on earth, submitting his will to the will of the 
Father (John 4:34; 5:30; 6:38). He likewise taught on the cruciality of submission (John 
14:15, 21; 15:10). 
Thomas à Kempis prayed, “Grant that I may always desire and will that which is to 
Thee most acceptable, and most dear. Let Thy will be mine, and my will ever follow 
Thine, and agree perfectly with it” (Imitation of Christ, III, xv). Similarly, the author of 
Theologia Germanica wrote, 
And therefore it is true to the very letter, that the creature, as creature, hath no 
worthiness in itself, and no right to anything, and no claim over any one, either 
over God or over the creature, and that it ought to give itself up to God and submit 
to him because this is just (Theologia Germanica, XXXV). 
The pursuit of union is not a half-hearted pursuit. The posture of consent seeks God’s 
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beauty as its chief desire (Ps. 27:4; 63:1–2; Exod. 33:18–19). God is to be sought 
wholeheartedly (Deut. 4:29; 10:12; 30:10; Jer. 29:13). Jonathan Edwards said, “True 
religion consists in a great measure, in vigorous and lively actings of the inclination and 
will of the soul, or the fervent exercises of the heart” (WJEO, 2:99). Again: 
 If we be not in good earnest in religion, and our wills and inclinations be not 
strongly exercised, we are nothing. The things of religion are so great, that there 
can be no suitableness in the exercises of our hearts, to their nature and importance, 
unless they be lively and powerful. In nothing is vigor in the actings of our 
inclinations so requisite, as in religion; and in nothing is lukewarmness so odious 
(WJEO, 2:99–100). 
Correspondent love is cultivated through actual experience. The experience of communing 
with God, when illuminated by the Spirit, is that experience. Therein, the believer loves 
God ultimately, loves what God loves, and love God expansively in fullness of joy, 
consecrating all things to God. When he or she falls, there exists the option of confession, 
cleansing, followed by a deeper conformity to Christ. This experience will take place to 
the degree that the “consenting” posture of humility, brokenness, and submissive drawing 
near is present.  
How is this process to be deepened, and its posture strengthened? The fourth aspect 
of cultivating correspondent love supplies much of the answer.  
9.4.5. The Practices of Correspondent Love  
The practices, or disciplines of the Christian life function to nurture correspondent 
love. The disciplines are not themselves the sum and substance of communion with God. 
Instead, they are the gymnasium, or rather the exercises, that develop and strengthen 
ordinate love for all of life. The process of experiential communion with God extends to 
family life, vocation, avocation, recreation, evangelism, and discipleship. It is not merely 
an exercise in one’s private devotions or in corporate worship. One can love God 
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correspondently in all of life. Nevertheless, the disciplines are concentrated, repetitive 
forms and practices that nurture that love. The disciplines provide the greenhouse in which 
desire for God thrives. How so? 
First, these disciplines provide the opportunity for communion with God to occur. 
The spiritual disciplines, rightly used, are the moments when one can give clearest 
attention to the process of communing with God, confessing sins, and conforming one’s 
life to Christ. It is no wonder that some have mistaken these means as ends, for they 
provide some of the most concentrated experiences of communion with God. 
Second, the spiritual disciplines develop the disposition of consent, with its 
humility, brokenness, and submissive drawing near. The practices are exercises in 
humility-faith-reverence, which train one in godliness (1 Tim. 4:7). When the chosen 
practices of a spirituality are repeated over time, they inculcate virtuous habits (Spohn, 
2003:257). 
Third, the spiritual disciplines form and shape the Christian imagination, filling the 
mind with analogies and metaphors by which to understand invisible and ultimate realities. 
The spiritual disciplines are not simply conveyors of information. They shape the 
imagination on a non-cognitive level through their form. The pattern of correspondent life 
is imprinted on the mind. They also create a rhythm of life that shapes the imagination 
(Deut. 6:6–9).  
Fourth, the spiritual disciplines unite the pattern, position, and process of the 
Christian life in one act. They shape and strengthen the other three pillars of correspondent 
love. Like those tasks in life that require one to combine and co-ordinate several actions at 
once, practice is necessary. The concepts of this model of spirituality (the pattern of 
trinitarian reality, new natures and what they enable, the cycle of communion) will remain 
inert and abstract ideas unless they are enacted in real life. Practical disciplines give the 
soul practice at combining these.  
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9.4.5.1. The Form of the Spiritual Disciplines  
In the post-Enlightenment era of positivism and idealism, attention has been given 
to the propositional content of Christian disciplines, and not to their form. Smith (2009:42) 
writes at length on the intellectualism of modern Christianity. Naming this a 
“intellectualist”, “cognitivist”, and “rationalist” approach, Smith describes modern 
Christianity’s approach of privileging intellectual ideas. He avers that much in evangelical 
Christianity fails to recognise how desires are shaped by the habitual practices, and by the 
very form of those practices. Often, the shaping influence of the mood, the gestures, the 
regularity, the routine, the musical genre, the literary form, or the symbolism within the 
practice has been ignored, or declared to be a meaning-neutral content holder. Smith 
(2013:§3610) even suggests the form/content distinction needs to be erased. What can be 
deduced about the actual form of the spiritual disciplines? Drawing from the historical, 
aesthetic, and epistemological studies, five characteristics of the form of these disciplines 
follow.   
1) Spiritual disciplines must be repetitive in nature. Smith (2013:§3912) speaks of  
the importance of repeating spiritual practices. Regular and intentional activities will 
“reshape a practitioner’s dispositions” (Spohn, 2003:260). Perhaps it is superfluous to 
mention, but a practice is only beneficial when it is a regimen. Only those practices that 
become regular have a formative, shaping effect. To be trained in godliness (1 Tim. 4:7) 
suggests a regimen, and Scripture commands a regularity and repetitiveness in the spiritual 
disciplines (Heb. 10:25). Only when a consciously practiced activity becomes second 
nature, has its regularity had a formative effect.  
At this point the Christian faces a dilemma: the desired familiarity can breed 
thoughtlessness, a lifeless repetitiveness that can be bereft of intentionality. To avoid this, 
the Christian must keep the intentionality and meaning of the practices clear. In summary, 
Correspondent love requires spiritual disciplines that are repetitive. 
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2)  Spiritual disciplines must be realised in creational form. Section 7.2.1 listed the ways 
that art and religion are similar. Two of the crossovers listed were that both art and religion 
seek to incarnate ultimate realities, and that both art and religion are concerned with 
creation. Practices that are formative are those that recognise and reflect what a human 
being is: an embodied soul, or conversely, an ensouled body. Practices that shape make 
use of the senses of the body and call for the body to respond. Eyes read and take in 
beauty; tongues and teeth and vocal cords makes musical sounds or prayers; ears hear 
preaching and praying and music; tongues taste the Lord’s Supper; bodies feel the water of 
baptism. The Platonic view of the body must not hinder Christian practice. The body is 
good, as is all creation. As creatures, Christians must make use of creation (music, 
language, poetry, water, bread) to know the Creator.  
Practices that assume a disembodied, cerebral Christianity will have far less 
formative effect than those which assume one’s creaturely nature. Murphy (2001:324) 
points out that one can never be at any distance from the knowledge one needs. Humans 
must be habituated to the knowledge of the faith by the ritual performance that is worship, 
for worship is the ultimate form of catechesis (pp. 325, 327). Correspondent love is 
nurtured through spiritual disciplines that are realised in physical, created forms. 
3) Spiritual disciplines must be revelational in content and form. Section 8.3.7 
demonstrated that in a correspondence model of truth for transcendentals, some form of 
disclosure theory is necessary. God must reveal himself for any spiritual discipline to be 
useful in nurturing correspondent love. God reveals himself specifically in Scripture, and 
generally in nature. If loving God comes through divine disclosure, then the practices that 
promote and shape love for God should be direct uses of Scripture, or uses of creation 
guided by Scripture. Those guided by the Regulative Principle of Worship15 could 
                                               
15 Those who believe in the Regulative Principle of Worship or the Rule of Prescription believe that a worship practice  
can be admitted to the worship of the church only if such a practice is unequivocally and positively grounded in  
Scripture (Duncan, 2003:64). 
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summarise their practice as “[R]ead the Bible, preach the Bible, pray the Bible, sing the 
Bible and see the Bible” (Duncan, 2003:65). For those practices not commanded for 
corporate worship, Scripture should still supply the principles that guide its form and 
content. By command or prohibition, by positive or negative principle, or by the 
application of sound wisdom, all practices should submit to Scripture. Scripture provides 
either the clear disclosure of God, or the framework to interpret the created order and 
interpret the works of God. 
Aniol (2015:157) suggests that the poetic and literary forms of Scripture itself are 
to shape the worship forms of Christians. Innovating new worship forms run the risk of 
forfeiting those forms that correctly shape the imagination and perception, by mistakenly 
assuming that the traditional form no longer carries such power (Smith, 2013:§3735). 
Correspondent love is nurtured through those spiritual disciplines whose form is 
revelational: shaped by the divine disclosure of Scripture. 
4) Spiritual disciplines should have been shaped in their form by historic Christian 
communities. Section 7.4.4.3 showed the deleterious effect that culture can have on 
shaping the loves of people. The following section (7.4.4.4) insisted that Christians limit 
their exposure to mass culture and find their primary social formation among God’s 
people. Similarly, section 8.4.2 showed that Augustine and Pascal saw the cruciality of 
culture in shaping rightly ordered love. As Peters (2009:35) demonstrates, both Pascal and 
Augustine thought that wisdom and clarity could come only to those whose sentiments 
were nurtured through participation in a historical community of faith.  
Forms are shaped through a reciprocal relationship between a religion and a 
culture. As the Word penetrates a culture, it begins reshaping the imagination of that 
culture. As the culture then worships using the Word, it develops forms commensurate 
with that imagination. The longer this process goes on, the more one can expect forms that 
better approximate ordinate love for God. Aniol (2017:100) writes that  
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Liturgies are developed over long periods of time, at first with very deliberate 
values in view, and those values are worn into the liturgies through regular use. 
And when people practice such liturgies, they are shaped by the values that have 
formed them, whether they recognize it or not. 
The Christian culture, and the tradition it passes down, becomes a secondary form of 
authority. Spiritual practices can be compared to a normative standard of what Christians 
practiced through the centuries.  
Perhaps the Protestant understanding of the canonicity of Scripture is the best 
explanation of how this phenomenon occurs and functions. Believing that Scripture is self-
authenticating, Protestants hold that the church of the first few centuries was able to 
identify Scripture, because existing Scripture had taught it to do so. Kruger (2012:§4018) 
suggests that as early Christians recognised the divine qualities of Scripture (beauty, 
power, and efficacy, and doctrinal, thematic, and structural unity), along with the apostolic 
testimony, they corporately recognised a particular book as part of the canon of Scripture.   
In so doing, the early church recognised a distinction between Scripture as the 
absolute norm of authority, and other sources as important but secondary sources of 
theological authority (such as received tradition or the agreement of councils) that could 
recognise Scriptural authority (Clendenin, 1995:401). Christians who lived generations 
after those of the first four centuries were simultaneously accepting Scripture’s authority 
and the secondary authority of the Christian tradition of the canon. To accept the canon, is 
at the very least, to accept one post-biblical tradition, and to submit to its authority 
(Harmon, 2003:591). 
In a similar, but not identical way, the process of the formation and acceptance of 
the canon has taken place with Christian worship forms, liturgical practices, and spiritual 
disciplines. Where the community understood and practiced the Word, they chose worship 
and devotional forms that best captured and expressed the Word. These forms of liturgy 
  281 
 
and devotional practice have been passed down, and deserve the considered attention of 
those seeking correspondent love. 
Those forms of worship and devotion that have arisen recently, out of a society 
immersed in the narcissism and sentimentalism of popular culture (Hodges, 1995:77) 
deserve careful and discerning scrutiny before being adopted. Modern Christians can still 
reach into the past, before the rise of popular culture, and become familiar with the forms 
of historic Christian culture. Correspondent love is nurtured through those spiritual 
disciplines deeply rooted in historic Christian communities of reverence. 
5) Spiritual disciplines must be reverently responsive to God. Many sections of this study 
have established the importance of humility, reverence, and self-transcendence for the 
apprehension of beauty. Section 7.4.1.1 explored the importance of humble receptivity to 
perceiving beauty. The necessity of unselfish, self-transcending judgement was established 
in 7.4.4. Sections 8.4.2 through 8.4.6 showed that a Christian epistemology requires 
humility, faith, benevolence, humble participation, submission, and indwelling. These all 
speak of reverence and teachable responsiveness. Since Scripture teaches that “The fear of 
the LORD is the beginning of wisdom” (Prov. 9:10) and “the beginning of knowledge” 
(Prov. 1:7), a posture of humble reverence in response to revelation is required to properly 
use a spiritual discipline. Some circularity here is inevitable. The practices of 
correspondent love help nurture, shape, and develop an attitude of consenting, humble 
reverence, but equally, such an attitude of humble reverence is needed to rightly use the 
practices of correspondent love. 
Both in form and in content, these practices must reflect and reinforce the humble, 
receptive, and submissive posture of correspondent love. Both the propositional content, 
and the form used, must teach the attitudes of unselfish surrender, submissive indwelling, 
and self-transcending evaluation. The intellectual aspect of the discipline, as well as the 
literary, poetic or musical form of the discipline must teach the disposition of consenting 
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benevolence, teachable attentiveness, and loving faith: all the attitudes and postures 
revealed in chapter seven and eight. Necessarily then, the form of the practices must 
exclude narcissism, sentimentalism, and other idolatries described in 7.4.4.3. Spiritual 
forms are not enjoyed by man in his natural state (1 Cor. 2:14). If Israel had “naturally” 
enjoyed all its worship forms, why were they perpetually tempted to embrace Canaanite 
forms? Why did they mingle Yahweh worship with Canaanite worship on the high places? 
Perhaps because Canaanite worship, being a religion shaped by man’s desires, was 
accommodating to fleshliness and self-worship.  
Put simply, properly chosen disciplines will communicate both who God is, and 
what he deserves; both what is true of God, and how he is to be loved; what the mind 
should know, and what the heart should love. Correspondent love is nurtured through 
those spiritual disciplines whose form is reverent and lovingly responsive and obedient to 
God. 
Having described the form of the spiritual disciplines, what can one conclude about 
the actual categories and types of spiritual disciplines? 
9.4.5.2. The Categories of the Spiritual Disciplines  
Many spiritual disciplines have been suggested16: private prayer, meditation on the 
Word, memorisation of the Word, wider reading of devotional or theological writers, 
journaling, silence and solitude, fasting, corporate worship, giving, service of others, 
evangelism, and so on.  
This study suggests three major categories of practices: the prescriptive practices of 
corporate worship, the derivative practices of private worship, and the formative practices 
of developmental worship. Why these three? The first two were considered the “means of 
grace” by the first Puritan generation (Spohn, 2003:261). Christian spirituality has long 
                                               
16 For a sampling of the some of the leading contributors to this discussion, see Foster (1989), Whitney (1991), and  
Willard (1988). 
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considered public worship and private worship to be the staple diet of healthy spirituality. 
The third is derived primarily through the Lutheran and Moravian traditions, as will be 
shown below. Each category can also be shown to meet the five criteria of form, given in 
§9.4.5.1 above. 
1. The Prescriptive Practices of Corporate Worship 
The Regulative Principle of Worship states that only what the Word positively 
prescribes to be used in corporate worship should be included (Duncan, 2003:64). The 
prescribed elements of corporate worship are then concluded to be the public reading of 
Scripture, the preaching of Scripture, public prayer, song, the collection, and the 
ordinances. This holds for corporate worship, since that is where the consciences of God’s 
people are bound to the shared practice. Corporate worship stands at the head of all 
practices, because of its powerful shaping influence. Lewis (2012:93) writes in Reflections 
on the Psalms: 
I did not see that it is in the process of being worshipped that God communicates 
His presence to men. It is not of course the only way. But for many people at many 
times the “fair beauty of the Lord” is revealed chiefly or only while they worship 
Him together. Even in Judaism the essence of the sacrifice was not really that men 
gave bulls and goats to God, but that by their so doing God gave Himself to men; 
in the central act of our own worship of course this is far clearer—there it is 
manifestly, even physically, God who gives and we who receive. 
Aniol (2017:97) suggests that “spiritual virtue is shaped by the cultivation of inclinations 
through habitual behavior in community”.  
 The content of corporate worship, should ideally, as Chapell (2009:99) shows, 
display the shape of the gospel: adoration, confession, pardon, thanksgiving, petition, 
instruction, charge, and blessing. Inherent in a gospel-shaped liturgy is the teaching of the 
position of the Christian life: union with God. Eventually, these soteriological ideas point 
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even higher: to the pattern of the Christian life, where the trinitarian, relational, and 
doxological nature of God gives an ultimate explanation.   
Although the elements of corporate worship have been prescribed, the 
circumstances have not. The circumstances refer to the form each of these will take: the 
kind of music, the type of prayers, the length and presentation of the elements, the shape of 
the liturgy, the architecture of the meeting place, and so on. Both these circumstances and 
their form must be judged using the criteria given in §9.4.5.1, such as their reverence and 
rootedness in historic Christian communities. The kind of aesthetic forms that grew in 
communities that were reverently submitted to Scripture are to be considered weightier 
when judging appropriateness than those that developed recently in secularised popular 
culture. 
2. The Derivative Practices of Private Worship 
 Private worship refers to acts of communion performed alone or (where available) 
in solitude. The prescriptions for corporate worship do not necessarily apply when it 
comes to private worship, but the practices of private worship are assumed by example 
(Dan. 6:10; Ps. 1:2; 5:3; Matt. 6:6; Mark 1:35; Eph. 1:16) and commanded in the form of 
principles (Col. 4:2; 1 Thes. 5:17). Private worship derives its practices from corporate 
worship: some form of reading Scripture, meditating on Scripture, praying, or singing 
(which is a form of prayer). Added disciplines such as memorisation of Scripture or 
journaling are really additional ways of meditating on Scripture. Missing from private 
worship are those elements that cannot function in solitude: the Lord’s Supper, baptism, 
and the collection.  
Private worship is a moment for the believer to focus on communion, confession, 
and conformity to Christ, as he or she reads and prays. Here the posture of humility, 
brokenness, and submissive drawing near can be practised.  
Again, the content of private worship will, at some point, teach and emphasise the 
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pattern of correspondent love, as well as the position, revealing the trinitarian, relational, 
God, and his union with his people.  
Similarly, the “circumstances” of private worship are to be judged for their 
reverence in form and content, using the criteria of §9.4.5.1 above. The use of prayer 
books, hymns and Christian poems, catechisms and confessions, the length and kind of 
meditation on Scripture employed, the physical posture adopted, and the use of different 
kinds of prayers are matters for ordinate, reverent judgement.  
3. The Supportive Practices of Developmental Worship 
The supportive practices are those practices that aid in developing the skills, 
judgement, discernment, and aesthetic literacy that support corporate and private worship.  
This study has placed great emphasis on the importance of art to worship. Section 7.2.1. 
listed seven similarities between art and religion. Chapter seven concluded with the words 
of Eliot (1949:29):   
Esthetic sensibility must be extended into spiritual perception, and spiritual 
perception must be extended into esthetic sensibility and disciplined taste before 
we are qualified to pass judgment upon decadence or diabolism or nihilism in art. 
To judge a work of art by artistic or by religious standards, to judge a religion by 
religious or artistic standards should come in the end to the same thing. 
Section 7.4.3 found that the aesthetic mode grasps the whole, not particulars, which makes 
it fundamental to worldview, faith, and worship. If this is true, then fundamental to the 
worship forms used in public and private worship is the aesthetic production and literacy 
of Christians. Christians have not only taught the people they evangelised to read (so as to 
read and comprehend the Word), they have taught them to sing and make poems (“psalms, 
hymns, and spiritual songs”) and tell their stories. Colossians 3:16 and Ephesians 5:19 
imply that Christians are to make music and poems.  
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Is this not arbitrarily privileging aesthetics over theology? Not at all, since the 
propositional content is richly supported in nearly every element of corporate and private 
worship. Instead, there should be an understanding that the cultivation of correct feeling 
will actually preserve sound doctrine. Charles Hodge (1829:92), made this remark:  
Whenever a change occurs in the religious opinions of a community, it is always 
preceded by a change in their religious feelings. The natural expression of the 
feelings of true piety is the doctrines of the Bible. As long as these feelings are 
retained, these doctrines will be retained; but should they be lost, the doctrines are 
either held for form sake or rejected, according to circumstance; and if the feelings 
again be called into life, the doctrines return as a matter of course. 
The arts are not mere embellishments for cognitive and didactic truth; they are formative 
and substantive (Hendricks, 1988:114). They are a transmission of emotional knowledge 
(Scruton, 2007:§94), which becomes all the more important during eras of barbarism (p. 
107). 
Moore (2004:171) asserts, “Love for God, creation, and our fellow human beings 
requires that Christians take seriously the obligation to cultivate theologically informed 
aesthetic taste”. He continues by insisting that aesthetic taste is a discipline, whose practice 
involves daily submitting of ourselves to improving this gift and applying it to life (p.  
172). 
 As chapter seven showed, one cannot worship without art, and one cannot then 
worship intelligently unless some aesthetic literacy is present. Public and private worship 
are hamstrung without aesthetic literacy. Chapter seven and eight rehearsed the historical 
reasons for the split between beauty and cognition. No reversal of the situation can take 
place as long as Christians remain passive consumers of secular aesthetic production, 
rather than active producers of their own.  
The advent of audio and visual recording, and storage and playback technologies 
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have increasingly turned much of the modern population into art consumers, rather than 
producers. The dominance of visual media has diminished the role of poetry and literature. 
A society obsessed with innovation is less interested in history. 
 What aspects of beauty or art should Christians produce? At least two are 
suggested by Ephesians 5:19 and Colossians 3:16: music and poetry (Bauder, 2012:12). A 
third can be implied by the dominance of narrative in Scripture: Christian stories and 
histories. Christians should be hearing, learning, and making music, poetry, and stories 
that reflect the Christian imagination.  
The supportive practices are therefore the repetitive, realised, revelational, 
historically-rooted, and reverent learning and making of Christian art: in particular, music, 
poetry, and story (whether true or fictional).  
 These practices are supportive in the sense that they support and shape the 
prescriptive and descriptive disciplines. They are not themselves prescriptive: it would be 
tenuous to say that Scripture commands all Christians to cultural production in the same 
way that corporate worship is commanded. Smith (2012:478) asserts that “[M]usic and 
singing whilst not of the esse (i.e., essence or being) of the church are vital for the 
beneesse (i.e., the health or well-being) of the church”. 
Some presence of these practices is, however, assumed by Scripture as normative. 
For example, this kind of artistic production is seen in Scripture. Israel was commanded to 
recite their own accounts to the generations to come (Exod. 12:26–27; Ps. 78:1–8). 
Composing songs and poetry was not unusual, but was done in at least the following 
instances:  Moses and Miriam after the Red Sea crossing (Exod. 15:1–21), Moses at the 
end of his life (Deut. 31:22), Deborah and Barak after victory (Judg. 5:1–31), David after 
Saul’s death (2 Sam. 1:18–27), and Mary after the visitation of Gabriel (Luke 1:46–55), to 
name a few instances. 
Christian history has similar examples of this artistic production. The Lutheran 
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tradition is one. Martin Luther wrote:  
We must teach music in schools; a schoolmaster ought to have skill in music, or I 
would not regard him. Neither should we ordain young men as preachers, unless 
they have been well exercised in music (Table Talk, DCCXCIV).  
Luther believed in the doctrine of ethos, which said that “devotion to the principles of 
beauty present in the ontological character of the object directly influences moral or ethical 
development” (Tarry, 1973:358). This sounds like Caldecott (2009:125), who writes that 
“[L]iturgy is a way of being in tune with the motions of the stars, the dance of atomic 
particles, and the harmony of the heavens that resembles a great song”. 
Luther made sure musical training was present in all three divisions of Lutheran 
schooling (Tarry, 1973:362). Music was once part of learning in the monastic schools and 
cathedral schools, a fixed part of the trivium and quadrivium of classical learning 
(Faulkner, 1996:84).  
Similar to the Lutheran tradition, American Moravians wove musical literacy into 
the education of their young. At all four levels of instruction, “nurseries, primary schools, 
academies or seminaries and the ‘choir’ houses of Single Brethren and Sisters”, music was 
integral (Hall, 1981:226). A letter from a twelve-year-old girl attending Bethlehem 
Seminary in 1787 to her brother spoke of her learning to sing, play the guitar, spinet, forte-
piano, and sometimes the organ. The daily schedule included morning and evening prayers 
on the guitar, then breakfast, three hours of grammar, followed by chapel and more 
singing. The afternoon consisted of three hours of needlework, drawing, and music. 
Suppertime was at six, followed by playing on a musical instrument. Bedtime was at eight, 
where the girls were serenaded to sleep by one of the ladies with guitar and voice (p. 230). 
Where and when these supportive practices have waned, corporate and private 
worship have suffered. Lacking these practices on a widespread scale, Christians are cut 
off from a living tradition, and default to the aesthetic production of their surrounding 
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popular culture. Without these supportive practices, Christians lose aesthetic judgement, 
and must borrow the judgements of their leaders, who themselves may be aesthetic 
illiterates. Pieper (1988:35) proposes that the remedy for a diminished capacity to see 
reality as God sees it is “to be active oneself in artistic creation, producing shapes and 
forms for the eye to see”. Wolfe (2011:46) argues that unless there exists a vibrant 
Christian humanism—Christians giving themselves to the creation and conservation of 
those aspects of knowledge called the humanities—it will impoverish the world itself. 
As artistic production ceases, the choices for circumstances of worship are cast 
upon an evil choice: to seek to repristinate fossilised ancient practices, or to attempt to 
“Christianise” artistic forms foreign to historic Christianity and lacking in reverence.  
 Christians steeped in these supportive practices develop aesthetic judgement, 
gaining the skill not only to worship more meaningfully, but better to judge the 
circumstances of corporate and private worship. When a large groundswell of Christians 
standing on the shoulders of their tradition are making music and poetry, emerging from 
the mass will be a few works of high excellence, that enter into the worship of the church 
universal. 
 How should Christians determine the “circumstances” of these elements of learning 
and making music, poetry, and narratives? That is, what should be learned? What has 
already been established in this study is a good guide:  
• whatever Christian art aids humble receptivity (see §7.4.1.1) 
• whatever Christian art informs a Christian imagination (see §7.4.3.3). 
• whatever Christian art strengthens self-transcending taste (see §7.4.4.4). 
By what standard should the art be judged? Some of the standards of 7.4.4.2 could 
be enlisted. Furthermore, returning to the discussion of parallels with canonicity, 
Christians shaped by the Word are increasingly adept at recognising Word-shaped art. 
Christians shaped by the aesthetic qualities of Scripture, incarnated in Christian history are 
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increasingly adept at recognising and shaping imitative forms of those Scriptural forms. If 
they are familiar with the Christian tradition, they can better spot continuity and 
conformity in historical Christian practices to the aesthetics of Scripture. Christians must 
go beyond a narrow focus on the propositional content of the forms they use and begin 
parsing the intrinsic meaning of the form chosen, whether it shapes the desires towards 
order or disorder, moderation or immoderation, reason or passion (Holloway, 2001:162). 
 The prescribed practices of corporate worship, the derived practices of private 
worship, and the supportive practices of developmental worship find their support in 
Scripture and Christian history. When chastened by the five suggested guidelines for form, 
these practices will nurture and cultivate correspondent love.  
This model is now summarised. 
9.4.6. The Model Considered Comprehensively 
 The model of Christian spirituality presented has been one that pursues 
correspondent love, since correspondent love is the means to perceive the beauty of God, 
and that reflects such love back to God and others. Since love has been defined in this 
study as desire, and since desires cannot be willed directly, the model reflects the way that 
correspondent desire for God can be shaped or cultivated. Cultivating desire was suggested 
to be a combination of shaping imagination (the pattern), possessing a new nature (the 
position), experiencing exposure (the process), and continual nurture (the practices) (see 
the discussion under 9.4.1). 
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Figure 2: The Model Considered Comprehensively 
 
 At the centre of the model is the gospel-shaped process, where communion with 
God (directly or indirectly) consists of loving God ultimately, loving what God loves, and 
loving expansively in fullness of joy. When convicted of wrong loves, the believer 
confesses, is cleansed, and comes to a greater conformity to Christ, which is a greater 
conformity to God’s loves. Hosting this process is the position. The position provides the 
basis for this process of communion: the believer’s union with Christ, and the consequent 
new heart and spiritual illumination.  
 Though each element in the model is reciprocally supportive and strengthening of 
the other, the pattern and the practices stand apart as fundamental for the process taking 
place, supporting it from below, through nurturing practices, and from above, through the 
pattern of a Christian imagination. Apart from the correct pattern of reality shaping the 
Christian’s imagination, correspondent love is impossible.  
This imagination is shaped primarily through the practices of the Christian life, be 
they corporate worship, private worship, or the supportive practices of developmental 
worship. The pattern and the practices, therefore, not only shape each other, but are the 
twin supports for the process of the correspondent love and its host, the position and the 
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posture. Each depends on the others, but the model is centred in the process, supported by 
the position, and is motivated and energised through the pattern and practices. 
9.5. Conclusion  
 This chapter has sought to combine the research of the previous chapters into a 
model of Christian spirituality, which has perceiving God's beauty at its heart.  
 It began by reviewing the research on the nature of God’s beauty. It found that the 
best definition of God’s beauty was God’s own love for himself, his dynamic self-
appraisal, and joyful gifting of himself.  
 The research on perceiving this beauty was then reviewed. The biblical, historical, 
aesthetic, and epistemological studies revealed that perception of beauty is allied to moral 
qualities in the perceiver: humility, faith/imagination, and sound judgement. This 
amounted to the attribute of love: a love that would correspond, in creaturely terms, to 
God’s own love in degree and kind. The term correspondent love was used to define and 
describe this kind of love.  
 Correspondent love was then examined along four lines. Philosophically, love was 
distinguished from the contemporary term emotion, and found to be the inclination of the 
will towards union. Biblically, correspondent love was defined as loving God ultimately, 
loving what God loves, and experiencing an expansive fullness of joy in lived communion 
with God. Historically, correspondent love was found in several writers. Aesthetically, the 
opposite notions of good taste and sentimentalism find exact parallels in the idea of 
correspondent love and its opposite, inordinate, or non-correspondent love. Correspondent 
love was found to be an established and viable concept. A model of Christian spirituality 
was then suggested: one that pursues correspondent love in the believer.  
 The difficulty found in such a model was then faced: love is a desire, and the will is 
actually a human’s strongest desire. It cannot be willed directly; it must be shaped. The 
research had thus far shown the importance of the imagination to cultivating desire, the 
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essentiality of a new nature for cultivating desire for God, the necessity of experiential 
exposure to cultivate desire, and the fundamental importance of habitual practices to in 
nurturing desire. In light of these, a model was then outlined having four aspects: the 
pattern of correspondent love, the position of correspondent love, the process of 
correspondent love, and the practices of correspondent love.  
 The pattern of correspondent love was suggested to be the Christian metaphysical 
“dream” or imagination. Drawing on Edwards’ view that beauty is being’s consent to 
being, the Christian imagination was identified as an imagination that views reality as 
trinitarian, personal, and doxological. 
 The position for correspondent love was found to be one in which the believer is in 
God’s presence and experiences spiritual illumination. This was the position that 
regeneration grants, as Edwards showed. This position is the believer’s positional union 
with Christ. 
 The process was understood to be the very experience of loving God 
correspondently, in which communion with God is experienced through the three forms of 
love, experienced in any life circumstance. A gospel-shaped cycle of conviction, 
confession, cleansing, and conformity was suggested as the cycle that takes communion 
from one degree of closeness to the next.   
 The practices of ordinate love were described as those repetitive, realised, 
revelational, historically rooted, and reverently responsive spiritual disciplines that would 
unite and form the other three aspects of the model. Both in form and content, these 
practices were asserted to be the concentrated exercises of correspondent love that would 
shape it for all of life. Three forms were considered: those prescribed for corporate 
worship, those derived from corporate worship to be used in private worship, and those 
supportive of developing the Christian imagination and aesthetic forms to be used in 
corporate worship. 
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 Finally, the model was considered as a whole. The model was summarised as 
follows: the process lies at the centre, with the position hosting it, while the pattern and 
practices are what support it from below and sustain it from above.  
This completed the presentation of a model of Christian spirituality in which the 
goal is the perception of God’s beauty through ordinate love. 
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Chapter 10. Conclusion 
 
This study has sought to answer the question, what would the nature be of an 
Evangelical Protestant Christian spirituality predicated upon seeking and finding God’s 
beauty in the spirituality’s priorities, postures, and practices? 
 It began by pointing to the return of the idea of beauty in academia, alongside an 
ironic resistance to beauty. The relevance of beauty to Christian spirituality was 
considered.  
 A definition of beauty was then sought. Chapter two examined the classical 
definitions, the transcendental definitions, the subjective definitions, and the theological 
definitions. Jonathan Edwards’ definition was chosen for its ability to harmonise with each 
of these theories, and yet remain mostly theological. His definition was “being’s cordial 
consent to being in general” (WJEO, 8:620), which is to say, God’s love for himself and 
all that reflects him. 
 A literature survey revealed the lacunae: a model of spirituality predicated upon 
apprehending God’s beauty. The research question was defined in chapter four, and the 
methodology set out in chapter five.  
 Chapter six studied God’s beauty as an objective notion. Scripture’s vocabulary 
showed the concept of divine beauty to be clearly present in the Bible. Christian 
intellectual history from premodern times until the Enlightenment demonstrated a belief in 
God as objectively beautiful. After this period, existentialism began to subjectivise the 
idea. Again, Edwards’ solution seemed the most tenable for reconciling objective and 
subjective notions of beauty. 
 Chapter seven considered the subjective apprehension of beauty by considering the 
methodology employed in art. After establishing art and religion as parallel endeavours, 
the chapter studied the four parts of the aesthetic experience: perception, immediate 
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response, interpretation, and evaluation. Spirituality equivalents were found in the ideas of 
humility, faith, and wise discernment.  
 The epistemological dichotomy between subject and object was the study of 
chapter eight. It was found that the dichotomy between subject and object is an 
Enlightenment innovation. Christians should consider carefully whether using this 
language is helpful to communicating Christian ideals, or whether it gives credence to 
false ideas. One might even suggest that the title of this study could alternatively be 
“God’s Real Beauty and Its Participative Apprehension in Christian Spirituality”. Having 
said that, the terms subjective and objective are, for the time being, here to stay, and this 
paper deals with that reality.  
After outlining the history of the problem, chapter eight considered models of truth 
for transcendentals such as beauty. Out of four models, two models (correspondence 
theory and disclosure theory) provided a method for obtaining contact between perceiving 
subjects and God’s beauty. Four approaches to this metaphysical realism were considered 
in the works of Augustine and Blaise Pascal, Jonathan Edwards, Owen Barfield and C. S. 
Lewis, and Michael Polanyi. Again, approaches such as humility, faith, personal 
commitment, and union were found to be necessary to obtain correspondence between 
subject and object.  
 In chapter nine, the insights from the previous chapters were combined in a series 
of five steps. First, God’s beauty as a real property was defined as God’s love. Second, the 
apprehension of this love was found to be in the subject’s love. Third, this love was 
understood to be a love that corresponded to God’s love, albeit in creaturely form. As a 
fourth step, the idea of correspondent love was then examined philosophically, biblically, 
historically, and aesthetically, and found to be a tenable, justifiable idea. Fifth, since love 
had been shown to be a desire, the chapter showed that it is necessary that such love be 
cultivated, since love cannot simply be willed into being.  
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 In pursuit of the cultivation of such correspondent love, the study then drew upon 
the findings of the previous chapters, along with Scripture. Four areas of cultivation were 
suggested: imagination, nature, exposure, and nurture.  
 Imagination, or the pattern of the Christian life, was to be patterned after Edwards’ 
definition of beauty: a trinitarian, personal, and doxological view of God and the world. 
 Nature, or the position of the Christian life, was shown to be union with Christ, 
which provided the divine disclosure of God’s beauty, and the permission, prompting, and 
power to love God.  
 Exposure, or the process of the Christian life, was proposed as a gospel-shaped 
cycle of communion and consecration, conviction and confession, and cleansing and 
conformity to Christ. In this communion, the believer loves God ultimately, loves what 
God loves, and loves expansively in fullness of joy. The dispositions of humility, 
brokenness, and submissive drawing near were seen fundamental to this experiential union 
with God. 
 Nurture, or the practices of the Christian life, were suggested to be the prescriptive 
practices of corporate worship, the derivative practices of private worship, and the 
supportive practices of developmental worship. Based upon the research of the previous 
chapters, it was suggested that the form of these practices ought to be repetitive, realised, 
revelational, rooted in historic Christianity, and reverently responsive. 
 These four sections of the model were combined and related to one another as a 
model for cultivating correspondent love for God. 
 Further scholarly pursuit of this subject might take up several questions. One, 
studying Edwards’ definition as a unifier and harmoniser of other theories of beauty could 
be a fruitful question. More extended reflection on disordered love, and particularly on 
sentimentalism and kitsch within Christian worship, would be helpful. Further work on 
differentiating love from emotion, and understanding some of the older taxonomies of 
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affections and passions, may be a fruitful avenue of research. Combining the 
epistemologies of the six realists of chapter eight, along with similar thinkers, into a 
sustained postmodern Christian realist epistemology would be an immense but edifying 
project. 
 Within spirituality, exploring how a trinitarian imagination could be cultivated 
would be an important study. Certainly the topic of supportive practices of developmental 
worship needs more exploration and elaboration. The question of how canonicity relates to 
the worship tradition is a needed area of research, particularly for Evangelical Protestants. 
 It is hoped that this study has fruitfully added to the field of Christian spirituality 
by investigating the nature of God’s beauty as a pursuit in Christian spirituality and by 
positing a model for that pursuit. 
 God’s beauty is God’s perfect desire for himself. The spiritual beauty of Christians 
is their answering desire for God. God’s love is his beauty, and love for God is the 
experience and apprehension of this beauty. This love is developed in four ways: through 
the implantation of a new nature, the cultivation of a profoundly Christian imagination, the 
regular practice of direct and indirect communion with God, and the repetitive use of 
spiritual disciplines that shape and develop the Christian’s sense and experience of the 
other three. This is the nature of an Evangelical Protestant Christian spirituality predicated 
upon seeking and finding God’s beauty. 
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Appendix A 
Verse references follow for the Hebrew and Greek words for beauty in Scripture.  
 
 Old Testament 
ybic., 31 times in 30 verses, 5 forms: Deut. 12:15, 22; 14:5; 15:22; 2 Sam. 1:19; 2:18; 1 
Kgs. 5:3; 1 Chr. 12:9; Prov. 6:5; Cant. 2:9, 17; 8:14; Isa. 4:2; 13:14, 19; 23:9; 24:16; 28:1, 
4–5; Jer. 3:19; Ezek. 7:20; 20:6, 15; 25:9; 26:20; Dan. 8:9; 11:16, 41, 45. 
rap,  21 times in 20 verses, 14 forms: Exod. 8:5; 39:28; Deut. 24:20; Jdg. 7:2; Ezr. 7:27; 
Ps. 149:4; Isa. 3:20; 10:15; 44:23; 49:3; 55:5; 60:7, 9, 13, 21; 61:3, 10; Ezek. 24:17, 23; 
44:18. 
tr,aep.ti  49 times in 48 verses, 10 forms: Exod. 28:2, 40; Deut. 26:19; Jdg. 4:9; 1 Chr. 
22:5; 29:11, 13; 2 Chr. 3:6; Est. 1:4; Ps. 71:8; 78:61; 89:18; 96:6; Prov. 4:9; 16:31; 17:6; 
19:11; 20:29; 28:12; Isa. 3:18; 4:2; 10:12; 13:19; 20:5; 28:1, 4; 44:13; 46:13; 52:1; 60:7, 
19; 62:3; 63:12, 14–15; 64:10; Jer. 13:11, 18, 20; 33:9; Lam. 2:1; Ezek. 16:12, 17, 39; 
23:26, 42; 24:25; Zech. 12:7. 
dmoh.,  27 times in 26 verses, 15 forms: Gen. 2:9; 3:6; Exod. 20:17; 34:24; Deut. 5:21; 7:25; 
Jos. 7:21; Job 20:20; Ps. 19:11; 39:12; 68:17; Prov. 1:22; 6:25; 12:12; 21:20; Cant. 2:3; 
Isa. 1:29; 27:2; 32:12; 44:9; 53:2; Ezek. 23:6, 12, 23; Amos 5:11; Mic. 2:2. 
dmoh.,   (noun) 16 times in 16 verses, 5 forms 1 Sam. 9:20; 2 Chr. 21:20; 32:27; 36:10; Ps. 
106:24; Isa. 2:16; Jer. 3:19; 12:10; 25:34; Ezek. 26:12; Dan. 11:8, 37; Hos. 13:15; Nah. 
2:10; Hag. 2:7; Zech. 7:14. 
Hpey, 50 times in 46 verses, 14 forms: Gen. 12:11, 14; 29:17; 39:6; 41:2, 4, 18; Deut. 21:11; 
1 Sam. 16:12; 17:42; 25:3; 2 Sam. 13:1; 14:25, 27; 1 Kgs. 1:3–4; Est. 2:7; Job 42:15; Ps. 
45:3; 48:3; Prov. 11:22; Eccl. 3:11; 5:17; Cant. 1:8, 15–16; 2:10, 13; 4:1, 7, 10; 5:9; 6:1, 4, 
10; 7:2, 7; Jer. 4:30; 10:4; 11:16; Ezek. 16:13; 31:3, 7, 9; 33:32; Amos 8:13. 
ypiy\  19 times in 19 verses, 6 forms: Est. 1:11; Ps. 45:12; 50:2; Prov. 6:25; 31:30; Isa. 3:24; 
33:17; Lam. 2:15; Ezek. 16:14–15, 25; 27:3–4, 11; 28:7, 12, 17; 31:8; Zech. 9:17. 
Hw,an’, 10 times in 10 verses, 2 forms: Ps. 33:1; 147:1; Prov. 17:7; 19:10; 26:1; Cant. 1:5; 
2:14; 4:3; 6:4; Jer. 6:2. 
han  3 times in 3 verses, 2 forms: Ps. 93:5; Cant. 1:10; Isa. 52:7. 
~[n 16 times in 16 verses, 8 forms: Gen. 49:15; 2 Sam. 1:26; 1 Chr. 4:15; Ps. 27:4; 90:17; 
141:6; Prov. 2:10; 3:17; 9:17; 15:26; 16:24; 24:25; Cant. 7:7; Ezek. 32:19; Zech. 11:7, 10. 
~y[in’ 13 times in 13 verses, 4 forms: 2 Sam. 1:23; 23:1; Job 36:11; Ps. 16:6, 11; 81:3; 
133:1; 135:3; 147:1; Prov. 22:18; 23:8; 24:4; Cant. 1:16. 
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Rd;h],  38 times in 37 verses, 13 forms: Gen. 36:39; Exod. 23:3; Lev. 19:15, 32; 23:40; 
Deut. 33:17; 1 Chr. 16:27; Job 40:10; Ps. 8:6; 21:6; 29:4; 45:4–5; 90:16; 96:6; 104:1; 
110:3; 111:3; 145:5, 12; 149:9; Prov. 20:29; 25:6; 31:25; Isa. 2:10, 19, 21; 5:14; 35:2; 
53:2; 63:1; Lam. 1:6; 5:12; Ezek. 16:14; 27:10; Dan. 11:20; Mic. 2:9. 
bAj, 553 times in 520 verses, 31 forms: Gen. 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31; 2:9, 12, 17–18; 
3:5–6, 22; 6:2; 15:15; 16:6; 18:7; 19:8; 20:15; 24:10, 16, 50; 25:8; 26:7, 29; 27:9; 29:19; 
30:20; 31:24, 29; 40:16; 41:5, 22, 24, 26, 35; 45:18, 20, 23; 49:15; Exod. 2:2; 3:8; 14:12; 
18:17; 33:19; Lev. 27:10, 12, 14, 33; Num. 10:29, 32; 11:18; 13:19; 14:3, 7; 24:1, 5; 36:6; 
Deut. 1:14, 25, 35, 39; 3:25; 4:21–22; 5:33; 6:10–11, 18, 24; 8:7, 10, 12; 9:6; 10:13; 11:17; 
12:28; 15:16; 19:13; 23:17; 26:11; 28:12, 47; 30:9, 15; Jos. 7:21; 9:25; 21:45; 23:13–16; 
Jdg. 8:2, 32; 9:2, 11; 10:15; 11:3, 5, 25; 15:2; 16:25; 18:9, 19; 19:24; Ruth 2:22; 3:13; 
4:15; 1 Sam. 1:8, 23; 2:24, 26; 3:18; 8:14, 16; 9:2, 10; 11:10; 14:36, 40; 15:9, 22, 28; 
16:12, 16, 23; 19:4; 20:7, 12; 25:3, 8, 15, 36; 26:16; 27:1; 29:6, 9; 2 Sam. 3:13, 19, 36; 
10:6, 8, 12; 11:2; 13:22, 28; 14:17, 32; 15:3, 26; 17:7, 14; 18:3, 27; 19:19, 28, 36, 38–39; 
24:22; 1 Kgs. 1:6, 42; 2:18, 32, 38, 42; 3:9; 8:18, 36, 56, 66; 10:7; 12:7; 14:13, 15; 18:24; 
19:4; 20:3; 21:2; 22:8, 13, 18; 2 Ki. 2:19; 3:19, 25; 5:12; 8:9; 10:3, 5, 30; 20:3, 13, 19; 1 
Chr. 4:40; 13:2; 16:34; 19:13; 21:23; 28:8; 29:28; 2 Chr. 3:5, 8; 5:13; 6:8, 27, 41; 7:3, 10; 
10:7; 12:12; 14:1; 18:12, 17; 19:3, 11; 21:13; 30:18, 22; 31:20; Ezr. 3:11; 7:9; 8:18, 27; 
9:12; Neh. 2:5, 7–8, 18; 5:9; 9:13, 20, 25, 35–36; Est. 1:10–11, 19; 2:2–3, 7, 9; 3:9, 11; 
5:4, 8–9; 7:3, 9; 8:5, 8, 17; 9:13, 19, 22; 10:3; Job 2:10; 7:7; 10:3; 13:9; 20:21; 21:13, 16; 
22:18; 30:26; 34:4; 36:11; Ps. 4:7; 14:1, 3; 21:4; 23:6; 25:7–8, 13; 27:13; 31:20; 34:9, 11, 
13, 15; 36:5; 37:3, 16, 27; 38:21; 39:3; 45:2; 52:5, 11; 53:2, 4; 54:8; 63:4; 65:5; 69:17; 
73:1, 28; 84:11–12; 85:13; 86:5; 92:2; 100:5; 103:5; 104:28; 106:1; 107:1, 9; 109:21; 
111:10; 112:5; 118:1, 8–9, 29; 119:39, 65–66, 68, 71–72, 122; 122:9; 125:4; 128:2, 5; 
133:1–2; 135:3; 136:1; 143:10; 145:7, 9; 147:1; Prov. 2:9, 20; 3:4, 14, 27; 4:2; 8:11, 19; 
11:10, 23, 27; 12:2, 9, 14, 25; 13:2, 15, 21–22; 14:14, 19, 22; 15:3, 15–17, 23, 30; 16:8, 
16, 19–20, 29, 32; 17:1, 20, 26; 18:5, 22; 19:1–2, 8, 22; 20:23; 21:9, 19; 22:1, 9; 24:13, 23, 
25; 25:7, 24–25, 27; 27:5, 10; 28:6, 10, 21; 31:12, 18; Eccl. 2:1, 3, 24, 26; 3:12–13, 22; 
4:3, 6, 9, 13; 5:4, 17; 6:3, 9, 12; 7:1–3, 5, 8, 10–11, 14, 18, 20, 26; 8:12–13, 15; 9:2, 4, 7, 
16, 18; 11:6–7; 12:14; Cant. 1:2–3; 4:10; 7:10; Isa. 1:19; 3:10; 5:9, 20; 7:15–16; 38:3; 
39:2, 8; 41:7; 52:7; 55:2; 56:5; 63:7; 65:2, 14; Jer. 2:7; 5:25; 6:16, 20; 8:15; 14:19; 15:11; 
17:6; 22:15–16; 24:2–3, 5; 26:14; 29:10, 32; 31:12, 14; 32:39; 33:11, 14; 40:4; 42:6; 
44:17; Lam. 3:25–27, 38; 4:1, 9; Ezek. 17:8; 18:18; 20:25; 24:4; 31:16; 34:14, 18; 36:31; 
Dan. 1:4, 15; Hos. 2:9; 3:5; 4:13; 8:3; 10:1, 11; 14:3; Joel 4:5; Amos 5:14–15; 6:2; Jon. 
4:3, 8; Mic. 1:12; 3:2; 6:8; 7:4; Nah. 1:7; 3:4; Zech. 1:13, 17; 8:19; 9:17; 11:12; Mal. 2:17. 
DabK', 200 times in 189 verses, 10 forms: Gen. 31:1; 45:13; 49:6; Exod. 16:7, 10; 24:16–
17; 28:2, 40; 29:43; 33:18, 22; 40:34–35; Lev. 9:6, 23; Num. 14:10, 21–22; 16:19; 17:7; 
20:6; 24:11; Deut. 5:24; Jos. 7:19; 1 Sam. 2:8; 4:21–22; 6:5; 1 Kgs. 3:13; 8:11; 1 Chr. 
16:24, 28–29; 17:18; 29:12, 28; 2 Chr. 1:11–12; 5:14; 7:1–3; 17:5; 18:1; 26:18; 32:27, 33; 
Neh. 9:5; Est. 1:4; 5:11; Job 19:9; 29:20; Ps. 3:4; 4:3; 7:6; 8:6; 16:9; 19:2; 21:6; 24:7–10; 
26:8; 29:1–3, 9; 30:13; 49:17–18; 57:6, 9, 12; 62:8; 63:3; 66:2; 72:19; 73:24; 79:9; 84:12; 
85:10; 96:3, 7–8; 97:6; 102:16–17; 104:31; 106:20; 108:2, 6; 112:9; 113:4; 115:1; 138:5; 
145:5, 11–12; 149:5; Prov. 3:16, 35; 8:18; 11:16; 15:33; 18:12; 20:3; 21:21; 22:4; 25:2, 
27; 26:1, 8; 29:23; Eccl. 6:2; 10:1; Isa. 3:8; 4:2, 5; 5:13; 6:3; 8:7; 10:3, 16, 18; 11:10; 
14:18; 16:14; 17:3–4; 21:16; 22:18, 23–24; 24:23; 35:2; 40:5; 42:8, 12; 43:7; 48:11; 58:8; 
59:19; 60:1–2, 13; 61:6; 62:2; 66:11–12, 18–19; Jer. 2:11; 13:16; 14:21; 17:12; 48:18; 
Ezek. 1:28; 3:12, 23; 8:4; 9:3; 10:4, 18–19; 11:22–23; 31:18; 39:21; 43:2, 4–5; 44:4; Dan. 
11:39; Hos. 4:7; 9:11; 10:5; Mic. 1:15; Nah. 2:10; Hab. 2:14, 16; Hag. 2:3, 7, 9; Zech. 2:9, 
12; Mal. 1:6; 2:2. 
  301 
 
hw’n’, occurring once in Exodus 15:2. 
ha,r.m;, 116 times in 93 verses, 15 forms: Gen. 2:9; 12:11; 24:16; 26:7; 29:17; 39:6; 41:2–4, 
21; 46:2; Exod. 3:3; 24:17; 38:8; Lev. 1:16; 13:3–4, 12, 20, 25, 30–32, 34, 43; 14:37; 
Num. 8:4; 9:15–16; 12:6, 8; Deut. 28:34, 67; Jos. 22:10; Jdg. 13:6; 1 Sam. 3:15; 16:7; 
17:42; 2 Sam. 11:2; 14:27; 23:21; Est. 1:11; 2:2–3, 7; Job 4:16; 41:1; Eccl. 6:9; 11:9; Cant. 
2:14; 5:15; Isa. 11:3; 52:14; 53:2; Ezek. 1:1, 5, 13–14, 16, 26–28; 8:2–4; 10:1, 9–10, 22; 
11:24; 23:15–16; 40:2–3; 41:21; 42:11; 43:3; Dan. 1:4, 13, 15; 8:15–16, 26–27; 9:23; 10:1, 
6–8, 16, 18; Joel 2:4; Nah. 2:5. 
Rp,v,  4 times in 4 verses, in 3 forms: Gen. 49:21; Num. 33:23–24; Ps. 16:6. 
New Testament 
ἀstei/oj two times in two verses, in two forms: Acts 7:20; Heb. 11:23. 
do,xa, occurring one hundred and sixty-eight times in one hundred and fifty-one verses, in 
five forms: Matt. 4:8; 6:13, 29; 16:27; 19:28; 24:30; 25:31; Mark 8:38; 10:37; 13:26; Luke 
2:9, 14, 32; 4:6; 9:26, 31–32; 12:27; 14:10; 17:18; 19:38; 21:27; 24:26; John 1:14; 2:11; 
5:41, 44; 7:18; 8:50, 54; 9:24; 11:4, 40; 12:41, 43; 17:5, 22, 24; Acts 7:2, 55; 12:23; 22:11; 
Rom. 1:23; 2:7, 10; 3:7, 23; 4:20; 5:2; 6:4; 8:18, 21; 9:4, 23; 11:36; 14:26; 15:7; 1 Cor. 
2:7–8; 10:31; 11:7, 15; 15:40–41, 43; 2 Cor. 1:20; 3:7–11, 18; 4:4, 6, 15, 17; 6:8; 8:19, 23; 
Gal. 1:5; Eph. 1:6, 12, 14, 17–18; 3:13, 16, 21; Phil. 1:11; 2:11; 3:19, 21; 4:19–20; Col. 
1:11, 27; 3:4; 1 Thess. 2:6, 12, 20; 2 Thess. 1:9; 2:14; 1 Tim. 1:11, 17; 3:16; 2 Tim. 2:10; 
4:18; Tit. 2:13; Heb. 1:3; 2:7, 9–10; 3:3; 9:5; 13:21; Jas. 2:1; 1 Pet. 1:7, 11, 21, 24; 4:11, 
13–14; 5:1, 4, 10–11; 2 Pet. 1:3, 17; 2:10; 3:18; Jude 1:8, 24–25; Rev. 1:6; 4:9, 11; 5:12–
13; 7:12; 11:13; 14:7; 15:8; 16:9; 18:1; 19:1, 7; 21:11, 23–24, 26. 
euvpre,peia,, one time in one verse, in one form: Jas. 1:11. 
kalo.j one hundred and one times in ninety verses, in sixteen forms: Matt. 3:10; 5:16; 
7:17–19; 12:33; 13:8, 23–24, 27, 37–38, 45, 48; 15:26; 17:4; 18:8–9; 26:10, 24; Mark 4:8, 
20; 7:27; 9:5, 42–43, 45, 47, 50; 14:6, 21; Luke 3:9; 6:38, 43; 8:15; 9:33; 14:34; 21:5; John 
2:10; 10:11, 14, 32–33; Acts 27:8; Rom. 7:16, 18, 21; 12:17; 14:21; 1 Cor. 5:6; 7:1, 8, 26; 
9:15; 2 Cor. 8:21; 13:7; Gal. 4:18; 6:9; 1 Thess. 5:21; 1 Tim. 1:8, 18; 2:3; 3:1, 7, 13; 4:4, 
6; 5:10, 25; 6:12–13, 18–19; 2 Tim. 1:14; 2:3; 4:7; Tit. 2:7, 14; 3:8, 14; Heb. 5:14; 6:5; 
10:24; 13:9, 18; Jas. 2:7; 3:13; 4:17; 1 Pet. 2:12; 4:10. 
kosme,w occurring ten times in ten verses, in nine forms: Matt. 12:44; 23:29; 25:7; Luke 
11:25; 21:5; 1 Tim. 2:9; Tit. 2:10; 1 Pet. 3:5; Rev. 21:2, 19. 
megaloprepou/j one time in one verse, in one form: 2 Pet 1:17. 
prosfilh,j one times in one verse, in one form: Phil 4:8. 
fai,nomai Thirty-one times in thirty-one verses, in nineteen forms: Matt. 1:20; 2:7, 13, 19; 
6:5, 16, 18; 9:33; 13:26; 23:27–28; 24:27, 30; Mark 14:64; 16:9; Luke 9:8; 24:11; John 
1:5; 5:35; Rom. 7:13; 2 Cor. 13:7; Phil. 2:15; Heb. 11:3; Jas. 4:14; 1 Pet. 4:18; 2 Pet. 1:19; 
1 John 2:8; Rev. 1:16; 8:12; 18:23; 21:23. 
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w`rai/oj occurring four times in four verses, in three forms: Matt. 23:27; Acts 3:2, 10; Rom. 
10:15. 
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